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boy during the mid-1990s in one of the refugee camps across the Malian borders. These 
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Up until that time the D’regs, a collection of cheerfully warlike nomadic tribes, 
had roamed the desert quite freely. Now there was a line, they were sometimes 
Klatchian D’regs and sometimes Hershebian D’regs, with all the rights due to 
citizens of both states, particularly the right to pay as much tax as could be 
squeezed out of them and be drafted in to fight wars against people they’d never 
heard of. So as a result of the dotted line Klatch was now incipiently at war 
with Hersheba and the D’regs, Hersheba was at war with the D’regs and 
Klatch, and the D'regs were at war with everyone, including one another, and 
having considerable fun because the D’reg word for ‘stranger’ was the same as 
for ‘target’. 
 
Terry Pratchett, Soul Music 
 
 
 
This is no affair for a boy who says he studied history and pretends to know 
 
Cheick ag Aoussa, F-16 
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On terminology, spelling and pronunciation 
 
 
 
 
This history focuses mainly on Kel Tamasheq and ‘Malian’ views of the world. 
In such an enterprise, it is hard to do justice to the complexity of the concepts 
presented while keeping the text easily readable at the same time. The use of 
some Tamasheq concepts is inevitable. I have used the terms and expressions as 
they are used in the Adagh, as this is the main site of this history. Hence 
Tamasheq instead of Tamahak; eghewid instead of tagelmust; and ndêk instead 
of ma imoos. I have not wanted to bother the reader with diacritical marks, 
using a very light and therefore rough transcription, but as the pronunciation of 
a number of vowels and consonants differs from dialect to dialect (especially h, 
j, s, t and z), and even within dialects, the average reader can do without and 
still grasp what is meant. Pronunciation of the transcription follows below. 
Nevertheless, I feel I owe my sincere apologies to the linguistically trained 
reader. 
When it comes to the translation of French administrative terminology and 
Tamasheq concepts, I have been rather eclectic, translating those that could be 
easily and correctly translated, while those for which translation would mean 
loss of meaning have been left untranslated. Hence: Governor or Governor 
General instead of Gouverneur, but Commandant de Cercle instead of District 
Commissioner, and (most of the time): tribal chief instead of Chef de Tribu (and 
then in analogy fraction chief instead of Chef de Fraction). While tewsit can be 
translated into clan or tribe (and the appropriate term has of course been used in 
context), egha is too complicated to translate. I have used the term Soudan 
Français to indicate the former French colony and reserved Mali for the 
present-day Republic of Mali. The Mali Empire and the Mali federation are 
indicated as such. Région stands for the administrative unit (there are currently 
eight Régions in Mali), whereas region should be read as in English. 
Writing a history of a place as unmapped as northern Mali involves great 
difficulty in spelling. There exist a variety of topographical spellings for Tama-
sheq place names. I have used the English spelling for those few places for 
which it exists, such as Bamako, Timbuktu and Segu. For many others I have 
used the most current spelling, used on the latest official map of the Republic of 
Mali, and on Google Maps. Many Tamasheq place names start with /In/ or /Tin/ 
followed by a noun, for example Tin Essako, or In Ekker. This is currently 
spelled as /I-n-/ or /T-in-/, but in many works and on other maps, these names 
can be spelled as /In-/, /In / or simply /In/, hence Ti-n-Essako can be found as 
Tin Essako, Tin-Essako, or Tinessako. The same problem arises with proper 
 xiii 
names, which I have found in many different spellings. I have used one spelling 
throughout the text, in keeping with French spelling. Thus: Mohamed instead of 
Muhammad. 
I have chosen to translate all quotes to English, including citations of pub-
lished works. Unless indicated, all translations to English are mine. My limited 
linguistic capacities, combined with the linguistic limits of the authors (often 
not more than primary education), and the particular idiom used (Marxist or 
other revolutionary rhetoric) does not always make an easy reading, which 
cannot be changed however, without dealing too freely with the original text. 
 
a short 
â long open 
e short, as ∂ (shwa) 
ê long open 
é long open 
i short 
î long open 
ou as in French ou 
u as in French ou 
ue as e in English get 
g as g in English get 
gh as the Parisian r 
j as in French jeu 
kh as the Dutch g 
q as the Arabic qaf (glottal k) 
r as the Scottish rolling r 
sh as in English ship 
th as in English the 
‘ ‘ain and hamza both pronounced as in Cockney bottle  
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French or Tamasheq when  not indicated, Arabic: (Ar.), Songhay: (Son.), Bam-
bara (Bam.) masculin singular: (m.s.) masculin plural: (m.pl.) feminin singular 
(f.pl.) feminin plural (f.pl.). 
 
 
aboubash (m.s.) iboubashen (m.pl.)  
tababasht (f.s.) tiboubashen (f.pl.) cross cousins 
Adagh mountain area in Northern Mali 
ag (m.s.), ouled (f.s.) son of, daughter of 
aggiw (m.s) aggiwin (m.pl.) praise singer 
‘aid al-’adhâ (Ar.) feast of the sacrifice 
‘aid al-fitr (Ar.) celebration at the end of  
 Ramadan 
akafal warfare without rules 
akal earth, ground, country, territory 
alasho indigo cloth from Kano 
alesel ancestor 
alfaqiten (m.pl.) specialists in Muslim law 
Alfellaga first Tamasheq rebellion in  
 Mali 
amashegh (m.s.) imushagh (m.pl.) 
tamasheq (f.s.) timushaq (f.pl.) noble 
amenokal (m.s.) ‘owner of the land’, leader 
amghid (m.s.) imghad (m.pl.) 
tamghid (f.s.) timghaden (f.pl.) free, not noble 
annetma  mother’s brother 
aqqa attack to restore or gain honour 
aran meddan male patrilineal parallel cousins 
aran tidoden matrilineal parallel cousins 
Aribinda Niger inner delta 
Azawad wadi in southeastern Mali 
bahutan lies 
Bamanakan Mande language 
bellah (Son.) (former) slaves 
Bilâd es-Sudân (Ar.) 'the land of the blacks' 
boubou male Muslim dress 
Brigade de Vigilance para military movement under  
 Keita 
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burnous male Muslim dress 
Canton administrative unit in AOF 
Cercle administrative unit in AOF and  
 Mali 
cheick (Ar.) leader 
Commandant de Cercle administrative head of a Cercle 
Communauté Française French Colonial Common  
 Wealth 
dibi (Bam.) grilled meat 
dugutigi (m.s.) dugutigiw (m.pl.) (Bam.) owner of the land 
egha hatred and revenge 
eghewid male turban and veil 
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Entoutcas ishumar nickname for  
 Intellectuals 
eshardan mulatto 
eshik honour, restraint composure 
ettebel (m.s.) ittebelen (m.pl.) drum, federation 
exode annual seasonal migration 
fasobara (Bam.) forced labour 
fiqh (Ar.) Muslim law 
fraction nomad administrative unit 
gandoura (Ar.) thin burnous 
goum camel mounted military police  
 force 
goumier military policeman 
Gourma Niger Bend 
al-guitara (Ar.) musical genre of the teshumara 
hajj (Ar.) pilgrimage to Mecca 
haratin (Ar.) Moorish (former) slaves 
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taklit (f.s.) tiklatin (f.pl.) slave 
iklan n eguef ‘slaves of the dunes’ sedentary  
 slave communities 
Ikufar (m.pl.) Akafer (m.s.) 
Takafert (f.s.) Tikufarin (f.pl.) ‘infidels’, ‘Westerners’ 
imzad monochord violin 
inadan (m.pl.) enad (m.s.) 
tenad (f.s.) tinaden (f.pl.) casted craftspersons 
ineslemen (m.pl.) aneslim (m.s.) 
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taneslimt (f.s.) tineslemen (f.pl.) persons of religious occupation 
ishumar (m.pl.) ashamor (m.s.) ‘unemployed’, 
tashamort (f.s.) tishumarin (f.pl.) those of the teshumara  
jâhil (Ar.) ignorant, anarchist 
jihad (Ar.) holy war 
kokadjè (bam.) (‘ethnic’) cleansing 
koual black, ‘black people’ 
al-Maghreb al-Aksâ (Ar.) the far west’, Greater Morocco 
Malinke Mande language 
Mande language and culture group 
marabout Muslim mystic or religious  
 specialist 
mazbut (m.s.) mazbuten (m.pl.) (Ar.) ‘OK’, évolué nickname for  
 ishumar 
Milice Populaire para-military brigade under  
 Keita 
ould (m.s.), mint (f.s.) (Ar.) son of, daughter of 
Région Malian administrative unit 
senankuya (Bam.) joking relationship 
sattefen ‘greenish black’, ‘white noble  
 people’ 
sefham to make understand 
Service Civique conscription alternative to  
 Military  service under Keita  
 regime 
shaggaran red, ‘white people’ 
shorfa (Ar.) descendent from the prophet  
 Muhammad 
sous fraction Malian administrative unit 
Subdivision colonial administrative unit 
tabahohumt melodious humming 
tagelmust male veil and turban 
takamba rhythm and musical style 
takaraket shame 
takoubilt tribal gathering 
talaqiw (s.) tilaqiwin (pl.) poor, weak 
Tanekra ‘the uprising’, movement  
 preparing the second Tamasheq  
 rebellion 
tanyatin female paternal parallel cousins 
at-tarikh (Ar.) history, written history 
ath-thawra (Ar.) revolution 
Targui singular of Tuareg 
tasirnest long female veil-based dress 
 xvii 
tayite intelligence, understanding 
tefoghessa ‘being Ifoghas’, Ifoghas culture 
tegezé pelvis, confederation, (relation  
 with) sister’s children 
teghere modern education 
teherdent four-string lute 
temet placenta, lineage, genealogy 
temushagha ‘being amashegh’ 
temust / tumast social identity, nation 
ténéré emptiness, ‘desert’, ‘fatherland’ 
tengelt allusive language 
Territoire des Oasis colonial administrative region  
 in Southern Algeria 
Teshumara ‘being unemployed’, 
 Tamasheq youth culture since  
 1970s 
tewet attack to gain booty 
tewsit descent group, fictive kingroup,  
 clan, tribe 
teylelil followsome behaviour 
tifinagh Tamasheq alphabet 
tikunbut hat 
timgheda ‘being imghad’ 
tindé mortar, drum, musical genre 
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tiwse tribute 
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Wilaya Algerian administrative unit 
zahuten ishumar parties 
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MFUA Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad 
MNJ Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice 
MPA Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad 
MPGK Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy 
OCRS Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes 
PAREM Programme d’Appui à la Réinsertion des ex-Combattants au  
 Mali 
PDS Parti Démocratique Soudanais 
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
 xix 
POLISARIO Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio  
 de Oro 
PSI Pan-Sahel Initiative 
PSP Parti Socialiste Progressif also Parti Progressiste du Soudan 
TSCTI Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative 
UDPM Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien 
UMADD Union Malienne pour la Démocratie et le Développement 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
US-AID United States Agency for International Development 
US-RDA Union Soudanaise – Rassemblement Démocratique  
 Africaine 
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Movement Date of creation Motivation Tewsiten involved 
Tanekra 
FPLSAC 
al-Jebha 
ath-Thawra 
MLT / FPLA / MPLA 
1980s and at the 
start of the 
rebellion: 
Tanekra, al-
Jebha and ath-
Thawra After 
outbreak of 
rebellion: 
MPLA, MLT 
and FPLA 
Independence All those involved in the 
Tanekra 
FPLA 
Front Populaire de 
Libération de 
l’Azawad 
After the 
outbreak of 
rebellion, July 
1990 
Independence 
Hardliners 
Modernists 
Timgheda 
 
June 1990  December 
1990: All December 1990 
– January 1991: All but 
the Ifoghas and Moors. 
January 1991 – January 
1993: Tewsiten from the 
Azawad and Niger Bend. 
January 1993 – March 
1996: Chemennamas.  
MPA 
Mouvement Populaire 
de l’Azawad 
January 1991, 
during the 
negotiations of 
the Tamanrasset 
agreement 
Autonomy 
Moderates 
Tradition- 
alists 
Tefoghessa 
Mostly Ifoghas 
FIAA 
Front Islamique Arabe 
de l’Azawad 
January 1991, 
during the 
negotiations of 
the Tamanrasset 
agreement 
Underlining 
Moorish 
participation 
Moors of all clans, some 
Kel Tamasheq, mostly 
Kel Intessar 
ARLA 
Armée Révolutionaire 
de Libération de 
l’Azawad 
November 
1991, after the 
signing of the 
Tamanrasset 
agreement 
Autonomy 
Moderates 
Modernists 
Timgheda 
January 1991 – August 
1994: Imghad and Idnan. 
August 1994 – March 
1996: Imghad from the 
Adagh, Imekelkalen and 
Irreguenaten 
BAUA 
Base Autonome Unifié 
de l’Azawad 
August 1994, 
after the military 
conflict between 
MPA and 
ARLA 
Protection of 
tewsiten 
Idnan 
No strong presence 
 xxi 
 
Movement Date of creation Motivation Tewsiten involved 
FNLA 
Front National de 
Libération de 
l’Azawad 
January 1993 Protection of 
tewsiten 
Ishidenharen, Dabakar, 
Daoussahak 
No strong presence 
FULA 
Front Unifié de 
Libération de 
l’Azawad 
January 1993 Protection of 
tewsiten 
Kel Intessar 
No strong presence 
MFUA December 1991 Negotiating 
with the 
Malian state 
Regroup all 
movements 
All, and yet none 
Intellectuals 
MPGK 
Mouvement 
Patriotique Ganda Koy 
April 1994 Defending 
the sedentary 
population of 
the North 
Songhay and other 
sedentary population of 
the North 
Kel Tamasheq bellah 
ADC 
Alliance Démo-
cratique du 23 Mai 
pour le Changement 
Mai 2006 Local politics 
Claiming the 
implementati
on of the 
national Pact 
Kel Adagh 
ATNMC 
Alliance Touarègue 
Niger-Mali pour le 
Changement 
July 2007 Local politics 
Unification 
Malian and 
Nigerien 
Tamasheq 
Movements 
Kel Adagh 
Kel Aïr 
MNJ 
Mouvement Nigérien 
pour la Justice 
February 2007 Equitable 
economic and 
political 
treatment of 
northern 
Niger 
Kel Aïr 
Kel Tedele 
non-Kel Tamasheq 
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 Du Gouverneur du Soudan à tous Cercles et divisions et  
 Commune Mixte: 1954. 
FN B1229 Correspondances secrets et confidentiel au départ du 
 Gouverneur du Soudan à tous les Cercles, Subdivisions et  
 Communes mixtes: 1954. 
FN 1E 1227 Rapports des tournees dans le Cercle de Kidal: 1958. 
FN 1E 1246 Trafic d’esclaves: 1957. 
FN 1A 720 Décisions de la Région de Gao: 1964. 
 
In the Archives Nationales Section Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence (ANSOM),  
I have concentrated on the series Fonds Ministerielles, especially 
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FM 62 Afaires Politiques: AOF-AEF (affaires communes) 1920- 
 1957. 
FM 64 Affaires Politiques: Mauritanie – Soudan – Niger – Sénégal  
 – Ht Sénégal-Niger. 
FM 73 Affaires Politiques: Moyen-Orient – Palestine – Sahara –  
 Syrie –Tunisie. 
 
In these series, I have concentrated on files concerning French Sudan, Mau-
ritania and the Sahara. Many of these files, especially those in FM 73 con-
cerning Mauritania, the Nahda al-Wattaniyya al-Mauritaniyya, the Sahara and 
the French Moroccan conflict are still under embargo, with embargo dates vary-
ing between 2019 and 2020. I have received permission (dérogation) from the 
French Ministry of Culture to access these files under Archive law 79-18 of 3 
January 1979 and decree 79-1038 of 3 December 1979 (permissions de déroga-
tion CAOM 98/1844, CAOM 98/ 1655, and CAOM 98/ 1539). These permis-
sions did not allow me to quote documents, but paraphrasing (and translation is 
perceived as such) was allowed. The archive codes given in the footnotes are 
those used in the ANSOM archives’ digital database. These codes are the ones 
necessary to demand access to the pertaining file within the series. As footnotes 
serve to facilitate reference, these codes are the quickest way to the file or docu-
ment referred to. 
 
In the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (SHAT) I have used the series 
  
5H Inventaire provisoire, Afrique Occidentale Française (A.O.F.) 
1K297 Fonds privées, fonds Colonel Lesourd 
 
During my research, SHAT underwent a restructuring of its repertoire and 
classification system. The series 5H starts with AOF in general, followed by 
series on the various Territories within AOF in a more or less chronological 
order. The series on French Sudan run from 5H 186 to 5H 204. For this 
research, a more interesting series runs from 5H 23 to 5H 140, dealing with the 
organisation and activities of the French Military forces in the late 1950s, and 
with French military support for and intelligence on the new national armies 
and states of the former territories in the early 1960s. These files, however, are 
still under embargo and I have not received permission to access these files, due 
to logistical circumstances. A last very useful series is the series K – Fonds 
privées, containing the personal archives of various former army officers. Of 
this series, I have made use of 1K297, which contains the private archives of 
Colonel Lesourd, who had kept an archive of his personal interests, but also of 
his activities in the Maghreb and Sahara, concerning the OCRS and Mohamed 
Mahmoud ould Cheick, the Qadi of Timbuktu in the late 1950s. 
Research in the Archives du Cercle de Kidal (ACK) were initially hampered 
by two problems. The first is that they lack a repertoire. The archives do not 
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serve a public interest, they are mainly intended to facilitate the task of the 
Commandant de Cercle. Although physically in perfect shape, the files con-
tained documents pertaining to various subjects, which made research a ques-
tion of adamantly continuing to ‘speed-read’ file after file. For this reason, I do 
not make reference to archive codes when referring to the documents from these 
archives. I have simply given the name of the concerned document, followed by 
‘ACK’. Those interested in these documents are welcome to visit me and look 
at my notebooks. The second problem concerned the right to access itself. As 
the post of Commandant de Cercle was unoccupied during my research stay, I 
have received permission to search the archives from acting Commandant de 
Cercle and Premier Adjoint Marc Dara, with the support of His Excellency 
Eghless ag Foni, Haut Conseiller du VIIIème  Région de Kidal. This permission 
was not put to paper. 
Three other archives have been used less extensively in this research: the 
archives of the Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et de Sûreté in Ba-
mako (AMSAT, now known as Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et des 
Collectivités Locales) and the Centre de l’Histoire et des Etudes des Troupes 
d’Outre Mer (CHETOM) in Fréjus. I have received permission by word in 1997 
from the acting Minister, His Excellency Colonel Sada Samaké, to access the 
AMSAT archives. These archives do not have a repertorium. I have used one 
but very important file from this archive 
 
AMSAT  Dossier 35 – OCRS 1957-1962 
 
This file contains material from the Ministère de l’Intérieur et de l’Information 
(as AMSAT was then called) under Madeira Keita on the US-RDA’s policies 
towards the OCRS and the Kel Tamasheq. From the CHETOM archives, I have 
also used one file 
 
CHETOM 15 H 77-2 Mali, armée nationale 1964 
 
This document probably originates from the French Military Intelligence Ser-
vices SDECE on the organisation of the Malian army. The document in 
question was updated yearly. CHETOM contains versions dating from 1962 and 
1963 as well, but only the 1964 document contained an annex which gives a 
chronology of Malian military activities during Alfellaga from 1963 to 1964. 
I have made use of a number of documents, especially on the Qadi of Tim-
buktu and the slave trade to Mecca described in chapters 1 and 2, emanating 
from the Archives de Cercle de Goundam (ACG). The problems stated above 
for the Archives de Cercle de Kidal also hold for these archives. I have not 
collected these documents myself. I am greatly indebted to Professor Bruce Hall 
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for his generosity in providing me with these documents, which he photo-
graphed during research in these archives. 
As a last, I should mention the now no longer existent Centre d’Etudes sur 
l’Afrique et l’Asie Moderne, the former Centre des Hauts Etudes pour l’Admi-
nistration Musulman (CHEAM) in Paris. This centre contained an archive of 
research reports written by its former students – administrators preparing for 
service in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. Although I only refer to a few 
of these reports, many others have served to enlarge my understanding of 
French Administrative ideas and practices in AOF. The CHEAM has closed 
down in December 2000. Its archives have been transferred to the Centre des 
Archives Contemporaines in Fontainebleau (CACF), where they are accessible 
under filenumbers 2000.0002. There exists a small repertoire of all CHEAM 
files at CACF under their original file code from CHEAM. CHEAM documents 
used are listed as unpublished manuscripts, giving the original CHEAM code 
between brackets. 
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Introduction 
What is Alfellaga and what does it mean? In June 1990, a group of Tuareg 
started an armed uprising against the Malian state. To anybody taking an 
interest in these events it would quickly become clear that the upsurge had its 
roots in a previous insurgency that took place in 1963, when the inhabitants of 
the Adagh n Ifoghas revolted against their inclusion in the Malian state. This 
revolt is locally known as Alfellaga and its narrative history, as well as its local 
historical interpretation and politization with its consequence in the past twenty 
years are central to this book. It is also about the contested meanings of de-
colonisation, independence and nationalism in the desert part of the Republic of 
Mali. 
Answering the main question of this book resulted in formulating other 
questions, as it goes with scholarly work these days, which became just as 
important. These questions evolve first of all around the workings of Kel 
Tamasheq politics. This book hopes in a way to fill the lacuna in knowledge on 
the recent political events of a remote corner of the world, the inhabitants of 
which are so widely yet so shallowly known. Then there are the eternal 
questions all historians ask themselves time and again: How does historical 
discourse influence the present, and how does the present influence historical 
discourse? Is the past created in the present or the present in the past? These 
questions will be dealt with not so much on the level of events, although of 
course that will be part of the book too, but more on the level of local visions 
and local workings of history in Tamasheq society and politics. In a way, this 
book wants to be an ethnography of the local politics of history in the Central 
Sahara. A history that has a worldwide impact if only because a number of its 
actors and eyewitness poets are now world famous musicians who sing the 
history studied in this book in sport stadiums and concert halls from Sidney, via 
Paris and London, to Los Angeles. But perhaps also since the Central Sahara 
has come under attention of those interested in the perceived conflict between 
‘Radical Islam’ and ‘The West’ and despite their focus on actual geopolitics, 
most of those interested cannot help but to frame their vision on this supposed 
2 INTRODUCTION 
‘Clash of Civilisations’ in historical terms.1 But even if this history would not 
have had any worldwide ramifications at all, it would still be interesting simply 
because there is no such thing and there cannot be such a thing as an unknown 
remote corner of the globe. 
The Adagh n Ifoghas, where Alfellaga took place, is a small range of low 
Mountains appended to the southwestern edge of the central Saharan Hoggar 
Mountains. The mountains are called Adagh n Ifoghas after part of its in-
habitants, the Ifoghas, a Tuareg clan. Adagh n Ifoghas literally means ‘moun-
tains of the Ifoghas’ in their language, Tamasheq. Worldwide the people speak-
ing this language are known as Tuareg but unless I quote source material, in this 
book they will be referred to as they refer to themselves: Kel Tamasheq, ‘the 
people speaking Tamasheq’. Kel Tamasheq is a general plural taken from the 
female plural. The masculine plural is imushagh, a term with a particular mean-
ing fully explained later on, ‘noble’. The masculine singular is Ou Tamasheq 
and the feminine singular Tou Tamasheq, which simply designate individuals, 
but which are seldom used. For the sake of simplicity these singulars will there-
fore not be used in this book either. A single person will be referred to as ‘a 
Tamasheq’, in full realisation of the grammatical abhorrence. Tamasheq 
normally means the language, but I will use Tamasheq as an adjective as well. 
The Ifoghas are the leading clan of a larger group of Kel Tamasheq clans in the 
Adagh Mountains. Only the Ifoghas call these mountains ‘Adagh n Ifoghas’. 
The other clans in the Adagh simply speak of ‘Adagh’ – ‘The Mountains’ – and 
refer to its inhabitants as Kel Adagh, ‘The People of The Mountains’. In turn, 
the Kel Adagh form part of the larger Tamasheq world, which forms part of the 
North African Berber culture and language group. 
On a Tamasheq map of the area, the Adagh is bordered by the Hoggar 
Mountains to the north, by the sandy plain of the Tamesna to the east, by the 
Azawad valley to the southeast, by the stony and treeless Tilemsi plain to the 
south and southwest, and by the Timetrine plain to the west and northwest. 
Most of these areas are seen as part of the Kel Adagh living space. The areas 
beyond, the Hoggar Mountains and Touat plain to the north, the Azawagh 
valley and Aïr Mountains to the east, the Aribinda lands in the Niger interior 
delta to the south, and the land of Shinqit to the west, are not formally part of 
the Kel Adagh living space, but they do form part of their world as they are 
inhabited by other Kel Tamasheq groups and by their most direct neighbours: 
First and foremost the Bidân (also known as Moors) and other Arabs, and the 
Fulani, who share a nomadic pastoralist culture; second by the Songhay, Dogon, 
Bambara and Hausa peoples who are sedentary farmers. 
                                                 
1  Lecocq, B. & P. Schrijver 2007. 
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On a political map of the world the Adagh n Ifoghas is called Adrar des 
Ifôghas and it is situated in the Northeastern corner of the Republic of Mali, on 
its border with Algeria. While Mali’s northernmost part, including the Adagh, is 
situated in the Sahara, its southernmost part, the Mande Mountains, is situated 
in the more forested part of the West African savanna. This geographical loca-
tion places Mali in the Sahel zone, neighbouring Mauritania and Senegal to the 
west; Niger and Burkina Faso to the east; and Ivory Coast and Guinée (Cona-
kry) to the south. 
Kel Tamasheq politics 
This book deals with political changes and internal debates about political 
changes within Tamasheq society from the late 1940s to the present. These 
debates focus on new political structures introduced into Tamasheq society 
from outside – such as the colonial bureaucratic administration, the post-inde-
pendence socialist one-party state, nationalism, and multi-party democracy – 
and their impact on and incorporation into local concepts of politics, the origins 
of which predate colonial rule. These local concepts – and I try very hard here 
to avoid the much despised term ‘traditional’ – are based on concepts of kinship 
and hierarchy, which have long been misunderstood to be akin to European 
feudalism, with dire consequences for local political history. So before we can 
say anything on the political history of Northern Mali we need to have some 
basic understanding of the principles of Tamasheq social and political organi-
sation, and the ways in which they have been shaped. The first thing that can be 
observed about Tamasheq social and political structure is its extreme diversity. 
As Clare Oxby has rightly put it: 
Scholars have always tried to distinguish “ordered structures” in Tuareg social 
organisation (...) In the end, all attempts to model society fail as one can always find 
a Tuareg group escaping the rule.2 
This is not to say that the Tamasheq world does not know social or political 
unity. The Tamasheq are organised into a number of interconnected social and 
political constellations, acknowledging each others existence in cooperation and 
rivalry, and in the idea that they are all part of one culture and one people, the 
Kel Tamasheq: ‘Those who speak Tamasheq’. However, it does mean that with-
in the Tamasheq world, as everywhere else, variety in political organisation 
exists. What will be said here is only valid for the western part of the Tamasheq 
world included in the Republic of Mali. Other Tamasheq polities in other coun-
tries have different experiences, both at present as in the recent and more distant 
past. 
                                                 
2  Oxby, C. 1996: 172. 
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The bases of social-political organisation in the western part of the Ta-
masheq world are twofold. The first is hierarchy. The second is the one social 
structure all Tamasheq groups have in common: The clan or tewsit, which can 
be seen as quasi kin groups based on a lineage ideology, which varies per clan. 
The basis for the hierarchical structure of society is a system of social strata 
referred to as castes. The clans, or tewsiten (sing. tewsit), are largely based on 
lineage structures and are partly caste related. The very notions of hierarchy and 
even the mere existence of castes and tewsiten are controversial subjects of 
debate within Tamasheq society as well as among scholars. Various parties 
outside and inside Tamasheq society wanted, or still want, to abolish either the 
hierarchical relationships, or the clans, or both, while others wanted to enforce 
their role. Knowledge of this particular dynamic in internal Tamasheq social 
political debates is crucial in understanding all political events ever since the 
late 1940s, when the existence of the political order shaped by colonial rule was 
first put into question by Malian politicians and the lower strata of Tamasheq 
society as described in Chapter 1. When attempting to describe the workings 
and organisation of these castes and tewsiten, one is confronted with two 
problems. The first problem is the legacy of colonial observation, describing 
Tamasheq social strata as a feudal system in which racial characterisations 
played an important role. The second problem consists of the colonial and post-
colonial administrative meddling in social and political organisation, which has 
resulted in confusion around the content and meaning of the term tewsit. I will 
first explain the colonial observation and the resulting description of Tamasheq 
society as feudal. Then I will describe the historical development of the various 
contents and meanings the word tewsit has acquired throughout pre-colonial, 
colonial, and post-colonial times. I will explain how the French administrative 
terms tribu and fraction, translated throughout this book as ‘tribe’ and ‘frac-
tion’, are related to the Tamasheq term tewsit, without these three concepts 
being totally congruent, although many people, administrators, researchers and 
even Kel Tamasheq alike, think this to be the case. 
Tamasheq society is based on a set of social strata into which one is born. 
Early French ethnographers described the social organisation as feudal.3 At the 
top of this society stood the imushagh (m. sing: amashegh, f. sing: tamasheq) or 
noble warriors, referred to in early colonial ethnographies as a ‘noblesse d’épée’ 
and perceived as racially ‘white’. The imushagh distinguish themselves by a 
culture of honour and shame, quite common among the Mediterranean cultures 
                                                 
3  It should be noted that the first explorers and ethnographers of the Kel Tamasheq, 
such as Barth, Bissuel or Duveyrier, hardly used the term feudal to describe Ta-
masheq society. They are nevertheless responsible for the introduction of this term 
which became popular especially among colonial ethnographers/administrators from 
the 1920s onwards. Barth, H. 1859; Bissuel, H. 1888; Duveyrier, H. 1864. 
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most anthropologists classify them amongst, precisely on the grounds of this 
particular trait.4 This culture is called temushagha, ‘the way of the imushagh’.5 
It consists first of all of the knowledge of honour and shame – eshik and taka-
raket respectively in Tamasheq – and second in the knowledge of one’s temet – 
one’s lineage and ancestry – which form the basis of political organisation and 
which are kept closed off from strong political and social mobility through 
marriage strategies. The first group the French distinguished from the imushagh 
were the ineslemen (m. sing.: aneslim): A group of free or noble status, racially 
described as ‘white’, who specialised in religious affairs. They were described 
as a ‘noblesse de robe’ that stood directly under the imushagh in the social 
hierarchy. Although their primary guidance in life are the tenets of Islam they 
also adhere to temushagha. The imghad (m. sing.: amghid f. sing.: tamghid) 
formed a third group. This group consisted of free, ‘white’ people who were not 
noble, but who tried to live according to the temushagha, the noble way of life, 
with one notable exception: Most imghad, but not all, do not have a temet, a 
lineage to which they belong, and which they guard against impurity or political 
encroachments through endogamous marriage strategies that form the basis of a 
policy to keep the social strata in place. They were often described as dependent 
on the nobles for protection and rearing their cattle for them, although neither 
was necessarily true. However, for these reasons they were referred to as 
‘vassaux’ to the nobles. The inadan (m. sing.: enad f. sing.: tenad) or craftsmen, 
generally simply referred to as ‘blacksmiths’, were another important group the 
French encountered. They stood out especially in the Timbuktu area and in the 
Algerian Hoggar and Ajjer, where they performed functions similar to that of 
the griot in other West African societies (sometimes a special subgroup from 
among the inadan, the aggiwin performed these tasks). They were racially 
classified as ‘black’, but free. Most ethnographers placed them outside the strict 
social hierarchy they construed for Tamasheq society as they enjoyed certain 
liberties of behaviour that the slaves – also perceived as ‘black’ – did not (and 
neither did other groups in society for that matter) as the inadan did not follow 
the temushagha the nobles adhered to. At the bottom were the iklan (m. sing.: 
akli f. sing: taklit): The slaves, divided into various subgroups which were all 
                                                 
4  Behnke, R. 1980; Hart, D. 1981; Peristiany, J., ed., 1966; Peristiany, J. & J. Pitt-
Rivers, eds, 1992. In his groundbreaking work Honour in African History, Iliffe 
even excludes North Africa and the Kel Tamasheq from his work as they are part of 
a supposed Mediterranean culture zone in which, according to most works on 
honour and shame in this area, honour is bound to female chastity, in contrast to 
sub-Saharan African cultures where this is not the case. The fact that this is not the 
case in Bidân and Kel Tamasheq concepts of honour either escapes Iliffe and most 
other scholars dealing with this subject. Iliffe, J. 2005: 1-3. 
5  Bourgeot, A. 1990, 1995; Claudot-Hawad, H. 1990, 1993, 1993b. 
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categorised as ‘black’. This social classification into five groups still form the 
basis of description of Tamasheq society by many present-day researchers, al-
though more and more reluctantly so. 
Actually, it is not at all clear what it exactly means to be a member of any of 
these groups nowadays. Slavery was formally abolished in 1905 in French West 
Africa, and Tamasheq slaves were gradually emancipated since the 1940s, as 
we will see in Chapter 1. At present, slavery formally no longer exists at all, 
although the emancipation process is still incomplete.6 The imghad deny any 
form of actual dependency on the nobles. At most they pay an honorary tribute, 
the tiwse, the worth of which is trivialised by the giving party, and sometimes 
even by the receiving party. This does not mean however, that anyone denies 
their existence as a social category. To the contrary, being imghad or not is of 
the utmost importance in Northern Mali ever since the 1960s, and it gained even 
more importance during the rebellion of the 1990s as a form of self-ascription. 
However, what it exactly means to be imghad is an issue of hot debate and 
opinions differ. It is not even clear whether a social group called ineslemen 
actually exists. The exact meaning of the word is ‘Muslims’ and all Tamasheq 
are Muslims. True enough, some tewsiten are in one way or another connected 
to a Muslim identity, such as the Ifoghas who claim shorfa status (descent of 
the prophet Muhammad) or the Kel Essuq who are generally connected with 
religious study such as fiqh and therefore called alfaqiten, a Berber plural of the 
Arabic faqîh. But the strict hierarchical distinction made between ineslimen and 
other tewsiten is difficult to make. At present, the social political meaning of the 
word amashegh – noble – is very unclear. In present-day Northern Mali the 
term seems to be reserved to denote small groups of Ouillimiden, tewsiten of 
the former ruling elite of the Ouillimiden confederation that ruled Northern 
Mali in the 19th century. They are often referred to as ‘Bajan’s (their leader) 
imushagh’ or, when speaking French, ‘les Touaregs’. Formerly an external eth-
nonym, the word is now internally used to denote exactly the one quintessential 
group imagined to be Tuareg in the global imagery of consumption. 
It is only clear that one is born into either group and that these groups stand 
in a certain hierarchical relation to each other. What that hierarchy looks like or 
whether it should be there in the first place is another matter which is, as has 
been said earlier, hotly debated within Tamasheq society. 
I would like to propose another way of looking at this system of hierarchical 
strata, one not based on the old colonial parallel to feudalism. As I see it, the 
main criteria for classification of the existing groups are the following three 
oppositions: Free – unfree; strong – weak; and lineage – non-lineage. 
                                                 
6  Lecocq, B. 2005. 
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Free – unfree. The main categorisation is between ellellu, free; and akli, 
(former) slave, hence unfree. French colonial politics towards slavery in the 
Sahara was characterised by a dual attitude. Formally denying its existence in 
Arab and Tamasheq society after abolition, the French had never done anything 
to change the situation of former slaves, thus perpetuating their servitude. From 
the 1940s onwards, Malian politicians made the freeing of slaves and the 
breaking up of Tamasheq ‘feudal relations’ one of their focal points in regional, 
and even national politics. But despite this, notions of free and unfree status still 
exist in Tamasheq society, and still form the major divide. The issue of social 
inequality expressed in the existence of a social category of former slaves will 
play an important part throughout this book. It should be noted directly that this 
divide is not a feature unique to Tamasheq society. Other Malian societies, or 
West African societies in general, know this social divide between slaves and 
free as well.7 
Strong – weak. The distinction between strong protecting groups or even 
persons, and weak protected ones, is the most important in this study. The 
Tamasheq concepts of strong and weak are ellellu (meaning of free origins or 
social independence) and talaqqiw (poverty or weakness). It includes ideas on 
economic and cultural capital, physical and military capacity, and certain 
character traits. Weak and strong are more or less fixed categories, only slowly 
changing over time, and applied to whole social political groups, the tewsiten, 
although of course they can also be applied to individuals. The French at first 
perceived the opposition between weak and strong, poor and rich as a dis-
tinction between the nobles, the imushagh; and the ‘vassals’, the imghad. In 
reality, some nobles are classified as tilaqqiwin – poor or weak – and some 
vassal groups as illellan, rich or strong. It is arguable whether those people 
labelled as talaqqiw have a lower status than those who are not labelled as such. 
A poor noble might still be seen as better placed than a strong amghid from a 
noble’s point of view or vice versa from an amghid’s position. After inde-
pendence, especially from the 1970s onwards among Tamasheq immigrants, the 
hierarchical position between tewsiten became open to negotiation, while its 
continued existence was a matter of political debate. During and after the 
second rebellion, the internal dynamics of Tamasheq society led to violent 
conflict between tewsiten to alter their hierarchical position. At the same time 
occurred a shift in terminology used in the selfascription of certain social 
groups. Those who were once referred to as imghad now referred to themselves 
as ellellu (strong, which they were), which came to be similar to ‘noble’, 
without using the term amashegh. The imghad now started to define their way 
of life as timgheda – ‘the way of the imghad’ – as in contrast to temushagha – 
                                                 
7  Rossi, B., ed., 2009. 
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‘the way of the imushagh’ – while certain tewsiten went even further and 
defined their way of life as particular to their tribe: Tefoghessa, ‘the way of the 
Ifoghas’. These new statuses were based on ideas on strength and the ensuing 
obligation to defend weaker groups.  
Temet – lineage and prestige. The last major opposition is between those 
who claim a lineage and know their genealogy, and those who do not claim a 
lineage or do not know their genealogy. Lineage or genealogy is called temet, 
which literally means ‘placenta’ in Tamasheq. A clan’s lineage can be either 
patrilineal or matrilineal. In the Adagh and Azawad, lineage is only patrilineal, 
but in the Niger Bend and the Northern part of Burkina Faso, some groups, such 
as the Udalan and Imededdeghen imghad (who have temet) are matrilineal.8 In 
the Algerian Hoggar, the transfer of political power seems to be only matri-
lineal, which has been at the basis of much Orientalist speculation on (matri-
archal) gender relations in Tamasheq society. Having a temet is perceived to be 
the major characteristic of a noble origin. One of the main functions of keeping 
and knowing one’s temet (or, as it is, inventing one that is accepted by other 
groups), is to accumulate prestige, a criteria on which hierarchy is based, and to 
keep social and political power within the tribe through endogamous marriage 
strategies. The prestige generated by a temet depends on the ancestors claimed, 
and on the amount of known historical personae further down the line. It is 
partly through the temet that status and hierarchy are designated to a tewsit as a 
whole. The ideological construct of lineage and genealogy is based more on 
wider kinship relations than on strict descendance. In Tamasheq kinship termi-
nology, most of ego’s ancestors are called ‘father’ (abba) or ‘mother’ (anna), 
with the notable exception of mother’s brother and his male ascendants, who 
are called mother’s brother (annet ma). In this way, lineage and descent allow 
for a larger construction of tewsit belonging through an idea of direct descent. 
All criteria presented here as split entities are of course totally interwoven. 
They are concepts that can be played with and moulded at will in everyday 
practice where scholarly classification is of no concern. What is presented here 
concisely is, and will always remain, one of the major subjects within the study 
of Tamasheq society, because of its enormous complexity and because of social 
scientists’ fascination with classification. 
 
Tewsit 
Tewsit is the most important word in understanding the history and contem-
porary structure of Tamasheq politics. The etymological meaning of the word 
                                                 
8  Guignard, E. 1984. 
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tewsit is that of a woven mat or a hair plait.9 A plait starts at the roots of one’s 
hair, taking various strands together, and intertwining them into a strong whole. 
A Tamasheq woman’s hair is plaited into three plaits, consisting of a number of 
smaller plaits. The plaits are partly visible from under her kerchief. This 
comparison is highly illustrative for the construction and functioning of tewsiten 
and the imbroglio they have become nowadays. Due to the fact that the term is 
now in use to denote different but related social-political structures – the 
original clan, but also the tribu and fraction of modern administration – the 
meaning and content of the tewsit as a social political structure has become hard 
to define. Researchers, administrators and the Kel Tamasheq alike have used 
the word to denote various indigenous and administrative organisations in 
Tamasheq society. In these sorts of situations, words like ‘traditional’ (alas, it 
seems unavoidable to use this term) or ‘original’ immediately come to mind as 
useful to discern between what is old, indigenous and Tamasheq, and what is 
foreign or new. I will first discuss what the tewsit might have been and looked 
like in pre-colonial times. Then we will see how and why the French admi-
nistrators thought it wiser to introduce their own system of social organisation, 
which they thought was reflecting the ‘traditional’ Tamasheq system. Finally 
we will see how in post-colonial times both systems became intermeshed into 
one inextricable whole in which practically everybody gets lost. 
The shortest and least inaccurate translation of the tewsit into anthropolo-
gical terms is ‘clan’. Other appropriate translations could have been ‘lineage 
group’ or ‘descent group’. What makes it more complicated is that the tewsit 
can also be seen as a ramage of lineages or clans. That is to say: A grouping of 
lineages or clans through descent from the same but more distant ancestor, 
which can be either male or female.10 At present the Kel Tamasheq also use the 
term tewsit to denote the administrative units called fraction and tribu. The 
concepts of temet – genealogy – and tewsit – clan – are interrelated. Clan and 
genealogy together form a kinship structure. A tewsit consists of all the living 
members of a lineage, hence the anthropological translation ‘descent group’. 
However, not all Kel Tamasheq are perceived to have a genealogy, such as 
imghad groups, former slaves and other poor and powerless or tilaqqiwin. This 
does not mean that those without a genealogy are without a tewsit. Slaves were 
incoporated into their masters’ tewsit. Nowadays former slave families can still 
use their former masters’ clan to position themselves socially. Imghad, or other 
socially poor or weak without their proper tewsit, were incorporated into the 
                                                 
9  This meaning might be particular to the Tadghaq dialect. H. Claudot-Hawad gives 
as etymologies for tewsit; a wrist; a circular trap; or a woven mat, which conveys the 
same meaning as a plait. Claudot-Hawad, H. 1990. 
10  Terminology according to Schusky, E. 1972. 
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clan of the free/strong illellan under whose protection they were placed. In fact, 
often the noble’s real protection only consisted of this incorporation in the 
tewsit, since it offered incorporation into a social and political structure. A 
tewsit is thus a social-political group centred on a free or noble lineage or clan, 
containing other social categories. In practice a tewsit can be seen as a group of 
people who consider themselves to form one, explaining and justifying their 
common belonging in kinship terms, which makes it a quasi-kin-group. This is 
possible through the way tewsiten are both split and bundled into ramages, 
precisely like a plait. A person can therefore belong to more than one tewsit at a 
time. A clan is part of a larger ramage when one ascends in the genealogical 
tree. This larger ramage, in turn, can also be part of a larger ramage when 
moving even higher up the genealogical branches. Sub-branching goes a long 
way. 
The relations between tewsiten of the same ancestor (alesel, from the Arabic 
al-Asl, the root) are expressed in the language of non-lineal kinship structures. 
The two most important supportive kinship relations in western Tamasheq 
society are the aran meddan and the tegezé relationships.11 The aran meddan – 
which very likely means ‘the backbone of men’ – are male paternal parallel 
cousins (female paternal parallel cousins being called tanyatin, and male and 
female maternal parallel cousins being called aran tidoden – ‘the backbone of 
women’). This relation can be extended over various generations, expanding the 
limits of the group to a fraternal interest group writ large. In the western 
Tamasheq world, the aran meddan relationship forms the ideal basis of most 
tewsiten, with the tegezé relation as a supportive relation between tewsiten. 
Tegezé – literally meaning pelvis – is the relation between sister’s children 
(sons) and mother’s brother. This relation entails unrestricted material support 
and protection to his nephews and nieces by mother’s brother (called annetma), 
and protection and loyalty to their uncle by sister’s children (called tegezé). 
This relation, too, can be extended over the generations, when it can be an 
instrument to invoke support between tewsiten, which are seen as related 
through tegezé. In the eastern part of the Tamasheq world (the Aïr and beyond), 
the term tegezé is used to denote a confederation of federated tewsiten.12 Of 
course, with cousins being preferential marriage partners within the political 
                                                 
11  The relative importance attached to aran meddan, tegezé or aboubash relations 
differs throughout the Tamasheq world. In the Adagh, the aran meddan relation is 
most important, whereas the Nigerien Kel Ferwan do not even know the term. 
Among the Kel Hoggar the tegezé relation is more important, since it forms the basis 
of power transmission. 
12  For the perception and expression of social cohesion through the human body see 
Claudot-Hawad, H. 1990. For more detailed schemes of kinship classification, see 
Nicolaisen, J. & I. Nicolaisen 1997: 615-653. 
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ideal of temet and tewsit endogamy, tegezé relations also occur within one 
tewsit. This can eventually form the basis of differentiation between tewsiten 
within a tewsit (as ramage group), or at least helping the demarcation. The same 
goes for the aran meddan type construction of a tewsit. Cross cousins are called 
iboubashen.  
The origins of a tewsit can be partly made and unmade at will. There is no 
exact system, and although the Kel Tamasheq see them as created in historical 
time, they are therefore often seen by researchers as post-fact creations, which 
has led many to describe the Tamasheq kinship and clan structure as a seg-
mented lineage system. Paul Pandolfi argues against this description by stating 
that the making, dissolving and continuous blending of clans is not a form of 
segmentation, but of internal dynamics and adaptation to new social political 
and economic situations.13 The same argument, however, led others to applying 
the term segmentary system to certain societies in the first place. A second 
argument is that many tewsiten that came into existence after the 1910s were 
not formed through internal dynamics expressed in kinship relations. They were 
the result of direct administrative meddling, which will be dealt with below. 
All tewsiten are perceived to be incorporated, in or at least under the in-
fluence of, an ettebel, which literally means (war)drum, hence the anthropolo-
gical translation ‘drum group’.14 An ettebel is a grouping of clans and ramage 
groups forming a political unit under the leadership of one clan or ramage 
group. The various clans and ramage groups stood in hierarchical relations to-
ward each other. The leader of the ettebel as a whole is called amenokal, which 
literally means ‘owner of the land’. The symbol of his power is a drum – the 
ettebel (from the Arabic tobol, drum) – hence the name. A convenient trans-
lation of ettebel is federation. The ettebel was historically the most important 
political and military defence group. 
Federations could rise and fall. They could be made and dissolved, depend-
ing on the strength of dominant groups in the political field. They could also 
combine in an even larger unit, the confederation, called tegezé in the eastern 
Tamasheq world. The once powerful Kel Tademekkat confederation was dis-
solved shortly before colonial conquest. In the 18th century, the large confede-
ration of the Ouillimiden split in two halves: The Ouillimiden Kel Ataram; and 
the Ouillimiden Kel Denneg. During the phase of colonial pacification, roughly 
between 1900 and 1920, the French military administration enhanced the in-
ternal process of creating and dissolving federations. Federations that posed 
threats to French rule, such as the Ouillimiden Kel Ataram and the Ouillimiden 
                                                 
13  Pandolfi, P. 1998: 204-205. See also Bernus, S. & E. Bernus, eds, 1986. 
14  The term was first coined by Johannes Nicolaisen. Nicolaisen, J. 1963a, 1963b; 
Nicolaisen, J. & I. Nicolaisen 1997. 
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Kel Denneg, were dissolved. Loyal collaborating clans were promoted to the 
rank of a federation, which might lead a French recognised confederation. This 
was the case with the Ifoghas federation in the Adagh, which was recognised by 
the French as an ettebel independent from the Ouillimiden Kel Ataram in 1910. 
Their leader Attaher ag Illi was promoted to the rank of amenokal, who 
informally led the other ramage groups in the Adagh Mountains – the Idnan, the 
Kel Taghlit and the Taghat Mellet – in a confederation called Kel Adagh. 
Although it might well be that the Ifoghas perceived themselves as independent 
from the Ouillimiden prior to French conquest, it is secretly known that this was 
not the case. However, the Ifoghas present themselves today as having had their 
own ettebel since the late 19th century, prior to French arrival, which, according 
to their own version of history, only helped to have their independence finally 
recognised by their neighbours. At present ittebelen are seen as historical relics 
in Northern Mali but, informally, they do exist and have an influence on local 
politics that is hard to measure. 
It is clear that the flexibility and interchangeability of the social-political 
system outlined above would get on the nerves of French colonial admini-
strators. Most colonial administrators dealt with this problem in the same way: 
They decided for themselves who belonged together and what that group should 
be called. The administration in Soudan Français was characterised by the 
colonial administration itself as a double system of French Commandants and 
locally recruited Chefs Traditionels. The largest administrative unit was the 
Cercle, lead by a Commandant de Cercle, who could be a military officer or a 
civil administrator. The Cercle was divided into Subdivisions, also headed by a 
Commandant, and into parallel French created chefferies coutumiers, traditional 
chieftaincies. In sedentary societies, these were the cantons and villages, each 
headed by a chief, the Chef de Canton being placed over de Chefs de Village. 
Among the nomads, the French had created tribus and fractions – tribes and 
fractions – as ‘traditional’ social and now administrative units, with both 
headed by a chief, and the tribu regrouping the fractions. At first these tribes 
and fractions were based on the French understanding of the tewsit system. The 
term tribus was believed to be the proper translation of the Tamasheq tewsit as a 
larger ramage group, for example the Ifoghas. Fraction was seen as the proper 
translation of the term tewsit as a clan, for example the Irayakan tewsit within 
the tewsit Ifoghas. It then slowly evolved into a system based on French politics 
of control. Commandants could merge or split tewsiten to group them together 
again into new tribus or fractions. The creation of tribus and fractions should 
not however be seen as a one-way process dictated by French administrators. 
Their administrative grouping and regrouping often took place on the demand 
of, and effected under the influence of, the chiefs. In the end, the connection 
with the pre-colonial tewsit system was almost totally severed when dependent 
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groups were regrouped into fractions, detached from their original tewsit. Until 
the late 1930s, the communication and dealings with the Kel Tamasheq for the 
Commandants de Cercle was limited to the tribal chiefs, the interpreters and the 
goumiers – the native police force. Hence, the real impact of the administrative 
reshuffling of the tewsiten into tribes and fractions might have been quite small 
when it comes to internal social and political dynamics. The Kel Tamasheq only 
had dealings with their tribu and fraction insofar as they had dealings with the 
administration and their administrative chief. They could still use the pre-colo-
nial tewsit and ettebel structures in internal matters. It took devoted Comman-
dants who spoke Tamasheq and regularly visited the bush to make a real impact 
on the Kel Adagh social-political system. 
After independence, the new Malian administration set out on an active 
policy to modernise society and to undo parts of the administrative colonial 
heritage. Like the French had done before them, but this time based on Marxist 
theory, the new regime concluded that Tamasheq society was feudal. In order to 
change this, the ‘feudal lords’ – the traditional chiefs – had to be ousted, and the 
still existing servile social relations between former slaves and their former 
masters had to be totally abolished. Paradoxically, part of the pre-existing 
colonial structure was now formalised by law in order to change the system. 
The new regime believed that in traditional pre-colonial African society, the 
village had been the center of social-political and economic organisation and it 
therefore proclaimed the village to be the basic unit of Malian political, eco-
nomical and administrative organisation. Parallel to the village, the fraction 
nomade became the basic unit of administrative, political and economic 
organisation in nomad societies. However, the tribes that had stood over the 
fractions in colonial times were completely dissolved as an administrative unit. 
Their place was left vacant and was only filled by the enlargement of the 
fractions, which still exist today. But as the regime quickly discovered, it could 
not effectively govern without the assistance of the tribal chiefs, who were 
informally kept in place. The autonomy of the fractions from the tribe and the 
empowerment of its chiefs, as against the power of the tribal chiefs that took 
place in the 1960s, opened the possibilities for political use of the fractions in 
internal affairs between tewsiten as clans. In the 1970s the Teshumara culture of 
Tamasheq immigrant labourers in the Maghreb, and the Tanekra, the revolu-
tionary movement preparing the second rebellion, were hotly debating the exist-
ence of tewsit and caste hierarchy. While a majority of the members seemed to 
have been strongly against hierarchy and the tewsit system, a minority was in 
favour of strengthening its existence. Eventually, this minority would win the 
debate with the active help of the tribal chiefs and the passive help of the 
community, but this struggle is not over yet. In the 1990s finally, the fraction 
and its institutions were democratised and the procedure for their creation or 
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dissolution formalised in law. This new democratic structure made it possible to 
create, split, or bundle fractions on the initiative of others than the chiefs and 
Commandants. The main requirement to form a new fraction is one hundred 
potential members who agree upon a designated chief and elect among them-
selves a fraction council (often consisting of the initial organizers of the new 
fraction). The potential chief and his councillors can then request the necessary 
administrative forms from the Commandant de Cercle, fill them out and submit 
their demand. This procedure became very popular shortly after the second re-
bellion and still is today. In 1960 there were 64 fractions in the Cercle of Kidal, 
a number that had been more or less stable since the 1940s. In 1974 there were 
65, in 1996 their number had almost doubled to 114.15 ‘It won’t be long until 
everybody is his own fraction’ as one informant cynically observed. These new 
fractions, created on the initiative of the Kel Tamasheq themselves partly 
reinstitute the internal social dynamics of Tamasheq society on clan basis. The 
new fractions are often rooted in the social and political dynamics within a 
tewsit as clan (instead of as fraction), which, despite all French and Malian 
efforts, and despite the efforts of the Tanekra movement, has largely remained 
the basis of Tamasheq social thinking and organisation. 
An ethnography of historical research 
A historical work is always the outcome of the encounter between a historian 
and his sources. In this case, part of those sources consists of the historical 
discourse and memory of the actors and eyewitnesses of the presented events. 
These actors and eyewitnesses have informed the present writer from the point 
of view of their historical culture. Thus, it is necessary to be aware of their way 
of producing historical discourse, and the notions that inform this production. 
Therefore, I will give here an outline of Tamasheq thought on history, its 
sources, circumstances of its production, and the functions of its production. 
My relations to those who could help to produce this history were charac-
terised by both restraint and active engagement. During fieldwork in Northern 
Mali, I made contacts with a number of people I hoped to use as key informants 
and who could perhaps lead me to others. Some these were former ifulagen 
(sing. afuleg), as the fighters of Alfellaga are called, but they were not keen on 
talking much about their experiences, nor did they direct me to former com-
rades. I have not even been able to meet the leaders of Alfellaga as one of them, 
Zeid ag Attaher, had already died before I arrived in Mali, while the other, 
Elledi ag Alla, was reticent to meet me. Many former rebels of the 1990s were 
reluctant to speak too, since the organisation of the rebel movement had been 
                                                 
15  Journal officiel de la République du Mali, 26/11/1996. 
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formally sworn to secrecy. As one informant put it, ‘you erect a wall around a 
house to keep the rubbish out’.16 Yet I did find one man who doubled as key 
informant and as fieldwork assistant in Kidal, the capital of the Adagh. Mo-
hamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall, presented to me as ‘the official historian of 
the Ifoghas clan’, doubled as research assistant and informant on a period that is 
crucial in this book: That of the Tanekra, the movement that prepared for the 
second rebellion from 1975 to its outbreak in 1990. Fall had been among the 
first organisers of the Tanekra movement and knew the story – his story – by 
heart. Working with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall proved to be a 
pleasure, but sometimes a handicap when meeting other people. A handicap as 
it blocked access to some categories of informants who were not too keen on 
the ideas of ‘the Ifoghas Minister of Propaganda’ as he was called outside his 
own clan, and a pleasure as his narratives provided me with a basic story and a 
deepened understanding of how Tamasheq history works. When my attempts to 
have people discuss the subjects I was interested in failed, I often offered to 
recount what I presumed to know. I then told the history according to Mohamed 
Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. More often than not people reacted to this version in 
exclaiming ‘bahuten ghas dihadagh!’, ‘those are nothing but lies!’ 
The relations between those who construe events in Tamasheq historical pro-
duction are shaped by what Andrew Shryock calls ‘a community of disagree-
ment’.17 During my fieldwork, Tamasheq society was in a phase of high po-
litical polemics, based on tewsit affiliation. And, like the tribal world of the 
Jordanian Balga described by Shryock, ‘In a community defined by polemic, 
dissensus must be preserved (...) if tribal names are to retain their signific-
ance’.18 The narrative I gave to potential informants was either too general to fit 
the narrative of their own tewsit, or it was too close to that of another tewsit to 
be acceptable. Thus, all information given (with a few remarkable exceptions) 
is coloured by the polemical relations between certain tewsiten. Indeed, I doubt 
that many of my informants would agree entirely with the story as I present it 
below, simply because the role of their own tewsit is absent or presented in a 
way which conflicts with their own vision. If there is one concept that lies at the 
heart of Tamasheq historical discourse, it is that of the fundamental incomplete-
ness of narrative, since there is always a voice being left out. On the other hand, 
it is not completeness that matters so much, as does the vision presented in 
historical discourse. 
The Kel Tamasheq encountered during this research distinguish between 
four main forms of historical knowledge constituting the sources of history as a 
                                                 
16  Interview with Malik ag Sallah. Ménaka, 28/04/1999. 
17  Shryock, A. 1997: 59. 
18  Ibid. 
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whole: At-tarikh, written history; tinfusen, oral history or narrative; tisiway, 
poetry; and temet, genealogical recollection. The Tamasheq appreciation of 
historical sources seems to be not far removed from common views on history 
in Western culture and, indeed, from concepts held by some professional 
Western historians, which is probably due to the fact that the Kel Tamasheq 
have a long-standing tradition of literacy in Arabic.19 The literacy rate has 
increased in the last fifty years when some Kel Tamasheq became educated in 
French as well. Some forms of oral literature, like poetry, are highly regarded as 
historical sources, but most forms of tinfusen, stories or oral history, were 
discarded as unreliable. I do not know to what extent this was the case a few 
generations ago, but I imagine that this is a process linked to the increase in 
literacy. As far as they are available, books constitute a source of historical 
knowledge presented as such, and used as a final argument reinforcing the 
validity of historical discourse. The Arabic word at-tarikh – history – means 
‘written history’ in Tamasheq. It is classified in two categories. Historical pro-
ducts written in Arabic are called kitaban, the Arabic word for book put in 
Tamasheq plural. Historical products written in French are called livrtan, the 
French word for book put in Tamasheq plural. Regardless of language, most 
value and credibility is given to these written historical works and many of my 
informants deplored their lack of availability or access to them. Some of my 
informants referred to articles or books written by local scholars (sometimes 
themselves), or the works written by foreign researchers. Some of them also 
referred to the local archives as livrtan of great value. One of the more frus-
trating moments of my fieldwork occurred when one of my informants asked 
me, ‘Why don’t you go to France? There are many books and archives there. 
We don’t know anything about our history. France is where you can find it all’. 
Tinfusen (sing. tanfust) means ‘stories’ or ‘oral narrative’ in general, a large 
category ranging from folkloristic tales, jokes, and the narrating of anything 
from important events to what one did yesterday. The exact meaning of tanfust 
depends on its contents. In this respect, a tanfust might be historical discourse 
itself, or the stories passed on by others on which one bases one’s own inter-
pretation. Tinfusen are perceived to be untrue due to their changing nature. One 
can tell a story in one way, only to tell it differently the next time. Written texts 
and poetry are perceived to be fixed, unchanging, and hence more ‘true’. Tisi-
way (singular: tasawit) means poetry. Poems dealing with historical subjects are 
highly valued as both sources of history and as historical discourse itself. Poetry 
is, however, not a form of historical narrative. Poems serve as an aide-mémoire, 
emphasising other historical genres. The events dealt with are presented very 
concisely. It is more a reference to events, than an account of them. What makes 
                                                 
19  Norris, H.T. 1977. 
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a poem valuable is the argument, vision or feeling expressed, which can be 
debated or taken as an example in other forms of historical production. 
Fragments of poetry are often used to illustrate what has been said, or as a 
fundament to build one’s own narrative on.20 The Teshumara movement and its 
successors have been very prolific in the domain of poetry and song writing. 
Most poems and songs reflect upon the social-political situation the ishumar 
found themselves in, and upon the social-political conditions of the Tamasheq 
world outside the Teshumara. The aim of the poets was to raise political 
awareness within the Tamasheq world, along the lines of their own thoughts, 
which were not by definition shared by all Kel Tamasheq. Hence, the relations 
underlying the (re)construction of events in historically loaded political dis-
course was one of ‘informed’ towards ‘non-informed’. Teshumara poetry is not 
only the result of relations contemporary to their production. Many poems 
evoke historical moments. Therefore, they are themselves historical end pro-
ducts, used to raise political awareness. I have collected a corpus of poetry 
myself but, due to unfortunate circumstances, most of this corpus remains 
untranslated and thus closed to me. Luckily enough, more competent people in 
this respect have done similar work. With few exceptions, I will make use of 
two unpublished corpuses of poetry. The first was collected in 1995, mostly 
from the mouth of the composers themselves, by Nadia Belalimat and translated 
with the help of Moussa ag Keyna, himself a poet of the Teshumara.21 The 
second corpus was collected by Georg Klute in 1996 and 1998 and was trans-
lated with the help of Ehya ag Sidiyene.22 These poems were collected largely 
in a similar fashion to my own collection and are similar in content as well. The 
two people that helped translate both corpuses were exactly those I had hoped 
to engage in the translation of my own corpus, simply because they are the best 
ones normally available. But alas, they were not. 
The centrality of individualised history, the exploits of persons, is predomi-
nant in all forms of historical production mentioned above. Tamasheq commu-
nal identity and belonging are imagined, in the sense of Anderson’s work, but 
the whole of Tamasheq society consists of face-to-face communities in close 
contact with each other. They know of each other’s existence, stories and 
particular exploits. The role of the physical environment is related to this. In 
times of scarcity, it is vital to be able to leave one’s territory and dwell on that 
of neighbours. In this particular environment, knowing people, and the relation 
to them over space as well as time, is essential to survival. It is easier to re-
member the historical relation one has to a particular tewsit through the inter-
                                                 
20  A good and available example of this is: Ag Alojaly, G. 1975. 
21  Belalimat, N. 1996. 
22  Klute, G. 2001. 
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mediary of some of its most renowned members than through knowing all of 
them personally. Second, the renown of individuals spreads out to their des-
cendants and living kin. Tamasheq society is essentially hierarchical. The hie-
rarchy is not only based on caste status, but within a tewsit on the value and 
consequent prestige of its members. One factor in acquiring status or keeping it 
is to have legendary personalities in one’s genealogy. In this way, the history of 
a person reflects the history of a tewsit at a given moment, and their current 
status is partly derived from it. 
The individuality of Tamasheq history is reflected in archive material of the 
French period and early Malian administration. Apart from oral sources of all 
kinds, this research is based on a set of archival sources from a number of 
archives. Although I have collected a large body of relevant data in the Archives 
Nationales du Mali in Bamako and at the Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer in 
Aix-en-Provence, the most important archive collections I consulted come from 
four rather obscure and sometimes less accessible archives. After some efforts, I 
managed to gain access to the Archives du Cercle de Kidal in Kidal itself, kept 
in the then-vacant office of the Commandant de Cercle. It is largely thanks to 
local administrators of Kel Adagh origins who knew and supported my ende-
avours that I gained access to this collection, which contained an important file 
on Alfellaga, on which I base part of my narrative in Chapter 4. This material is 
supplemented with a substantive report written by the French intelligence 
service, the Service de Documentation Espionage et Contre Espionage 
(SDECE), who observed Alfellaga from their bases in Algeria (without giving 
any indication on possible support from their side), that I found back in the 
Centre d’Histoire et d’Etudes des Troupes d’Outre Mer in Fréjus France. This 
archive holds a set of copies from the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre in 
Paris, which is still under embargo, but which is freely available in Fréjus. 
Material on the late colonial period, especially on the Organisation Commune 
des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS) and its effects on local politics, were found 
first of all in the Archives of the Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et de 
la Sûreté (now Ministère de l’Adminstration Territoriale et des Collectivités 
Locales) in Bamako, to which I was granted access by then Minister of the 
Interior Colonel Sada Samake. Last, but certainly not least, I have been able to 
make use of a substantive body of documents from the Archives du Cercle de 
Goundam, which have been generously put at my disposal by Bruce Hall. With-
out these, this book would not have been possible. 
French rule in the Sahara was highly indirect. The French Commandants in 
the North were all military officers until the late 1940s. These men were often 
from the French nobility, who thought in terms of leaders; army hierarchy; and 
French prestige. They only had contact with the appointed chiefs and their 
helpers, and then only when they went on inspection and tax collecting tours. 
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Their reports reflect this. Most reports deal with tax collection, the functioning 
of the chief, his actions, and disputes over leadership. The civil servants of the 
late 1950s largely kept to the military tradition that had set the paradigms of 
their policy. After independence they were replaced by French-trained Malian 
administrators and army officers, who had previously been their subordinates. It 
is striking to see the resemblance between early Malian administrative reports 
and the reports of French Commandants. This individualistic approach to events 
from all sides, both Tamasheq and administrative, will be mirrored in this work. 
If all sources available deal with individuals, it is more than logical that the 
stories narrated and the examples given will do likewise. One can consider a 
history as a case to be presented and analysed to the benefit of scholarly 
endeavours undertaken outside its original milieu. One could also see it as a 
presentation of the way a community looks at its existence and presents itself in 
time. If the latter option is taken, one should incorporate elements of historical 
production and presentation indigenous to the history told. I will try to strike a 
balance between both approaches. 
A reader’s guide to this book 
The work presented here is a history, and presented as such, but it shares 
borders with anthropology. The two extreme visions on both disciplines have it 
that history asks how the past shapes the present and that anthropology asks 
how the present shapes the past. The general idea at present is that both visions 
meet half-way. This study is no exception to the rule. I will try to argue both 
ways. Discourses on the past are shaped in the present, but simultaneously 
discourses on the past shape an idea of the present and therefore a possible 
future. I will argue that preconceived stereotyped images of each other, most of 
which were of a particular racial nature, effectively shaped political and social 
interaction between the Malian state and the Kel Tamasheq between the 1940s 
and 1960s. In turn, the events that came of it – Alfellaga, the 1963 rebellion – 
were remembered and interpreted in a specific historical discourse, which 
served to muster support for renewed armed resistance against the Malian state 
since the 1970s. Thus, historical discourse both serves to explain events and to 
justify an intended course of events, but it also shapes reactions to events and 
thus events themselves. It is this interaction between idea and action in 
Tamasheq and Malian politics that will form the heart of this book. This 
approach means that I alternate various forms of historical writing in one book. 
While in one chapter I will construct a narrative, in the next (or in the same) I 
will show how narratives or similar narratives are used as an explanation or 
justification of a certain point of view. Where, in one part, I will use interviews 
as reference material in the construction of discourse or event, I will use them 
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elsewhere to deconstruct it as explanatory analysis to itself or events described. 
The underlying idea is that, to me, these analytical, argumentative and editorial 
means are valid if it is one’s goal to come to a comprehensive answer to a 
question, and that is exactly my intention. Although history, as all human scien-
ces, is involved in asking questions, I am somehow convinced that it should 
also be about giving answers. Structure, logic, ideas on veracity and interpret-
ation, are subject to a desire for understanding, for an answer, albeit an impro-
vised, incomplete, sometimes even incoherent and always temporary one. 
The first chapter of this book will discuss decolonisation, independence and 
nationalism in late colonial Soudan Français through a narrative history on 
party politics and the creation of the Organisation Commune des Régions 
Sahariennes (OCRS). The period at hand starts in 1946, the year France 
authorised the creation of political parties in its African colonies and organised 
elections for local representative bodies. This heralded the late colonial state 
and the first irreversible steps toward gradual independence. However, the 
discovery of mineral riches in the Sahara in the mid-1950s made many in 
France reluctant to grant full independence to the Saharan possessions. The idea 
to keep the Sahara under continued French rule was propagated among the 
Saharan political elite and, suprisingly perhaps at first sight, further promul-
gated with the ardent support of some of them, against the strongly expressed 
will of the West African political elite. However, French claims to the Sahara 
were also opposed by the newly independent Moroccan Sultanate, which 
claimed large tracts of the Sahara as part of the historical Sultanate, a vision 
supported by yet other politicians in the Sahara. These were the first seeds of a 
nascent and multivoiced Saharan nationalism, in opposition to a slowly evol-
ving Malian nationalism.  
The second chapter will discuss the role of stereotypes in colonial and post-
colonial rule in Africa and especially the role of racial stereotypes and racism in 
the wider Sahel and Sahara, but especially in Northern Mali. These subjects will 
be presented through a short history of the construction of stereotypical images 
and racial categories as part of colonial policies and through a narrative on late 
colonial and post-colonial politics in Northern Mali regarding slavery in Ta-
masheq society: The so-called ‘bellah question’ and the possible existence of a 
network of Tamasheq slave traders shipping slaves to Mecca. 
In the third and fourth chapters we will look at the relation between state and 
society in the early post-colonial period, through a narrative and analysis of 
Malian rule over Tamasheq society during Mali’s first Republic between 1960 
and 1968. The arguments brought forward in these chapters are twofold. The 
first is that different colonial and postcolonial experiences led to different ap-
preciations of colonial dependence and national independence, which are now 
expressed in local historical narratives. The second is that decolonisation and 
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independence led to competition over power between old and new political 
elites, which could be expressed in competing expressions of nationalism. 
While the first part of this contention is widely known and accepted, the second 
is less well known. In Northern Mali, this competition found many forms of 
expression during the precarious shift in powers between old and new political 
elites. The lack of actual control of the new political elite in Mali was hidden to 
themselves and to the outside world under a discourse of high modernism, 
which James Scott roughly defined as a firm belief in the malleability of society 
under the right rule.23 Yet, their anxieties about their real lack of power in the 
North came quickly to the fore in their dealings with local political elites, and 
the contestations these made to their power. The main rival elites were the tribal 
chiefs, who successfully managed to retain the position as mediator between 
state and society they had occupied in the colonial period, and the Western 
educated évolués of Tamasheq origins, who were excluded from administrative 
office precisely because of the racialised stereotypical views discussed in 
Chapter 2. These issues will be the focus of Chapter 3. Sometimes the conflict 
between rival political elites expressed in rival forms of nationalism escalated 
into violent conflict. Such was the case in late colonial Ghana/Ashanti and 
Morocco/Rif, in post-colonial southeast Nigeria/Biafra, in south Congo/Ka-
tanga, in post-colonial Zanzibar, and in post-colonial Northern Mali. Chapter 4 
will provide a simple comprehensive narrative of Alfellaga: the first armed re-
bellion of the Kel Tamasheq against their inclusion within Mali between May 
1963 and August 1964. Apart from a narrative on the rebellion and its effects, 
we will look at the present-day politics of historical memory and narration of 
these events among the Kel Adagh in particular, but also by other inhabitants of 
Northern Mali. 
Chapter 5 will deal first of all with the rapid and tremendous transformations 
in the Tamasheq economy, society and culture in the 1970s and 1980s. I will 
present a comprehensive narrative of the formation of a cultural movement 
giving shape to a new Tamasheq way of life in an altered world: Teshumara. 
This will form the background to a discussion of the transformation of Ta-
masheq politics from within, leading to the creation of a formal nationalist 
movement, the Tanekra, which gave shape to continued Tamasheq aspirations 
of independence. I will especially focus on the role of historical narrative and its 
politicization in the formation of this nationalist movement, arguing that in-
duced narratives of revolt, injustice, oppression, and suffering, as well as Tama-
sheq concepts of honour and shame, hatred and revenge, were instrumentalised 
in the construction of nationalist sentiments that found their expression in the 
rebellion of the 1990s. However, although the movement could shape a com-
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mon nationalist project, it remained internally divided on other political and 
social issues, especially the desirability of a social hierarchy and lineage-based 
politics as expressed in the tewsiten. 
In the final Chapter 6, I will present a narrative of the second Tamasheq 
rebellion, starting in June 1990, up until March 1996. All the issues discussed in 
the previous chapters will rise to the fore during the different phases of this 
rebellion. The rebellion took place in a generally turbulent period in Malian 
history in which dictatorship was replaced with democracy. Both the demo-
cratisation and the Tamasheq rebellion led to an upsurge in Malian nationalism 
that found its expression partly in the resistance against any compromise with 
the Tamasheq nationalist rebels. These competing nationalisms finally led to a 
full blown ethnic conflict locally perceived as a civil war, or an ethnic conflict 
cloaked in a nationalist discourse of true Malians against alien nomad invaders. 
All the stereotypical racist images and discourses discussed in Chapter 2 return 
to an even more prominent place than they had in the 1960s. But as the 
Tamasheq rebels were militarily superior to the Malian Armed Forces, com-
promise had to be reached. This, however, brought the internal divisions within 
the Tamasheq nationalist movement to light, which led to schisms on the basis 
of both national and social political ideals, and the politics of lineage and 
tewsiten. 
In the end, the question arises whether the conflict was still a nationalist one 
or whether internal political issues were more important. This question will 
implicitly be answered in the Epilogue to this book that deals with the period 
from the final peace between Mali and the Kel Tamasheq in 1996 to the present. 
It is perhaps a bit contrarian to present a book on precisely its discontents in 
a year in which half the continent celebrates half a century of national inde-
pendence. So be it. This is as good a moment as any other to read on these 
subjects. Giving it more weight by placing it in a narrative of celebration would 
in fact counter all analysis in this book. 
 
1 
Creating Mali 
From the 1960s onwards, historians constructed a periodisation that still struc-
tures the practice of African history. The division then made, into pre-colonial, 
colonial, and post-colonial periods, now impedes a more profound understand-
ing of current affairs on the continent. Stephen Ellis has already pointed out that 
writing on contemporary Africa remains largely steeped in a modernist dis-
course that aims to stimulate economic and political development. Alongside 
such usual suspects as journalists and political scientists, he fingers historians 
for their continued attachment to social theories and analyses held over from the 
heady days of social engineering.1 Such concerns do not necessarily shed light 
on issues important in Africa today. Much recent historical scholarship argues 
against national histories and so do I here. But I would like to argue, as I have 
done elsewhere, that histories that take the nation-state as a unit of analysis, 
rather than serving a nationalist purpose, might make an important contribution 
to understanding the genealogies of contemporary African politics.2 Studied in 
depth, independence, like colonialism, proves to be a gradual process with 
various stages and scales of interdependence, often labelled as neo-colonialism. 
But understanding the following assumption to be wrong, that all former colo-
nial subjects desired independence in the same way, is rather new, at least in 
African history. From the 1950s onwards, most Africanists have been enthralled 
by the independence myth, and they set out to write national histories for the 
newly independent states, or at least to frame their subject matter – be it eco-
nomic, social, or cultural – in a national grid. However, Africa in the mid-
twentieth century saw a number of violent political conflicts over independence 
that belied the myth of national unity. The most notorious of these were the 
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Biafra war and the Katanga war of secession. While the Biafra war is among the 
few to be explicitly recognised as a war of competing nationalisms, the Katanga 
secession is generally seen as a Belgian attempt to retain control over the mine-
ral wealth of this Congolese province. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, a growing 
number of studies have shown the fallacy of African national unity in the face 
of independence. Most radical is Basil Davidson who dismissed the nation-state 
model as an altogether inappropriate political structure in the African context.3 
But a small number of studies have shown that national sentiments were real 
but divergent in a number of African decolonisations. Jean Allman’s study of 
late colonial Ashanti showed the complexities of political life in Kumasi in the 
1950s, leading to the creation of Ashanti nationalism demanding for a federal 
Ghanaian state.4 In ‘Sorting out the Tribes’, Jonathan Glassman analyses poli-
tical processes similar to the ones described in this study, where racial and 
national imaginations were fused in an attempt by the Zanzibari political elite to 
regain independence from Tanzania in 1964.5 
Between 1946 and 1968, colonial Soudan Français was transformed into the 
Republic of Mali. The limits of the independence caesura as a useful moment in 
understanding Malian history have been amply discussed elsewhere, hence my 
focus here on a much longer period.6 The shape Mali took can only be seen 
from a supra-regional viewpoint overlooking AOF, North Africa and the Sa-
hara, with France at the horizon. The transformation process was inchoate at 
most times and often incoherent and contradictory. Agency in this process was 
dispersed over a multitude of players, and power balances shifted continuously 
between Europeans and Africans, administrators and politicians, parties and 
people. It was a slow and gradual process involving various legal statutory 
transformations of both the territory and its inhabitants, the formation of new 
political elites engaged in democratically organised party politics, the reshaping 
and reinforcement of states, and the imagination of nations. The main point of 
this chapter for my general argument lies in the plurality of these constructions. 
The outcome of the process was not a Malian nation-state, but a state harbour-
ing at least two nascent national ideas, if not more: the Malian nation and the 
Tamasheq nation. Whereas the first was intended and successfully stimulated, 
especially in the 1960s, the second seemed to be an unforeseen by-product that 
threatened the newly found and still unbalanced political order. 
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Competing nationalisms 
The choice between the terms ‘ethnic group’ or ‘nation’ sometimes seems arbi-
trary. Most writers agree that the concepts of ethnic groups, ethnicity, nations 
and nationalism are strongly interlinked. Ethnic groups and nations are seen as 
relatively large social units organised along principles of perceived common 
identity based on language, cultural traits, geographic location, polity and 
(fictive) bloodlines. Varying with the school of thought and purpose of use of 
both terms, other traits can be ascribed. The problem with both terms, as well as 
with the terms nationalism and ethnicity, is that they have never been the ex-
clusive domain of either social science or politics. Both the realm of perception 
and analysis and the realm of creative practice have used these terms and, in 
interaction, given them meaning and shape. All over the globe, the social polity 
identified with the state is called ‘nation’ as well, hence the concept ‘nation-
state’. The dual use of ‘nation’ as both a social polity in itself and as the social 
polity identified with the political unit ‘state’ enhances confusion, which is then 
solved by distinguishing between ‘nations’ as embodying ‘the state’, and 
‘ethnic groups’ as social polities living within but disconnected from the nation-
state ideological construct. Thus, in Mali, there is a Malian nation and there are 
Malians. There are also ethnic groups: Mande, Bambara, Minianka, Senoufo, 
Sarakole, Bobo, Dogon, Songhay, Fulbe, Kel Tamasheq etc, but these are not 
nations. To both politicians and, it seems, researchers, recognising their exist-
ence as nations would imply recognizing their right to separate from the Malian 
state. The implied difference is inspired by political rather than academic 
concerns. The political distinction between nation and ethnic group forms the 
basis for the distinction between their respective ideologies or cohesive forces: 
nationalism and ethnicity. Indeed, as with the characteristics ascribed to nations 
and ethnic groups, it is hard to observe the difference between nationalism and 
ethnicity. According to Ernest Gellner 
Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, 
can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of 
anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused 
by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this 
kind.7 
Here, Gellner seems to create congruence between nation and state, and he 
probably does so for practical reasons, as it is exactly the idea that nation and 
state as a polity should be congruent that matters to the nationalist, and also as 
Gellner goes on to describe nationalism as an ideology intimately linked to the 
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nation-state. It should by now be clear that what I will describe as the ideology 
of nationalism in this book is a modern-day, slightly less functionalist version 
of what Benedict Anderson has called ‘official nationalism’, or the ‘nationalism 
of the state or empire’. In practice, it shapes a national idea or image through 
the use of specific symbolism and language, the ultimate goal being to create a 
national image that is coherent with state interests and serving state-set goals.8 
In this way, nationalism decides who is a member of the nation (not all are 
worthy to participate in its politics or even live on its soil). Let it also be clear 
that I see this particular form of nationalism as the one that both the Malian 
state as well as the Tamasheq nationalist movement adhered to. 
Although ethnicity resembles nationalism as an ideology, it is not the same 
thing. In practice, they are both cohesive ideas intended to give shape to a social 
group larger than the direct surroundings and networks of its individual mem-
bers, and stimulating these members to create a larger social (and/or economic) 
polity. However, the distinctions between them, fine as they may be, are 
important. Contrary to nationalism as defined by Gellner, there is no such thing 
as a longing for congruence between ethnic belonging and ... what? The point is 
that ethnic groups can be seen as exactly the same polities as nations (which 
will at least be the case in this study). Thus, the sentiment expressing the wish 
for congruence between political unit and social group could always be called 
nationalism. Ethnicity is an idea expressing or shaping the human and social 
cultural content of an ethnic group or nation. While ethnicity defines the nation, 
nationalism expresses its political aspirations. Therefore, I will not refer to Ta-
masheq political ideas as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethno-nationalism’, a term often used to 
define the political aspirations of nations intent on seceding from the state(s) 
they currently live in. The Kel Tamasheq efforts to obtain their national inde-
pendence will be referred to as Tamasheq nationalism, indeed making it both an 
equal and rival to Malian nationalism and the creation of the Malian nation and, 
as I will argue, as such it was and still is perceived: a competing nationalism. 
Both the Malian state and the Tamasheq nationalists linked nation to state. Both 
the Malian political elite and the Tamasheq political elite imagined a nation – 
the Malian nation and the Tamasheq nation respectively – which had a right to 
political sovereignty or independence. Both political elites imagined these na-
tions as having been historically sovereign in precolonial times. The one differ-
ence is that the Malian political elite imagined the Malian nation as embodying 
various ethnic groups which should all strive to further the interests of the 
existing Malian nation-state, while the Tamasheq political elite imagined the 
Tamasheq nation as one, striving in the interests of independence yet to be 
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achieved. In fact, within the Malian state, two nationalisms and two nations 
strove for different goals. 
From Soudan Français to the Mali Republic 
Decolonisation in French Africa was closely linked to the Free French realities 
of World War II and the post-war interpretation of these realities by both 
French and African leaders. While French West Africa (AOF) sided with Vichy 
France at the start of the war, French Equatorial Africa (AEF) rallied to de 
Gaulle. Brazzaville became the capital of Free France. Most Free French Forces 
were African conscripts who eventually participated in the liberation of metro-
politan France.9 As in World War I, massive African conscription was obtained 
on the quid pro quo ‘blood for rights’. In the Brazzaville declaration of 1944, de 
Gaulle promised the colonial subjects more liberties after the war, notably the 
abolition of the indigénat, which would be replaced by a citizenship in a French 
Union, a promise kept during the slow but gradual process of decolonisation.10 
The first elections where African candidates could present themselves to an 
African electorate were those for the Constitutional Assembly that drafted the 
constitution of the Fourth Republic and its colonial dependencies in October 
1945.11 Soudan Français elected Fily Dabo Sissoko as its territorial represent-
ative. The political process that saw the creation of the French Fourth Republic 
also restyled the colonial empire into the Union Française that came into being 
in October 1946. The indigénat was abolished, a principal demand of the 
African representatives, and replaced by a citizenship of the new French Union. 
The Overseas Territories could create their own assemblies, first called Conseils 
Généraux and later Assemblées Territoriales, with growing competencies over 
the decade to come. Its members were elected by a gradually expanding electo-
rate. Along with the creation of territorial assemblies in this post-war decoloni-
sation process came the freedom to create political parties. 
In February 1956, the French overseas territories entered a new phase to-
wards independence. First, the Loi Gaston Deferre that sought to clear the road 
for reform of the Union Française was adopted. These reforms took shape in 
the loi-cadre, adopted later that same month. The loi-cadre was in fact a frame-
work for a series of laws, many of which were initiated by African senators, that 
provided internal autonomy to the colonies within the Union Française through 
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enlargement of the competencies of the territorial assemblies, the institution of 
universal (territorial) suffrage, and the decentralisation and africanization of the 
administration. The Assemblées Territoriales now held voting power over the 
territorial budget and internal economic and social policies. In the meantime, 
colonial subjects would acquire many of the rights of metropolitan citizens, al-
though they never gained full French citizenship on the same basis as their 
metropolitan counterparts in the Union.  
But while the demand for it grew stronger independence was still not 
reached. During his African tour in August 1958, de Gaulle proposed to reform 
the Union Française, together with the French Republic, which was nearing its 
fifth incarnation. The new Communauté Française would hold the same powers 
as the Union Française, but the former territories would formally become 
independent republics, with authority over most domains, with the notable ex-
ceptions of foreign policy, defence and finance. A referendum on the consti-
tution of the Fifth Republic, to be held in September 1958, would be decisive on 
the membership of the new republics. Voting in favour of the Communauté 
Française would mean a vote for continued partial dependency. A vote against 
the Communauté would mean direct independence. With the exception of 
Guinée, all territories opted for inclusion in the new Communauté Française. In 
November 1958, the colony Soudan Français was transformed into the Répu-
blique Soudanaise, member republic of the Communauté Française, with its 
own Assembly and a ministerial cabinet presided over by the Governor, but 
manned by Soudanese politicians. 
The creation of the Communauté Française and its adhering republics meant 
dissolution of the supra-territorial organisation of AOF, which many West 
African political leaders, in fact many West Africans in general, saw as a de-
cisive setback.12 Daouda Gary-Tounkara has argued that the transfer of power 
from the federal structure of French West Africa to the various semi indepen-
dent republics was seen by many of the federation’s inhabitants and leading 
politicians as a form of political divide and rule, as to many French West 
Africans, the federation had more political, social and economic meaning than 
its constituent territories.13 The dissolution of AOF was a disappointment for 
most who had hoped that their territories would remain united. Therefore, a new 
form of regional integration was looked for: a Francophone West African Fede-
ration. The Union Soudanaise – Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine (US-
RDA) took a leading role in its shaping. 
Within the West Africa-wide RDA there were two visions on the form 
federalism should take. The first, advocated by the US-RDA under Modibo 
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Keita and the Senegalese PDS under Leopold Sedar Senghor, advocated a West 
African federation of states, independent from France. The Ivorian PDCI-RDA 
under Houphouët-Boigny opted for a West African federation associated to and 
in close collaboration with metropolitan France. In December 1958, the RDA 
organised a Federal Council in Bamako. Delegations from Soudan Français, 
Senegal, Dahomey (Benin) and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) voted in favour of 
the independent federalist option. But Houphouët-Boigny had effectively lob-
bied for his own form of federation with France. Shortly after the Bamako con-
ference, Dahomey and Upper Volta opted out to join Houphouët’s Entente 
Africaine, leaving Soudan Français and Senegal alone on the road to federal 
independence. 
In February 1959, Soudan Français and Senegal formed the Mali federation, 
within the Communauté Française. Both republics would preserve their legal 
existence as such, but a federal government and assembly were to be created in 
Dakar, holding power over supra-territorial affairs. In many respects, the federa-
tion seemed a continuation of the federal structures of the AOF. The main goal 
of the federation was to achieve common independence form France. In April 
1960, the federation leaders reached an agreement with France over its exist-
ence as an independent federation outside the Communauté Française. The 
Mali Federation declared its independence on June 20 that year, but it proved to 
be short-lived. Conflicts arose over the political course of the Federation. 
Whereas the US-RDA under Modibo Keita adopted a rigid standpoint on 
Marxist Socialism as the basis of economic policy, Senghor’s African Socialism 
was far more moderate. Where the US-RDA took a stance against French 
foreign policy, notably on the Algerian war of liberation, Senghor’s PDS was 
more reconciliatory. Personal enmity between Keita and Senghor and a conflict 
over the presidency over the federation did the rest. The elections for the federal 
presidency were to be held on 27 August 1960, but on 20 August 1960, two 
months after its formal independence from France, and the start of its existence 
as an international sovereign federal state, Senegal left the Mali federation. 
Soudanese politicians in Dakar, including Modibo Keita, were arrested and put 
on the train to Bamako. In response, the Soudanese Government closed the 
borders and halted all transport to Senegal. On 22 September 1960, an extra-
ordinary congress of the US-RDA in Bamako declared the independence of the 
Soudanese Republic under the name Republic of Mali. Mali as we now know it 
came into existence. 
Party politics in Soudan Français 
In his influential historical essay The Black Man’s Burden, written as an argu-
ment against the creation of the nation-state in Africa, éminence grise Basil 
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Davidson rightly points out that the post-colonial state is essentially a reshaping 
of the colonial state by African servants of the colonial order, mostly by those 
who had been shaped through an educational system controlled by the colonial 
state or its allies, the various Christian missionary organisations.14 Writing on 
the decolonisation of French West Africa, Tony Chafer stresses the dynamics 
between the colonial administration both at the upper levels in France and at the 
local colonial levels, and the African political elites. The outcome of decoloni-
sation in AOF, according to Chafer, was not so much shaped by dialectical 
discourses and practices of resistance and control, but through close association 
and the meeting of diverging interests in shared political arenas. Although 
Chafer stresses the unpredictability of the decolonizing process and the fact that 
independence was largely achieved against the grain, it was in the end trans-
ferred to an African elite which had proved itself stable and dominant within the 
colony.15 This political class, whether or not one endorses Basil Davidson’s 
claim that it set out on a political course in divergence with African experience 
previous to colonisation, did stipulate that course by means of party politics on 
a vessel of state they had previously been helping to keep afloat. 
Contemporary observers to the decolonisation process in French West Africa 
have noted that its African participants fell into three groups: chiefs, teachers 
and soldiers.16 According to this vision, before World War II, the traditional 
chiefs dominated the African political field within the colonial system. During 
the interbellum, the teachers, who stand as a profession for all French educated 
colonial civil servants and other colonial évolués, organised cultural associa-
tions and literary clubs, which formed the breeding ground for the post-war 
parties. The soldiers were still absent, fighting for France in the various theatres 
of World War II, but on their return as veterans they would play an important 
part in winning rights for colonial subjects. In the post-war period, chiefs and 
teachers struggled for political supremacy in the new political institutions, a 
battle won by the teachers. The soldiers were absent, fighting colonial wars for 
France elsewhere in Madagascar, Algeria and Indochina. But again, on their 
return as veterans, they would side with the teachers in the construction of 
political parties. Finally, not long after independence, the soldiers took over 
political power in various coups d’état. This vision is of course strongly over-
simplified. First, it neglects other important actors such as, but not limited to, 
the Dioula merchants and the small professional class of mechanics, truck 
drivers, radio operators, veterinary assistants, nurses and other technical profes-
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sions.17 More importantly, it neglects the inchoate, ad hoc character of both 
decolonisation in French West Africa and the gradual construction of the post-
colonial states-to-be through the workings of party politics. 
The attention of historians to the process of decolonisation, and especially 
for its ambiguities and diversity, has been growing in the past decade. Although 
Tony Chafer stresses the collaboration of French and colonial political elites, he 
nevertheless stresses the difficulty these elites had to form a collective iden-
tity.18 Gregory Mann has effectively shown that the African veterans of the 
French colonial wars, often presented as a homogenous interest group dedicated 
to the cause of independence, were in fact a very heterogeneous constituency 
prone to first defend its own interests, and whose collective political language, 
if any existed, lay in ties of debt and claims with France that never ceded, 
despite claims to national belonging and citizenship in either the French Union 
or the independent states of the 1960s.19 Jean-Hervé Jezequel argues that the 
teachers, and in extenso the French educated West Africans, formed ‘un en-
semble déchiré’.20 He shows that the idea of a common political expression 
among this class, even the notion of this group as a class, is highly problematic. 
I fully endorse these visions on the heterogeneity of all politically active 
groups in AOF, a heterogeneity that finds it expression exactly in the political 
landscape of the late colonial period, which saw the creation of many political 
formations in strong competition with each other. Probably, the vision of these 
groups as homogenous and fighting for the common goal of independence that 
was presented by researchers in the 1960s, has been shaped by the total domi-
nance of the political field which the largest political formations in AOF had 
obtained by the early 1960s in single party states. In many former AOF states, 
these single parties in power were former RDA branches. In Guinée the PDG-
RDA had ruled since 1958. In Côte d’Ivoire the PDCI-RDA ruled since 1960, 
crushing all potential political opposition. In Mali, the US-RDA dominated 
politics since 1958 and it would effectively create a single party state in 1960. 
The common origin of these single parties obscured their politically diverse 
stances, from Marxist to Liberal, and the fact that they had either absorbed or 
crushed their opponents without totally smoothing out the political differences 
with these coopted politicians. 
However, despite the heterogeneity of all politically active groups, the 
centrality of French education in the creation of both a new class of party 
politicians, and the transformation of the ship of state by this class, cannot be 
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denied. Despite their conflicting political visions and interests, it was these 
groups that took the lead in the recreation of the political body of the colonial 
state through party politics. In Soudan Français, it seems that the key players in 
politics were educated in one colonial system or another, be it the army, the 
school, or the indigenous administration which created the chiefs and ‘notables 
traditionels’. Furthermore, many leading politicians were indeed teachers, al-
though they might have been opponents in the two main political parties of the 
colony. It can therefore rightly be argued that those groups in Soudan Français 
who failed to board the new ship of state in time were those who could literally 
not read the signs of changing times. Among those, it has been argued, were the 
Kel Tamasheq. I will here try to show that this is only partially true. Many 
Tamasheq simply did not want to board, while others were thrown off deck. 
In February 1946, the first parties saw the light of day in Soudan Français. 
Fily Dabo Sissoko, a schoolteacher from Bafoulabé, and the Soudanese repre-
sentative to the constitutional assembly of 1945, founded the Parti Progressiste 
du Soudan (PSP). The PSP dominated the Territorial Assembly in Soudan Fran-
çais from its creation in 1946 to the elections for the Territorial Assembly in 
1956. It had the support of the French colonial administration as it saw the PSP 
as moderate and willing to collaborate with the colonial system since many 
traditional chiefs, the colonial administration’s natural ally, adhered to it. It was 
therefore known as ‘the chiefs’ party’. Indeed, its uncontested leader Fily Dabo 
Sissoko was himself a traditional chief. Born in 1900, Sissoko came from a 
chiefly family in Bafoulabé, and he would replace his father as Chef de Canton 
in 1933.21 He was educated in the French school system at William Ponty, and 
became assistant schoolteacher in Dori (Burkina Faso) in 1915, where he wit-
nessed the bloody repression of the rebellion of the Tamasheq Logomaten tribe 
in 1916. Sissoko gained a certain reputation among fellow évolués as a novelist 
and poet in the négritude movement with a staunch anti-colonial stance. His 
modest fame as a writer, teacher and Chef de Canton had gained him his place 
in the constitutional assembly, where he collaborated closely with Felix Hou-
phouët-Boigny, another chief and évolué, in drafting the law abolishing the 
much hated forced labour. In France, Sissoko would distance himself from his 
earlier admiration for the Soviet Union to take a moderate socialist position 
within the French SFIO. His position as Chef de Canton and his moderate 
socialism brought him the favour of the colonial government in the years to 
come. The PSP's second asset was the support of the Soudanese traditional 
Canton Chiefs and Tribal Chiefs, who largely controlled the votes of their 
following. In return, the PSP strongly advocated their interests and political role 
in the administrative organisation of Soudan Français. Initially, support of the 
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colonial administration and the chiefs was enough to ensure the PSP's primacy 
in Soudanese politics against its only rival, the US-RDA.  
Mamadou Konaté, another schoolteacher, also from Bafoulabé was key in 
the creation of one of the ancestor parties to the US-RDA: the Bloc Soudanais. 
This party fused in October 1946 with the PDS, created by Pierre Morlet and 
Jacques Fayette, two French communists in colonial service (as schoolteacher 
and P.T.T. inspector respectively) to form the Union Soudanaise.22 The Union 
then immediately joined the AOF-wide Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
(RDA) at its founding conference in Bamako, in October 1946. Originally ini-
tiated by the Ivoirian leader Houphouët-Boigny to coordinate the actions of the 
African delegates to the constitutional assembly in 1945, the party now sought 
to promote West African interests in the metropolitan Assemblée of the Union 
Française. Thus, in October 1946 the Union Soudanaise – Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africain (US-RDA) was born. Some of its main leaders, like 
Mamadou Konaté and Modibo Keita, had been schoolteachers. Others, such as 
Madeira Keita, were civil servants in the colonial administration. Again others, 
far less influential at first but growing in importance after independence, were 
army veterans such as Diby Sillas Diarra. Their political education took place in 
the 1930s when, during the rule of the Front Populaire in France, African 
intellectuals were encouraged to organise cultural associations. After the War, 
so called GECs – Groupes d’Etudes Communistes – were created under the 
guidance of French communist volunteers, which started the strongly pronoun-
ced Marxist orientation in the later ranks of the US-RDA.23 Although most of 
its active members were intellectuals, and most of its early following came from 
the urban population, the US-RDA profiled itself as a ‘people's party’ or a 
‘party for the masses’, whose rights they advocated. This position gained it the 
suspicion of a colonial administration that, in the heydays of the Cold War, saw 
the machinations of the Soviet Union in every strong anti-colonial stance. 
To gain political prominence over its adversary the PSP, the US-RDA was 
faced with a multiple challenge. It had to enlarge its following in the country-
side. To do so, it had to oppose the chiefs who controlled the votes of their 
subjects. Besides this struggle for internal political support, it had to deal with 
the colonial administration, which backed the chiefs and their party. According 
to Snyder, the answer to all these problems was threefold. Through tight or-
ganisation and by adherence to strict party discipline, high-ranking members 
were allowed to tour the countryside, where they spoke to the people in a 
language they understood, listened to their complaints, and actually managed to 
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do something to relieve their needs, thus increasing US-RDA support. In turn, 
this meant the US-RDA gained more votes when suffrage was extended.24 
Many of the US-RDA main members were engaged in the colonial system as 
teachers or civil servants in the urban centres. The colonial administration could 
thus try to obstruct the US-RDA by sending its activists to the countryside, 
which proved counter-productive as it helped spread the US-RDA message to 
remote corners of the colony. Often, ‘the bush’ meant ‘the North’ as most US-
RDA activists, if not all, came from the Soudanese Bambara and Mande 
heartlands and were sent to places far from home. However, the banishments 
worked in the party's favour by spreading its message in the country, as well as 
by dedicating the exiled to their cause of uplifting the Soudanese masses.25 
Thus, in 1951 Modibo Keita was sent as a teacher to Kabara, the port village of 
Timbuktu. Awa Keita, Minister of Social Affairs after independence, was sent 
as a midwife to Gao in 1950, as a disciplinary act for her political activities 
within the US-RDA. However, having served in Gao in the 1930's to the 
satisfaction of the population, Awa Keita's possibilities to promote her party 
only increased. Having helped to quintuple the adherence to the US-RDA in the 
Gao region as one of two literate party members in the constituency, she was 
transferred to Senegal in August 1951.26 Thus having been banished and having 
served in the remote backwaters of the country came to be seen as an emblem of 
sacrifice to the party. The city-dwelling elite was not used to living in huts in 
remote hamlets and saw doing so as a sign of personal strength and political 
persistence. 
We always speak of the masses. But have we penetrated the masses so as to know 
their way of life, so as to have wiped away the hostility with which they look at 
those who went to the schools of the French, and finally so as to have sensed their 
vital needs and measured the extent of their ability to resist oppression? How many 
comrades agree to enter a dark and smoky hut, to sit on a mat which in colour and 
crust resemble the earth, to dip their hand, without the slightest repugnance, into the 
doubtful platter of tô or of rice, to carry to lip and drink without fear the milk on 
which swims a thin layer of dust.27 
Overcoming one’s repugnance for tô and milk reaped its rewards. In 1946, 
the US-RDA lost the elections in all Cercles except in Kita, San, and Sikasso. 
In 1951 it lost Kita but it won both Gao and Bamako, the two largest cities in 
Soudan Français, from the PSP. By 1956, the PSP had lost everywhere except 
Bafoulabé, Nioro, Macina (home of PSP’s second man Hamadoun Dicko), 
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Koutiala, Bougouni, and Goundam, home of the influential Tamasheq chiefs 
and PSP delegates Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar and his brother Mohamed 
Elmehdi. In 1957 only Fily Dabo Sissoko's home Canton, Bafoulabé, together 
with Koutiala and Macina, remained faithful to the PSP. By 1958, the PSP 
played no role whatsoever in Soudanese politics, and after their final defeat in 
the March 1959 elections the party was simply dissolved.28 Smaller regional 
political parties such as the Union Dogon and the Union Démocratique Ségo-
vienne, headed by Jean Sylvandre, a colonial civil servant from the Antilles, 
were simply banned on the grounds that regionalism was a dangerous divisive 
force.29 
 
Kel Tamasheq and party politics 
It has often been observed that the Tamasheq community was not actively 
involved in the politics of the post-war period, that they did not participate in 
elections due to a lack of understanding and interest, and that none of their 
leaders, also through lack of interest or understanding, presented themselves for 
elections. This picture is only partly true and does no justice to the complexities 
of the political arena in Soudan Français and to the differences within the Kel 
Tamasheq world during that period. The passive interest in, and knowledge of, 
political developments of the Kel Tamasheq is perhaps underestimated so far. 
First of all, interest in elections and politics was low throughout the Soudanese 
countryside, which had long regarded politics as a city affair. In 1955, only 26% 
of the total Soudanese population was registered as enfranchised.30 Universal 
suffrage was not introduced until 1956. But even then, voting percentages in 
Soudan Français were generally among the lowest in AOF.31 That the colonial 
administration often organised the elections at the start of the rainy season, the 
busiest time of year for farmers and nomads alike, did nothing to improve their 
interest. Additional handicaps to prospective nomad voters were the lack of 
information on upcoming elections, a shortage of ballot boxes, and the amount 
of time needed to get to existing polling stations. In general it can be said that 
the Kel Tamasheq inhabiting the Niger Bend were more active in party politics 
than those inhabiting the extreme north. Pierre Boilley analyses the elections 
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held in Kidal between 1946 and 1956 in full.32 From the number of Kel 
Tamasheq who cast their vote at each election, he concludes that the Kel Adagh 
had no interest whatsoever in elections. Yet, looking at the material he presents, 
one comes to the conclusion that numbers drop whenever elections for the 
National Assembly in Paris are held, but rise with elections for the Territorial 
Assembly in Bamako. In other words, the Kel Adagh, indeed probably the least 
interested of all the Kel Tamasheq in party politics, show an increase in interest 
when territorial affairs are concerned. Furthermore, as Boilley remarks as well, 
in those elections where nomad candidates from other tribes presented them-
selves, the Kel Adagh interest rose. Unlike the Kel Adagh, other Kel Tamasheq, 
such as those inhabiting the Timbuktu region or the Niger Bend, did express an 
interest in elections and party politics comparable to that of their sedentary 
neighbours, or even surpassing it. In 1957, the Commandant de Cercle in 
Goundam noticed that 
If the sedentary population is hardly informed on news from the outside world (with 
the evident exception of some civil servants and other literati), the nomads on the 
contrary are more and more interested in the outside world. It is for that matter very 
difficult to know exactly what sources they have and how from camp to camp the 
news is transformed into spectacular but seldom unfounded rumour.33 
When it comes to the active participation of Tamasheq and Bidân leaders in 
the new-style politics of the post-war period, the number of players was low. 
But those who did play did so at high levels and high stakes. The main reasons 
for the low number of active Tamasheq politicians were threefold. First, they 
were removed from the political centre. Party politics was an urban pheno-
menon in late colonial Soudan Français. Second, they did lack interest. Most 
Tamasheq tribal chiefs, the main intermediaries between state and subject, as 
many other forms of state infrastructure (schools, medical service, army) were 
absent in nomad areas, depended on French dominance. They did not feel the 
need to invest in the new political opportunities. When they did take an interest, 
they adhered to the PSP, which promoted their interests as chiefs. Third, an 
argument often put forward by some Kel Tamasheq and scholars alike: they 
lacked French education. Only a very small part of the Tamasheq world had 
access to French education, and this only at the lowest levels. In the Adagh and 
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Azawad areas, the first French schools were created as late as 1947. This was 
largely due to Tamasheq resistance against French education, but also, to a 
lesser degree, due to French reluctance. The French believed that education was 
unnecessary for a nomadic existence and that it would cause estrangement from 
the strongly orientalised Tamasheq ‘traditional culture’. As late as 1955, Claude 
Blanguernon, a school director in Tamanrasset, whose task it was to educate the 
Kel Tamasheq, wrote 
I do not believe it to be necessary to bring the Tuareg to a high level of education 
(...) this will not be beneficiary to them as the educated nomad will find himself cut 
off from his tribe, his habits and, fatally, will not be able to stay a nomad.34 
In this way the Tamasheq missed one of the most vital links to party politics: 
education and administrative jobs. As with their political interest, this vision of 
the lack of educational opportunities for the Kel Tamasheq is only partly 
correct. Indeed, levels of French education were low among them, but this was 
true for all of Soudan Français. According to Schachter-Morgenthau, in 1947 
less than 5 percent of school-age children were actually attending school. Not 
until the 1950s were there Soudanese studying abroad, and not until the 1950s 
did the first lycée classes open in Bamako, when the former Ecole primaire 
supérieure Terrasson de Fougères expanded. In 1961, only 10 per cent of 
school-age children could find places in classrooms, and at least 98 per cent of 
the total population remained illiterate in French.35 Literacy levels will not have 
been much different among the Kel Tamasheq by that time. 
One Tamasheq group specifically managed to escape these obstacles to 
political participation and lack of education: the Kel Intessar, a tribe living in 
the area south of Goundam towards the Mauritanian border. First of all, their 
living area, the Goundam, was less removed from the political arenas of 
Timbuktu and Bamako. From the mid 1940s, Goundam was connected to the 
Soudanese capital by regular flights with Air France, landing at its own airstrip 
in Goundam.36 Second, in the Goundam area and in Timbuktu, elementary 
schools had been available from an early date. The Medersa Franco Arabe of 
Timbuktu opened in 1911.37 Third, from the start of his reign in 1935 the 
amenokal of the Kel Intessar, Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, was interested in 
modernising the living conditions of his people. In this respect he was even 
ahead of the colonial administration. His requests for a school had been hon-
oured. The école nomade, a special educational institution for the nomad pupils 
of the Goundam that Louis Brenner characterises as a mix between a French 
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school and a madrasa was founded in the late 1930s. The Kel Intessar were seen 
as an example of the adequacy of the French mission civilicatrice.38 However, 
Mohamed Ali initially encountered administrative resistance to his plans for 
higher education. In 1942 he requested that his younger brother Mohamed 
Elmehdi be admitted to William Ponty in Dakar. His request was denied, like 
all his other requests for higher education. Mohamed Ali then started what he 
would later term a ‘crusade’ for education abroad. In 1948 he left his position as 
Conseiller Territorial to his brother Mohamed Elmehdi to perform the hajj. He 
travelled the Middle East and the Maghreb throughout the 1950s. During these 
years he managed to enroll some of his sons, which he officially took along 
with him to perform the hajj, in educational institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Libya and Morocco.39 Long after his resignation as tribal chief in 1948, the 
French would again change policy. Around 1947 a number of écoles nomades 
were created in the North. The ideal was to have one school per tribe or even 
per fraction. It was however very hard to find enough qualified personnel to 
staff these schools. Hence, by 1952 a number of former Kel Intessar school pu-
pils were employed as teachers. Their level of education being low, the French 
founded the so-called Collège Moderne under the immediate direction of the 
Inspector of Education in the North, Henri Combelles.40 The Collège Nomade, 
as the school became quickly known, was situated in Diré, one of the main 
village in the Kel Intessar area. Most pupils at this college were trained to 
become either teachers themselves to staff the expanding number of écoles 
nomades in the North for Tamasheq and Bidân pupils or as veterinary assist-
ants, which was in line with French colonial views on improving nomad exist-
ence. The Kel Tamasheq educated at the Collège Nomade in Diré would later 
rise to administrative posts and join in party politics, such as Commandant de 
Cercle in Kidal, Mohamed ould Najim, and Muphtah ag Hairy, Commandant de 
Cercle in Bourem.41 A number of these French educated Kel Tamasheq were of 
slave origins, which made their new position in society hard to accept for the 
nobility. 
In the first elections for the Territorial Assembly in 1946, we find two 
Tamasheq candidates. Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar presented himself as a 
PSP candidate. Sidi Mohamed ag Zocka, chief of the Shoukhan wan Ataram 
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tribe in Gourma Rharous presented himself as an independent candidate. Sidi 
Mohamed ag Zocka’s short-lived political career was one in search of allies and 
direction. In 1945 he travelled to Bamako where he contacted politicians of all 
parties, including Balobo Maïga, a northerner himself and a member of the PSP, 
and Mar Diagne of the US-RDA. In 1946 he did not gain enough votes outside 
his own Cercle to be elected. In 1947 Sidi Mohamed ag Zocka became ill and 
asked to be relieved of his functions as tribal chief.42 Mohamed Ali was elected 
in 1946, securing the Goundam and Timbuktu Cercles for the PSP. After Mo-
hamed Ali left on the hajj in 1948, not to return to Mali until rendition in 1963, 
his younger brother Mohamed Elmehdi took over his positions as Chef Tradi-
tionel and as Conseiller Territorial. He remained active in politics until well 
after independence, first within the PSP and later within the US-RDA. In the 
1951 partial elections for the Conseil général, we find a new PSP candidate 
from Kel Intessar origins: Hacko ag Ibrahim, a veterinarian from Goundam.43 
Hacko won these elections, but did not survive the political downfall of the PSP 
in the late 1950s. He remained active in the party in his home region of Goun-
dam. In 1955, Hacko ag Ibrahim founded a special nomad subcommittee of the 
PSP to reorganise nomad support for the party and to strengthen their position 
against the US-RDA.44 In 1956 he seriously opposed Mohamed Elmehdi’s 
candidacy for the PSP list in Goundam, who was nevertheless elected.45 Thus, 
two Tamasheq leaders competed in one constituency over parliamentary seats. 
But Tamasheq participation in elections did not guarantee their full inclusion in 
the political world of Soudan Français. Despite the PSP's downfall from 1956 
onwards, the chiefs' party remained strong in Goundam and the Niger Bend, 
where Tamasheq chiefs remained supportive of the party. By 1958 the PSP had 
no representatives left in the Assemblée Territoriale. Some Tamasheq and 
Bidân chiefs then went over to the US-RDA. Some did so on their own ini-
tiative and political insight, such as Intalla ag Attaher, the second son of the 
amenokal of the Adagh. Some only did so under strong pressure from the US-
RDA itself. This was for example the case with Badi ould Hammoadi, chief of 
the Bidân Kounta confederation. On the advise of Habib Wafi, a Bidân mer-
chant elected to the territorial Assembly in 1956, Badi rallied to the US-RDA in 
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1959, without ever being active in the PSP. But he did so only after the new 
Soudanese administration had threatened to dismember his confederation and 
thus curtail his chiefly powers. 
Despite later attempts to win them to their side, the US-RDA kept distrusting 
Tamasheq society in general and its chiefs in particular. The continued support 
of the chiefs for the PSP did not help their cause against a US-RDA bent on 
their abolition. In the first government installed after the implementation of the 
Loi-cadre, Minister of the Interior and US-RDA left-winger Madeira Keita 
started to curtail the chiefs’ power. In 1957 he wrote a first circular about the 
modernisation or the possible abolition of the traditional chiefs. On 10 April 
1958, the ordinance on the chiefs of March 1935 was withdrawn.46 But despite 
its formal opposition against the chiefs, the US-RDA very well knew its power 
and influence in the North to be insufficient to do without them. The nomad 
tribal chiefs were kept in place because of their influence over their subjects and 
their knowledge of the country. At the time, the US-RDA was not yet strongly 
implanted in the extreme North and the political events of the moment were not 
in favour of losing grip on a group suspected to be politically active to the dis-
advantage of the new regime. But the Tamasheq chiefs were certainly not well 
regarded. Soon after independence in 1960 the new regime started to curtail 
their power. 
International complications 
The fear of US-RDA leaders for Tamasheq political opposition to their rule 
came to a height between 1956 and 1959, when the territorial integrity of 
Soudan Français came under attack in various ways. The discovery of mineral 
riches in the Algerian Sahara in 1956, together with the gradual granting of 
autonomy and independence to the colonies of the Maghreb and French West 
Africa, provoked a political and military battle over Saharan territory involving 
France, Morocco and the political elites of Mauritania and Northern Soudan 
Français. The French attempted to keep the Sahara French through the creation 
of a new Saharan colony: The Organisation Commune des Régions Saharien-
nes. Simultaneously the Moroccan Istiqlâl party claimed parts of the Sahara 
including Mauritania and the Soudanese north up to Timbuktu on historical 
grounds. These claims were enhanced, supported and juxtaposed in Mauritania 
and Soudan Français by a number of political players advocating either the 
Moroccan claims on Mauritania and Soudan Français or their own claims on a 
greater Mauritania. These advocates of a greater Maghreb formed a small poli-
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tical party, the Nahda al-Wattaniyya al-Mauritaniyya, Parti pour la Renaissance 
Mauritanienne (Mauritanian Renaissance Party), which played a crucial role in 
the conflict. Various Tamasheq and Bidân leaders in Soudan Français actively 
supported either the French or the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, or all at 
the same time. Their support for these ‘foreign’ claims made them highly 
suspect in the eyes of the Malian nationalists. After independence they were 
regarded as enemies of the Malian state and ‘vassals’ to the ‘French neo-impe-
rialist cause’. 
 
The OCRS 
The OCRS was an attempt to keep the Sahara French, despite the imminent 
independence of the Maghrebin and West African colonies. Although the 
French efforts to remain in control over the Sahara became more intense after 
the discovery of hydrocarbons in the Algerian Sahara and the start of the 
Algerian war of independence in November 1954, the idea of a French Sahara 
predated these events. The first idea to unify the Sahara into one territory dates 
from 1951, when Emile Belime, the former director of the Office du Niger in 
Soudan Français, proposed to nationalise the Sahara. Belime headed a study 
committee for the creation of a French Sahara, which published its findings in 
1952, and in that same year Senators Pierre Cornet and Pierre July proposed to 
regroup the Sahara into one autonomous Région under a High Commissioner of 
the Republic or into a Département. Their propositions were voted down in the 
National Assembly, but the idea remained alive and in 1953 Senator Paul Alduy 
invited the Government to promote the rational organisation of the economy in 
the Sahara.47 In 1956, the idea resurfaced with more urgency. In February 1956, 
oil was struck in Algeria, near the Libyan border, in the northernmost part of the 
Tamasheq world.48 Five months later, the largest oil well in Algeria until pre-
sent started spouting its riches at Hassi Messaoud, while natural gas was 
pumped up at Hassi R’mel. At Colomb-Béchar, coal was mined. Various metals 
and other minerals were discovered in the Hoggar Mountains of Southern Alge-
ria, and phosphor and iron ore were located in Mauritania. In a contemporary 
study on the creation of the OCRS, Jean-Louis Quermonne, professor of law in 
Grenoble remarked with some glee: 
                                                 
47  Based on: Keita, N. 2005. 3; Annexe au proces-verbal de la séance de l’Assemblée 
Nationale du 9 mars 1956. ANSOM – 1affpol/2321/3; Jean-Louis Quermonne, 
L’Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes selon la loi du 10 janvier 1957. 
AMSAT – Dossier 35 – OCRS 1957-1962. 
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When he gave France a lot of Sahara for a lot of Sudan, Lord Salisbury declared: 
“The French Cock likes to scratch the Sand!” It seemed unlikely then that the Great 
Desert could harbour any useful riches, or at least not for a long time.49 
Well, the French cock had scratched the sand and the discovery of natural 
gas, petroleum and other minerals underneath transformed the Sahara from a 
worthless stretch of sand and rocks into a potential goldmine. But the ongoing 
war of liberation in Algeria was threatening to spread into the Sahara, which 
would endanger the effective exploitation of this mineral potential. Unifying the 
Sahara into one territorial and administrative unit would facilitate countering 
military and propaganda actions from the Forces de Libération Nationale 
(FLN): the Algerian Liberation Army. Furthermore, the imminent independence 
of the sub-Saharan territories and the independence of the Maghreb could mean 
a loss of Saharan riches for France. This was made clear by the Moroccan 
claims on Mauritania, South Western Algeria and Northern Mali, and the subse-
quent Moroccan invasion of Mauritania in 1956. 
The parliamentary debates, bills and amendments on the Sahara between 
1956 and 1957 show the ambiguity of the plan to unify the Sahara, and the 
resistance to these plans from African politicians. In March 1956, several differ-
ent proposals were made in the National Assembly for Saharan unification. 
Proposition 1131 proposed to erect the total Saharan zone in a group of three 
French Départements with special status called Afrique Saharienne Française. 
Proposition 1198 simply proposed to ‘proclaim the French Sahara a “National 
Territory”’, as did propositions 1068 and 1627.50 What all these plans had in 
common was the idea that the Sahara should be put under direct French 
metropolitan rule. The Sahara was seen as French property, a mineral rich no-
man’s-land, to be efficiently exploited and administered. 
However, none of these projects had included Mauritania or the Soudanese, 
Nigerien, or Chadian parts of the Sahara. When the members of the Political 
Bureau of the Ministry of Overseas Territories discovered that these Saharan 
territories were not included, they brought this to the attention of their supe-
riors.51 Overseas Territories was of the opinion that non-inclusion of the Saha-
ran zones of AOF within a new Saharan territory would only enhance the admi-
nistrative chaos. However, since all projects spoke of ‘nationalising the Sahara’, 
their idea to include the Saharan parts of these territories within the new 
‘National Sahara’ met fierce resistance from African politicians. 
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One problem in the debates about administrative unification was how to 
delimit the French Sahara.52 To the west, north and east, this problem was easily 
solved. The French Sahara started in the west at the border with the Spanish 
Sahara. It ended to the north at the Moroccan border and the non-Saharan 
Algerian Départements and in the east at the border between Chad and the 
Republic of Sudan. Problems arose in the South. First, the leaders of Chad, 
Niger and Soudan Français did not relish the prospect of losing part of their 
future national territory, and the potential mineral riches it might conceal. The 
Soudanese leaders in particular fiercely opposed any territorial and political 
reorganisation that could be detrimental to their national territory. 
A second problem was on what criteria the border between Sahara and Sahel 
should be drawn. On one side of the argument, the supporters of the Saharan 
unification believed the Sahara ended where the Soudan started. Here Soudan 
meant the original Arabic Bilâd as-Sudân – the ‘Land of the Blacks’. Both the 
Bidân and the Kel Tamasheq were seen as racially ‘white’. Accordingly, it was 
felt that those areas inhabited by the Bidân and the Kel Tamasheq were Saha-
ran, and areas inhabited by the black population were not. The French oppo-
sition to territorial restructuring countered this argument. They stated that many 
Bidân and Kel Tamasheq were black, that the majority of the Kel Tamasheq 
lived as far south as the Niger Bend and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), which 
could hardly be called Saharan, and that these populations were socially and 
economically interwoven with the populations surrounding them. Therefore, the 
idea of creating a new administratively unified Saharan territory including the 
AOF parts of the Sahara would end in chaos and problems for the nomad popu-
lations. 
Eventually, the project to unify the Sahara was put in the trusted hands of the 
Ivorian RDA leader and French Minister of State Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who 
managed to remove all the political angles. His focus was on the creation of an 
Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS), in which no mention 
was made of any political or territorial reorganisation, or of the delimiting of 
Saharan borders. All Boigny proposed to do was to create an umbrella structure 
to coordinate economic and social developments in the Sahara, regardless of 
territory or state. Nevertheless, he had to defend his project against the Sou-
danese leaders who still looked suspiciously on the OCRS as a French plan to 
annex their Saharan territory. Even in the final debates on Houphouët-Boigny's 
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project, the Soudanese Senator Amadou Bâ proposed to amend the law such 
that: 
The organisation of the Saharan regions should in no case lead to the creation of an 
autonomous territory.53 
After further debate, Houphouët-Boigny managed to convince the Souda-
nese of the good intentions of the OCRS. His legal proposition was accepted 
and the OCRS was created on 10 January 1957. For Soudan Français this meant 
the inclusion of the Saharan parts of the Cercles Goundam, Timbuktu and Gao 
in the new structure. Soudanese suspicions were revived however, by the re-
action of the French political establishment. François Mitterand, then Minister 
of Justice reacted in favour of the OCRS, but 
I would nevertheless have liked a more structured Saharan territory, in greater 
conformity with its geographical realities, administratively more autonomous from 
Algeria and the Black African Territories bordering to the South.54 
The ensuing creation of a Ministry of Saharan Affairs in June 1957, headed 
by Max Lejeune, former secretary of state at the Ministry of Defence made 
matters far worse. The new ministry was endowed with economic, social, diplo-
matic and political competences over the Algerian Territoires du Sud, reshaped 
into French Départements in August 1957, and the Northern parts of Soudan 
Français, Niger and Tchad (the limits of which were never specified). The 
diplomatic and political competences given to this ministry made clear that the 
French had more than economic intentions with the OCRS.55 From that point 
onwards, the political leaders of the AOF were no longer the only ones to 
oppose the OCRS. The Ministry of Saharan Affairs had been created to the 
detriment of the competence of the Ministry of Overseas Territories. Thus, 
some colonial administrators in AOF, who did not want to lose a part of their 
job or influence, and the Ministry of Overseas Territories, which felt likewise, 
now backed the African politicians against the competition of this new ministry. 
 
Marcel Cardaire and the Qadi of Timbuktu 
The OCRS had fierce supporters within the French administration and military 
services, and also among the Bidân and Kel Tamasheq elite. Two players in 
particular stand out: the French intelligence officer in Soudan Français, Marcel 
Cardaire; and the Bidân notable, Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick, better 
known as ‘the Qadi of Timbuktu’. 
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Of all the officers who served in Soudan Français and in the Sahara in the 
late 1950s Marcel Cardaire was probably the most influential and certainly the 
best known. It is no exaggeration to place him in line with early colonial ethno-
graphers and intelligence officers as Paul Marty or Maurice Delafosse. An offi-
cer in the Colonial Infantry, in 1954 Cardaire was posted in Soudan Français 
where he was integrated in the Bureau des Affaires Musulmanes. He was ob-
sessed with the possible threats that pan-Islamism and various modernist cur-
rents in Islam, generally labelled Wahabism, could pose to French influence in 
Muslim Africa, a subject he wrote an elaborate and well-informed book on.56 
He initiated the so-called ‘Counter Reform’ movement to safeguard the in-
fluence of quietist Sufi Islam on African Muslim civil servants, in collaboration 
with Amadou Hampaté Bâ and Abdelwahab Doukouré.57 Cardaire’s involve-
ment in Saharan affairs began in October 1956, when he was asked by the 
Ministry of Defence to study the Spanish Sahara, the Saharan areas of Algeria, 
and the connections of its inhabitants with the AOF in political and religious 
matters.58 This request was connected to the conflict between Morocco and 
France over Mauritania (infra), and the ongoing Algerian war of independence. 
Cardaire took Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick as his travel companion and 
interpreter, because of his connections with the communities Cardaire wanted to 
visit. They visited Tindouf, Atar, Colomb-Béchar, Ouargla, Ghardaïa, and Al-
giers. Cardaire was rightly convinced that to the inhabitants of the Sahara, the 
French administrative frontiers played no role whatsoever when it came to in-
formation, affiliation and travel. Such peoples like the Arab Rgaybat, Tajakant 
and Berabish tribes, and the Kel Tamasheq, thought and acted in interlinking 
networks of commerce, clan, and family affiliation extending from Colomb-
Béchar, through Tindouf to Timbuktu and Agadez.59 In these networks Cardaire 
saw a possible danger for continued French control over the Sahara, should 
local leaders decide to side with Morocco or the Algerian FLN. In his report 
Cardaire recommended that the borders between Algeria and AOF should be 
considered non-existent when it came to intelligence and military operations. 
Preferably the borders should be officially abolished. Furthermore, France 
should take actions among the Saharan population to ensure their continued 
loyalty to France, if they felt any, or to win their loyalty to the detriment of pan-
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Arab, pan-Islamic and Moroccan or Algerian nationalist sentiments.60 His ideas 
and recommendations would return later that year in the debates surrounding 
the OCRS. 
If there has been one advocate of the OCRS and the loyalty of the Saharan 
population to France, it is undoubtedly Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick, the 
‘Qadi of Timbuktu’ and principal informant to Cardaire on Saharan matters. 
Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick originated from theAhlAraouan tribe of the 
Berabish federation living north of Timbuktu. He was installed as Qadi of the 
Ahl Araouan in 1932, but had to resign his post in 1935, due to resistance from 
the local religious elite. Although he was reinstalled in his function, he resigned 
for good in 1949.61 Nevertheless he kept using his title of Qadi, and remained 
involved in the social and political games of the Tamasheq chiefs’ milieu. His 
main advantage over other Bidân and Tamasheq chiefs was that he could speak, 
read and write French, and had an extensive knowledge of French political and 
general culture through his travels and his library, which contained works on 
French penal and criminal law and the Petit Larousse Illustré.62 In 1946 Mo-
hamed Mahmoud joined the PSP. He was befriended by its leaders (except for 
Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, who was a bitter enemy), but left the party in 
1956.63 The Qadi’s finest hour came with the creation of the OCRS. Like the 
various senators and ministers discussing the creation of a Saharan territory in 
France, Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick was convinced that the existing bor-
ders in the Sahara were a problem. But unlike French administrators and jurists, 
ould Cheick did not see any problem in drawing a new border in the Sahara that 
would separate the ‘white’ nomads from their ‘black’ sedentary neighbours. Or 
rather, ould Cheick felt that his native Timbuktu and the whole of the Niger 
Bend belonged culturally and economically to the Sahara, and should fall under 
the political supremacy of the nomads inhabiting the region, under the aegis of 
France. To prove his point he wrote a book on the history of Timbuktu and the 
Niger Bend entitled Kitâb al-turjuman fi tarîkh al-Sahrâ’ wa-’l-Sudân wa bilâd 
Tinbuktu wa Shinqît wa Arawân (A Biographical Book on the History of the 
Sahara and the Sudan and the Lands of Timbuktu and Chingetti and Arawan). 
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According to Bruce Hall, this book is exceptional in two points. The first is that 
it contains praise on the merits of French occupation. The second is that it 
meticulously ‘whitens’ the history of the lands described, arguing for nomad 
supremacy.64 
In 1957, the Qadi started a campaign to promote the OCRS among the 
Saharan chiefs and notables, and to make their support for the OCRS and 
France known to the outside world. His campaign was based on the following 
arguments: the inhabitants of the Sahara are full citizens of France according to 
the Loi-cadre of 1956; they have become French subjects by signing treaties 
with France, and not with the leaders of African independence movements with 
whom they feel no affiliation; they are white and do not want to be incorporated 
into a territory or state dominated by blacks; they have their own specific 
culture and society and do not want to be incorporated into a North African 
state or territory. The Qadi maintained therefore that the inhabitants of the 
Sahara should either be given their own territory within the Union Française, or 
should remain French citizens like they were at that moment. In January 1957, 
shortly after the creation of the OCRS, the Qadi gave an interview to the 
Parisian monthly Le Télégramme de Paris, in which he explained his point of 
view. On 30 October 1957 he wrote a letter of petition addressed to President de 
Gaulle, signed by ‘the notables and merchants of Timbuktu’. This letter was 
published in Le Télégramme de Paris in December 1957. 
If there exists a right to self-determination for a people, we would like to believe 
that we are allowed to make our aspirations known. We declare without restrictions 
that we already are, and want to remain French Muslims [Français musulman]65 and 
an integral part of the French Republic. We manifest our formal opposition to being 
integrated in an autonomous or federalist Black Africa or North Africa. (...) We 
demand the incorporation of our country in the French Sahara of which we are part, 
historically, emotionally and ethnically. (...) France has not found us under Sou-
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danese domination. We have the strongest confidence that glorious France will not 
give us away freely to anyone’.66 
This would not be his last petition. The Qadi travelled extensively through 
the Sahara and Sahel. He first travelled to Ouargla, where a similar petition to 
de Gaulle was written and signed in the name of the traditional chiefs, the 
Aghas, Caïds, Chioukhs, the religious leaders, the notables and merchants of 
Ouargla. In Tindouf, he wrote a third letter of petition, which was signed by the 
Caïds, Kebar, merchants, the Qadi, the Imam, the notables of the Tajakant and 
Rgaybat. The letter was written in French and Arabic, and signed and sealed 
first by Abdallahi ould Sidi Senhouri, Caïd of Tindouf, followed by 152 other 
notables.67 The Qadi also visited the Hoggar and Ajjer areas in Southern Al-
geria, but apparently the chiefs and notables in these regions saw nothing in his 
project and refused to sign the petition.68 Back in Timbuktu, he wrote a fourth 
letter, in the name of the traditional chiefs, notables and merchants of the Niger 
Bend, Timbuktu, Gao and Goundam, in which he restated the demands of his 
letter of 30 October 1957. Two hundred seventy-six persons signed this last and 
longest letter.69 The Qadi did not limit his campaign to the nomad populations. 
He sought to include a maximum number of sedentary Canton and village 
chiefs as well. The reception of his ideas in these circles was greater than could 
be expected. In September 1957 Mohamed Mahmoud and his followers had the 
opportunity to explain their petition in person to a delegation of the Soudanese 
Government, including Madeira Keita and Modibo Keita, who visited Timbuk-
tu.70 
During the Minister’s reception in Timbuktu, the Qadi of the Kel Araouane, Mo-
hamed Mahmoud ould Cheick, insisted on presenting the nomad position. At his 
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arrival he organised a little manifestation, bringing together a number of supporters 
under a banner sporting “Long live the French Sahara”. Then, received in audience, 
together with two Berabish leaders, he presented the wish of the Saharans to be 
given an exceptional status [statut particulier], and the next day he tried to offer, 
without success by the way, a petition demanding the inclusion of Timbuktu in the 
Sahara. Without taking such outspoken positions, the chiefs confer on the repre-
sentation of the Saharan regions in the OCRS Commission.71 
In December that same year, the Qadi could again explain his vision to a 
visitor to Timbuktu: AOF High Commissioner (formerly known as the Gover-
nor General), Gaston Cusin.72 Clearly, Mohamed Mahmoud was not acting 
alone. First, he had the help of his brother Sidi Boubakar ould Cheick and his 
supporters. Then there were French officers who hoped to use the Qadi as the 
spokesman in a military strategy to unite what was referred to as the ‘Saharan 
Block’ – the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân – against both the nationalist forces of 
Algeria and the African political resistance against the OCRS as a political 
territory. Second, the Ministry of Saharan Affairs, which was still contested 
internally by the Ministry of Overseas Territories, and externally by the African 
politicians, welcomed the Qadi’s actions too. All signatories of the Qadi’s pe-
tition received a letter of receipt from the Minister of Saharan Affairs.73 That 
these different services were at odds with each other becomes clear from a 
correspondence from the AOF High Commissioner Pierre Messmer. In reply to 
inquiries on the Qadi’s activities by Madeira Keita, then Minister of the Interior 
of the Soudanese Republic, Messmer indicated that the Qadi could sometimes 
travel by military airplane. 
Minister, (…) The inconveniences of this person’s activities and the facilities that 
have been accorded to him by certain authorities have not escaped me. Thus, having 
learned that during his last stay in Paris, Mohamed Mahmoud conspired to obtain 
transport to Timbuktu by military aeroplane, I have intervened at the department, 
which managed to abort his project.74 
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The effects of the Qadi’s campaign 
The Soudanese political elite, who still strongly disapproved of the OCRS, 
regarded the Qadi’s actions with more than suspicion. In October 1957 the 
Soudanese Minister of the Interior, Madeira Keita, toured the North in order to 
see what was happening in the Soudanese part of the OCRS. His reports were 
alarming to the US-RDA. In Gourma Rharous and the Cercle of Goundam, Kel 
Tamasheq raided the herds of their former slaves. In Rhergo, a tribal chief had 
publicly offended the Conseiller Territorial for the US-RDA Abdoulaye Nock 
(most likely a Tamasheq himself), forbidding him to speak in public, and finally 
challenging him to a sword duel. Mauritanian Bidân entered the territory to 
campaign for a greater Mauritania (infra). In the Cercle of Gao, the Kounta 
cheick Badi ould Hammoadi campaigned in favour of the OCRS and ‘the 
separation of whites and blacks’.75 The Kounta cheick had already campaigned 
for more political awareness among the Tamasheq and Bidân in 1955 but to no 
avail.76 Inspired by the Qadi, he resumed his crusade. French reports about his 
activities and those of other Tamasheq chiefs confirmed US-RDA anxieties. It 
seemed the chiefs believed they could ‘affirm in no discreet terms, their wish to 
be integrated into a still badly defined OCRS, which is not favoured by the 
African leaders of Soudan’.77 
The Soudanese representatives in France accused the Ministry of Saharan 
affairs and the OCRS of engaging in racist policies, putting the Saharans against 
the Southern Soudanese population in order to make the OCRS a political 
territory after all.78 The OCRS was directed by a High Commission, which 
acted as a means of control over the Ministry of Saharan affairs, and as highest 
executive organ of the OCRS. The Soudanese representation in this High Com-
mission had been at stake during the autumn of 1957. Although the Houphouët-
Boigny law on the OCRS stipulated that the representation of the Saharan popu-
lations should in majority be of nomad origins, the US-RDA had successfully 
contested this position. A number of tribal chiefs organised by Mohamed 
Mahmoud ould Cheick, had proposed the territorial councillors Habib Wafi and 
Mohamed Elmehdi ag Attaher Insar as candidate commissioners. However the 
US-RDA appointed Mahamane Allasane Haidara, mayor of Timbuktu and pro-
minent US-RDA member, instead of Habib Wafi, thus violating the stipulations 
of the selection procedure, but securing its oppositional voice in the Commis-
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sion.79 At its inaugural session, Allasane Haidara made it clear that the High 
Commission to the OCRS or the Ministry of Saharan Affairs should avoid 
making the following ‘mistakes’: trying to transfer power from the Territorial 
Assemblies to the OCRS; trying to create a territory; and 
creating animosity between nomads and sedentary peoples, and between the differ-
ent ethnic groups of Soudan, Niger and Chad. Certain campaigns of agitation in 
Soudan lead to believe that there is a risk that this mistake will be made.80 
In Soudan Français itself the US-RDA leaders were well aware of the 
potential danger of the OCRS and the Qadi’s campaigns in favour of a Saharan 
Territory. The US-RDA leaders therefore counteracted all attempts to put the 
OCRS into effect on Soudanese territory until the September 1958 referendum 
on the new French constitution, and the creation of autonomous republics out of 
the former Overseas Territories. Modibo Keita would later admit that one of the 
reasons the US-RDA had campaigned for a ‘Yes’ on the acceptance of the new 
constitution and the Communauté Française in the September 1958 referendum, 
was their fear that a ‘No’ would lead to French incursion on the Soudanese 
Sahara through the OCRS. 
In fact, certain Commandants de Cercle in the Northern regions have created the 
myth of the nomad and the myth of the sedentary, the myth of the white and the 
myth of the black. They have created an embryo of opposition between white nomad 
and sedentary African elements. If, by consequence, we had to adopt a standpoint 
which risked putting us in opposition to the solidly implanted colonial element 
under these conditions, well, then, surely, the Soudan would have had its northern 
part amputated.81 
After the establishment of the Soudanese Republic in November 1958, the 
US-RDA remained reluctant to OCRS projects on Soudanese territory, and 
afraid of nomadic agitation in the North in favour of France. Indeed, expecta-
tions among the nomad populations of Soudan Français about the outcome of 
the referendum were linked to their perceptions of the function of the OCRS. In 
short, they expected that voting in favour of Soudanese participation in the 
Communauté Française had meant that their land would stay French within the 
OCRS. The visit to Goundam of the High Commissioner to the AOF, Pierre 
Messmer, accompanied by high-ranking US-RDA officials in November 1958, 
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shortly after the proclamation of independence of the Soudanese Republic, 
again raised such expectations among the nomad population.  
Great importance has been attached to this visit in Tuareg circles, which expected 
either a definition of their status, which they see, rightly or wrongly, as not yet 
defined in the present conjuncture, or an opportunity to manifest their separatist 
[particulariste] sentiments and aspirations. After the visit from these higher autho-
rities, they feel the question remains unsolved, and a certain feeling of discomfort 
remains.82 
After full Malian independence in 1960, the OCRS remained existent in 
Niger, Chad and Algeria, until Algerian independence in 1962. Mali, despite the 
visible financial and material advantages of the OCRS in Niger and Algeria, 
formally retreated from the organisation, to the regret of the Kel Tamasheq. It is 
clear that the nomad populations of the North had great interest in the OCRS, 
but it was not their only point of reference. Most tribal chiefs and Tamasheq 
and Bidân évolués knew full well what the international political setting was 
and what their position in the national field was. They estimated the latter to be 
a future position as a national minority without effective power (although they 
were unlikely to have used this term themselves). They estimated however that 
the international setting could perhaps generate a measure of autonomy through 
the complications of the struggle over the Sahara, but also through the struggle 
in Algeria and the Middle East, and the larger setting of the Cold War in 
general. 
The nomads are particularly informed. If an old chief such as the amenokal of the 
Iforas, who now lives in retirement, inquires with his passing guests after the OCRS, 
Egypt, Morocco, the developments in the Algerian war, Russia and the United 
States, it clearly shows the present worries, and to which point the entire Sahara 
resonates the with news of all events that could have an impact on their own lives.83 
 
Greater Morocco, greater Mauritania and Mali’s Northwestern border 
The OCRS project was not the only danger threatening the territorial integrity 
of Soudan Français or currying favour with nomad leaders. Although the direct 
impact was weaker, troubles in and over Mauritania would to some extent affect 
the Northern parts of Soudan Français as well. Bidân leaders of Soudanese 
origins were deeply involved. 
On 2 March 1956 the Kingdom of Morocco became an independent state 
under Sultan Mohamed V. But in 1956, Moroccan politics had not found its 
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balance yet. The National Istiqlâl party was divided into various political wings. 
No one doubted the legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy, but just how much 
power the king should have was in question. There existed various military 
forces in the country. In the Rif Mountains, a rebellion broke out opting for 
independence outside Morocco. Then there were the Royal Army and the more 
or less competing Liberation Army under the control of the Istiqlâl. Many Mo-
roccan politicians felt that large parts of the country were still under foreign 
domination. The Istiqlâl was divided into two camps on this issue. The left wing 
with Mehdi Ben Barka concentrated on political reforms within Morocco, while 
the right wing under Allal al-Fassi strived for the liberation of what it called al-
Maghreb al-Aksâ: literally the ‘Far West’ and here meaning ‘Greater Moroc-
co’.84 In July 1956, Allal al-Fassi presented a map of ‘the Moroccan Sharifian 
Kingdom in her natural and historical borders’. The map showed what the 
Istiqlâl considered as the liberated parts of Morocco and those it considered to 
be under foreign tutelage, but part of Morocco. These ‘occupied areas’ included 
the Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, the Algerian Territoire des Oasis and Soudan 
Français from the Algerian border at Bordj Mokhtar south-eastwards, via 
Arouan to Néma at the Mauritanian border with Soudan Français. The claim 
was not only based in historical and nationalist sentiments. The Mauritanian 
north is rich in iron ore and phosphate, riches the Moroccan Government could 
well use. Although their claims were vast, the actual dispute over territories in 
the 1950s would be concentrated on Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara. 
All sides to the conflict – mainly France and Morocco, but also the Mauri-
tanian political elite – used diplomacy, press campaigns and military action to 
win the Mauritanian population and other Saharans to their side. Part of the 
Mauritanian population, politicians and other elite agreed with the Moroccan 
claims. They were headed by Horma ould Babana. As the leader of the Entente 
Mauritanienne party, Horma ould Babana had been elected to the Assembly of 
the Union Française in 1946. In subsequent elections however, his party became 
oppositional to the Union Progressiste Mauritanienne (UPM) headed by Mokh-
tar ould Daddah. In the conflict over the mere existence of Mauritania, disputed 
by Morocco, Mokhtar ould Daddah was the head of the pro-French part of the 
Mauritanian elite. He was a very prudent politician who managed to keep his 
country together by developing the political doctrine that Mauritania was the 
turning point between the Arab Berber Maghreb and ‘black Africa’. This 
doctrine was given substance by a kind of neutrality of non-adherence to any 
regional or supra regional project. Despite French pressure, ould Daddah re-
fused to join the OCRS, and neither did he join the Mali federation or its 
counter, the Entente States. Thus he managed to keep strong pro-Moroccan and 
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anti-French sentiments in check. A third important party was the Association de 
la Jeunesse Mauritanienne, a group of young évolués headed by Ahmed Baba 
Miské, which took a radical stance towards independence from France, and was 
decisively pan Arab in ideology. The AJM was divided on the question of 
Mauritanian existence, with a majority of its members ultimately opting for the 
Moroccan side. Both the Moroccan and the French camps tried to convince the 
chiefs and religious leaders in Mauritania to join their side. The most important 
traditional chief to join the Moroccan camp was Mohamed Fall ould Oumeir, 
the Emir of Trarza, but most others remained in the French camp. 
The struggle did not stay on the level of propaganda and diplomacy.85 In the 
last months of 1956, the Istiqlâl organised an invasion force of approximately 
5,000 men. Part of this army consisted of officers and men of the Jaish li Tahrîr 
al-Maghrebiyya or Armée de Libération Marocaine (ALM), the Moroccan Libe-
ration Army. The ALM was well equipped with sufficient personal weapons, 
mortars, field telephones and vehicles, and discipline was strong. Most of the 
fighters however were recruited locally among the Rgaybat from the Lgouacem 
clan. The Rgaybat are a Bidân tribe, famous for their camel-based pastoral life, 
whose pasture grounds stretch from Goulmime in Southern Morocco to the 
Draa valley, through the Seguiet El Hamra and Rio D’Oro or Spanish or 
Western Sahara, southwards into Mauritania, and eastwards to Tindouf in 
Algeria, and Taoudenit down to I-n-Dagouber in Mali. The Rgaybat had formed 
the core of warriors around the famous Moroccan resistance fighter Maa Al 
Ainine in the Draa valley and beyond. The last of their leaders had only sur-
rendered to France in 1934. Throughout the conflict of the 1950s, the Rgaybat 
would play their own political game. In 1956, drought had hit the Lgouacem 
pastures in Mauritania, forcing them to move up to their pastures in southern 
Morocco. The Rgaybat lived in hostile relations with most Bidân tribes in the 
Southern part of Mauritania, who dominated Mauritanian political life, hence 
their resistance to the idea of Mauritanian independence. Furthermore, borders 
between their pastures complicated their nomadic existence. Thus, while herd-
ing their camels in southern Morocco in 1956, the Rgaybat joined the ALM 
forces. 
On 13 January 1957, the ALM Rgaybat forces invaded Mauritania, with 
Atar as their main goal. To get there, the ALM fighters had to cross the Spanish 
colony of Seguiet El Hamra and Rio d’Oro. According to French sources, the 
Spanish authorities let the ALM pass for two reasons. First, they did not have 
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the means to stop them. Second, the Spanish were said to have struck a deal 
with the Istiqlâl to let the ALM into Mauritania unhindered in exchange for the 
dropping of Moroccan claims on Sidi Ifni, Villa Cisneros, Ceuta and Mellila, 
Spanish enclaves in Morocco and West Sahara. The ALM forces were driven 
off, mostly through the military assistance of local Bidân tribes hostile to the 
Rgaybat, including other Rgaybat clans hostile to the Lgouacem clan, headed 
by retired army Colonel Borricand. The French escape was narrow as the ALM 
forces had superior equipment. Only timely air support called in from Algeria 
saved the French forces on the ground. In June 1957, a large number of Rgaybat 
Lgouacem defected from the ALM and surrendered to France. The French 
accepted their surrender, gave them cloth and tea in recognition, and assigned 
them pastures in the Adrar, which was exactly what the Rgaybat had come 
looking for. Their transhumance cycle, rather than their political sentiments, 
had led them to the Adrar in June. Thus the ALM forces were depleted. But in 
September 1957, a new ALM force stood ready for invasion. This time their 
goal was the Spanish Sahara, the territory of their former silent allies. It came to 
heavy fighting over the main Spanish enclaves at the coast, Sidi Ifni, Villa Cis-
neros and Cap Juby. The ALM managed to capture Tentane and Smara from the 
Spanish troops. In threat of escalation, elements of the Spanish fleet patrolled 
the coast below Agadir. In retaliation to the ALM incursions, the Spanish and 
French armies jointly launched a counter offensive in February 1958 under the 
name Opération Ecouvillon, involving 10,000 men.86 The main front of this 
operation was situated in the Spanish Sahara. The French forces involved were 
drawn from Mauritania, and Algerian Tindouf, who joined the Spanish forces in 
the Spanish Sahara. By the end of February, the ALM forces were driven from 
the Spanish Sahara into Morocco. After the battles of early 1958, the last Rgay-
bat, about 3,000, left the ALM, and surrendered to France. The recuperation and 
requisition of part of their herds and pastures in Mauritania by the French as 
part of Opération Ecouvillon were probably decisive in their new and tempo-
rary choice of allegiance. The heavy bombing of their herds and camps in the 
Spanish Sahara was another. The most violent phase of the Moroccan aspira-
tions was over, but sporadic violence in the form of assassinations and bomb 
attempts inspired by the Moroccan services, and razzias from southern Morocco 
effected by Rgaybat, occurred until well into the 1960s.87 The Moroccan claims 
over Mauritania did not subside until the 1970s, when both countries divided 
the Spanish Sahara between them, to the detriment of Rgaybat and other 
                                                 
86  There is some uncertainty about the name of this operation. Guillemin gives Oura-
gan. De Boisboissel and most other documents state Ecouvillon, while in a few 
cases the name Ecouvillon-Ouragan is given. 
87  Guillemin, J. 1982; Lavroff, D.G., ed., 1979: 417; Ould Daddah, M. 2003: 210-215. 
56 CHAPTER 1 
Saharan aspirations to independence. With Algerian help, the Rgaybat, Tajakant 
and Tikna of the Spanish Sahara then organised into the Sahraoui Arab 
Democratic Republic, with its army the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Seguiet El Hamra and Rio d’Oro: POLISARIO, based at Tindouf. The battle 
over Saharan borders is yet to end. 
Concentrating all their efforts on Mauritania and Spanish Sahara, the Mo-
roccans paid much less attention to their claims on Soudan Français and South-
ern Algeria in the 1950s. The Bidân community in Soudan Français however 
responded vividly to the ‘Saharan question’, to phrase the conflict in the ter-
minology of those days. In complementary response to the idea of a ‘Greater 
Morocco’, Bidân politicians developed the idea of a ‘Greater Mauritania’, 
which should include, besides Mauritania, the Bidân inhabited northwestern 
part of Soudan Français and southern Morocco.88 This idea was based on the 
history of the 11th century Almoravid Empire, which originated in present-day 
Mauritania, from where it conquered Morocco and parts of Spain. This his-
torical discourse implied that Morocco was part of Mauritania. Thus in the eyes 
of its advocates, greater Mauritania equalled greater Morocco and should in all 
cases include the Bidân-inhabited parts of Soudan Français. This idea was 
advocated by the Nahda al-Wattaniyya al-Mauritaniyya, the Mauritanian Re-
naissance Party. The Nahda was founded in August 1958 in Atar by members of 
the Association de la Jeunesse Mauritanienne who were in favour of the Mo-
roccan claims. The party was presided over by Bouyagui ould Abidine, a Bidân 
with strong connections to Soudan Français. The leader of the Nahda was born 
in 1919 around Timbedgha, a Cercle that Soudan Français lost to Mauritania in 
1944 as a result of the Nioro du Sahel incident, a religious dispute between the 
Tijaniyya Hamawiyya Sufi brotherhood, its neighbours, and the French admini-
stration that suspected the brotherhood of anti-colonial agitation.89 After this 
administrative reshuffling, the Bidân who stayed behind in Soudan Français, 
including Bouyagui’s family, pleaded that their territory should be included in 
Mauritania as well.90 After his education at the Ecole Primaire Supérieure in 
Bamako, Bouyagui worked for the Postal Service. In 1952 he presented himself 
for the Territorial Assembly elections, but was not elected. From 1955 to 1958 
he was stationed in Bamako. There, right in the den of the Soudanese 
nationalists, he focused most of his activity in favour of Greater Mauritania, 
culminating in the foundation of the Nahda in Mauritania with dissident pro 
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Moroccan AJM members. With the creation of the Nahda in Mauritania, a 
Soudanese branch of the party was created with sections around Kayes and 
Nara. Later, local sections were founded in Timbuktu and Gao as well. With the 
French-Moroccan war in West Sahara and Mauritania at its height, the Nahda 
under Bouyagui’s leadership became more pronouncedly pro-Moroccan, while 
maintaining the idea of a greater Mauritania. The French and the Soudanese 
political elite feared that the Bidân from Soudan Français would come into 
contact with the ALM via the Nahda. Many observers were apprehensive of a 
massive Bidân exodus from Soudan Français to Mauritania. 
The Soudanese leaders do not seem to have worried as much about the 
Moroccan claims as they did about the French OCRS project, but they would 
have been well aware of Bidân support for the Moroccan cause, propagated by 
Bouyagui’s Nahda. In return to this threat, the US-RDA laid claim on parts of 
Mauritania, especially on the Cercle of Timbedgha, which it had lost to Mauri-
tania in 1944.91 In 1959 problems arose in the Cercle when a dispute broke out 
among the local Bidân political elite about election results. As a consequence 
some of them retreated to their pasture areas in Soudan Français, from where 
they demanded the reintegration of Timbedgha in Soudan Français. Another 
part of the disgruntled joined with yet another small Mauritanian party: the 
Union des Originaires de la Mauritanie du Sud, which defended the interests of 
the riverain sedentary population along the Senegal River. These political forces 
created the Union Nationale Mauritanienne (UNM), which demanded the 
integration of Mauritania in the Mali federation. This would solve the problems 
of trans-border migrations of the Bidân population of the border area and ensure 
the position of the sedentary population along the Senegal. Both the UNM and 
the Bidân of Timbedgha were actively supported by the US-RDA, especially in 
their claims to join the Mali federation, angering Mokhtar ould Daddah.92 In 
1959, Mokhtar ould Daddah managed to unite all Mauritanian political parties 
into one single party, the Parti du Peuple Mauritanien.93 Together with the 
Union Nationale Mauritanienne, the Nahda was dissolved, its aspirations unful-
filled. The break-up of the Mali federation a year later was greeted with relief in 
Mauritania, but the border dispute and the Malian threat were not over. From 
1960 onwards, Mali actively supported the persisting Moroccan claims on 
Mauritania. Border incidents proliferated between 1960 and 1961, culminating 
in the assassination of the administrator of the nomad population in the Mau-
ritanian Cercle of Nema, which Mauritania accused to have been plotted by  
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Photo 1.1 
Bouyagui ould Abidine, founder of the  
Nahda al-Wattaniyya al-Mauritaniyya 
[Source: Mauritanie Nouvelle, October 1961. Courtesy of Archives Nationales du Mali.] 
 
 
Horma ould Babana, still in exile in Morocco, with Malian support. Only in 
February 1963 did Mali and Mauritania sign an agreement on their mutual 
border. 
The history of Saharan border disputes in the 1950s and 1960s is much more 
complicated than presented here and merits a book of its own. The aim of its 
presentation here however, was to show the political involvement of Tamasheq 
and Bidân political elites from the start. As many of these projects threatened 
the territorial integrity of Soudan Français, the Bidân and Kel Tamasheq in-
volved became highly suspect as political troublemakers and anti-nationals, or 
even traitors to the Malian cause, which indeed was not always theirs. In the 
end, Mali became independent in 1960 with its borders as they had been since 
1944. National construction could commence. 
Creating Mali 
Since the 1990s there has been much debate among Africanists about the failure 
of the state, and the creation of solid national identities in postcolonial Africa. 
Most vocal in this debate is the work of Basil Davidson described above, which 
refutes the possibility and the appropriateness of the national model for African 
states. Indeed, in 1960, the idea of a Malian nation was not yet deeply rooted. 
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This was perhaps due to the way the country had gained its independence. First 
of all, there had not been a long, violent and bitter anti-colonial war, so helpful 
in shaping a national identity in other postcolonies. The process of decolonisa-
tion in Soudan Français had been a long, calm and gradual one, taking shape in 
its last years through cooperation between the US-RDA and the administration, 
which had come to accept the inevitability of US-RDA power, and in fact by 
then included US-RDA members in the higher echelons. The mutual interests of 
French and African political elites described by Tony Chafer prevailed over 
anxieties over Marxist rhetoric.94 Second, prior to September 1960, it had not 
been the aspiration of the Soudanese political elite to create a nation. The US-
RDA, part of the AOF-wide RDA was staunchly Pan-African and it sought to 
create a Pan-African AOF-wide federal political union. Their efforts had re-
sulted in the creation of the short-lived Mali federation with Senegal. When this 
federation broke up in August 1960, the Sudanese leaders were suddenly faced 
with the fact that they stood alone in their federalist ideal and that the Sou-
danese Republic had to go on as a singular state. The ideal of a federal political 
entity had foreclosed a strong nationalist identity within the ranks of the party. 
According to former ministers Mamadou Gologo, the main US-RDA ideologist, 
and Moussa Keita, Modibo Keita’s younger brother and former Minister of 
Sports and Youth Affairs, only after the break-up of the Mali federation did the 
Soudanese political leaders realise they had to inspire a national idea within 
what was now the Republic of Mali.95 And even then, the idea of Pan-African 
federalism was not discarded. The new Malian constitution included the possi-
bility of a ‘total or partial abandonment of national sovereignty in favour of 
federation’.96 Yet, today, a Malian national sentiment exists, even a very strong 
one. Malians in general are proud to be Malians, to the point of being chau-
vinist. A possible explanation for this rooted national sentiment is the existence 
of potent symbolic material to incorporate and store in the registers and libraries 
of a Malian national discourse. These include a rich history with which to create 
a national historical myth; folklore from which to create national customs; a 
strong ideological stance in which to interpret this myth and custom; a glorious 
future ahead now that the shackles of colonialism had been broken; and internal 
and external neo-colonialist enemies to fight against. These elements were all 
skilfully brought into play by the US-RDA regime, which purposefully sought 
to create a Malian nation, perhaps one of the few endeavours it succeeded in 
beyond expectations. For the purpose of brevity, I will limit myself to dealing 
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with only the most substantial elements of Malian national identity. In 1960 not 
only the Malian national idea still had to be created. In part, the state had to be 
created too. This was done in full continuity with the colonial period. However 
much fanfare was blown at independence, in practice much stayed the same, 
while changing at the same time. As has been extensively argued elsewhere, the 
continuities of rule over the caesura of independence are more profound than 
the rhetorics of independence try to make us believe.97  
 
Nation building 
The land and peoples occupying the present day Republic of Mali have a rich 
and largely documented history, either through oral traditions or through Arabic 
documents written by local Muslim scholars. Some of the oldest cities of West 
Africa, such as Djenné, Timbuktu and Gao, are found here, and since medieval 
times, great empires and powerful kingdoms have succeeded each other on 
Malian ground. This is the stuff par excellence on which to build a national 
historical myth: antecedent states, which can be connected, without too much 
interruption, to a dignified present and a glorious future. To begin with, the 
best-known medieval African empire, the Mali Empire founded by Sunjata 
Keita, was largely situated within the borders of its present day homonym. The 
Mali Empire was followed and conquered by the Songhay Empire with its 
capital Gao. The decline of this empire was followed by a period of anarchy and 
‘foreign rule’ – the capture of Timbuktu and Gao by the Moroccan Sultanate in 
1591 – after which followed a series of kingdoms in the Mande and Bambara 
heartland of Mali and in the Niger Bend. These were the kingdoms of Kangaba, 
Kaarta and Segu, which were, in turn, conquered or reformed by Fulbe Muslim 
rulers from the Maacina (Cheick Ahmed Lobbo) and the Futa Toro (Elhajj 
Umar Tall) in the 18th and 19th centuries. This is, in short, how Mali’s national 
history is presented to young Malians in the national educational history curri-
culum.98 But even those who have not had formal education know this history. 
It can be said that in Malian societies, history forms the basis of social and 
cultural relations. The history of the founding of the Mali Empire by Sunjata 
Keita forms the explanatory basis and justification of Mande social, cultural and 
political organisation. The Sunjata epic serves to explain the relation between 
various Mande family groups (jamuw), villages and social strata. Without 
knowledge of this epic, a Mande simply cannot function socially or culturally.99 
The same can be said about the Songhay and their empire, the Fulbe and their 
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jihad-states and the Bambara kingdoms, which are presented in the national 
myth (and much scholarly work) as the rightful heirs to the Mali Empire. 
For a new state, the social and cultural importance of history in wider society 
is a solid anvil on which to forge a sense of national unity. If the new state can 
be successfully linked to the conception of history as embodying culture and 
society, the national historical myth is made. The Keita regime did its utmost to 
do so. By giving the Republic the name of its adopted medieval predecessor, the 
Mali Empire, the Republic of Mali presented itself as its rightful heir, and also 
as the rightful heir to its succeeding kingdoms. Modibo Keita, namesake to the 
founder of this empire, Sunjata Keita, was without a doubt to any Malian mind 
a descendant of the great imperial family, and he implicitly presented himself as 
such.100 Sunjata’s alleged device ‘Rather dead than dishonoured’ was taken up 
by the new nation.101 The colonial period was presented as a short and disturb-
ing interlude to the natural course of history, with only two positive elements: it 
had brought modern education and technical expertise with which the country 
could improve its living standards; and it had created the opportunity to reunite 
most of the areas formerly included in the Mali Empire and succeeding 
kingdoms into a new state.102 The historical foundation of the Malian national 
myth is first and foremost based on the all-important living history of the 
Mande and Bambara areas. As Cutter argues, ‘the variety of historical traditions 
which co-exist in contemporary Mali, while not explicitly dismissed, were 
denied operative consequence for the contemporary state in the leadership’s 
myth of unity’.103 However, the new government was quick to admit that these 
Mande and Bambara kingdoms had been conquered and transformed by other 
ethnic groups living in the present-day republic. The Songhay Empire and the 
Fulbe jihad-states, the glorious past of Timbuktu founded by the Kel Tamasheq, 
as well as Samory Touré’s empire and the Sikasso kingdom of Babemba Traoré 
all found their place in the national myth, and not without reason. As Mamadou 
Gologo, former Minister of Information and the Keita regime’s main ideologist 
explained: 
Nationalism is the awareness of belonging to a nation and the conservation of this 
identity, which is shaped in a rich history. All Malian ethnic groups have had the 
experience of state rule, to have been ruled and to have ruled. This experience 
excludes tribalism in national sentiments.104 
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How far Malian national identity was perceived to be ‘Mande’ or ‘Bambara’ 
by the new republic’s inhabitants is a pertinent question. Most elements used in 
Malian nationalist discourse and identity-building were taken from Mande cul-
ture and history. Even the name of the new republic is indicative. Many colo-
nies in Africa changed their name after independence, but although references 
to the past were gladly made, most sought historically neutral names to avoid 
enhancing possible ethnic tension. Hence, Dahomey, a colony created largely 
around the kingdom with the same name, changed its name to Benin, a well-
known pre-colonial kingdom which territory was located to the west of 
Dahomey. Although the Gold Coast Colony was more or less shaped around the 
Ashanti kingdom, the colony renamed itself Ghana after an empire that had 
been located at the upper Senegal River hundreds of kilometres to the north. 
Soudan Français however, opted to adopt the name of an empire, which had 
indeed largely been situated on the same territory as the new republic. However, 
the new republic included land that once formed part of other empires, such as 
Songhay, the name of which was explicitly not adopted. The name of the new 
republic reflected the dominance of its core populations: the Mande and 
Bambara. Mali was explicitly presented as the rightful heir not only of the Mali 
Empire, but also, more broadly, of a Mande civilisation whose glory and 
dignity, robbed by colonialism, had to be restored. Malian schoolbooks 
presented the history of the new nation almost uniquely through the history of 
the Mali Empire and other Mande kingdoms, leaving some space to the 
Songhay Empire, and largely leaving aside the complex histories of the many 
other communities in the republic. The imaginary glue holding the various 
peoples of the country together consisted of frequent reference to Sunjata’s 
empire-building, thus reflecting an ‘official nationalism’ in Anderson’s mean-
ing of the term.105 Certain Mande social structures, such as the village young 
men’s associations known as tonw, were conscripted into ‘the Revolution’ and 
became the vectors of modernity. In this way, Malian national culture was 
Mande culture, and Mali’s national character was the Mande national character 
of industriousness and self-sacrifice. 
The new regime stimulated the creation of local troupes artistiques to pro-
mote national cultural heritage in music, song, and dance. Frederick Lamp dis-
cusses the function of similar groups in neighbouring Guinée (Conakry). He 
argues that the theatrical troupes in Guinée and the attention given to their 
performances served primarily ‘the “Malinke-ization” of all of Guinée – at 
heart, the expansion of Islamic Malinke cultural hegemony’.106 Cutter has des-
cribed a similar situation for the Keita regime’s cultural policies through 
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national radio. Each night at six, Radio Mali broadcasted a music programme 
with folk music. More important in this policy was the broadcasting of the ‘tales 
of Baba Sissoko’ – the Sunjata epic and other tales of Mande kingdoms, per-
formed by the ‘national griot’ Banzoumana Sissoko. To the Keita regime, 
national folklore largely meant Mande and Bambara music, song, and dance. 
The troupe artistique of Kidal was forbidden to sing in Tamasheq, and had to 
learn and perform Bambara songs instead.107 The Kidal artists were not the only 
ones to experience this cultural exclusion. Afel Bocoum, an artist from Nia-
funké and musical heir to famous guitar player Ali Farka Touré, remembers his 
first performance at the national biannual festival in 1972: 
Everybody liked it, but the fact is, I couldn’t have won first prize, because I was 
Sonrai, not Bambara (...) That’s the way it was in those days in Mali – the Bambara 
ruled. If you weren’t Bambara – forget it. Luckily, that’s all changed now under our 
new democracy. But still now, the Sonrai aren’t dominant culturally. Why should 
this be so? This is something I fight against in my music.108 
Where Afel Bocoum fights against ‘Mandefication’ in songs, Tamasheq rebels 
fought against it in guerrilla warfare, both in 1963 and in 1990. 
 
State building 
In 1960 there was almost no infrastructure in Mali. Tarmac roads did not exist. 
From Bamako it took about a week to travel to Kidal over land. Electricity, 
telephone, transport, all means a modern government relies on to perform its 
functions, were desperately lacking in all remote parts of Mali. Reading the 
official newspaper L’Essor of those years, one is left with the impression that 
Mali did not extend beyond the area directly surrounding Bamako and Segu, 
with outposts at Mopti, Gao, Kayes and Timbuktu. The lack of infrastructure is 
expressed in the five-year plan of 1961 which foresaw the construction of a 
railway connecting Bamako to Conakry; the enlargement of six regional air-
ports; the deepening of the Niger river for river transport between Koulikoro 
and Mopti; tarmac roads between Bougouni, Sikasso, Koutiala, San and Mopti, 
and between Koutiala and Segu; strengthened earthen roads between Bamako, 
Nara, Niono and Kayes; bridges and ferries; and, last but not least, extensive 
postal and telecom services.109 The distance between government and governed 
that this lack of means created was closed in strategies adopted from the US-
RDA’s experiences of the late colonial period. Most party leaders and high-
ranking government officials extensively travelled the country. Independent 
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Mali was administratively organised in six Régions, headed by a governor. The 
regions were divided into Cercles, largely taken over from the colonial period, 
and Arrondissements, which mostly overlapped with the colonial Subdivision 
administrative unit. In these constituencies existed parallel administrative and 
party structures, which were quite often filled with the same people. At each 
level, Arrondissement, Cercle and Région, a monthly Conférence des Cadres 
was organised to discuss the economic and political situation. These conferen-
ces were often attended by high-ranking party members and administrative 
officials from Bamako, who came to explain and defend measures taken. 
Moreover, each Région organised a Conférence Economique des Cadres Tri-
mestrielle that was systematically attended by Modibo Keita himself.110 Despite 
the regular attendance and close monitoring of the US-RDA leaders at meetings 
in the country, to adequately solve local problems governors and administrators 
were allowed a measure of executive freedom in a system described by Zolberg 
as closest to European medieval feudalism. 
Nowhere, perhaps, is the historical parallel with [Weber’s view on medieval feudal] 
Europe as striking as in Mali, where Modibo Keita has appointed a set of regional 
governors directly responsible to him in his capacity as president, and also a set of 
roving party commissioners directly responsible to him as Secretary-General of the 
Union Soudanaise. In addition, he spends about one-quarter of every year touring 
the regions with a suite consisting of party officials, elected representatives, and 
important bureaucrats. (...) In spite of the use of modern Marxist phraseology, the 
mood is akin to that of pre-modern Europe.111 
Although this image is fitting in its irony, since Keita was determined to 
eradicate social practices he himself described as ‘feudal’, it is not altogether 
true. It is more appropriate to compare Keita’s travels to the colonial admini-
strative tours made by the Commandant de Cercle, so often described in French 
colonial literature.112 This comparison with colonial times could be, and indeed 
was, extended to the whole national administration. According to Barate, a 
jurist specialised in the administrative structures of Mali: 
The functions of the regional administration are, apart from their militancy, in no 
way different from those of their colleagues of the colonial period. No innovations 
are made in this field. The traditional administrative functions of the colonial 
administrators have simply been taken over. The only difference: nationals occupy 
the old positions.113 
In the late 1950s the colonial government had officially inaugurated a policy 
of administrative ‘Africanisation’, promoting lower rank African civil servants 
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to higher ranks to prepare for the growing autonomy of the colonies. The pro-
cess was however severely slowed down by the reluctance of both the Ministry 
of Overseas Territories and local European staff to see large numbers of co-
lonial administrators made redundant and swelling the administration in the 
metropole. Thus, faced with a lack of trained civil servants, after independence 
large numbers of Malians with higher levels of education but with hardly any 
administrative experience, among whom many schoolteachers were deployed to 
staff the fledgling administration, leaving gaps in the staffing of other insti-
tutions. Thus, the newly independent state started with a lack of both manpower 
and means.  
In his speech preceding the Malian declaration of independence Modibo 
Keita made it clear that Mali would ‘take the socialist option, derived from Ma-
lian realities, grafted on successful experiences elsewhere’.114 Malian Socialism 
was, like the policies of many other African regimes, described as ‘African 
Socialism’. The regime envisioned the development of the country through 
State planned economy, directed by the Comité National de Planification et de 
Direction Economique, indirectly presided over by Modibo Keita. This was 
nothing new per se, as the colonial economy of Soudan Français had been plan-
ned similarly in four-year plans drawn up by the FIDES since 1949. In practice 
planning in independent Mali meant strengthening the agricultural sector, while 
at the same time constructing a complementary industrial sector and supportive 
state enterprises almost from scratch. The latter was new, as the colonial plans 
had never invested in the secondary sector. The first plan in effect in inde-
pendent Mali dated from 1959, hence shortly after the formal independence of 
the Soudanese Republic, sovereign in its economic course. This plan was drawn 
up almost exclusively by foreign experts, among them a number of colonial 
administrators. The team was headed by the Egyptian economist Samir Amin, 
but included Jean Benard, a student of the French Marxist Charles Bettelheim, 
lecturer at the EHESS in Paris and responsible for the economic planning of 
Guinée (Conakry); Jean Leroy, a Marxist colonial administrator specialised in 
agriculture and finance; and Eli Löbel, an Israeli planner.115 In fact, trained 
economists were almost totally absent among the French African elite, the 
Senegalese Mamadou Dia being the only AOF politician holding a degree in 
Economy. The first four-year plan these men drew up was readjusted to eco-
nomic realities into a five-year plan in October 1961.116 Since Mali was es-
sentially a rural society, social and economic policy remained based on the 
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village as the primary social and economic unit.117 The plan’s programme for 
agricultural and rural modernisation, the Action Rurale, consisted of two main 
elements: the organisation of farmers into socialist cooperatives, and the ration-
alisation of agricultural production through the introduction of credit, modern 
equipment (ploughs, artificial fertilizer, improved seeds) and, most of all, 
education. Material means for this project were desperately lacking.118 With the 
help of foreign development aid and loans from various countries, a wide range 
of state enterprises, industries and para-statal organisations were created. Indus-
trial plants for the processing of agricultural products such as refineries for 
peanut oil; a soap factory; fruit canning industries; and large refrigerated abat-
toirs were planned and indeed partly constructed. The national air company Air 
Mali was invested with a fleet of six Iljouchins, two Antonovs and three DC-3s 
maintaining regular national and international flights.119 All this at least gave a 
modern industrial and socialist look to the new country. 
Despite the lack of material and personnel, the Malian political leaders were 
optimistic about Mali’s bright future. Like most African leaders after indepen-
dence, they had aspirations and ambitions, which James Scott has labelled 
‘High Modernist’. Scott defines High Modernism as 
a strong (…) version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, 
the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery 
of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social 
order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws.120 
Scott’s description entirely fits the Malian case, as it fitted most African 
postcolonies. Although in scale Modibo Keita’s Mali cannot be compared to 
Nyerere’s Ujamaa, the most notorious example of social engineering in Africa, 
it could certainly be compared in intention. When in 1967 the regime’s eco-
nomic policy proved a failure, Keita proclaimed a Permanent Revolution in 
Chinese Cultural Revolution style, to save his policies from what he basically 
saw as a lack of commitment from the rank and file, not a failure in social and 
economic engineering itself. Scott observes that when high modernist plans 
remain unsuccessful, its directors tend to turn to ‘easily controlled micro-order 
in model cities, model villages, and model farms’.121 In Mali a number of such 
model villages were created, or existing villages were appointed to serve as 
such, such as Sanankoroba, Samayana, Kimparé and M’pésoba. Foreign re-
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searchers studying the policies of the new African states were only allowed to 
do research in these model villages. Most of these researchers, regardless of 
their political orientation, were unimpressed with the results they saw in these 
villages and were immediately able to pinpoint the weaknesses in the execution 
of the planned economy. But high modernism is first and foremost an ideology, 
‘a faith that borrowed the legitimacy of science and technology’ as Scott put 
it.122 What the regime envisioned was the realisation of economic growth 
through sheer willpower. The modernisation of the economy could only be 
successful if the mentality of the rural population could be transformed from a 
backward traditional outlook on production and society to a modern rational 
one. If this process was successful economic production would rise automatic-
ally, or so the regime thought. Snyder teaches us that the Keita regime gave 
total prevalence to politics over economy. Like many other Marxist-inspired 
leaders, the regime thought economy was, by definition, political, and that 
changing politics would automatically mean changing the economy. Unfor-
tunately, the regime also thought that politics was rhetorics and that speeches 
and education were enough to make people behave as desired. What Modibo 
Keita and his team envisioned was the reshaping of Malian peasant village 
society on modern scientific socialist principles, combined with the pristine 
traditions and the original Mande spirit of industriousness. Keita believed that 
humanity was in essence good, rational and malleable. Moreover he firmly be-
lieved in the existence of a Mande national character, one of the clearest signs 
Keita was inspired by nationalism after all. In his view, the Mande were serious, 
dignified, honourable, hard-working, constant, stubborn, patient, fraternal and 
loyal. They persisted in the pursuit of their goals, and kept their word.123 These 
qualities had to form the new Malian national character, which could then be 
mobilised to harness the new Malian nation, and to inculcate a spirit of self-
sacrifice and industriousness in the people. According to the ideology of the 
US-RDA, Malian society had been originally communalist or proto-socialist. 
The communalist spirit of the villager had been corrupted by the introduction of 
a monetary economy and feudalist rule in colonial times.124 These distortions in 
Malian society had to be uprooted. Negative attitudes, introduced by colonial-
ism, such as greed, individualism, selfishness and feudalism had to be stamped 
out. The new regime promoted the position of the modern and young, and of 
disadvantaged groups – women, members of the lower castes and former slaves 
– within the traditional village decision-making structures, which had so far 
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been the domain of elder men. Through the Rural Development Schools, farm-
ers received education in modern agricultural techniques (which often, due to 
lack of means, could not be practiced). The Party Elementary Schools organised 
courses on the structure of the republic’s administration, Marxism-Leninism 
and the aims of the US-RDA.125 This then, would propel the nation forward 
both economically and morally. This process of mental transformation was 
called ‘intellectual decolonisation’.126 It was first and foremost directed towards 
those parts of the population that had enjoyed an advantageous position in 
society under colonial rule: the bureaucrats; the merchants; the elders; and the 
nomads. 
Coercion, resistance and control 
The leaders of the regime were quick to realise that several interest groups in 
the country could still effectively oppose their policies and that parts of the 
population were not necessarily happy with their restructuring of the economic 
and political landscape along socialist principles. Measures that especially 
caused resentment among the population at large were the Service Civique and 
the so-called Investissements Humains – human investments. Since the Malian 
Government lacked resources to develop the country, it tried to cut costs by 
demanding the population to work voluntarily with national fervour on 
construction sites in their spare time. The five-year plan for example, projected 
the improvement of roads throughout the country, financed for 40% through 
‘human investment’.127 These ‘chantiers d’honneur’ received much attention in 
the media and in administrative reports, since they were not only meant to 
create new infrastructure, but also to inculcate civic duty in the Malian popu-
lation. The human investments caused strong resentment. To many Malians, the 
practice resembled too closely the much-hated forced labour under French rule, 
or fasobara as it was called in Bamanakan, which had been abolished in 1946. 
This resemblance was of course denied by the Keita regime, arguing that 
fasobara had been colonial exploitation in the service of the white man, while 
the human investments uniquely served the needs of the people.128 A second 
asset was the Service Civique, the conscription of young man into labour bri-
gades working common fields (forobara in Bamanakan) and state organised 
agricultural schemes. Many Malians closely associated the ‘little farming sol-
diers’ of the Service Civique with the so-called Deuxième Portion under French 
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rule: a means to tap the labour forces of youths who were not conscripted for 
military service.129 
One option open to Malians to escape the coercive forces of the new regime 
was a strategy they had deployed since the early colonial period: labour mi-
gration. In colonial times Soudan Français had largely served as a labour re-
serve at the service of other colonies. Especially Ivory Coast and Senegal 
profited, but Malian labour could be found as far away as Belgian Congo and 
the Middle East.130 In the years prior to independence labour migration to the 
neighbouring colonies intensified. The barangini, or ‘those in search of labour’ 
as they were called in Bamanakan, circulated in West Africa by the ten 
thousands.131 As a first step, young Malians from the countryside thronged to 
the Malian cities during the dry season, when agriculture came to a standstill, to 
look for work. The administration perceived these seasonal migrants as lazy and 
a nuisance, causing the congestion of the growing urban centres. But many of 
the young seasonal migrants used their stay in the city as a launching platform 
for labour migrations abroad, permanently drenching the countryside of the 
labour force needed for the intensification of agricultural production during the 
farming season. As early as 1959 Modibo Keita, then in his function of Mayor 
of Bamako, launched an appeal to ‘Return to the land’, an appeal transformed 
into a policy to force young seasonal migrants back to the countryside and to 
work the collective fields, or forobara, the administration had ordained, under 
the regime of fasobara, human investment. The attempts to curtail labour mi-
gration took serious forms in 1962 with the reintroduction of so-called laissez-
passer, a travel permit needed to move around AOF under the colonial regime 
during the indigénat. Under the guise of national improvement, the US-RDA 
reinstalled colonial practices it had helped to abolish a decade earlier, to the 
resentment of the population. 
Migration as a passive form of resistance could take a large scale. After the 
1963 rebellion, an estimated 25% of the population of the Adagh had migrated 
to Algeria. But even prior to Alfellaga, massive migration took place. In 
November and December 1962, hundreds of Dogon and Kel Tamasheq living in 
the western part of the Niger Bend, between Hombori and Douentza, began to 
leave Mali for Upper Volta. Apparently, they left the country to avoid taxes and 
membership dues to the US-RDA. At first, the regime reacted calmly. Modibo 
Keita, the Minister of Finance Attaher Maïga, and the Chief of Staff Abdoulaye 
Soumaré, toured the area to calm people down and stop the exodus. In No-
vember, some government agents in the area were killed. The Government 
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responded by sending two motorised army units, one to Hombori and Gossi and 
one to Douentza, to prevent the flight of the population. Although hampered by 
logistical and equipment difficulties, the army was able to at least partly stop 
the exodus through intimidating actions, such as test-firing weapons in Dogon 
villages. At least one serious clash resulted in a significant loss of lives, when 
government agents halted people from the Bandiagara region heading for the 
border. An estimated fifty civilians died in this clash. After the events at 
Hombori and Gao, Modibo Keita ordered certain villages to be razed to the 
ground, and the ringleaders to be imprisoned in Kidal or Ménaka.132 
Another group the US-RDA sought to curtail in its economic endeavours 
were the merchants or Dioula. Many had been active US-RDA supporters in the 
1950s, helping party members with transportation and spreading the message of 
the US-RDA in the countryside. Now the party dismissed them as petty 
bourgeois allies who were no longer functional or needed. Their AOF-wide 
trade economy had been partly possible through the existence of a French West 
African common currency. On 1 July 1962, Modibo Keita announced the 
launch of the Malian Franc. The new national currency served first of all as a 
national marker. As Keita put it: ‘History has taught us that political power is 
always and by necessity accompanied by the regal right to coin money, that 
monetary power is inseparable from national sovereignty’.133 The new currency 
was intended to serve Malian withdrawal from the monetary control of the CFA 
Franc zone and to allow the state to regulate its own debts in foreign currency, 
and hence to finance state budgetary deficits. These rose as official exports 
faltered behind plan, while state imports remained high, hence causing inflation 
and larger state deficits.134 One way to curb this spiral was to exert control over 
the massive private import and export business the Dioula generated with 
neighbouring countries, which remained partly undeclared. A national currency 
would make this undeclared business impossible. On 20 July 1962 the Dioula 
community in Bamako protested against the curtailment of their activities and 
the Malian Franc. Apparently, slogans such as ‘long live France’, ‘down with 
the Malian Franc’ and ‘down with Mali and its Government of infidels’ were 
shouted.135 A large number of the protesters were arrested. Fily Dabo Sissoko 
and Hamadoun Dicko, the former leaders of the PSP, who had not joined the 
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rally, were arrested as well. Despite its dissolution after the 1959 elections, 
support for the PSP was still strong in Mali, especially in the Dioula com-
munity, and not all of its party structures had dissolved.136 The Keita regime 
took the opportunity the Dioula riots presented to rid itself of these potential 
opposition leaders. On 24 September 1962 a ‘popular trial’ commenced against 
those arrested who were accused of conspiracy against the state. Sissoko and 
Dicko were the main defendants. They were accused of organising the rally and 
of being in contact with such former colonial top brass as Max Lejeune and 
Marius Moutet, which was taken as evidence of French support for Sissoko’s 
antinational conspiracy to topple the Keita Government.137 The tribunal an-
nounced its verdict on 1 October 1962. Seventy-seven merchants received sen-
tences ranging from one year of imprisonment to twenty years of forced labour 
in Kidal prison. The main defendants, Fily Dabo Sissoko, Hamadoun Dicko and 
Kassoum Touré, the organiser of the Dioula rally, received death sentences, 
which Modibo Keita changed to life sentences of forced labour in the Kidal 
area.138 
Although probably the largest forms of organised protest before the 1963 
rebellion in the Adagh, the Dioula riots and the mass exodus of the Bandiagara 
area were not the only forms of resistance against the Keita regime. More 
passive forms, such as simply not being a member of the US-RDA, tax evasion, 
disregard for communal fields and human investment, or other disobedience to 
government instructions, were commonplace.139 These forms of resistance will 
have contributed to a heightened awareness within the new regime that its 
control over the country was still to be consolidated. The Keita administration 
consisted largely of educated urbanites with no small amount of contempt for 
the villagers, as its ‘Return to the land’ policy destined for lazy, free-riding 
urban migrants, demonstrated. The elite was determined to develop the 
population, even against its own will, but it was well aware of the possible 
resistance and reverted to harsh reprisals such as the deployment of the army in 
the Dogon area and the trial of the Dioula. However, one could develop the 
argument that the US-RDA needed resistance in order to consolidate the Malian 
nation and its control over that nation. In depicting resistance as unpatriotic 
expressions of hostility, or even as a plot against the nation – imagined or real – 
the regime could inculcate an acute sense of national danger and launch an ap-
peal to defend cause and country. The colonial history, ideology and organisa-
tion of the US-RDA showed the party that it needed enemies both outside and 
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inside the country in order to grow. In colonial times, the US-RDA had two 
main adversaries: colonialism and the PSP. It had defeated both by consoli-
dating its unity and following rigorous party discipline.140 In order to keep this 
discipline, and thus for the party leadership to be in control, the party needed 
new enemies to fight. These were found in neo-colonialism, both outside the 
country where the ‘retrograde regimes’ of France, Senegal and Ivory Coast had 
conspired against the Mali federation, and inside the nation, where merchants, 
former PSP leaders and other ‘anti-national elements’ conspired to overthrow 
the regime. The Keita administration would soon find its most outspoken ‘neo-
colonial’ adversary in the Kel Adagh. 
Epilogue 
The economic policy of the regime proved to be a failure.141 In its attempts to 
modernise state and society the new regime perhaps overstressed politics, as 
Jones remarks, and underestimated the populations’ resistance against ‘getting 
them to grow more cash crops for sale to the Government while offering them 
little but patriotic slogans in return’.142 In 1967, the Malian Franc was devalu-
ated and reconnected to the West African CFA, in exchange for new loans from 
France to rebalance the state budget, and to jump-start the economy. The 
desired effect of the monetary agreements did not occur. The economy col-
lapsed further and the state budget remained in deficit. The crisis was aggra-
vated by the agitations of the Milice Populaire and the Brigades de Vigilance: 
two armed para-military forces under command of the US-RDA. In July 1967, 
Modibo Keita had urged these organisations to purge the party and the country 
of ‘(...) the smugglers and speculators, the degenerated rank and file at all levels 
whose revolutionary flame has withered or died (...)’. They did so with zeal, 
unleashing a reign of terror.143 The various crises highlighted the long existing 
internal division within the US-RDA between economic moderates, such as 
Jean Marie Koné and Attaher Maïga, and Marxist hardliners, like Madeira Keita 
and Mamadou Gologo.144 Modibo Keita had started his political career as a 
moderate, but had gradually developed towards the left side of the party. In line 
with Scott’s description of High Modernist idealists, Keita strongly believed 
that at heart, the root of the country’s problems should not be sought in the 
socialist option itself, but in those who were appointed to carry out socialist 
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policies. To purge party and state of incompetent and moderate elements, Keita 
dissolved the executive office of the party in August 1967. In January 1968, 
Parliament was also dissolved. All political institutions were replaced by the 
Comité National pour la Défense de la Révolution, in which only Marxist 
hardliners found a place, but this did not end the economic crisis, and even 
aggravated the Cultural Revolution-style actions of the Milice Populaire and the 
Brigade de Vigilance. Finally, what seemed inevitable in those early years of 
post-colonial Africa happened. On 19 November 1968 the Comité Militaire de 
la Libération Nationale (CMLN) staged a coup d’état. Modibo Keita and his 
principal ministers and US-RDA leaders were imprisoned and sent to specially 
erected prison camps in the Adagh, where they were guarded and taken care of 
by the people they had most of all sought to educate, develop, and rule against 
their will: the Kel Adagh.145 The news of the coup d’état was enthusiastically 
greeted in the Adagh. The fall of Keita, a reality to the Kel Adagh as he entered 
Kidal as a prisoner, was at first equated with freedom and the end of Malian 
rule. Children abandoned school. Caravans were formed to move to Algeria, 
probably as the effects of the drought were already being felt and many wanted 
to sell livestock before disaster befell them. The administration reacted quickly 
by organising an ‘explanatory campaign’ to warn the Kel Adagh against ‘a pos-
sible deformation of the meaning of freedom’.146 The caravans were halted; 
children were sent back to school; business remained as usual. 
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Race, stereotypes and politics 
If one was to draw a ‘Top Ten’ list of most mythical peoples, the Kel Tamasheq 
would probably rank rather high. If confronted with the ethnonym ‘Kel 
Tamasheq’, or even ‘Tuareg’, most people outside West Africa would not 
necessarily know who are meant. But if shown a picture they would quickly 
recognise one. Cars, camping gear, travel agencies, perfumes, even skiing 
outfits have been advertised with the image of a Tamasheq, some products even 
sporting a Tamasheq as their logo or simply being called ‘Tuareg’. In globalised 
commercial imagery, the Tamasheq man with his veiled face and turban, 
flowing indigo robes and camel, has become the prototype desert nomad, a 
symbol of freedom. This essentialisation of the Kel Tamasheq into ‘The 
Nomad’ in global culture is the result of a process of stereotyping a strange 
‘other’, which had already started in classical Arabic culture and even well 
before in the ancient Middle East. As evidenced in documents almost as old as 
writing itself, nomad-sedentary relations have been problematic since their 
beginnings, thousands of years ago.1 Yet, sedentary fascination and idealisation 
of nomadic existence is almost as old. Much of the Old Testament deals with 
nomadic existence and draws its wisdom from it. Yet, the recollections (or 
imagination) of their ancestors’ deeds were written down in a (by then) largely 
sedentary Jewish society. The present-day image of the Kel Tamasheq would 
definitely qualify as Orientalist in Edward Said’s sense, but the creation of 
stereotyped images, and the subsequent projections of virtues and failings on 
the Kel Tamasheq and other nomads, is not a uniquely European business.2 
Tamasheq culture has a few characteristics that make it peculiar not only in the 
eyes of the European, but also of the Arab-Muslim culture or of neighbouring 
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African cultures. When visiting Timbuktu, Ibn Battuta already remarked (and 
scorned) the relative freedom in gender relations that are now seen as almost 
unique to Tamasheq culture.3 It is the men who veil their faces in front of 
women, and not the other way around, which astounded both Arabs and Euro-
peans. European administrators cherished Tamasheq ‘chivalry’ but condemned 
their ‘nomad laziness’. On the other hand, these days, rich Saudi tourists visit 
Northern Mali and Niger to see the people who still live the honourable nomad 
camel-breeding life their Saudi grandfathers had lived, as one of them told me. 
The nomadic pastoral existence of the Tamasheq ancestors was already extolled 
by Ibn Khaldun as an explanation for the military and moral superiority of the 
nomadic Berber tribes over their sedentary Arabised neighbours.4  
On the other hand, the Kel Tamasheq too have their preconceived ideas 
about the Europeans, and about their neighbours. The idea of the European, in 
colonial times as well as now, is best summarised in the term reserved for them: 
Ikufar, infidels. Although militarily superior to the Kel Tamasheq, Europeans 
were (and still are) seen as ethically and morally inferior as they do not adhere 
to Islam. However, to some Kel Tamasheq in the late twentieth century, the rule 
of the ‘infidel’ was preferred over that of the ‘slave’. Indeed, to many Kel 
Tamasheq of free origins, ‘black Africans’ were peoples who had long been 
subjected to Tamasheq rule. Ever since the Moroccan invasion and subsequent 
fall of the Songhay Empire at the end of the sixteenth century, the Kel Ta-
masheq had not been subdued to a sub-Saharan polity. On the contrary, after the 
quick demise of Moroccan rule in the area, it was the Kel Tamasheq federations 
who ruled the Niger Bend and present-day Northern Mali. In Tamasheq ideas 
on power, black peoples could not rule over the Kel Tamasheq. At best they 
ruled themselves and were left alone or were partners in business. At worst they 
were Kel Tamasheq dependents and victims to slave raids.5 
Politics regarding, rather than involving, Tamasheq society from the 1940s 
onwards revolve around a complex set of stereotyped images. The image the 
Malian leaders projected on the Kel Tamasheq was partly inherited from their 
colonial predecessors, and was complemented with already existing local 
stereotypes held by those people who were in contact with the Kel Tamasheq in 
the Niger Bend. To paint the image at its most colourful and with the broadest 
of strokes: The Kel Tamasheq were thought of as white, feudal, racist, pro-
slavery, bellicose and lazy savage nomads, who were used as the vanguard of 
French neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist projects in the mineral-rich Sahara. 
As for the populations of the Niger Bend: Until the 1940s they lived in fear that 
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the departure of the French would almost certainly be followed by a renewed 
period of Kel Tamasheq political dominance. As for the Tamasheq perception 
of, and consequent dealings with, the US-RDA political elite, it was not much 
better and, in a warped way, complementary to the images held by the latter. To 
paint the picture at its crudest: Based on the historical construction of local 
racial identities, and the pre-colonial socio-political realities of the Niger Bend, 
the Tamasheq political elite saw the politicians and inhabitants of the South as 
an overwhelming mass of religiously ignorant and uncivilised blacks, with 
whom they had nothing in common and with whom they either had nothing to 
do or who they had previously dominated. Certainly, such people were unfit to 
command the Kel Tamasheq, especially since prior to the French conquest the 
Kel Tamasheq had commanded them. Furthermore, the Kel Tamasheq leaders 
feared that the nomad minority would be left out of politics and power if they 
were included in the same state as this vast majority of sedentary Southerners. 
Like the US-RDA image of the Kel Tamasheq, Tamasheq fears about the US-
RDA’s intentions held some truth. 
In his book Native Sons, Greg Mann argues that contemporary Mali, and in 
extenso Francophone West Africa, is as much a postslavery society as it is a 
postcolonial society, a phenomenon he holds to be perhaps more visible at the 
desert edge than in Southern Mali.6 In this chapter I will show that in the case of 
Northern Mali, the post in postcolonial is fully entwined with the post in post-
slavery and that race indeed played, and indeed still plays, a major role in the 
perception of Tamasheq society and in the perceptions held in Tamasheq so-
ciety. For the late colonial period it can be argued that it was in fact still partly a 
slavery society. Starting in 1946, the emancipation of these (former) slaves was 
taken up by both the PSP and the US-RDA as a political rallying point in their 
campaigns against French rule, as the persistence of servitude demonstrated the 
failure of the French mission civilisatrice. Having its hands forced by political 
campaigns, and in fear of social disturbance, the issue was subsequently taken 
up by the colonial administration. The ‘bellah question’, as the issue was 
dubbed, developed its own dynamics through the agency of (former) slaves in 
Tamasheq society. The issues of slavery, race, racism, and perceived colonial 
favouritism toward Saharan societies were brought to a head by a notorious case 
of slave trade from West Africa to Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, in which a 
number of Tamasheq tribal chiefs were involved, or at least accused of being 
involved. These two issues and the consequences they had for the way the 
future Malian administration would look at and subsequently deal with Tama-
sheq society will be at the centre of this chapter. 
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But issues of race and slavery were not the only stereotypical images exist-
ing about the Kel Tamasheq. Just as important are the images of the Kel 
Tamasheq as primarily a war prone, nomad, and anarchist population. The myth 
of the Tamasheq slave raider is only part of the larger myth of the ‘guerriers 
des sables’, the ‘lords of the desert’. The colonial idea that the Kel Tamasheq 
were prone to military resistance originated in the period of conquest when the 
Kel Tamasheq did in fact put up heavy armed resistance. It was given further 
substance by the revolts against colonial rule the Kel Tamasheq organised 
during World War I when Tamasheq fighters under Kaocen ag Kedda, in 
alliance with remnants of the Ottoman forces and warriors from the Sanusiyya 
Sufi brotherhood, put up resistance against French colonial troops until 1920. 
These events led the colonial authorities to believe Tamasheq society to be 
constantly on the verge of open revolt, a belief that grew again at the outbreak 
of World War II. This image of the Kel Tamasheq was transferred to the post-
colonial authorities, which linked this idea to the Tamasheq political support for 
the political projects described in the previous chapter into a fear for open revolt 
as soon as independence from France would be reached. 
As a last important stereotypical image of the Kel Tamasheq, their nomadic 
existence itself should be mentioned. It will be argued here that a lack of under-
standing of nomad social and political organisation from the side of sedentary 
peoples leads to the belief that nomads are by definition unruly anarchists 
averse to organisation and control. 
Colonial images 
The colonial period in AOF can be divided into three phases: A first phase of 
conquest and pacification, followed by a phase of functional administration and 
exploitation, and a last phase of slow decolonisation and development of the 
colonised. During the phases of colonial conquest and pacification, the Kel 
Tamasheq put up heavy military resistance with some major successes and 
heavy defeats at great cost for both the Kel Tamasheq and the French. This led 
to the stereotype of noble and fierce warriors discussed below. The memories of 
their defeats and troubles in pacifying the Sahara were at the basis of French 
policy towards the Kel Tamasheq until well in the 1940s, which consisted 
solely of keeping la paix française at all costs. During the phase of functional 
administration and exploitation the Kel Tamasheq showed great deference and 
reticence towards the colonial system. Their attitude was considered as ‘re-
served’ at its mildest or ‘deceitful’ and ‘medieval’ at its worst. On the other 
hand, there existed a great French interest in Tamasheq society during and after 
this period. Certain cultural peculiarities, real or imagined, such as the matri-
lineal transfer of power; a certain amount of liberty in gender relations des-
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cribed as a ‘courting culture’; men veiling their faces for women and not the 
other way around in contrast to other Muslim societies; and the hierarchical 
structure of society, often (wrongly) compared to the European feudal system, 
with a heavily racialist dimension to top it up: ‘White’ nobles ruling over 
‘black’ slaves. It all helped to transform the Kel Tamasheq from real people into 
the quasi-mythical ‘lords of the desert’ in the best of Orientalist traditions as 
described by Edward Said.7 
The myth of the ‘lords of the desert’, defiant and proud of their culture and 
traditions, had a tremendous impact on colonial policy towards the Kel 
Tamasheq during the third phase of colonial rule, that of ‘development’ during 
the 1940s and 1950s. The colonial administration saw no problem in applying 
development policies in the heartlands of Soudan Français. But its policy was 
‘protective’, in Donald Horowitz’ meaning of the term, towards the culture and 
traditions of Tamasheq society.8 In his analysis of the general colonial attitude 
towards ethnicity and ethnic groups, Horowitz describes a distinction being 
made by most colonial authorities between ‘modern’ and ‘backward’ ethnic 
groups, the first embracing colonial modernity, the second being reticent to-
wards it. The ‘modern’ groups are then perceived as ‘degenerated’, astray from 
their traditions, while the ‘backward’ groups are seen as proud bearers of ori-
ginal culture. In this particular logic, ‘backward’ groups are then seen as in need 
of protection from modernity to preserve their way of life. This model of rea-
soning is perfectly applicable to the case at hand.  
Local French administrators certainly developed this protective attitude to-
ward the Kel Tamasheq in the 1950s. Service in the Sahara attracted a certain 
kind of men. Former Commandant de Cercle Jean Clauzel has nicely evaluated 
their attitude toward the Kel Tamasheq as ‘a double state of mind with partly 
contradictory orientations – a preoccupation with surveillance, attraction and 
sympathy’.9 In some cases this attraction and sympathy resulted in civil or 
military officers ‘going native’. In general it led to a resistance to any change 
that would destroy their subjects’ ‘traditional way of life’. It also meant the 
adoption of what the French thought to be the Tamasheq perception of their 
neighbours. This perception can be described as racist. According to this vision 
the Arabo-Berber ‘white’ Kel Tamasheq, living their harsh nomadic life in the 
Sahara, were naturally of a higher order than the ‘black’ inhabitants of Soudan 
Français, and saw themselves as their natural lords and masters. This sup-
posedly indigenous view of social and racial relations can be sensed in colonial 
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reports and was then internalised by both the Kel Tamasheq and the Malian 
administration. 
Race 
The area that we now commonly refer to as the Sahel (Arabic for coast), has 
been known from the earliest Arabic sources to the end of the colonial era as 
Bilâd as-Sudan: Arabic for ‘the land of the blacks’. This is the clearest and most 
obvious indication that race has always played an important role in the con-
struction of social identities and realities in this part of Africa. It is only 
recently, through analysis of the discourse of justification in the genocidal 
conflict in Darfur, that issues of racial identity construction in the Sahel have 
been reaccepted in Western academia, albeit reluctantly.10 But the problem is 
not new. Chad has been ravaged for decades by a civil war between the Arab 
and Tubu FROLINAT and the peoples from the South. In Mauritania, ‘white’ 
Bidân drove ‘black’ riverain Mauritanians across the Senegal River, while 
neighbouring Senegal did the same with Bidân on its territory in 1989, and 
again in 2000.11 In Sudan itself, in the 1980s and 1990s, ‘white’ Arab tribes 
such as the Baggara and Rizeiqat, armed by, and under protection of, the state, 
raided the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equatorial provinces for ‘black’ Nuer and Dinka 
slaves as part of a state policy to submit the Christian or Animist ‘black’ South 
to the ‘Muslim Arab’ North. Among African scholars, notably from Sudan, the 
importance of this issue and its connection to histories of slavery and slave 
trade has been recognized since at least the 1990s.12 Jok Madut Jok rightly 
suggests that in Sudan the ‘boundaries between “races” and ethnic groups are 
not so clear cut, at least to the outsider’.13 Thus, racialist perceptions influencing 
political and social relations between local populations are not unique to 
Northern Mali. They can be found in the whole Sahel zone from Mauritania to 
Sudan. Even the Swahili coast had its racial problems in the late colonial and 
early independence period.14 It will be argued here that the Sahel is not only a 
postslavery and postcolonial society, but also a society where racial discourse is 
at least always latently present. 
Let it be perfectly clear from the start that I do not use race as a category of 
analysis. Let me state it as plainly as possible that I here present race and racism 
as discursive categories, and as distinctions used by some of the players in this 
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history to explain and justify their actions. From its beginnings in the late 
1940s, the tension between the Kel Tamasheq and ‘Mali’ has been expressed 
through local and/or imported ideas on race. Both the Kel Tamasheq and the 
Malian political elite, as well as more common citizens used, and still use, 
concepts of race in their construction of ‘the other’. 
In his influential book Desert Frontier, James Webb argues that the Western 
usage of the terms ‘white’ and ‘black’ as racial markers ‘seem to be a distant 
and refracted borrowing from the Arabo-African past’.15 Webb rightly warns us 
of the dangers that lie in extrapolating European and American histories and 
historical constructs of race to the Sahel, to which could be added the danger of 
conflating Southern African histories of race and race construction. But Webb 
also hints at the possible common histories in the construction of racial iden-
tities in the European and Arab-African world. This idea is endorsed and further 
developed by Amir Idris in his writings on racial discourses and slavery in the 
Sudan.16 The question of conflagration of these racial discourses is especially 
important in the postcolonial Sahara and Sahel. In other words: Can a term such 
as ‘race’ be used to describe the social realities and discourses of the present-
day Sahel, and if so, how can it be historically analysed? This question has so 
far been most elaborately dealt with for Northern Mali by Bruce Hall in his PhD 
Mapping the River in Black and White: Trajectories of Race in the Niger Bend, 
Northern Mali.17 Hall retraces the history of Arabic racial discourse in the 
Sahara and Sahel since the 17th century, and their final intermixture with Euro-
pean racial discourses in the colonial period. With Webb, Hall argues that eco-
logical changes in the region since the 16th century worked in favour of nomad 
pastoral groups to the disadvantage of sedentary communities, leading to the 
political and military dominance of the former over the latter. This dominance 
was partly legitimated in a racialist discourse on cultural and religious differ-
ences borrowed in part from the thinking of Ibn Khaldûn on the origins of 
phenotypical difference. Ibn Khaldûn refuted the ‘Ham thesis’, linking the 
origins of race to the story of Noah’s curse of his son Ham, but his thinking was 
racial in that he linked phenotypical difference to cultural, religious and mental 
inferiority, positioning the inhabitants of the most extreme zones, the Africans 
and the Slav populations of Europe close to animals. He explained this infe-
riority through the classic Greek theory of seven climatic zones, and the detri-
mental effects of living in the most northern and southern climates. Of course, 
this theory presented a major hermeneutical flaw in failing to explain the rise of 
Islam in such an intemperate climate as the Arabian Peninsula, which is refuted 
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by insisting on the moderate influence of the sea winds, which temper the 
Arabian climate. But furthermore Ibn Khaldûn believed that the deficiencies 
caused by life in the harsh climatic zones could be mitigated by adherence to 
Islam.18 This concept was, as Bruce Hall demonstrates, reworked in the Saharan 
context to become linked to descent from Arabic Muslim lineages. 
First, ideas about ‘white’ Arab Islamic culture that originated in the Islamic 
Middle East and North Africa were made part of Southern Saharan cultural 
identity by a reconfiguration of local genealogies connecting local Arabic- and 
Berber-speaking groups with important Arab Islamic historical figures in North 
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Second, local Arabo-Berber intellectuals 
rewrote the history of relations between their ancestors and ‘black’ Africans in a 
way that made them the bearers of Islamic orthodoxy and the holders of reli-
gious authority in the Sahelian region.19 
The political dominance of these Arabo-Berber groups, partly originating in 
ecological advantages, was thus legitimated by a claim on Islamic cultural and 
religious heritage, handed down in particular lineages of Arabo-Berber origins. 
Thus, religion, behaviour and descent were primal traits of ‘race’. Bruce Hall 
summons this reasoning up as: ‘To be “Black” is to be a son of Ham; to be 
“White” is to be a bearer of “true” Islam’.20 At present, the link between lineage 
– temet in Tamasheq – and a racialised Muslim identity is still made in Northern 
Mali, where the Ifoghas claim to be bearers of true Islam through descent from 
the prophet, while local imghad groups counter this claim by stressing an 
identity as ‘true Berbers’, against ‘Arab invaders’.21 This conception of race as 
defined through, first, belonging to a lineage; and second, the status quality of 
this lineage, is strikingly parallel to developments in Europe since the 15th cen-
tury as described by Pierre Boulle. According to Boulle, the term race became 
used first by the Italian and French nobility to differentiate between older 
families and the newly ennobled. The difference was perceived to be one of 
moral character and (older) lineage.22 How far these Arabo-African and Euro-
pean discourses are connected is a difficult but most interesting question. It is 
also strikingly similar to the way an ‘Arab national’ identity is construed in 
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present-day Sudan.23 The general claim that slaves do not have lineage, and are 
therefore inferior, is still of importance in most West African societies. It is not 
surprising that the Malian association in promotion of the social emancipation 
of former Tamasheq slaves founded in 2006 is called Temedt, ‘lineage’ or 
‘heritage’. 
A second historical strand of racial discourse, linked to the previous one, is 
based in local and North African histories of slavery. Chouki El Hamel has 
developed the connection between Islam, race and slavery in North Africa.24 
Describing the creation of the so called Jaish ‘abîd al-Bukharî, an army of partly 
expropriated slaves created by Moulay Isma’îl in 1705, El Hamel argues that all 
black inhabitants of Morocco were included in this army, regardless of their 
juridical status, while slaves of other origins were not included. Skin colour was 
the main, if not only, criterion for inclusion as the equation between African 
origins and servile status had already been firmly rooted in early 18th century 
Moroccan society. This equation stems from the interpretation of Islamic law 
regarding slavery and a local historical context. 
Only ‘infidels’ were legally allowed to be enslaved. Therefore, the best place to 
obtain slaves was across the closest borders of the infidels, in the Sudan. This 
borderline, with the contrast in physical type, contributed to the connection of skin 
colour with slavery. So, the ancient rivalry between nomadic Berbers and sedentary 
Blacks that led towards cultural and racial prejudice took an Islamic form after the 
conversion of the Berbers to Islam since the seventh century.25 
This argument is developed by many scholars dealing with slavery in North 
Africa and the Sahara and Sahel, but El Hamel argues further that the con-
nection between ‘black’ and slave status can be traced through the etymology of 
the term haratin: The present-day inhabitants of Oasis towns of servile origins. 
Contrary to the consensus that this word comes either from the Arabic hurr 
thânî (the second [generation is] free, i.e. manumitted) or the Berber haratha 
(gardening, from the Latin hortus), El Hamel argues that haratin is derived 
from the Berber root HRD or SHRD, denoting a dark colour – black or red – 
connected to skin colour and descent.26 The word eshardan indeed means 
mulatto in Tamasheq, while ehardan indeed means a reddish or black dark 
colour.27 
This brings us to the complex link between colour and race in Saharan racial 
discourse. With hard-to-measure historical depth, the word for black, koual in 
Tamasheq, is in use as a term to denote people of a dark complexion and low 
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social status, (former) slaves and casted craftsmen. This is parallel to the use of 
the term sudân in Arabic. But contrary to the Arabic use of the term bidân, in 
Tamasheq the term ‘white’ (imoulan) is not used in racial discourse. Instead, 
Tamasheq makes use of the terms shaggaran – red – and sattefen – bluish black 
– to denote people of noble status and a particular phenotype. According to 
Brhane, a similar colour label is used in present-day Mauritania, where the term 
Khadriyîn (Arabic khadr, green) is used to denote a group of haratin who have 
been manumitted in ancient times and who have since acquired slaves them-
selves.28 Hence a similar colour to the Tamasheq sattefen – bluish black – is 
here used to denote a social group in between free and unfree. It can be con-
cluded that local terms to describe racial and/or social status cannot easily be 
translated into Western racial concepts of skin colour. Yet, during the colonial 
period this is exactly what happened. What follows is a complicated language 
game, but it is of importance to understand as it explains the mixture of racial 
concepts that at present are at play in Northern Mali. 
To the colonial administration, Tamasheq society combined two races in one 
social order: ‘Blanc’ and ‘noir’. Through their own racial perceptions based on 
phenotype and skin colour, European explorers and French conquerors saw 
those inhabitants of the Sahara, who would locally most likely be denoted as 
shaggaran, red, as blanc, while failing to ‘see’ the locally constructed racial 
difference between sattefen – bluish black – and koual – black. Thus, while the 
lower strata of society were perceived as noir, the upper strata of society that 
would locally be seen as sattefen were simply seen as ‘racially impure’. This 
idea of racial impurity of the upper strata of society can already be found in the 
oldest ethnographic descriptions of the Kel Tamasheq, such as those of Heinrich 
Barth and Henry Duveryier, and they persisted throughout the colonial period. 
In 1951, the French Colonial Administrator Lieutenant Barthé noted about the 
Tamasheq nobility of the Niger Bend, which would most likely be qualified as 
sattefen, that ‘many are black and generally do not have the noble appearance of 
the inhabitants of the [Algerian] Hoggar’.29 Through his own racial bias, and 
despite a hundred years of ethnography, the French commander still translated 
shaggaran as blanc and only blanc as noble. The French racial discourse had 
had a profound impact on local perceptions and constructions of race in Soudan 
Français. Bruce Hall argues that in pre-colonial days, not only Arabo-Berber 
families had constructed a racial identity based on Islam and lineage. Songhay 
and Fulani elites in the Niger Bend also considered themselves as different from 
‘blacks’, albeit their claim was less thoroughly developed. But the French re-
fused to acknowledge this self-perception as ‘not black’, since their perception 
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of race was purely based on phenotype, and not on lineage or culture.30 To 
recapitulate: In Tamasheq discourse shaggaran is the colour of the free (ellellu) 
but not of the noble (imushagh), who are seen as sattefen. But contrary to this 
local perception the French perceived blanc/shaggaran to be the colour of 
nobility. Hence, especially after the virtual extinction of the imushagh after the 
Tamasheq uprisings during the First World War, French racial perceptions 
gained ground and led to a gradual reappraisal of skin colours within Tamasheq 
society itself. Blanc/shaggaran won in importance and noir/koual became more 
and more stigmatised as the colour of slaves, with sattefen becoming in disuse. 
Under the influence of French as the (former) colonial language, Tamasheq 
racial discourse has gradually incorporated European racial discourse and 
terminology even further. When speaking French, a Tamasheq will nowadays 
translate koual as noir, while both shaggaran and sattefen are translated as 
blanc. But when speaking Tamasheq, the local term shaggaran would still be 
used, while the word imoulan – white – would not be. Yet, although hard evi-
dence is lacking, the French colonial equation of blanc with noble, together 
with the virtual elimination of the sattefen coloured nobility after their uprisings 
in the 1910s, probably helped the upward social mobility of some shaggaran/-
blanc coloured groups. At present, some groups formerly described as imghad 
in colonial ethnography now stress that the term ellellu, which originally meant 
‘free’ simply means ‘noble’. By collapsing the terms sattefen, the colour of no-
bility, and shaggaren, the colour of the free into blanc when speaking French, 
and by changing the meaning of the word ellellu from 'free' into 'noble', these 
lower status groups effectively climb the ladder of society through the restruc-
turing of race in society itself.31 
On the basis of their perception of race in the Sahara, colonial historiography 
and ethnography presented the Kel Tamasheq elite as an ‘alien invader’. They 
have been portrayed, among other things, as the descendants of the Vandals, 
lost crusaders or even of a ‘Caucasian-populated sunken Atlantis’.32 These in-
vaders had then subdued an indigenous African population, an image that would 
resurface at various times after independence. In the colonial perception, in a 
way, Tamasheq society in its ‘historical’ and ‘white’ origins mirrored colonial 
images of the colonial project: ‘Whites’ ruling ‘blacks’. This may have been at 
                                                 
30  Hall, B. 2005: 67. 
31  Based on discussions with members of the fraction Ishidenharen Kel Ashu, Cercle 
Ménaka, who claim ellellu (which they are) to mean noble, but who were described 
by Nicolaisen as imghad in the 1960s. Nicolaissen, J. & I. Nicolaissen 1997. Similar 
claims are made by the Ifoghas and Idnan in the Région Kidal. Although these 
groups were not noble in pre-colonial times, but were dominated by the Ouillimiden 
imushagh, their pre-colonial status is less clear. 
32  Henry, J-R. 1996. 
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the root of the positive appreciation the French had of Tamasheq society. This 
stereotype is strongly connected to the stereotype of the Kel Tamasheq as slave 
holders described below. Both the French and the new African elite held this 
stereotype and appreciated it in different ways. The French obsession with 
racial difference linked to social inequality at the beginning of the colonial 
period can be easily explained in the way outlined above. However, the per-
sistence of this obsession in the late colonial period is less easy to explain. It is 
however very likely to have still been based on ideas of ‘white superiority’, and 
linked to an idea of ‘white’ physical inaptitude to labour in Africa. Exemplary is 
the Governor General’s circular of 1949 on the ‘bellah question’, which in-
cluded the following observation: 
It is a striking observation that populations living in servile conditions are to be 
found in the Saharan and Sahelian zones of West Africa, where all attempts at 
liberation are blocked by particular difficulties: The existence of a nomad population 
of the white race which, for historical and physical reasons, (...) can hardly be forced 
to perform manual labour.33 
Whatever its reasons, the image of the ‘white’ Kel Tamasheq and Bidân 
dominating ‘black’ servants persevered. The social and economic emancipation 
of the former Tamasheq slaves was postponed partly for this reason, and dealt 
with only at the instigation of Soudanese politicians in 1946. The stereotype of 
Tamasheq society as racially divided between ‘white’ lords and ‘black’ slaves 
had by then been absorbed by the Malian political elite, often colonial civil 
servants themselves. The Soudanese political elite rightly regarded certain ex-
ceptions on colonial practice made for Tamasheq society as being based on a 
racist preference for the ‘white’ nomads over other, ‘black’, colonial subjects. 
For example, the ‘white’ Kel Tamasheq and Bidân had always been exempted 
from conscription in the colonial army. That armed service gave some ad-
vantages to the conscripts after their service – exemption from forced labour; a 
small pension; and some status at a local level – was forgotten. However, the 
Tamasheq slaves, the iklan or bellah, were enlisted in the colonial armies, 
which indicated to the Soudanese political elite that the exemption of the Kel 
Tamasheq from conscription was based on racial rather than ethnic grounds.34 A 
second privilege was the exemption of the nomads from forced labour. Indeed, 
forced labour took a heavy toll in Southern Soudanese societies, and it must 
have soured the conscripted labourers in the Niger Bend to see their nomadic 
neighbours being exempted. Again, bellah were not exempted from forced 
labour. These exemptions led many Soudanese to believe the Kel Tamasheq 
                                                 
33  Haut Conseiller, Directorat Général Interieur no. 730 INT/ AP2 aux Gouverneurs 
Mauritanie, Soudan, Niger, 17/08/1949. ACK. 
34  Mariko, K. 1993: 191-201. 
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were the French colonial ‘darlings’. In terms more appropriate to the US-RDA; 
they were the ‘vanguard of French neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism’. 
To the postcolonial Malian Government, the Kel Tamasheq were just as 
‘white’ as they had been to the colonial administration. However, where the 
latter appreciated their ‘whiteness’ positively, the Malian Government saw it as 
a sign of ‘otherness’ and as a threat. In postcolonial Mali discourse on race was 
further complicated by a collapsing or superimposing of the ideas of ‘nomad’ 
and ‘sedentary’ as identity markers on the previously described discursive re-
gisters of race. This becomes evident in the indiscriminate use of the terms 
‘nomads’ and ‘whites’ by the Government and by the population when talking 
about the Kel Tamasheq. Tamasheq and Arab ‘whiteness’ is now partly defined 
by their nomadic way of life. ‘Nomad’ and ‘white’ are interchangeable in form-
ing one identity as ‘other’. In contrast, the terms ‘farmers’ and ‘blacks’ remain 
used separately by both those who are indicated by these terms, i.e. Malian 
sedentary societies, and by the Kel Tamasheq themselves. On the other hand, 
‘black’ and ‘slave’ seem interchangeable derogatory terms used by the Kel 
Tamasheq from the upper strata of society to denote all who are not ‘their kind 
of people’. In other words, the lower caste members of Tamasheq society itself, 
but also members of other societies in Mali. In the 1950s and in the first years 
after independence, Malian political leaders made it quite clear that they 
perceived the Kel Tamasheq, their ‘whiteness’ and their way of life as a 
problem. This was because in the mind of the ruling US-RDA elite, the Kel 
Tamasheq had been colonial favourites because of their ‘whiteness’, which had 
given them a misplaced superiority complex. 
Let us now look at the impact of racial discourse on the perception the Kel 
Tamasheq, especially the Kel Adagh, had of the newly independent Malian 
Government. This discourse has been shaped mainly in the early post-colonial 
period. By contrasting the independent Malian regime to the colonial regime I 
argue that contrary to most people in West Africa, or Africa in general, or even 
contrary to the experience of other Tamasheq tribes and federations, the Kel 
Adagh appreciation of the colonial period is rather positive. Understanding this 
inverse of the general logic and history of contemporary Africa is crucial in 
understanding the events under discussion. The racist dimension is in a way 
only secondary in importance to this main inversion of historical perception. 
The following is still hard to believe for those who are brought up with an 
African historiography in the service of the construction of national identities, a 
historiography prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, and one that still affects much 
present-day scholarship. This historiography depicts colonial times as the epi-
tome of an African nightmare. At present, the Kel Adagh see colonial times as 
better days, as a golden age.  
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The Kel Adagh today maintain that their ancestors in pre-colonial times 
were reputed for their piety and knowledge of Islam, but not for their warrior 
prowess. Pre-colonial times were bad times for the Kel Adagh. They are pre-
sented locally as days of domination by surrounding federations, when the Kel 
Adagh were raided and dominated by the Kel Hoggar and Ouillimiden Kel 
Ataram, sometimes even by raiding parties from the Aïr Mountains. French rule 
ended these raids and the dominance of the Ouillimiden and Kel Hoggar. In the 
1900s and 1910s, the French policy to pacify the Ouillimiden confederation, 
then the most powerful Tamasheq political entity in present-day Northern Mali, 
entailed the dismembering of the confederation by allocating political privileges 
to former tributary groups. Thus, in a series of treaties signed between the 
French, the Ouillimiden, and their tributaries, the Kel Adagh gained the status 
of an independent federation under the leadership of their new amenokal; 
Attaher ag Illi of the Ifoghas.35 Not only that, under colonial rule the Kel Adagh 
gained renown and status as warriors within the Sahara at large at the side of the 
French.36 The Tamasheq rebellions against the French in the 1910s saw the Kel 
Adagh combating the rebellious Ouillimiden as French allies. During the 1920s, 
the Adagh was under constant attack from the inhabitants of the Western Sahara 
and the Moroccan Drâa area, which had not yet surrendered to the French. 
These continuous attacks are now remembered as ‘the war with the Rgaybat’. 
The French Commandant Charles Lecocq and a small army headed by the 
freshly appointed amenokal of the Adagh managed to end the raids in a decisive 
battle at Boceyat in 1928.37 The story of Boceyat allows the Kel Adagh to 
present themselves as full-fledged warriors from then on. That this was done 
with French help is not forgotten. After the end of the Rgaybat war, peace and 
prosperity reigned in the Adagh. This prosperity culminated in the late 1940s 
and 1950s. The rainy seasons were good, and there were abundant pastures. 
Trade flourished as raiding had ceased almost totally. In 1947 the first school 
was created in the Adagh. French education met with heavy resistance in co-
lonial times. It was then widely believed the French school would turn children 
away from Islam. It is now widely believed that teghere – education – is the 
only hope of ensuring Tamasheq survival as a people. This calls for a historical 
reappraisal of French efforts in education within Tamasheq society and his-
torical discourse, but this reinterpretation has by now been largely completed. 
More importantly perhaps, communication and relations between the French 
administration and the Kel Adagh improved. Jean Clauzel, the Commandant 
                                                 
35  For a detailed discussion of this policy and its effects on local Tamasheq politics, 
see Lecocq, B. 2003. 
36  See Boilley, P. 1999. 
37  Ibid.: 101-151. 
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serving the longest period in these two decades, spoke Tamasheq and it is clear 
from his own reminiscences that he deeply loved the Adagh and its inhabit-
ants.38 His love is returned with at least sincere affection. Many older people I 
interviewed in the late 1990s presumed I knew Clauzel and inquired about his 
wellbeing. Clauzel’s name brought them memories of better days. In short, 
French presence in the Adagh in colonial times is at present not explained as 
conquest or occupation. The French are seen as having been allies. And then 
these allies left. In June 1960 some Kel Adagh looking for pasture in Algeria 
asked a French officer whom they met: 
(…) ‘why have we been said to vote “yes” for de Gaulle and to remain French, and 
now you have left and have given the “tobol” (command) to the blacks’ and ‘why 
did France leave while neither she nor we desired this’?39 
The Kel Adagh held a grudge against the French in 1960, and the French 
transfer of power to the US-RDA is still seen as treason from their side. But as 
some see it now, the French were not the only ones to betray the Kel Tamasheq 
in 1960. Some of my interlocutors felt the Malian Government had tricked them 
into accepting inclusion in the Malian state by making false promises. This is 
how former rebel leader Amegha ag Sherif told the story: 
At the last moment, France wanted all the chiefs to sign a petition to de Gaulle that 
they did not want their independence within the African states such as Mali and 
Niger. Therefore, it was necessary for all the chiefs to sign, all the chiefs of the 
Tuareg tribes and of the big confederations. They summoned the chiefs to Gao to 
inform them of this petition. All the chiefs came. They were told: “Look here: In a 
month we will go. If you do not want to stay in an independent Mali, you only have 
to sign this letter here to say that you want to stay with the French until you can 
have your own independence”. So. They replied that this was a serious matter, and 
that they had to think about it. They had to confer with each other to see what kind 
of matter this was. So. It was in the morning at ten o’clock. They told them: “OK. 
Think it over and then come back to me around two o’clock this afternoon.” So. 
They returned to the city of Gao where the black delegates who were there, such as 
Alassane, Alhuseyni Maïga and Anyi Doungouy and others were waiting for them. 
The people there were informing them and they were curious to know why the 
French had received only them. They repeated to them what the French had said. 
[The Kel Tamasheq chiefs] told [the black delegates that the French] had proposed 
[to the Kel Tamasheq chiefs] to sign a petition if they did not want to be inde-
pendent with the blacks. So the others looked at each other and replied: “The French 
try to set you against us. As for us, we only seek our independence and not to com-
mand you or to command anyone. No one who will go to Ménaka to command the 
Ouillimiden in Ménaka. There will be no one going to Badi the Kounta to command 
in his place. This is unthinkable; we cannot consider this. There is no one who can 
go to Attaher in Kidal to command in his place. All we want is to separate Islam 
                                                 
38  For Clauzel’s memories of his service in the Sahara see Clauzel, J. 1998. 
39  Regnier, J. 1960, CHEAM 3457: 9. 
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from the Catholics. We want them to go, and from then on everyone will command 
in their own right. There will only be exchanges between us. That is all we want. It 
is not to command in your place. Each will command in his own place. And the 
French want to set you up against this to slow it all down?” The Tuareg chiefs 
replied: “We and the French, we have agreed on nothing definite so far. If you do 
not want to command us, there is no problem”. “We are not going to command you, 
each one commands in his own right. There will only be exchanges between us as 
much as there are now.” So. They [Tamasheq chiefs] said: “We will go back to tell 
them this”. [Amegha directly makes the others reply:] “Yes, yes, they have only one 
month left before they leave. No one will come to see you and they are forced to 
leave since they have signed to do so.” So they did this. Everyone returned home 
after having bought some bags of millet. They returned home. One month later 
independence arrived. Contrary to what was said to the chiefs, we saw the black 
soldiers coming to command the goum platoons and the ettebel. We were occupied 
by civil servants while the goumiers were only loyal to France. And indeed, the 
blacks have changed things.40 
Two main elements stand out in this story. First, the Kel Tamasheq chiefs 
were in contact with the Sudanese political elite on the subject of independence. 
The latter assured the former that autonomy was guaranteed and that inde-
pendence to them entailed a religious commitment. It was their intention to free 
the country from the rule of infidels. Second, and most important, these poli-
ticians did not keep their word. The last two elements came up in other conver-
sations I had with Kel Adagh on independence and the nature of the Keita 
Government. Mohamed Lamine Fall explained to me why the Kel Adagh had 
decided to fight the Malian Government in 1963 as follows: 
Attaher had come to an agreement with the head iklan of the South to unite, to form 
the Government. But the Malians are badly educated. They accept anyone into the 
army; Christians, the non-religious, et cetera. They did not send people here who 
knew politics. The people Mali had sent were not of the sort agreed upon in 
Attaher’s agreement. (...) The people who were sent to the bush by the admini-
stration were not the nobles of the South, but bad people whom they had promoted 
to officer ranks so they would agree to come to the North.41 
The language used is telling. Mohamed Lamine first calls the new Malian 
Government the ‘head iklan’, the ‘head slaves’. These had no ‘education’, were 
uncivilised, and were not Muslims. He then recognises that the Southern 
                                                 
40  Conversation with Amegha ag Sherif. Brussels, October 1994. It is not clear which 
petition Amegha is referring to. It could be the September 1958 referendum, the 
petitions by Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick, or an entirely new one. Interestingly 
enough, Amegha has developed a kind of standard narrative about these events. 
Amegha gave a very similar account to Pierre Boilley, see Boilley, P. 1999: 299-
300. Boilley links this account to Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick’s petitions dis-
cussed in Chapter 1. 
41  Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 23/5/1999. 
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population of Mali had nobility, but these nobles were not sent to the North, as 
it had been stipulated in a supposed treaty of agreement between Attaher ag Illi 
and the nationalist leaders. 
Both Amegha’s and Mohamed Lamine’s form of discourse fit with notions 
held in Tamasheq society on ‘black peoples’. This notion consists first of all of 
the equation ‘blacks are slaves’.42 Second come concepts of the mentality and 
ways of thinking perceived to be proper to slaves. Considering the Tamasheq 
concept tayite – intelligence, or mind/competence regulating behaviour – Gun-
vor Berge has argued that the Kel Tamasheq see the status of ‘free’ or ‘slave’ as 
naturally determined, and not as cultural and social constructs.43 Both free and 
slave have tayite, but of a different nature. A free or noble person knows shame 
and honour, which restrains his or her conduct. Slaves do not know shame or 
honour, and therefore their behaviour is unrestrained by nature. They cannot 
control their desires and are therefore liable to steal, lie and deceive. This belief 
in the ‘natural’ difference (inferiority) of the racialised other is not unique to 
Tamasheq society. It should be kept in mind that this idea was long held in 
Europe as well as in the Americas before the abolition of slavery, and even now 
these ideas are not fully discarded. The South African apartheid example is al-
most too commonplace to bring to mind. Closer to the events studied here, 
conflicts based on racial antagonism occurred throughout the Sahel.  
Given the equation ‘blacks are slaves’, the Keita Government could only be 
expected to deceive the Kel Tamasheq chiefs into accepting independence, 
based on certain promises, which were then easily withdrawn. In Kel Adagh 
discourse, this act of deceit, explains the reasons for their revolt in 1963, as my 
interlocutors indicated. 
Both Amegha ag Sherif’s and Mohamed Lamine’s explanation of the rea-
sons for the revolt are also telling in the way the Kel Tamasheq see the making 
and breaking of independence: By agreement and treaty. The Kel Adagh had 
surrendered their independence (as far as they had had any) voluntarily to the 
French. And they expected the same in 1960: To accept the inevitable inclusion 
in Mali at least as equal partners and under some conditions, set out in a treaty. 
This idea is illustrated in the following account of a discussion between Bakary 
Diallo, the first governor of the Gao Région after independence, and Attaher ag 
Illi in June 1960:  
Attaher, who certainly knew that we would come, received us with a strong dele-
gation at a considerable distance from his tent. A few minutes after our arrival a 
                                                 
42  I realise that this is a harsh statement. One could argue at length about the question 
of whether this equation is made as literally as I present it here. However, during my 
research, remarks and historical discourse underlining this equation kept piling up.  
43  Berge, G. 2000: 204-205. 
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large group of Ifoghas surrounded us already and conversations were struck up on 
various subjects. (...) The Kel Effele notables expounded their ideas on the future 
organisation of the state which can be summarised as follows: 1) Primacy of edu-
cation through Arabic over education through French 2) An equitable place within 
state organisms and the administration for those instructed in Arabic 3) The estab-
lishment in the Adagh of a kind of regional autonomy in which the representative of 
central power, even in the case of public order, would only act when requested by 
the local power.44 
Bakary Diallo saw things in a different light. He replied simply that such 
ideas on the organisation of the state were opposite to those of the central 
government. Of course, in a state there could not be two armies and the main-
tenance of public order should be the sole function of the state. ‘Going beyond 
this principle would open the way to anarchy and secession’ as Diallo told 
Attaher. In the eyes of the state, no promises about autonomy were ever made. 
But the Kel Adagh, at least today, regard things differently. The broken promise 
to grant autonomy and to rule the country in accordance with Islam proved to 
the Kel Adagh that they were not dealing with nobles after all, as Mohamed 
Lamine explained. They were dealing with slaves, as they had suspected be-
forehand. This belief in the untrustworthiness of the ‘black’ Malian Govern-
ment still shaped historical discourse in the Adagh in the aftermath of the 
second rebellion. Consider the following excerpt from an interview I had in 
Kidal. We were discussing the Kel Tamasheq attitude towards the French. My 
interlocutor suggested that the Kel Tamasheq have a complex towards the 
French originating in colonial history. 
Me:  Do you also have a complex towards the Malians? 
M.:  No, not in the least. I have nothing but contempt for them, but their attitude is 
understandable. The French have never been colonised by the Berbers and 
Arabs as the blacks have been. We have brought them civilisation. Tekrur 
was a Berber empire. So was Ghana. When the Mande tried to conquer 
Ghana, the Almoravids kicked them out. We brought them civilisation, but 
by force. Now they have taken their revenge, that’s all. Unjust? Certainly. 
Vindictive? Certainly, but that is how humans are. I only despise them, those 
slaves.45 
Thus, in the Sahara and Sahel exist a number of alternate overlapping dis-
courses on race which all come to play a role in the historical social and 
political relations described in this book. 
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The bellah question 
One of the main prejudices held against the Kel Tamasheq by the Malian 
regime and population at large is that they were slavers, slave raiders and 
slaveholders.46 Even today, in Mali and especially Niger, the issue of slavery in 
Tamasheq society is not resolved and continues to play a role in local politics 
and in the popular image of the Kel Tamasheq. In both countries exist or-
ganisations of former Tamasheq slaves furthering their economic, social and 
political interests, apart from the rest of Tamasheq society, and in some respects 
an independent cultural or ethnic identity. In Niger the Association Timidria, 
created in the early 1990s by former Tamasheq slaves, propagates that in Niger 
today slavery still exists on a large scale. With the support of Anti-Slavery 
International (The Former British and International Anti-Slavery Society), Ti-
midria claims their rights through written reports, lawsuits and ritual liberation, 
to the embarrassment of the Nigerien Government.47 In Mali, the Association 
Temedt, an organisation with goals and a constituency similar to that of Timi-
dria, was created during a conference of ‘black Tamasheq’ as they called them-
selves, in Ménaka in August 2006.48 The historicity of Ménaka as the place 
where the politics of bellah emancipation started exactly sixty years earlier 
would surely have not escaped the minds of the conference organisers. Al-
though the impact of Temedt seems smaller than that of Timidria, both organi-
sations form the current expression of the historical and actual importance of 
discourses and politics of race and slavery in, and especially about, Tamasheq 
society, and their profound impact on state-society relations and rebellion in 
Northern Mali. 
The stereotyped image of the Tamasheq slaveholder certainly held some 
truth in the late colonial period, during which the new Soudanese elite formed 
its opinion of the Kel Tamasheq. Besides being a basis for prejudice, the eman-
cipation of the former Tamasheq and Bidân slaves, the bellah and haratin, 
became one of the US-RDA’s major campaign themes in the North during the 
1950s. In addressing their emancipation, the US-RDA hoped to gain the votes 
of the former slaves and to profile itself as the champion of social equality and 
liberty. It also served to attack the main reason for prolonged French colonial 
dominancy, the mission civilisatrice française. This subject became known as 
‘the bellah question’. 
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After formally abolishing slavery in its African colonial territories in 1905, 
the French denied its existence in Arab and Tuareg society, thus perpetuating its 
existence.49 The French denied the persistence of slavery in certain areas of the 
empire by voiding indigenous terms related to slavery of their meaning, using 
them without any relevance to social practice. During the colonial conquest of 
Northern Mali, the French took up the Songhay term gaabibi, meaning ‘black 
person’, but which they believed to mean slave, to denote all sedentary popu-
lations of the region. Thus, they even reversed local terminology on race and 
slavery to denote all inhabitants they did not see as ‘white’. Exceptions were 
made only for the white Tuareg and Bidân, and for the Songhay Arma, who 
claim descent from the Moroccan army conquering the Songhay Empire in the 
late sixteenth century.50 By the 1930s, the term gaabibi had been replaced with 
proper ethnonyms. French administrators avoided the term iklan, Tamasheq for 
slaves, when possible, replacing it with such euphemisms as serviteurs or tra-
vailleurs coutumiers. The term bellah, originally a Songhay word for all Tuareg 
of lower social status or a derogatory term for all Tuareg, quickly gained ad-
ministrative and political acceptance to denote Tamasheq slaves 
The absence of emancipation policies toward slaves came to an end in 1946 
with two main events: The election of the first Conseil général; and the 
abolition of forced labour with the Houphouët-Boigny law. Contrary to the 
Tamasheq of free status, Tamasheq of iklan, or slave, status had not been 
exempted from the much-hated forced labour. The abolition of forced labour in 
Tamasheq society was presented as an element of bellah emancipation by the 
colonial administration. In fact, the abolishment of forced labour was interpreted 
as if no forced labour of any kind, including internal to African societies, 
existed any longer. The terminology used to describe labour relations between 
(formally former) slaves and (formally former) masters was now even more 
strongly rephrased in such terms as travailleur coutumier (‘traditional labour-
er’), and these labour relations were then presented as normal, which of course 
they were in local societies. But the issue was also picked up by the newly 
founded political parties and presented to the bellah in much the same way. 
More important were the newly installed electoral policies in AOF. As they 
were officially free people, (former) slaves had the right to be enfranchised and 
cast their vote for the new installed Conseil général. Both PSP and US-RDA 
campaigners first brought this to their attention in the Ménaka area. They told 
the bellah population that they could elect an African who would certainly 
advocate for their rights with the administration and their former masters, some-
thing they had already proven to be able to do by having forced labour abo-
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lished. Many slaves indeed managed to reach the ballot boxes in the elections to 
come. They interpreted their vote as an act of liberation, calling the voting 
bulletins ‘freedom papers’.51 The effect of these elections in the Ménaka area 
was that many slaves left their masters, taking part of their masters’ herds with 
them. The end result was twofold. First the colonial administration finally took 
the issue of prolonged servitude of the former slaves seriously, and took 
measures to promote their social and economic emancipation. Second, the US-
RDA took ‘la question bellah’ as its battle horse in the North and did not 
dismount until the fall of their regime in 1968. 
The persistence of slavery in Soudan Français gave the US-RDA an ar-
gument to put French presence into question. After all, continuing French 
governance over Africans was publicly based on the idea of the mission civi-
licatrice française. The abolition of slavery was part of that mission. The open 
failure to put this practice to an end undermined the colonial raison d’être. Sure 
enough, servile conditions persisted (and persist) in all Soudanese societies.52 
But continued servitude was (and is) literally most visible among the Bidân and 
the Kel Tamasheq. First, the difference in appearance between former slaves 
and former masters can be seen, if not in physiognomy, then in bodily and 
social habitus. Second, in the Sahara, the colonial administration had not devel-
oped the infrastructure or policies that had helped to emancipate the slaves in 
other parts of AOF. There were few villages de liberté – liberty villages – and 
less labour or army recruitment which had offered slaves the means to leave 
their masters elsewhere.53 The few villages de liberté that did exist in the North 
were situated in the Niger Bend; further north they were entirely lacking.54 
Pastoral existence in general and a lack of herd ownership in particular made it 
difficult for former slaves to leave their masters while remaining in their region 
of origin. This is especially true in the extreme north where agriculture is 
virtually impossible. However, it was less valid in the Niger Bend where agri-
culture is possible and where many former slaves lived in villages and practised 
agriculture. Finally, colonial policy towards slavery in Tamasheq society was 
based on political interests. Collaborating groups, such as the Kel Hoggar and 
the Kel Adagh, had been allowed to keep their slaves and even to acquire some 
more, while resisting groups, such as the Ouillimiden Kel Ataram and Kel 
Denneg, saw their former slaves being diverted from their influence.55 
Thus, the efforts of the US-RDA to abolish servitude, the most prominent of 
all social inequalities, became focused on Tamasheq and Bidân society. Another 
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reason the US-RDA concentrated its efforts in the North was that it hoped to 
gain the electoral support of the liberated slaves. After all, the bellah constituted 
the demographic majority of the nomadic population in the Niger Bend. The 
strategy was very successful. Many slaves reached the ballot box with a clear 
understanding of the purpose of voting. Voting US-RDA equalled a vote against 
the master, it meant filing a ‘freedom paper’. On 17 June 1951: 
712 bellah in Gangaber, 59 at In Tillit, 26 at Chunkaye, and 203 at Indeliman have 
voted against their master. The results at the ballot box of In Tillit are especially 
interesting: A particularly isolated post, people untouched by propaganda, and yet 
59 freedom papers.56 
In the Niger Bend, the campaigns of the US-RDA had the most impact, given the 
number of slaves who could be emancipated. In 1955, at the advent of the 1956 
elections for the Assemblée Territoriale, the US-RDA made the bellah question one 
of its main campaign themes in the Cercle of Gao. 
Even before the start of the electoral campaign, [the US-RDA] seems to orient its 
actions on two issues in the central Subdivision. (...) A strong interest in the nomadic 
tribes in general and in the bellah question in particular. The current policy of the 
administration in this matter is closely scrutinised.57 
The reaction of the colonial government to the ‘bellah question’ was the 
gradual development of a policy of social and economic emancipation. Most of 
this policy was based on the practical measures taken by the Commandant de 
Cercle in Ménaka to resolve the problems after the 1946 elections. These were 
the administrative fissure between former slaves and former masters by giving 
the slaves their own identity cards; the redistribution of cattle between former 
slaves and masters; and the creation of separate bellah fractions.58 These 
measures were copied by the Governeur Générale in Dakar and dispatched as a 
basis for the emancipation policy of all bellah in 1949.59 
In the Kidal area, US-RDA activists and schoolteachers Amadou Bâ and 
Cheick Bathily tried to use the ‘bellah question’ to promote the US-RDA cause 
in the late 1950s. Both Amadou Bâ and Cheick Bathily were teachers at the 
nomad school of the Adagh. As an active US-RDA member, Bâ quickly clashed 
with the French administrators and with the local population, which was re-
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luctant to send their children to school in the first place. The same held for 
Bathily, who was of slave origins himself.60 The local administration finally 
managed to get Bâ and Bathily replaced. The US-RDA and Bâ did not give up 
their efforts to win Kidal for the US-RDA through the ‘bellah question’, but 
[T]he small number of servants diminishes their propaganda opportunities. They try 
nevertheless. Mr Bâ Amadou, who is no longer in service in Kidal, nevertheless 
returns each year by airplane to Tessalit, from where he travels on camel to the 
centres of Aguelhoc, Kidal, Ménaka and perhaps Ansongo. He also visits the camps 
where he tries to bring up the “servant question”.61 
In the Niger Bend, the campaigns of the US-RDA had more impact, since the 
number of slaves who could be emancipated lay much higher. In 1955, at the advent 
of the 1956 elections for the Assemblée Territoriale, the US-RDA made the bellah 
question one of its main campaign themes in the Cercle of Gao. 
Even before the start of the electoral campaign [the US-RDA] seems to orient its 
actions on two issues in the central Subdivision: (...) A strong interest in the nomadic 
tribes in general and in the bellah question in particular. The current policy of the 
administration in this matter is closely scrutinised.62 
An illustrative example of the ‘bellah question’ was the ‘Norben affair’ in 
1955 in the Cercle of Gourma Rharous.63 The Norben are a community of iklan 
who practiced agriculture and tended the herds of their masters, the Kel Gheris, 
but did not live in their masters’ camps. Under the influence of the US-RDA 
campaign, the Norben claimed that the herds under their custody actually be-
longed to them and consequently appropriated them. The Kel Gheris did not 
accept this behaviour and raided the Norben to reclaim their animals. It came to 
a trial in the traditional court of Gourma Rharous, which ruled in favour of the 
Kel Gheris. However, the Commandant de Cercle overruled its judgement. He 
decided that the Norben would no longer be part of their former masters’ 
fraction, but would form an independent Norben fraction from then on. Further-
more, he awarded them more than half of the herds they had taken from the Kel 
Gheris. The success of these liberation policies could be debated. The allocation 
of land to bellah fractions, as well as the general increase of land under culti-
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vation in this period in the Niger Bend created new conflicts between the 
pastoralists and their former sedentary dependants over access to pasture and 
water around the temporary wallows and the river bank.64 Neither did the 
former masters accept the loss of control over their former slaves. Nevertheless, 
the scant evidence seems to indicate that the emancipation policies were suc-
cessful. With regards to the Norben, Winter has provided evidence from one 
camp. In 1951, the camp at In Ahara consisted of four imghad tents and ten 
bellah tents. By 1960, five of these bellah families had left (a sixth had died 
out). Of the fifty-six descendants of the four tents remaining in 1960, only eight 
still inhabited the camp, while seventeen lived in a separate bellah camp, and 
another thirty-one lived in Gao or elsewhere in West Africa. 
In the early 1960s, the Keita Government still believed slavery had not yet 
been eradicated in Mali despite the US-RDA’s campaigns over the ‘bellah 
question’ in the 1950s. One of the major objectives of the new Government in 
the North was to end this state of affairs. But slavery did not so much exist 
legally, as it did psychologically and socially. Most former slaves who had had 
the opportunity to leave their former masters had by then largely done so. This 
can be said to a large extent for the more southern Tamasheq groups in the 
Niger Bend, where former slaves had easier access to new ways of existence, 
such as farming or leaving the area for the cities. Also, in these areas, the 
‘bellah question’ had been a major issue for both the colonial administration 
and the US-RDA.65 However, the same cannot be said for the Adagh, where 
former slaves had no opportunities to employ themselves in farming, and where 
infrastructural conditions did not make migration easier. 
Much still needed to be done therefore to emancipate the former slaves in 
the Adagh. Before the 1963 rebellion, the new regime, wary of further straining 
their already fragile relation with the Kel Adagh, did nothing to alter the social 
relations between former masters and slaves. Writing to Commandant de Cercle 
of Kidal Mohamed Najim in 1962, the Governor of Gao analysed the situation 
with regards to slavery in the Adagh as follows. 
It is beyond doubt that the people, the party, and the Government of Mali have 
abolished slavery once and for all. Nevertheless, as the President of our Government 
has put it so well, there can be no standard solution in this vast country of Mali. 
Therefore, it would be prudent, given the actual context, a context you know all too 
well, not to proceed immediately with the restitution of [slave] children who stayed 
with the family of old ATTAHER. A political education is needed, since it is 
necessary that, at the end of the day, the population itself understands the necessity 
of liberating the bellah. It is rather a national problem and, in waiting for a solution, 
we will be compliant and full of tact, as I have said above. In any case – our desire 
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to emancipate the bellah should not form an occasion for them to manifest their 
discontent beyond reason.66 
This attitude of compliance and tact changed after the 1964 rebellion was 
crushed. But the actual measures the administration could take to promote slave 
emancipation were limited. One policy was the support of former slaves in their 
horticultural efforts, mainly through the agricultural brigades discussed in the 
next chapter, or through appointing allotments in Kidal to the few slaves who 
settled in the town. A second measure was the creation of bellah fractions, a 
continuation of the policy the colonial administration had already pursued. But 
even this process was slow. The evidence on the creation of special bellah 
fractions is scarce, but this does not mean they were not created. The first 
mention of the creation of a bellah fraction by the Malian Government in the 
Kidal area dates from 1966. The Commandant de Cercle invested the procedure 
with some ceremony by delivering a speech in which he stated that he 
(...) would have liked to see all of the Adrar assisting at this ceremony to see you fly 
away as free birds in the sky. You owe this present day that you live to the Party 
alone, and nothing but the Party, since it is thanks to its institutions that you live this 
memorable day.67 
From the available data, this first creation of a bellah fraction seems not to 
have been followed by many others. Only one other mentioning of a bellah 
fraction; the fraction Kel Bella Kel Tadjmai has been found.68 Another, more 
indirect measure to emancipate the slaves was formal education. In independent 
Mali, all children should attend school. Since the Kel Adagh of free descent 
were still reluctant to send their children to school, the administration ended up 
educating more slave children than free ones. This time, this was not a con-
scientious policy, as it had been in colonial times for both the Kel Tamasheq to 
send the children of their slaves to school, and for the administration to accept 
these children. In this way, relatively more former slaves than free Kel Tama-
sheq ended up in the administration, since they had been educated. 
The former slaves were not the only ones to profit from ideas on class 
struggle in a feudal society. Since the number of former slaves was very low, 
much attention was given to the social elevation of the imghad in the Adagh and 
elsewhere, who were seen as a kind of working class. Sources on this elevation 
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are even scarcer than on those of the bellah, except for some party rhetoric in 
monthly reports, which never omitted to say something like 
The sentiments of hostility clearly disappear, to make way for honest and loyal 
collaboration between members of different groups. A team spirit blossoms at the 
honourable sites of human investment. Most of them, having hardly passed the door-
steps of obscurantism, barely gaining conscience of belonging to a nation, having 
just shed a state of irresponsibility, are almost blinded by the eternally radiant per-
spectives of our socialist option: Socialism. On the triumphant march towards the 
goals of Socialism they progress like the others. Stumbling from time to time, but 
nevertheless progressing.69 
I hope to make clear in the following chapters that this appraisal of local 
sentiments was utterly wrong. 
The slave trade to Mecca 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, slavery and slave trade re-
mained legal on most of the Arabian Peninsula and as far as it was illegal, trade 
and ownership remained lively despite continued efforts by the British Navy 
patrols in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.70 Only in 1962, with the installation of 
king Faysal, were slavery and the slave trade formally abolished in Saudi 
Arabia. The history of abolition in Saudi Arabia in the early 1960s is entangled 
with the history of Mali and with the history of some of the main political actors 
in Northern Mali in the 1950s: Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, Marouchett ag 
Moussa and Sidi Mohamed ag Zokka. It should be stressed that the slave trade 
to Saudi Arabia had both all of French West Africa and French Central Africa 
and Baluchistan in present-day Pakistan as its main sources. African pilgrims to 
Mecca were not always sure to return home safely as they might end up being 
enslaved.71 There is enough evidence that people from West Africa were indeed 
sold as slaves in the Arab Peninsula. French commanders were well aware of 
the existence of this trade and did not deny its existence in internal admini-
strative correspondence or even to the outside world. Those French officers who 
were sent to accompany the pilgrims to Mecca as ‘pilgrim agents’ on what was 
referred to as the ‘official’ pilgrimage, such as Marcel Cardaire, Gabriel Ferral 
and Georges Brouin paid particular attention to the subject, stating as much 
detail on the trade as possible. But the final abolition in Saudi Arabia in 1962 
came partly about through an international media scandal over the last remnants 
of slave trade to Saudi Arabia involving some Tamasheq chiefs and the Malian 
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Government. It will be argued here that, whatever the true events around this 
trade might have been, the media scandal that ensued and the attention paid to 
this subject by the US-RDA leadership came from their vision of the Kel 
Tamasheq as slavers, and reinforced this vision. Perhaps the desire to effec-
tively remove a powerful opposing politician from the political scene played a 
role in the denouement as well. 
In 1948 Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, until then chief of the Kel Intessar 
and PSP councillor in the Assemblée Territoriale, left to perform the hajj and to 
travel extensively throughout the Middle East and the Maghreb.72 With him 
travelled some of his family members, whom he wished to enrol in educational 
institutions in the Middle East, and also some of his servants. Among these was 
a certain Awad or Awatan, a bellah from the Igouadaran tribe, who had pre-
viously worked as a cook for a Tamasheq officer of the goum corps in Goun-
dam.73 Mohamed Ali was replaced in all his functions by his younger brother 
Mohamed Elmehdi ag Attaher Insar. After his hajj he travelled between Mecca, 
Egypt, Libya and Morocco, but he was back in Soudan Français in 1953, where 
he did not reclaim his old functions, although he was appointed as honorary 
tribal chief. In 1953, information came from the French consul in Jeddah that 
West Africans naturalised as Saudis were active in West Africa as slave traders, 
who offered to organise the pilgrimage overland, after which these pilgrims 
were sold.74 The Consul was especially worried about a group of about five 
bellah from the Goundam and Gourma Rharous Cercles, three men and two 
women and their children, who had travelled with Mohamed Ali. Inquiries were 
made with Mohamed Ali about who exactly these people were and what might 
have happened to them. With some embarrassment, Mohamed Ali explained 
that most of them had left him in 1952 in Khartoum, where they had found 
employment, on their way back to Soudan Français. Awad el Djouh, or Awatan, 
was among these five missing servants. 
In March or April 1954 Awad el Djouh arrived in Niamey, where he filed a 
formal complaint to the Chief of Police against Mohamed Ali for having sold 
him in Saudi Arabia.75 From Niamey, Awad continued to Bamako where his 
complaint was brought before court. The rumour about the slave trade organised 
from Soudan Français quickly spread in Bamako, and from there it reached the 
desks of the local press. The weekly Afrique nouvelle, a Catholic newspaper run 
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by the White Fathers from Dakar, was the first to track down Awad el Djouh in 
his lodgings in Bamako’s Bagadadji neighbourhood to interview him. The 
interview is presented with a seldom given insight in the setting of the con-
versation and its pursuit, which leads to believe that the quotes are verbatim 
within the limits of translation as Awad’s French was not very good. 
“Awad el Djoud? 
-  Yes” (…) 
-  I have heard saying that you filed a complaint with the authorities against a 
certain Mohamed Ali who has sold you as a slave. Is this true? 
-  Yes, that is true (…) 
-  Would you like to tell me your story yourself? 
-  Oh, yes! You know, I am … 
-  Sorry. Do you allow me to write this down? 
-  Oh, yes! (…) 
“You know, I was born in Gourma Rharous around 1933. At the age of 9, 
Mohamed Ali ag Attakher took me in his service. I was not paid, but only 
provided for. In 1949 my boss decided to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. I was to 
accompany him with four other servants. (…) After our arrival in Mecca, we 
stayed there for a year. After a journey to Medina, we returned to Mecca for the 
1950 pilgrimage. 
-  Were you well treated? 
-  Yes, we ate with Mohamed Ali from the same dish. (…) After the pilgrimage 
Mohamed Ali has send me to work for prince Abdallah Faysal, telling me that 
the money I would earn would serve to pay my return journey to Soudan. 
-  Did the prince pay you well? 
-  I have never received any pay. 
-  Where was your master at that moment? 
-  I understood that he had left Saudi Arabia. Only then did I understand that I had 
been sold to Abdallah Faysal as a slave. As a matter of fact, the prince himself 
told me so.76 
In the meantime, Mohamed Ali had returned from Soudan Français to 
Mecca. Many suspected he had fled there, which seems not unlikely. However, 
no French politician or administrator wanted such an embarrassing case to go 
out of hand. It was reasoned that as slavery formally did no longer exist, the 
case could not be sustained. In the end the case was judged at the Bamako 
Tribunal de Travail as a work dispute, in which Awad el Djouh claimed 13 
years of back pay between 1939 and 1952 from Mohamed Ali, to the sum of 
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1,083,304.55 Francs.77 This ruling was to the despair of the French colonial 
administration, which envisioned thousands of this kind of claims from former 
slaves all through the territory.78 In its ruling of 10 November 1954 the Tribunal 
declared itself incompetent to deal with the matter ‘ratione loci’, but the poli-
tical dimensions of the case had to be dealt with. In 1954 the Commission on 
Social Affairs of the Assembly of the Union Française commissioned one of its 
members, Pastor Emmanuel La Gravière, of the French Reformed Church, to 
conduct an inquiry into the slave trade in AOF. Awad el Djouh, from his side, 
went to appeal at the Tribunal de Première Instance, which validated the judge-
ment of the Tribunal de Travail and returned the case to this court. In its second 
judgement of 30 November 1955 the Tribunal du Travail restated its incompe-
tence. In a letter to the Governor of Soudan Français, the Governor General in 
Dakar decided that: 
The competent Tribunal in this Territory is the Juge de Paix of extended competence 
in Gao to which the Procureur général will direct himself confidentially, to draw his 
attention to the social (and political) effects of the judgement he will be called to 
make.79 
By then the case of Awad el Djouh was publicly known in France and 
throughout the world through newspaper articles, and the work of La Gravière 
who did not shun media coverage. The inquiries of La Gravière and the case of 
Awad el Djouh coincided with renewed efforts of the British Anti Slavery 
Society to integrate measures against slavery in the structures of the United 
Nations, which generated much media attention too.80 By 1955 Awad el 
Djouh’s story had been condensed and presented in the tabloid press as follows: 
Mohamed Ali ag Attaher, a powerful and rich man, engaged me one day as his 
servant, together with another man, his wife and their baby. This is a long time ago, 
probably 15 years. Together, we made the long sacred journey. But upon our arrival 
in Mecca, my master sent me to work for Prince Abdallah Faysal. Long months 
passed. (…) I learned one day that Mohamed Ali had left for Africa. The Prince 
called me before him and told me that I was no longer a free man; that I had been 
sold as a slave; that he had paid for me and that I was his property forever. Years 
went by. One day the prince ordered his steward to sell me on the slave market in 
Jeddah. I was brought there in a truck. I entered a great dark hall. There were many 
men and women assembled there: Slaves, like me. I managed to escape. (…) I tried 
to get on board of a ship destined for Africa a number of times but the police 
followed me. I managed to board a cargo ship: I hid on board and disembarked in 
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Sudan. I was free! I sold my clothes to pay for my journey to Khartoum. Upon 
arrival I had no clothes and no money left. I left naked and on foot for my village in 
Senegal. I made the journey sometimes by train, mostly on foot, stopping and work-
ing to pay for my travels.81 
The case of Awad el Djouh and his accusations of being sold by Mohamed 
Ali are less straightforward then they seemed in the press. Mohamed Ali vehe-
mently denied the accusations in letters he wrote to his relatives and friends in 
the Goundam area.82 According to Mohamed Ali, he had known Awad, or 
Awaten as he had been called in Gourma Rharous, since his childhood, as he 
had been brought up among the Kel Intessar, but he had not employed him. He 
had met him again in Bamako in 1948, where Awaten had worked, but where 
he now lived in destitution. Awad had asked Mohamed Ali to take him back 
home to Gourma Rharous, which Mohamed Ali did. From there he had fol-
lowed him to Mecca on Mohamed Ali’s expenses, after which he worked for 
the Saudi Minister of Defence (Prince Faysal) to pay back his travel debts to 
Mohamed Ali. The last bit seems to concord with Awad’s own explanation, but 
with the difference that this was not to pay his return journey, but to repay his 
journey coming. Also, Awad stressed in the interview that he had been treated 
well; he had even eaten from the same plate as Mohamed Ali during the 
journey, which indicates a relation of equality rather than one of subservience. 
Normally a master would not eat from the same dish as a slave. According to 
Mohamed Ali, Awad’s former patron from Gourma Rharous, Akounkoun, had 
visited him in Mecca, had been lodged by Awad and had given Awad some 
money in return. Everyone from Goundam and Gourma Rharous, in short, knew 
about Awad’s whereabouts. According to Mohamed Ali, Awad had to flee from 
Mecca because he had started an affair with one of Faysal’s concubines. 
How could I have forced Awaten to leave Bamako or Goundam without him filing a 
complaint? How can one think that I could have sold him here a long time ago 
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without him filing complaint here with the French Consul? How can one believe that 
I sold him here while on the road he was often at least a month behind me?83 
In fact, Awad had tried to file a complaint with the French consul in Jeddah, 
but had failed. According to Suzanne Miers, European consular policies in the 
1950s towards questions of enslaved Africans was to not interfere when it 
concerned slaves belonging to the royal family, and Awad had been sold (or 
not) to the Saudi crown prince himself, reducing Awad’s chances on consular 
help to almost zero.84 On the other hand, it was Abdullah Faysal who soon after 
his instalment as king of Saudi Arabia abolished slavery and prohibited the 
slave trade, and before his coronation he had been known to oppose slavery and 
had manumitted a large number of his own slaves. The French political report 
from Goundam in 1953 quoted here above on the possibility that Mohamed Ali 
had sold Awad indicated that Awad had been able to send money back home, 
which would have meant that his situation in Mecca was not as destitute as he 
described it himself. The possibility cannot be ruled out entirely that Awad had 
either been manumitted by Faysal, or that he in fact had been employed by 
Faysal, with a large sum of his salary advanced to Mohamed Ali as repayment 
of the travel expenses that Mohamed Ali had advanced for him. Furthermore, 
the court case of Awad el Djouh resulted in an enquiry being made by the 
French administration among returned pilgrims about the existence of a slave 
trade, which was denied by all those questioned, including a number of 
prominent local members of both the PSP and the leader of the US-RDA in 
Diré, a man who had no political reason to protect Mohamed Ali (quite the 
contrary).85 As a last point of unclarity should be mentioned the position of 
Mohamed Elmehdi, Mohamed Ali’s younger brother who had replaced him in 
all his official functions. Documents from the colonial archives in Goundam 
show that the leading family of the Kel Intessar was deeply divided at the time. 
Mohamed Elmehdi was in dispute with his brother, who accused him of having 
sold all his possessions, distributed his lands and neglected to take care of 
Mohamed Ali’s children. In his absence Mohamed Elmehdi had become a US-
RDA member in the late 1950s, and it seems that by that time he had definitely 
turned his back on his older brother, a former PSP stalwart. In an article on the 
Casablanca conference, the chief editor of the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram, 
Mohamed Hasanayn Heikal, mentioned in passing a discussion he had over-
heard in the corridors: 
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If I hadn’t heard the discussion between Abdul Kader al-Aalam, the Libyan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and sheikh Mohamed Mehdi, member of the official 
Malian delegation to the Casablanca conference, I would have believed that the 
whole story was nothing but pure fabrication without foundation. The discus-
sion was about a man, a Malian citizen, who lived in exile in Libya. It attracted 
the attention and the curiosity of those present who heard the questions and 
answers. The sheikh Mehdi turned towards those around him and towards the 
Libyan minister and declared: “We claim this man: Listen to what he did. He 
was the sheikh of a tribe in Mali. Just before Malian independence he called the 
people of his tribe to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. Many responded to his 
call, among them men and many women who took their children with them on 
this holy journey. After many misadventures, they arrived in Mecca (…) 
[There] he sold the group to a number of slave dealers: Men, women and child-
ren were delivered in the hands of slave traders of faraway lands where they 
were taken. Having received the money, the price for his own people, of his 
own tribe, he left, but he did not return to Mali. He installed himself in Libya 
and used the money to set up business. The men of his tribe, in Mali, inci-
dentally discovered what their chief had done. One of the pieces of merchandise 
managed to communicate all the details of the case to the tribesmen in Mali. 
The case has been brought to court and the merchant was judged in his ab-
sence.86 
In the early 1960s, the slave trade problem gained new momentum. Unde-
niable proof of the trade, although this time organised by less illustrious people, 
reached Mali in January 1960 in the form of a letter, written from Mecca by 
Aghali ag Nushbighair , a bellah from Diré, to his brother Ibrahim in late 1959. 
Praise be to God. I let you know that I have been sold in Mecca by Moussa Al-
hassan. The latter has sold me and collected the sum of the sales. He returned alone 
to you; this proves the truth of my declaration. Every one of you slaves who comes 
to Mecca will be enslaved without exception.87 
The letter was translated, photocopied and sent to all the Cercles in the 
North with a warning that all demands to perform the pilgrimage by road, hence 
escaping the formal control of the ‘official’ pilgrimage, should be thoroughly 
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checked. By 1961, the slave trade from Mali, involving Tamasheq chiefs 
reached a new momentum with the pilgrimage of that year. 
The first pilgrims from independent Mali were accompanied by Abdelwahab 
Doucouré, a former subordinate to Marcel Cardaire in the Bureau des Affaires 
Musulmanes and now performing the same task as his former superior had: 
Being the formal pilgrim agent on the official hajj, responsible for the pilgrim’s 
welfare, their safe return, and the monitoring of all things political surrounding 
the hajj. The official pilgrims delegation from Mali landed in Jeddah on 1 May 
1961.88 Upon his arrival in Saudi Arabia, Abdelwahab was confronted with 
what he believed to be a case of slave trade. On the 3rd of May he was visited by 
a certain Abdel Koudous, a high-ranking Saudi civil servant, who seemed to 
have functioned as a broker between Saudi clients and Soudanese suppliers, 
among them Mohamed Ali and Marouchett ag Moussa who was the amenokal 
of the Tenguereguedesh tribe. In his interview to Afrique nouvelle, Awad el 
Djouh had indicated that another servant to Mohamed Ali, who had travelled 
with them, had been sold to Abdel Koudous.89 Marouchett had fled in exile 
from Malian rule in the years before. From Abdel Koudous, Abdelwahab 
learned that Marouchett was awaiting Sidi Mohamed ag Zokka, the former chief 
of the Chouakhan tribe and former PSP candidate in the Niger Bend. Sidi 
Mohamed, so Abdel Koudous stated, would arrive with twenty-eight ‘slaves’. 
When he learned of Sidi Mohamed’s imminent arrival, Abdelwahab flew back 
to Bamako to receive instructions from Minister of the Interior Madeira Keita 
on this matter. Upon his return at Jeddah airport, he found Sidi Mohamed ag 
Zokka there in the company of 31 people, mostly children and some men. 
Immediately, Abdelwahab had Sidi Mohamed and his followers were arrested 
by the Saudi police, informing the Saudi head of security and Madeira Keita of 
his catch. The Saudi police decided not to deliver Sidi Mohamed ag Zokka and 
his followers to the Malians since Mali had no official diplomatic representation 
in the Kingdom, but instead extradited him to Sudan for want of legal visa and 
thus probably preventing a scandal. Sidi Mohamed’s following was kept in 
Saudi Arabia, and, on his demand, entrusted to Marouchett ag Moussa, who was 
first made to sign all sorts of guarantees for their safekeeping. Abdelwahab then 
proceeded to deal with a number of smaller cases of slave trade, for example the 
arrest of Intaha ag Sidi Oualad Driss, who had tried to sell two children who he 
pretended were his own. Then there was a group of 30 pilgrims who had 
travelled with a certain Warninekh, who had tried to sell them to a Saudi 
                                                 
88  The following is entirely based on: Rapport sur le pélerinage 1961. Abdelwahab 
Doucouré. ANM – BPN104d398 Carton 104 Dossier 398. I thank Gregory Mann for 
sharing this material with me. 
89  D. Traoré, “La route des esclaves noirs commence à Villa Cisneros et aboutit à la 
Mecque”, Afrique nouvelle 04/09/1954. 
 RACE, STEREOTYPES AND POLITICS 107 
member of government, a certain Abdel Aziz Renchaïdane. The pilgrims had 
resisted by beating Warninekh up, after which they got arrested by the Saudi 
police.90 Then there was a certain Mrs. Djamloul from Gao, who wanted to sell 
two children to a Saudi. 
In the meantime, President Modibo Keita had written a formal letter to King 
Ibn Saud on the activities of Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, Sidi Mohamed ag 
Zokka, and Marouchett ag Moussa, which was presented to his brother Nawaf, 
director of the Kings cabinet, by the Malian ambassador in Cairo, Modibo 
Diallo, on 18 May. Nawaf demanded a file on the complaints against these men, 
which Modibo Diallo wrote that same night. In turn, Mohamed Ali, Marouchett 
and Sidi Mohamed wrote a letter to the King asking for his protection. It is not 
clear how the king reacted formally to both the report and the letter, but none of 
the Tamasheq chiefs was extradited to Mali. However, Prince Faysal stopped 
the financial support that Mohamed Ali had until then received from the Saudi 
Government. Mohamed Ali left for Libya shortly after. 
Mohamed Ali is seriously hindered by the growing goodwill Mali holds in the Arab 
countries. In these countries no one can organise any opposition to Mali any longer. 
The only option that he still has, is to write to the former tribal chiefs in Mali to send 
him a large number of Bellahs to sell. The average price of a slave is 25,000 Ryals, 
being 1,400,000 CFA francs. If we could have Mohamed Ali returned to Mali in one 
way or another, I think that would clearly diminish the massive departure of Bel-
lahs.91 
As for Marouchett ag Moussa and Sidi Mohamed ag Zokka, in a meeting 
with Abdelwahab Doucouré Marouchett declared his motives and desires. 
When the chieftaincy was abolished they took my possessions and my lands to give 
them to the Bellahs. I had the impression that the chef de poste avenged himself on 
us. I spoke of my troubles to President Mahamane, Madeira and Abdoulaye Dicko. 
They did nothing to improve the situation. If President Modibo assures me my lands 
will be given back to me and that I will not be humiliated in front of my brothers, I 
swear I will come back to Mali without even passing through Mecca. Me, I have no 
need for the pilgrimage. All the Tuareg think like me, they will all come.92 
Marouchett was offered the possibility of return with his following, which he 
did not immediately take up, but he would return soon after to be reinstalled as 
amenokal of the Tenguereguedesh and to rule that tribe until the early 1990s. To 
complete the story, in 1962, King Ibn Saud was replaced by his brother Ab-
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dullah Faysal who had been openly opposed to slave trade for a few years, and 
who had manumitted the majority of his own slaves. In 1962, after the rather 
embarrassing episode of publicity around the case of the slave trade with Mali, 
king Faysal formally abolished slavery in Saudi Arabia.93 
Stories about these cases of slave trade are not unknown in Tamasheq so-
ciety. Concerning Marouchett, it is told that he sold hundreds of slaves in 
Mecca. One of my informants said that, contrary to what he said in his letters 
found in the local archive in Goundam, Mohamed Ali has never denied that he 
sold some of his slaves in Mecca, but that he acted for their benefit. They would 
have a much better life in Mecca than he could give them in Soudan Français. 
Whatever might have been the intentions of the sellers, it goes without saying 
that these affairs did no good whatsoever to the reputation of the Kel Tamasheq. 
It is clear from the report presented by Abdelwahab Doucouré, and from his 
French predecessors, that slaves were traded from Northern Mali to Saudi Ara-
bia. But close inspection of detailed cases shows that whether or not particular 
individuals were sold or not by particular others is harder to establish. Political 
motives could lead to exaggeration. From the side of Christian clergy such as 
La Gravière, to rekindle the image of the savage Muslim was part of the game. 
The claims in his report, endorsed by the British Anti Slavery Society, that 
thousands of people were sold were clearly exaggerated and meant to stir their 
cause. The motives of the Malian Government to have Sidi Mohamed ag Zokka 
arrested for slave trade without any proof, existing or further being given, or 
even mentioned, in Abdelwahab’s report, were undoubtedly inspired by the 
image created of the Kel Tamasheq as slave traders, enhanced by the case 
against Mohamed Ali by Awad El Djouh. That Mohamed Ali was further 
simply treated as a slave dealer by the Malian Government and therefore re-
mained in exile in the Middle East, whatever truth there might have been in his 
involvement in the trade, meant that a powerful possible opposition leader 
against the US-RDA regime was effectively removed from the political field. 
Given the fate of his political comrades, Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun 
Dicko, who ended up in prison in Kidal, Mohamed Ali got away lucky for a few 
years until he was finally extradited by Morocco as a leader of the rebellion in 
the Adagh in 1964. Stereotypical images, their grounds, and political realities 
converged here in ways almost too good to be possible.  
Les guerriers des sables 
If there is one mythical name attached to the Kel Tamasheq, it is that of ‘les 
guerriers des sables’ – the warriors of the sand. The stereotype of the fierce 
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Tamasheq warrior is perhaps the most long-standing of all Orientalist visions of 
Tamasheq society, renewed through photo-reportages of the last rebellions. 
What the Zulu and Maasai are to the British colonial stereotype of ‘warrior 
tribes’, the Kel Tamasheq are to the French. This stereotype was constructed 
even before colonial conquest. Explorers travelling through Tamasheq country, 
like Gordon Laing or Alexandrine Tinne, did not live to tell their story. Those 
who did, like Henry Duveryier, were heralded as great heroes for their mere sur-
vival. Where in other parts of Africa the murder of European explorers would 
be avenged by sending in the troops, this did not happen when it came to the 
Kel Tamasheq, in fear of their military power. 
The Kel Tamasheq put up more than fierce resistance against French con-
quest. In 1881 the second mission Flatters was totally annihilated by the Kel 
Hoggar despite superior French armament.94 In January 1893, the Bonnier expe-
dition was defeated near Timbuktu by the Tengueregif under their amenokal 
Cheiboun.95 The ensuing reprisals led by Colonel Joffre culminated in a defeat 
for the Tamasheq-led coalition under the Tengueregif at Niafunké a few weeks 
later, but still the Timbuktu area was not pacified. In 1897 a coalition of Kel 
Intessar, Kounta, Ouillimiden and Tengueregif besieged Timbuktu for two days 
after having defeated a French squadron under Lieutenants Chevigné and De La 
Tour de Saint Ygest. In 1896 Lieutenant Hourst travelled the land of the Ouilli-
miden Kel Ataram. He estimated their fighting powers at 20,000 men and there-
fore thought it unwise to even try to conquer the Aribinda.96 The Kel Adagh and 
the Kel Ajjer, who did not resist conquest militarily, did not, in their own 
opinion, surrender either. The Kel Ajjer had merely signed an alliance with the 
French while the Kel Adagh had obeyed religious prescriptions forbidding jihad 
against a stronger military opponent. 
The French conquest did not end combat between the French and the Kel 
Tamasheq.97 The first to contest French power were their first allies, the Kel 
Ajjer in 1913. In 1916, practically all Tamasheq federations revolted against 
French occupation. In April 1916 the Ouillimiden Kel Ataram under their 
amenokal Firhun ag Elinsar rose against the French in the Azawad. They were 
followed by the Logomaten under amenokal Bokar wan Zeidou, and the 
Ouillimiden Kel Denneg under amenokal Elkhurer. In 1917 the Kel Aïr rose 
under Kaocen ag Kedda. They were joined by those Ouillimiden Kel Denneg 
who had survived their resistance against the French in 1916.98 Kaocen’s army, 
well-equipped with field canons and machine guns, first besieged Agadez for 
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nearly two months. This tactic proved to be unsuccessful and Kaocen changed 
his strategy. His army kept defying French troops in guerrilla warfare until 
1920, leaving the Aïr in ruins after the crushing French repression.99 The 
notable exceptions to revolt were the Kel Hoggar and, most important for our 
history, the Kel Adagh who fought as French allies against the insurgents. 
Bidân resistance against French conquest was perhaps smaller in scale, but it 
showed longer endurance. While part of the Kounta federation in French Sudan 
allied to the French under their cheick Hammoadi, another part under Abidine 
ould Sidi Mohamed el Kounti resisted French rule in alliance with the Rgaybat 
of the Western Sahara. Until 1927 Abidine’s men successfully attacked the 
Adagh and Mauritania from their base in the still unpacified Drâa valley.100 
The stereotype of the desert warrior led to a permanent state of distrust and 
paralysis of the administration. In evaluating French occupancy of the Sahara 
afterwards, French administrators and scholars attribute French inactivity in the 
Sahara to the respect and sympathy of the ‘victorious warrior for the honourably 
defeated warrior’.101 All the French tried in Saharan affairs was to keep la paix 
française at any price. 
The experience of Tamasheq rebellion during World War I led to a state of 
almost paranoid fear for renewed revolts during World War II. This is well 
illustrated by the situation in Gourma Rharous.102 By the end of 1939 the tribes 
of the Gourma were buying horses on a large scale. Rumours were circulating 
that the French who were mobilising forces against Germany would soon leave 
the country. When they had left, the Kel Tamasheq would take over the country 
again. On these rumours, an inquiry followed, which led to the replacing of the 
chief of the Kel Ansattafa fraction of the Irreguenaten tribe. In April 1940, a 
goumier noticed that a blacksmith of the Igouadaren tribe was repairing lances 
and that a slave was repairing a shield. On the basis of these rumours, the chief 
of the Igouadaren tribe, Ouedan ag Baber, was arrested and relieved from 
command on charges of plotting a rebellion. Reports were written, asking for 
reinforced military presence in the area. By 1942, the French Commandant de 
Cercle of Gourma Rharous had become so paranoid, that a gathering of chiefs 
under presidency of Cheiboun, amenokal of the Tengueregif and victor over 
Bonnier expedition in 1893, was directly taken as a sign the French were ‘under 
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the threat of revolt similar to that of 1916’103 The alleged revolt in the Gourma 
also revealed the fears and thoughts held by the local population towards the 
Kel Tamasheq. In 1939, the administration held an inquiry among the local 
sedentary population about the plotted uprising. The assembled statements of 
the questioned population are not only revealing about Tamasheq acts; they also 
inform us about local sentiments towards them. Clearly, not only did the French 
administration still see the Kel Tamasheq as rebellious warriors and pillagers, 
the local population did so as well. 
If the French leave, we will ask God to disappear with them. We do not want to be 
ruled by the Tuareg. (...) If it were Mougassou [a Tamasheq chief] who ruled, I 
would have been beaten; I would no longer have a boubou to wear, no harvests, 
nothing. (...) A Targui, Trafatou ag Moussa-Gallo, of the Kel Ansattafa asked me for 
millet. I refused. He insulted me, insulted my father and mother and said to me: 
‘You are going to bring this millet to me since the French are no longer here’, and 
he left. I answered: ‘The French are still here, because if they were not, you would 
have taken my millet by force.’104 
Suspicion toward the Kel Tamasheq and the obsession with la paix française 
led to other excesses of thinking about security. Thus, the few solitary men who 
refused to submit to French rule in the 1940s and 1950s, such as Alla ag Al-
bachir, Inalaghen ag Dida and Ahmed wan Egarew, were hunted down syste-
matically with all means the French disposed of. Even cars and aeroplanes were 
used to put them out of action. These men, often living with their family or even 
totally on their own, were the subjects of reports and concerns on levels totally 
outweighing their real importance and possibilities of effective resistance. Yet, 
the French, concerned with their image as strong occupiers and the guardians of 
peace, could not allow themselves to leave these men unbothered. Their capture 
would be proof of French capacities to rule and maintain law and order. Their 
liberty and resistance against French domination, however marginal, could set a 
bad example to the local population. This French obsession with the Kel 
Tamasheq as rebellious warriors was easily transferred to the Malian admi-
nistrators, especially since the Kel Adagh were seen as under French influence, 
and since France was still a military presence in Algeria. 
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Nomad anarchy 
Besides being seen as racist slaveholding warmongers, the Kel Tamasheq, and 
nomads in general, were perceived as anarchist. This will be the last important 
stereotypical discourse on the Kel Tamasheq dealt with here. The last, less 
important stereotype, laziness, will be dealt with briefly in the next chapter. The 
idea of nomadic anarchism stems from two main characteristics of nomadic 
society – its social-political structure; and nomadic existence itself. At heart, it 
all comes down to the question of blood and soil. Pastoral nomadic societies are 
organised along the lines of expanding lineages (see Introduction). A member 
of a given society organised along these lines is prone to see herself as part of 
ever larger bodies of organisation, which form a whole at the top level. Euro-
pean administrators and their sedentary African heirs however, were inclined to 
first look for the largest unit and then work their way down to the smallest 
group – the family unit. This up-side-down look at nomadic societies earned 
them the label ‘segmentary societies’. In other words: Fragmented, scattered, 
unbound, anarchist.105 Indeed, nomadic social organisation leaves room for de-
cisions on the smallest level, necessary for the optimal exploitation of the scarce 
resources in their environment, but this does not mean anarchy. In Tamasheq 
society, and in many other nomadic societies, hierarchy binds the freedom of 
the individual. As has been argued in the introduction – social order is created 
by who you are in relation to others in your lineage, the origins of your lineage 
and the status attached to it. 
A second argument put forward in ideas on nomad anarchy is sheer nomadic 
existence itself. Here I will allow myself a degree of speculation since it is hard 
to underpin exactly why nomad existence is found so disturbing by those who 
are not nomads. It is, I think, not so much mobility itself, as it being the rule and 
not the exception in nomad existence that is disturbing for the sedentary mind. 
In sedentary societies social order is created through the appropriation of space. 
In village-based Mande society, social relations are regulated on the structure of 
the village. Social positions are reflected in spatial organisation, age and land 
tenure, which, in turn, are reflected in the local tale of origin, and the local ver-
sion of the Sunjata epic.106 ‘Who you are’ is partly defined by ‘where you are’ 
and ‘whose land you are on’. This does not hold for nomadic societies. Tama-
sheq society hardly knows the equivalent to dugutigiw, the Mande term for 
‘owners of the land’. The imenokalen, the ‘attributors of land and water’ are few 
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in numbers and their tenure is as symbolic as their ‘estates’ are enormous.107 
This is not at all to say that nomads do not have any form of spatial organisation 
or land tenure. On the contrary, land tenure systems are specific and elaborated. 
But land tenure is only significant in economic organisation, not in social or-
ganisation or identity. Tamasheq groups might have the right to use certain 
areas first, or they might ‘own’ a well they have dug, but they cannot simply 
forbid others to cross this area or to use this well. Trespassing does not exist 
because of the absence of land that has been divided up and legally distributed. 
One’s position in space and landownership are crucial to the sedentary mind, 
but insignificant to the nomad with respect to belonging and social organisation 
(but very significant in land use itself). ‘Who you are’ is defined through 
‘whom you are related to’. This fundamental difference in spatiality might well 
explain why sedentary governments (and there are no others) are inclined to see 
nomads as anarchist. They do not stick to one place, they own no land, thus they 
have no space and they are therefore unorganised and asocial. 
Epilogue 
The social-political relations between the Kel Tamasheq and the Government 
and broader populace of Mali became governed by a set of preconceived stereo-
typed negative images of the other which were created in the colonial period, 
but which were largely based in ideas and images with much longer historical 
standing. Essentially, the Malian Government came to see Tamasheq society as 
inherently racist with a divide between unscrupulous white masters able to sell 
their black slaves into servitude in the Middle East, inherently anarchist per-
force their nomad way of life, and prone to violence and military rebellion 
against the authorities. That the Kel Tamasheq were also seen as lazy and 
irrational in their economic endeavours will be dealt with at great length in the 
next chapter. In turn, the Kel Tamasheq, certainly the Kel Adagh, saw the 
Malian Government if not directly as black slaves, then at least as the untrust-
worthy deceiving descendants of slaves who had not kept their promises re-
garding home rule and local autonomy for the Kel Tamasheq, and who unjustly 
and unrightfully sought to rule where they had no right to do so. These visions 
would form a major handicap in the effective political relations between the Kel 
Tamasheq and the Malian Government that will be the focus of the next 
chapter.  
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Mali’s mission civilisatrice 
In his influential work The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, 
Merwin Crawford Young describes the late colonial phase of the 1950s in 
Africa as gilded years, in which the colonial governments, for the first time 
confronted with a question of legitimation towards their colonial subjects, 
created the rudimentary basis of a welfare state – education, public health and 
other infrastructures – to the benefit of the local population.1 For the first time, 
African subjects reaped some benefits from the colonial system. Especially in 
comparison with later post-independence regimes, so Crawford Young argues, 
Africans who witnessed that period tend to look back in favour. I will not try to 
refute or defend the idea that the late colonial period can be justifiably gilded. 
Although many of the nomad inhabitants of Soudan Français now indeed look 
upon the late colonial period as a golden age, the interview I close this chapter 
with shows another sentiment toward the French, one of abandonment and 
treason. I do however hope to make clear that, in the 1960s, the Kel Tamasheq 
were in a situation to compare colonial rule to the new US-RDA regime and 
that this comparison then did not fall in favour of the new rulers. 
As has been discussed in the first chapter, the new regime was essentially 
positive about Mali’s political and economic future. This positivist high mo-
dernist belief in the national capacity stood contrary to social and economic 
realities in Northern Mali at the moment of independence. Of course, most of 
Northern Mali’s desert region is very difficult to develop when development is 
not based on mining or industry. But as far as the new regime was concerned, 
the colonial regime simply had done nothing to improve economic or social 
conditions in their Saharan territories, where this could have been done. This 
would certainly change under the new regime, which was determined to bring 
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all its subjects the benefits of modernisation. Government and the party pre-
sence were to be strengthened, the feudal rule of the tribal chiefs was to be 
crushed, schools had to be created to uplift the ignorant masses, production 
needed to increase, and therefore the nomads had to be transformed into pro-
ductive sedentary ranch farmers. This ambitious project came down to doing 
what the French had neglected to do: Truly ruling the Kel Tamasheq. This 
ambitious project could provocatively be described as a mission civilisatrice, to 
avoid calling it internal colonialism. It is not an exaggerated observation that 
the Keita Government saw the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân as a kind of ‘barbarian 
others’ who needed to be integrated in the fabric of national society, while 
being closely scrutinised as possible traitors of the Malian nation. This double 
attitude did not make for easy relations between rulers and ruled. 
It has been argued by a number of scholars and by some Tamasheq poli-
ticians that the Kel Tamasheq did not understand what independence would 
mean. In an article published in 1987, three years prior to the second rebellion, 
Hélène Claudot-Hawad made the general argument that most Kel Tamasheq 
saw ledepadas (independence), as a new form of colonisation.2 More specific-
ally, Pierre Boilley has argued that the Kel Adagh had not clearly understood 
what the colonial elections and the 1958 referendum on the Communauté 
Française had been about and did not realise quickly enough to what sort of 
organisation and to what sort of situation these elections would lead.3 In a 
‘Manifesto from the Malian Tuareg appealing to France and the international 
conscience’ written after the start of the 1990 rebellion, the author starts by 
assessing colonisation and decolonisation. 
As of 1958, we observed the progressive departure of French troops to Algeria with-
out understanding its meaning; we had to witness their total retreat from our territory 
and their replacement by others whose existence we had not known about, to hear 
the word ‘independence’ pronounced.4 
I will argue that this argument does not hold true when examined in detail. 
Not only were the political elite involved in independence politics, but so was 
the average Kel Tamasheq who knew that independence was imminent and that 
a US-RDA-led Mali would be the incarnation of this independence. However, 
they hotly debated whether or not they wanted to be part of the new political 
configuration, and if so, under what conditions, in the full but erroneous con-
viction that conditions could be set. This debate was especially pronounced 
                                                 
2  Claudot-Hawad, H. 1987. 
3  Boilley, P. 1999: 283-284. 
4  Anonymous, ‘Nous Touaregs du Mali. Le génocide du peuple touareg. Manifeste 
des Touaregs du Mali, en appelant à la France et à la conscience internationale’. 
(n.d. (July) 1990), 2-3. Private Archives. 
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among the Kel Adagh where it continued even after the establishment of the 
Malian state at a moment of internal political change: The succession to Attaher 
ag Illi as the amenokal of the Adagh. 
This chapter will focus on the administrative and political relations between 
the Keita regime and the Kel Tamasheq throughout the 1960s. The US-RDA’s 
high modernist social economic policies were unrealistic and unwanted, and 
they proved to be a failure in the end for more or less the same reasons as they 
were a failure elsewhere in the country: Too few material and financial invest-
ments, and too much reliance on willpower. But perhaps more so than else-
where in Mali, the patronising attitude of the regime toward the population, in-
formed by existing stereotypical ideas, caused a build-up of tension that would 
in the end form one of the root causes of the rebellion. The regime’s lack of 
understanding of local work ethics, gender relations, social dynamics, and poli-
tical power structures led to a wavering policy that was much resented among a 
population bent on preserving the colonial social-political legacy. The Kel 
Tamasheq, especially but not only the Kel Adagh, saw the US-RDA policies 
and rule as either an unjustified and unwanted meddling in local affairs, or at 
least as a discrimination of the Kel Tamasheq over other Malians. This last opi-
nion was certainly not unfounded. In the Adagh, the international setting further 
complicated the already tense relation between the Kel Adagh and the Malian 
administration. While the Malian regime felt itself surrounded by possible neo-
colonial adversaries in general, these adversaries were actually present in north 
Mali, where the French Air Force continued to use a military base until 1961 
while Algerian FLN fighters were located at a training camp right next to them, 
at the invitation of the Keita regime. This is what the local administrators seem 
to have feared the most: The active meddling of the French army or the FLN in 
Northern Mali, stirring the local population to revolt. The tension was further 
enhanced by the spread of rumours. In a context where a political frame of 
reference based on long standing experience with the other is lacking, and 
where most thinking is directed by stereotypical images and uncertainties, ru-
mours are both an indication of the lack of mutual trust and enhancing distrust.  
Ruling the North 
The Keita administration was well aware of its precarious relations with the Kel 
Tamasheq. Its initial policies were intended not to disturb the peace and to 
create a more positive image of itself. Politically loaded issues, such as the 
emancipation of former slaves, were handled with care. Despite the abolishment 
of traditional chieftaincies by law, the nomad tribal chiefs were maintained in 
place (infra). As far as possible, local administrators were recruited among the 
Kel Tamasheq and the Bidân. 
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If it wanted to integrate French-educated Kel Tamasheq, the Malian Govern-
ment had no other option than to recruit members of the Kel Intessar tribe who 
had a reasonable level of education thanks to the Collège Nomade in Diré. But 
due to their background, these Kel Tamasheq administrators would never be 
fully trusted by the Keita Government either. Former Kel Intessar chief Mo-
hamed Ali was in exile in the Middle East and North Africa, due to the Awad el 
Djouh affair. Besides, he was a former PSP stalwart, and from his place of exile 
in Morocco he had furthered the cause of a Tamasheq state, or inclusion of 
Tamasheq country in the Maghreb states. Mohamed Ali’s pupils – those Kel 
Intessar he had managed to integrate in the Saudi, Egyptian and Libyan educa-
tional systems – were suspected of anti-Malian sentiments as well. Although 
educated, and although the present chief of the Kel Intessar, Mohamed Elmehdi, 
was an important US-RDA member, Malian leaders felt that the Kel Intessar 
could not be entirely trusted. This distrust, although undoubtedly other motiva-
tions existed as well, resulted in a large number of administrative posts in the 
North not being given to these educated Tamasheq, to the discontent of the 
excluded. In August 1961, Zeïni ag Hamouta, a Kel Intessar school teacher in 
Timbuktu, wrote a letter to Minister of the Interior Madeira Keita: 
We both agree that the nomadic populations of the Niger Bend have participated in 
the expulsion of the enemy and in the destruction of the OCRS chimera. Therefore, 
their rights within the nation should be respected. We want a two colour govern-
ment, in which both sedentary people and nomads figure. (...) The nomadic popula-
tions of the Niger Bend consider the sedentary representatives as usurpers in Goun-
dam, Timbuktu, [and] Gao. To be recognisable, one needs a bi-coloured [bi-couleur] 
representation. We do not have a nomad minister since we do not have nomad 
representatives; we do not have nomad representatives since our sub-section com-
mittees consist solely of sedentary people, and the regional congresses work under 
political boycotts (the fractions are not represented). In fact, the representatives and 
the politicians of the Niger Bend have never approved of a nomad with political 
responsibilities (local or national), and that is the real racism, since we want to trust 
our affairs to capable men, nomadic or sedentary.5 
In November that year, Zeïni was joined in his protest by Mohamed Ayoul ag 
Mohamed, another Kel Intessar, who wrote a letter of the same purport to 
Modibo Keita himself, in the name of the Kel Intessar party committees. 
We thank God who has taken us out of slavery and who gave us our freedom. Also, 
glory to God, who saved us from the hands of the Christians and who lets us be 
commanded by Muslims, because of our understanding and our unity. (...) We are 
very happy to see our enemies (the French) leave the country. The chiefs of the 
nomad committees wish you a long life, Mister President, while presenting you with 
this letter to tell you that we Malians, we have only found our freedom through 
                                                 
5  Lettre de Zeïni ag Hamouta, professeur d’école à Tombouctou, à Monsieur le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur et de l’Information. Tombouctou, 21/08/1961. ACK. 
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agreement on good terms. We inform you that for our brothers, the Malians, that is 
to say, our Soudanese Commandants, we are always ready to obey their orders and 
we are willing and ready too, for all that Mali needs. (...) We see that they [the 
Commandants] barely consider us as we consider them, they judge us differently. 
That is to say, they do not know our character. We would like our leaders [chefs] to 
organise the country and to understand that disorder stains everyone’s name. We ask 
you to appoint one of us, who understands our character, as your representative here, 
to become our chief [chef]. Our Soudanese brothers do not understand our character, 
and therefore we fear that disagreement will rule in our country. This serves no 
purpose, this only stains the names of some, and if this should continue, there will 
be shame. We all follow the same book, and it would bring us shame when you, who 
are our chief, will hear about disagreements between us. Or worse, that other nations 
will hear about them. We do not want our country to be like the Congo, or like the 
disagreement between the Algerians and the French.6 
A third letter written that same month by an unknown Kel Intessar, directed to 
the Secretary General of Youth Affairs and younger brother to Modibo Keita, 
Moussa Keita, continued among the same lines: 
We approve of the promising acts of your executive office. But one thing is in-
dispensable, that is to place a nomad in your executive office for this office to be 
representative of the Malian populations. Mali is a country of racial diversity. It is 
normal that all the races partake in political power. We should see all colours 
figuring in all the democratic organisations: Youth, trade unions etc. (...) The sup-
pression of racism is only possible with the disappearance of patronage. Well, the 
acts of our sedentary brothers in the Niger Bend towards the nomads are in many 
respects not in this interest. The nomads do not participate in the politics of their 
sub-sections. They are not committee members, there are no nomad delegates, no 
nomad ministers, no nomad ambassadors. Even in the smallest detail the racism of 
the politicians towards the nomads is daily manifested.7 
The letters and their authors received ample attention from their respondents 
who sent copies to all the Commandants in the North, asking them ‘to at-
tentively follow these young men and to take adequate measures against all 
attempts to subversion at their part’.8 The distrust the petitioners had sensed was 
certainly present. In a report on the region from July 1960, Governor Bakary 
Diallo neatly reveals the administration’s attitude to the incorporated Kel 
Tamasheq administrators in his discussion of the functioning of Mohamed ould 
                                                 
6  Lettre de Mohamed Ayoul ag Mohamed, Fraction Kel Kaoukoraï, Tribu Kel In-
tessar, à Monsieur le Président et Secretaire Général de la République du Mali. 
Niafunké, 26/11/1961. ACK. 
7  Lettre à Secrétaire Général de la Jeunesse et du Sport. Tombouctou, 28/11/1961. 
ACK. 
8  Ministre de l’Administration Territoriale Madeira Keita à Gov. Gao et aux Cdts. 
Cercles Gao, Ansongo, Bourem, Kidal, Ménaka, Tombouctou, Gourma-Rharous, 
Goundam, Diré. No2/MIITCAB, 05/12/1961. ACK. 
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Mohamed Najim, the Commandant de Cercle of Kidal. Mohamed ould Mo-
hamed Najim had attended the Medersa Franco Arabe in Timbuktu and had 
continued his studies to become a schoolteacher himself in Gourma Rharous 
before entering the administration.9 Najim spoke Tamasheq, Arabic, French, 
English and Spanish and was a true évolué. 
Today, more than ever, I am convinced that we have been well inspired to place the 
command of this Subdivision in the hands of Mr. Mohamed Najim. His profound 
knowledge of the Berber psychology permitted him in a difficult moment to affirm 
his authority, and by consequence that of our state, over the difficult and unin-
telligent Ifoghas, accustomed to illegality and irregularity by Clauzel and Allard. 
(...) He has already rendered us eminent service in this respect and will continue 
doing so until the moment we have found a cultivated African officer, capable of 
accomplishing the administrative and political tasks needed in this nerve-racking 
region of our state.10 
The language used by both the Kel Intessar petitioners and Bakary Diallo is 
revealing of the mutual images and stereotypes, as well as of the ensuing at-
titudes towards each other. The least one can say is that all make use of a 
discursive register from the colonial period, which remained in use, even in 
political science, until quite recently: The belief in a ‘national psychology’. 
Furthermore, all three petitioners are, to say the least, race conscious. They 
explicitly state an opposition between white nomads and black sedentary peo-
ple, who are seen as fundamentally different. As Mohamed Ayoul phrased it: 
The ‘Soudanese do not understand the nomadic character’, they see the nomads 
as different and judge their actions wrongly. This could lead to disorder, which 
should be avoided. Mohamed Ayoul makes an explicit connection between 
discord, disorder and shame. In Tamasheq society, open quarrels and brawls are 
things a noble person does not engage in. It brings takaraket; shame, which 
stains honour: Eshik. Only slaves, who have no shame and honour, would 
behave like that. By accusing the Government of not understanding Tamasheq 
ways, which would lead to quarrelling behaviour and shame, he indirectly ac-
cuses them of shameless behaviour, hence of a slave’s mentality. Second, to 
some extent the petitioners place themselves outside Mali. They speak of ex-
                                                 
9  Dossiers de personnel de l’enseignement. Dossiers de Mohamed Ali ag Hamma, 
Mohamed Aly ag Mamatal, Mohamed Ali ag Moctar, Mohamed El Moctar, Mo-
hamed ould Najim 1944-1957. ANM – RNII 1C-143. 
10  Cdt. Cercle Gao, Rapport de la tournée effectué du 4 au 10 Juillet 1960 dans la 
Subdivision de Kidal. ANM – FR 1E-24. Then Commandant de Cercle Gao, Bakary 
Diallo, would become Governor of the Gao Région shortly after, when the admi-
nistration was reorganised. The Cercles Gao and Timbuktu became Région of Gao, 
the Subdivision Kidal became Cercle of Kidal and the Postes became Arrondisse-
ments. 
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clusion by the state and oppression by ‘Soudanese’ administrators and politi-
cians. This implicit positioning outside the Malian state is perhaps most visible 
in Mohamed Ayoul’s letter. Although he overtly claims to be a Malian citizen 
he also speaks of ‘our brothers the Malians, that is to say the Soudanese com-
manders’. The Soudanese commanders are Malians since they represent the 
state, instead of the excluded Kel Intessar. 
These thoughts are exactly mirrored in Governor Bakary Diallo’s choice of 
words when speaking of Mohamed Najim and the Kel Adagh. First, the Kel 
Tamasheq are not seen as African. Although Diallo holds Najim to be of good 
service, he should be replaced by an African officer as soon as a suitable one is 
found. Second, the ‘unintelligent’ Kel Tamasheq have been ‘spoiled’ and in-
fluenced by colonial administrators ‘who accustomed them to illegality and 
irregularity’. Through this influence, they are perforce allies of neo-colonialism. 
The same point of view is reflected in Bakary Diallo’s speech quoted in the 
introduction. Diallo’s opinion that Najim is not an African tallies with the idea 
that ‘white Africans’, the Arabs and Berbers, originate from outside the African 
continent, and thus with their implicit otherness. This otherness is here ex-
pressed as a different ‘national psychology’. The Kel Tamasheq have a dif-
ferent, Berber, ‘psychology’. They are unintelligent, but cunning and anarchist, 
and one needs someone to know this ‘national psychology’ in order to control 
them. For the moment, the only ones available were educated Kel Tamasheq. 
But even these ‘civilised’ Kel Tamasheq had better be surveyed since their 
education could also serve them to express their still latent anarchism and pre-
dilection to violence, as the Kel Intessar petitioners demonstrate. Those willing 
to, especially those who held these conflicts to be neo-colonial machinations 
could easily read Mohamed Ayoul’s reference to the war in Congo and the 
Algerian war of independence as subtle threats to national unity with outside 
support. This view might well have been prevalent among US-RDA politicians. 
Thus, for the moment, the regime could not function in the North without 
men such as Mohamed Najim, since ‘Africans’ did not know the ‘Berber psy-
chology’. On this point, all parties agree. The accusation by the Kel Intessar that 
the Soudanese did not know their character is fully acknowledged in Diallo’s 
views on the ‘Berber psychology’. The Kel Tamasheq and the ‘Soudanese’ did 
not know each other and acknowledged their mutual lack of understanding in 
messages to each other stating the difference in a mutually shared discourse on 
‘national character’, or ‘national psychology’, inherited from colonial rule. 
Stereotypes could take over. In June 1963, one month after the start of the 
rebellion, both Mohamed Najim and Mohamed Mahmoud were transferred 
from the Adagh to other posts. Najim was replaced by an ‘African’ officer, 
Diby Sillas Diarra, who stayed in command until 1967. The distrust toward Kel 
Tamasheq civil servants, and their consequent absence in local administration, 
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was locally seen as one of the signs that independence would not bring what 
was hoped for, liberation from foreign rule. Worse, where they previously were 
ruled by a people who had defeated them militarily and politically, they were 
now ruled by people who had done nothing to earn their supremacy and who, in 
the eyes of many, were mere slaves. 
The chiefs’ question 
Ironically, although tribal societies are often portrayed as pre-modern, they are 
in fact essentially modern. In many places, tribalism was created during the first 
few decades after colonial conquest and where it pre-existed, such as among the 
Berber and Arabs, it was thoroughly reconfigured. The colonial tribu and frac-
tion into which the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân were organised in colonial times 
were based on the French understanding of the Tamasheq social-political sys-
tem. The term tribu was believed to be the proper translation of the term ettebel, 
or clan federation, the highest level of Tamasheq political organisation. Frac-
tion was seen as the proper translation of the term tewsit, or clan. The tribes 
were headed by chiefs. A number of these chiefs were given jurisdiction over a 
larger group of tribes as amenokal or chief over a set of tribes. These chiefs 
were salaried administrators, with their own ranks and salary scales, and the 
possibility to be promoted or demoted. In French West Africa, the Mogho 
Naaba of Ouagadougou was the highest ranking traditional chief, while in 
Northern Mali amenokal Attaher ag Illi of the Adagh was the highest ranking 
and best paid traditional chief after the cheick of the Kounta tribes; Badi ould 
Hammoadi.11 
In the African socialist language of the Keita Regime, before independence 
the oppressors of the masses had been, of course, the French colonialists. But 
they had been assisted by the traditional chiefs who had been integrated in the 
colonial system. Therefore, in order to ensure the successful emancipation of 
the people, these chiefs had to be abolished and their feudal power over the 
masses had to be broken. This administrative and political elimination of the 
chiefs could start the moment the US-RDA leaders wielded some effective 
power, which they did after the Loi-Cadre came into effect in 1956. By 1958, 
the Cantons – the administrative unit under the rule of a chief in sedentary areas 
– and the Canton Chiefs themselves, were formally abolished.12 However, the 
nomadic tribus, the administrative equivalent to the canton and their chiefs had 
been maintained. At that time, dissolving the power of the nomad chiefs was 
thought unwise, since they still effectively controlled a population hostile to 
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12  Ernst, K. 1976: 93. 
122 CHAPTER 3 
incorporation in the Malian state, just as these chiefs themselves were partly 
hostile to that same state. Enhancing hostility while losing control was judged a 
bad strategy at that moment. 
After independence the new Malian administration set out on an active 
policy to modernize society by undoing parts of the administrative colonial 
heritage. Paradoxically, to do so, part of the colonial structure was now for-
malised by law. The new regime believed that in ‘traditional African society’ 
the village had been the pivot of society, and therefore proclaimed the village to 
be the basic unit of Malian political, economical and administrative organiza-
tion. In nomad society, the new regime saw the fraction, an essentially colonial 
administrative structure that had the same administrative status as the village, as 
the basic ‘traditional organization’. Thus, officially, the nomad tribu was dis-
solved as an administrative entity in 1960, and its place was taken over by the 
fraction.13 What happened was that former tribus were now referred to as 
fractions, and fractions were officially referred to as sous fractions: Sub-
fractions. Unofficially however, the tribes, the fractions and their chiefs were 
still used by local administrators in day-to-day rule. The main difference was 
that the Commandant de Cercle now directly appointed the chefs de fraction. 
The tasks of the fraction chief were largely extended, surpassing even the tasks 
the tribal chief had formerly fulfilled. He was made responsible for the control 
of land use and land tenure, the management of collective goods (all means of 
production were eventually to become collective), the handling of economic 
problems in the interest of the fraction, general policing, the maintenance of 
public order, the protection of goods and persons, rural policing, the protection 
of crops and herds, and the administration of his fraction. However, despite 
their direct appointment by the Government, the fraction chiefs were also seen 
as potential ‘feudal oppressors’. Their power was to be checked by the fraction 
councils (conseils de fraction), who were elected by the fraction members. 
These fraction councils were inaugurated as early as 1957, and legally installed 
in 1959.14 The new regime created political structures at fraction level too: The 
fraction committees (comités de fraction) were to give shape to the party and its 
activities in this smallest of socio-political groups. These two structures – both 
council and committee – remained largely ineffective, just as the cooperatives 
                                                 
13  This is based on the knowledge that the Malian administration wanted to abolish the 
tribes, and a document stating the abolishment of the tribe Taghat Mellet by decree 
no 537/DI-2 of 10 August 1960, dated 07/03/1962, signed by the Governor of Gao. 
ACK. 
14  Loi No. 59-6/AL, modifiant l’ordonnance No. 43 du 28 Mars 1959, portant organi-
sation des villages et des conseils de village. ACK. 
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and the rural brigades would remain dead letters of modern economics in no-
mad territory.15 
The Malian leaders might well have wanted to rid themselves of the last 
remaining chiefs, but they soon felt they needed them. ‘Because of their know-
ledge of the country and the people, and because of their personal influence 
they could and should be valuable collaborators to the administration’.16 Despite 
all Marxist rhetoric against the ‘traditional feudal chiefs’, they were maintained 
for some time to come. This double attitude is nicely evoked in a circular on the 
role and status of the chiefs written by Minister of the Interior Madeira Keita in 
1961: 
The heads of the administrative circumscriptions should never forget that the main-
tenance of the tribal chiefs can only be justified by their conversion to democratic 
development, and to justice in progress. In our daily actions we should not give the 
impression that the tribal chiefs do not participate in our work. But it is even more 
important not to let the population get the impression that these traditional ranks are 
tolerated against their interests.17 
This double attitude also existed among local administrators. On the one 
hand they were (or pretended to be) convinced of US-RDA-cum-Marxist doc-
trines prescribing the abolition of social inequality, and hence of the chiefs. On 
the other hand, the administrators knew perfectly well that they needed the 
chiefs to have access to the nomadic population. Despite the increase in staff 
since colonial times, the administration was still too short-handed to effectively 
control the North. The chiefs were welcome extra manpower who knew the 
population and the area, which the administrators of Southern origins did not. 
The chiefs on the other hand were caught in the same dilemma they faced in 
colonial times. They needed to juggle the roles of assistant to the administration 
in its policies on the one hand, and representing their subjects on the other. In a 
mid-way attempt to (not) deal with the dilemma of the chieftaincy, the Keita 
Administration resorted to the simple tactic of not officially replacing deceased 
tribal chiefs. The policy towards the tribal chiefs was first seriously tested in 
late 1962, early 1963, with the death of Attaher ag Illi, amenokal of the Kel 
Adagh; a test with serious consequences for the region in the years to come. 
The following narrative on the chief’s question in the Adagh is of major im-
                                                 
15  Barate, C. 1977. 
16  Ministère de l’intérieur et de l’information: Circulaire à mm. les Cdts. Cercle Gao, 
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portance in the buildup of political tension toward the rebellion of 1963. The 
political ideas and ideals of the Kel Adagh – of internal autonomy or at least a 
measure of control over their own organisational institutions – were shattered, 
setting the tone for State/Tamasheq relations in the decades to come. But it is 
also simply illustrative of the Malian policy toward chieftaincy: It is indecisive-
ness and makeshift pragmatism, cloaked in socialist rhetoric. 
Attaher had two potential heirs: His sons Zeyd and Intalla. Both had been 
assistant chiefs to their father in the late 1950s and thus had experience in com-
mand, while the administration had some experience with both men. Intalla and 
Zeyd had opposing opinions on the position of the Adagh in Mali. Intalla was in 
favour of cooperation with the Malian authorities. He had become a member of 
the US-RDA in 1958, and was therefore highly favoured by the Keita Regime. 
Zeyd had always opposed the inclusion of the Adagh in Mali. In the debates on 
who should succeed their father, these opposing views evidently played an 
important part. Both the French and Malian administrators, and the Kel Adagh 
characterised Intalla as a ‘real chief’: Authoritative, authoritarian even; intelli-
gent and able-bodied. He was also seen as a moderniser, interested in economic 
development and in favour of modern education. His modernity and willingness 
to cooperate with the Keita Regime meant however that the Kel Adagh dis-
favoured him as the new amenokal, despite his qualities. 
The French opened their school in 1947, but cheick Baye [an influential religious 
leader] told Attaher not to send the children to school. Attaher was very religious, so 
he did what cheick Baye said. (...) In 1956 or 1955 Attaher sent Intalla to France for 
the parade [celebrating 14 July]. There he met other Tamasheq chiefs, such as 
Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick. They said: “You are stupid. We are marabouts 
but we can read and write French, we can stand up for our rights. You don’t know 
anything and will be deceived”. At that moment Intalla understood that Attaher had 
been mistaken to listen to cheick Baye. He took his camel and went to the camps to 
gather children for the school. Attaher told him: “If you want to remain my son, you 
stop this”, so Intalla stopped. Intalla then decided to live in the city [of Kidal] and to 
start a shop. Perhaps this example would get the Ifoghas interested in the school. But 
everybody laughed at him. “Intalla is looking for candy, just like the children”, they 
said. After two years he gave up, discouraged. I remember that as children we would 
say: ‘Our Zeyd and Intalla the Frenchman’. That’s how we called him then, ‘Intalla 
the Frenchman’.18 
The impression all parties had of Zeyd was just as unanimous. He was seen 
as less fit to be a chief; less authoritative; amiable, but a loose cannon and not in 
favour of cooperation with the Malian administration. His later actions as leader 
of the rebellion are the strongest proof of his anti-Malian sentiments, but they 
were not the first signs of his discontent. In the summer of 1961 Zeyd had spent 
                                                 
18  Conversation with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 08/06/1999. 
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a long period in Tamanrasset, the capital of the Algerian South. There he had 
met with the French Commandant of the Oasis Territory, Colonel Nivaggioni; 
the Nigerien Minister of Nomadic Affairs Moudour Zakara, responsible for the 
continued Franco-Nigerien cooperation within the OCRS; and with Baye ag 
Akhamouk, amenokal of the Kel Hoggar and Zeyd’s official host. The Keita 
Regime regarded Zeyd’s visit with suspicion, and not without reason. It was 
rightly seen as a sign of his opposition to Malian rule. Indeed, Zeyd did not 
conceal his dissatisfaction with Mali, and it was clear to all that he had sought 
to ally himself to other powers. 
The respective sides chosen by both heirs provoked lively discussions in the 
Adagh. In discussions about who should succeed Attaher ag Illi, the main topic 
was not the suitability for chieftaincy of both candidates, but their respective 
sides on the question of Malian rule over the Adagh. This is how Mohamed ag 
Intalla remembers those days: 
At the moment of independence I was still very young, but I still remember. I 
attended the Koranic school near the mosque. There were always people discussing 
things there. They had heard of Mali and said the country would become Muslim 
now. That provoked much discussion. Some believed it, others did not. Not only the 
Kel Adagh came to discuss things, but a lot of strangers too. People from Timbuktu, 
from Algeria, and from Gao. My grandfather had to put up I don’t know how many 
tents to lodge these guests. They discussed the problem at length. Attaher said he 
didn’t know any more either, and had to think about it. Intalla said they had to 
decide now. Then a marabout arrived from Gao, not an important marabout, but a 
minor one named Ghissa. He came with a black commander, or whatever he was, by 
car. They held prayer beads all the time. Everyone said it was true then, that the 
country would be Muslim. Intalla, who was amenokal [assistant chief to his father] 
then, signed a letter to the Malians written by Embakoua [the religious leader of the 
Adagh at the time] that they agreed on independence. Only Zeyd was against this. 
He said “Whatever his religion, I prefer to stay with someone of my own skin 
colour”. Zeyd said the blacks had a complex because of their skin colour and this 
would give troubles. Then there was the problem with slavery. Intalla said it was too 
late now and if Zeyd really thought about it that way he should have said so 
earlier.19 
Both parties had their supporters. However, support for Zeyd, and thus 
against Mali, was highest. Zeyd could count on the support for his case from 
Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, who remained in contact from his place of exile 
in Morocco. Zeyd was not only supported by the politically active. The com-
mon Kel Adagh was not much in favour of Intalla either. Even before Attaher’s 
death, when both Zeyd and Intalla ruled as second in command to their father, 
the subject of Malian rule had provoked discussion as some Kel Adagh travel-
lers had pointed out to Jerôme Regnier, a French officer in Southern Algeria. 
                                                 
19  Conversation with Mohamed ag Intalla. Kidal, 23/05/1999. 
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Attaher has said he will never accept the rule of the blacks. He wants the same tobol 
[rulers] as Bey [ag Akhamouk, amenokal of the Hoggar]. Intalla on the other hand is 
happy with the blacks. But Intalla is “nothing”. At present, Attaher wants nothing to 
do with Intalla. He only wants to work with his son Zeyd.20 
In the end, Kel Adagh discussions on who should succeed Attaher were 
closed in Zeyd’s favour, and he was subsequently appointed by the council of 
the Kel Adagh as the new amenokal. It then became clear whose alliance 
proved the strongest. Zeyd’s support inside and outside the Adagh could not 
prevent the administration ruling in favour of Intalla, whom they appointed as 
the new amenokal, but only unofficially. Whereas his father had held an official 
and classified rank, with corresponding remuneration in the colonial administra-
tion, Intalla only held an informal position as figurehead and representative 
between the masses and the administration. Administrative meddling in what 
they considered their internal affairs became clear once again to the Kel Adagh. 
Those in favour of Zeyd would not consent to this situation. Their protest – a 
protest against not being heard and against being Malian in the first place – was 
brought home to the Malian Government in a violent way throughout 1963 and 
1964. 
At the height of the rebellion, the policy towards the chiefs was at its most 
incoherent. Officially, the chieftaincies had been completely dismantled. Never-
theless some chiefs, still being seen as such by the population, served as medi-
ators between the army and the rebels. Their mediating task was facilitated by 
the army, which equipped them with guns, food and camels to tour the area. 
Therefore, in 1965 those chiefs who had rendered services during the rebellion 
were reinstated. 
In fact, these auxiliaries of the administration were put aside and therefore provoked 
difficulties in the execution of administrative orders toward the population (...) The 
decision to associate these traditional administrative agents has been favourably 
received by both the concerned chiefs and the population. To the administration this 
is a unique occasion to have the chiefs at their side, to educate them and to force the 
incapable into a real reconversion.21  
In January 1967 Commandant de Cercle Diarra went even further, proposing 
to the Governor in Gao to reinstate Intalla ‘officially at the head of the Kel 
Effele tribe, even if tomorrow a general decision to suppress the chieftaincy will 
hit him as it will hit others’.22 Minister of the Interior Madeira Keita blocked 
Diarra’s proposal, but despite not having an official position as tribal chief, 
Intalla was referred to as such by the administration and was financially re-
                                                 
20  Regnier, J. 1960, CHEAM 3457:10. 
21  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de janvier 1965. ACK. 
22  Cdt. Cercle Kidal à Gov. Gao. Kidal, 06/01/1967. ACK. 
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warded for his activities. In November 1967 Diarra proposed rewarding Intalla 
‘who is the sole to render some service, by according him, with retrospective 
effect from 1 January 1967, a monthly recompense of 10,000 francs, that, with-
out nominating him as a tribal chief, will encourage him to serve with relative 
loyalty’.23 The 10,000 francs proposed was the same amount of money Intalla 
had earned as salary as assistant chief to his father in colonial times. 
Chiefs who did not collaborate faced a totally different fate. In February 
1967 Hamzata ag Alkassem of the Kel Telabit, Ebeug ag Elmouack of the 
Taghat Mellet, and Bissaada ag Ghakad of the Idnan protested against the 
forced education of girls and their inclusion in the Milice Populaire, which they 
believed to be against Islam. Two other chiefs, Oumayata ag Sidi of the Ifor-
goumoussen and Bégui ag Rabidine of the Ibotenaten, who were in the Cercle 
of Ménaka at that time but who also resisted the education of girls, escaped with 
most of their tribes to Algeria before any measures could be taken against 
them.24 The former three were removed from their unofficial office and brought 
to trial. They were sentenced to forced labour, carrying out the most menial 
activities, such as cleaning latrines. Being of advanced age, Ebeug ag Elmouack 
died under this punishment in November 1967.25 
The institution of the chieftaincy would survive the Keita Regime. It might 
have come out in a transformed way, as it had come out of the colonial period 
in a transformed way, but the adaptive powers of African society and its internal 
political structures to new circumstances, a well studied subject, proved just as 
effective in the Adagh as elsewhere on the continent. After the 1968 coup d'état 
against Keita, and the creation of the single party Union Démocratique du 
Peuple Malien (UDPM) by Moussa Traoré in 1979, which was less hostile to 
traditional leaders that the US-RDA had been, a number of tribal chiefs or their 
sons managed to have themselves elected as representatives of their constituen-
cies. Thus the traditional elite regained power in national politics after only two 
decades of absence. 
The nomad problem 
With the presentation of its first five-year plan in 1960, the Keita Government 
had embarked on a rather ambitious scheme of modernisation and industrialisa-
tion for the country. The plan counted on an extraordinary economic growth 
rate of 11% in the primary sector to finance the planned industrialisation and 
                                                 
23  Rapport du Cdt. Cercle Kidal no 45/KI.C. Rélatif au comportement des chefs de 
tribus nomades face à la révolution malienne. Kidal, 10/11/1967. ACK. 
24  Extrait de la revue mensuelle du mois de mars 1967 de l’Arrondissement nomade 
Tidarmene, Cercle Ménaka. ACK. 
25  Cdt. Cercle Kidal à Gov. Gao. Kidal, 15/12/1967. ACK. 
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infrastructural investments.26 The Keita Regime based its financial investments 
in the industrial sector on increasing revenues in the primary sector. One of the 
most direct ways to increase these revenues was through better control over 
increased cattle exports. Even before independence, livestock had been Mali’s 
main export product. The country was the largest exporter of cattle in West 
Africa.27 This comparative advantage had to be put to use. In February 1962, 
Oumar Baba Diarra, Secretary of State for Animal Husbandry and Meat In-
dustry, projected that by 1965, Mali should reach livestock exports ‘at a value 
of 4,560,000,000 Franc CFA, 22% of total exports, involving 330,000 heads of 
cattle and 1,800,000 sheep and goats, against 180,000 and 830,000 respectively 
at present’.28 Unfortunately, there were some major handicaps to overcome. 
Stockbreeding is confronted with unfavourable conditions: Difficulties in providing 
water, thus a pastoral hydraulic problem, scarcity of pastures and watering holes in 
the dry season, tsetse flies and other parasites, epidemics and animal diseases (bone-
black, pneumonia, rinderpest, etc ...), pastures outside of Macina; no choice of re-
productions; finally the mentality of the stockbreeder who prefers quantity over 
quality and who only takes older animals to the butcher.29 
However, since the Government reserved most of its investments for the 
creation of a secondary sector not much money was left to improve conditions 
in the primary sector. Budgeted investment in agriculture was set at 25.6% of 
the total budget, but only 1.55% of this 25.6% was reserved for ‘cattle’.30 This 
investment had resulted by 1964 in the deepening of 16 seasonal wallows; 5 
explorative drills for new wells; 12 veterinary posts; and 12 vaccination cor-
rals.31 By 1967 this ‘impressive result’ was augmented with 26 new wells in the 
Cercles of Gao and Niafunké, the deepening of 20 others in the Cercle of Nara, 
and a campaign against rinderpest.32 It is easy to imagine that these investments 
were insufficient to overcome the problems outlined above. 
In livestock production, as in agriculture, the increase in production and 
revenues was expected to come from a change in attitude from the pastoral 
population towards livestock rearing. If the Mande were perceived to be es-
sentially hard working, industrious and communalist, the Kel Tamasheq and 
Bidân were seen as essentially idle and lazy. The idea of the idle nomad is older 
than the Bible. Ancient Babylonian texts already convey the notion that the 
                                                 
26  Jones, W. 1976: 126. 
27  Cissé, M.N. 1964, CHEAM 3935. 
28  “Conference des chefs de circonscriptions d’élevage du Mali”, L’Essor, 12/02/1962. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Jones, W. 1976: 119.  
31  Cissé, M.N. 1964, CHEAM 3935. 
32  Cissé, M.N. 1967, CHEAM 4239. 
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nomads surrounding the kingdom were lazy, anarchist and dangerous.33 Both 
administrators and scientists alike reinvigorated the idea of the lazy nomad in 
colonial times.34 Early literature on pastoralism notes a nomadic preoccupation 
with quantity in neglect of quality. A pastoralist’s primary concern is the steady 
increase of numbers of the herds. When beset by catastrophe, numerous heads 
of cattle save nomadic existence. Herdsmen do not want to increase lactation 
yields or improve meat-build in animals; they simply want loads of them, at all 
costs. This is what is generally called ‘contemplative pastoralism’. It is seen as 
irrational, inspired only by the love of herds, without regard to their conditions. 
Pastoralists are also seen as defiant of profit maximizing strategies. They only 
sell their animals when in need of cash to pay taxes or to acquire some basic 
materials, without further plans for investment since their herds are the only 
investment known to them.35 Beside this laisser faire attitude in stockbreeding 
nomads are often accused of having a laisser faire attitude in general. The 
nomad is contemptuous of hard agricultural labour, ‘(...) all alike regard horti-
culture as toil forced on them by poverty of stock, for at heart they are herds-
men, and the only labour in which they delight is care of cattle’.36 These ideas 
are basically false and the described attitudes are non-existent, but that did not 
make this perception less persistent among anthropologists, development spe-
cialist and colonial and post-colonial administrators until well in the 1990s.37 
The idea that nomads are disinclined to engage in any activity other than con-
templative herding, caravan trade, and warfare, are hard to root out, despite the 
many detailed ethnographies depicting pastoral life as one of constant toil and 
labour.38 
Scientific and colonial ideas about contemplative pastoralism and nomad 
anarchy informed the Keita Regime’s policy in the North with respect to the 
nomad Kel Tamasheq. But not only their mentality with regards to raising cattle 
had to change, their whole way of life needed to. In his opening speech to the 
second regional social economic conference in Gao in 1962, governor Bakary 
                                                 
33  Klengel, H. 1972. 
34  Camel, F. 1996. 
35  The fact that in many African societies cattle form the main investment for seden-
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36  Evans-Pritchard, E. 1940: 16. 
37  For an excellent analysis of pastoral flexibility and operation in the high risk envir-
onment that is usually theirs, see Bruijn, de, M. & H. van Dijk 1995. For an analysis 
of Tamasheq pastoral trading patterns and profit maximisation, see Swift, J. 1979. 
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Diallo gave a very vivid image of the Malian vision on French colonial policies 
in the Sahara, and its social and political outcomes: 
The colonial regime has entailed a prejudicial policy towards the nomads, of which 
the consequences are now fully visible. The colonial maniacs, in love with exotism, 
wanted to preserve the nomads for anthropologists, berberophile ethnographers, and 
Orientalist scholars exasperated by the XXth century, for whom an island of men 
untouched by the pollution of progress had to be found, so they could inhale the 
delicious perfume of antiquity from time to time. Thus, while everywhere else the 
first act of the colonial regime was to suppress slavery, France authorised the white 
nomad to keep his black slave called “bellah”. The nomad was dispensed from 
military service and education. (...) Nomad society, as it is left to us by the colonial 
regime, undoubtedly poses us problems in light of the objectives of our socio-
political programme. (...) Our objective is to know the problems that we, in refer-
ence to the colonial regime, will call the nomad problem.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 3.1 
Bakary Diallo (with sunglasses), 
Governor of the Gao Région, in 1963. 
[Source: Klemm, H. & H. Klemm, Die Enkel der Könige. Berlin: Verlag Volk und Welt.  
Courtesy of Mrs. H. Klemm.] 
 
                                                 
39  Typescript of speech by Gouverneur de la Région de Gao, Conférence régionale des 
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The ‘nomad problem’ that the Keita Regime perceived to have, mainly 
consisted of inherited colonial perceptions of the nomadic populations and of a 
negative appreciation of nomad social economy as counter to modernity. It can 
be summarised as follows: The nomad practices an irrational pastoral mode of 
production, the results of which are illegally exported; there are deficits in 
cereals due to the non-existence of agricultural practice; there are further de-
ficits in basic needs as the nomad population is basically unproductive; they 
have a lack of formal education; they are still ruled by traditional chiefs, instead 
of organised US-RDA party structures; and, last but not least, nomadic exist-
ence itself makes effective administration and development of these backward 
populations impossible. In James Scott’s terms: Their mobility made them ille-
gible to the administration.40 
The new Malian administration was determined to solve ‘the nomad prob-
lem’. Believing in modern technique, rational production, socialism, and, above 
all, the malleability of the human condition, the new regime was determined to 
put the Sahara to use and civilise its population. The regime was convinced that 
agriculture was possible in the Sahara; that the Kel Tamasheq could and should 
be sedentarised and educated; and that they should take up farming and ranch-
ing, instead of wandering around and counting their heads of cattle. 
In order to rationalise the pastoral economy and to socialise the nomads the 
Keita Regime made the sedentarisation of nomadic populations one of its main 
goals in Northern Mali. Material found in the Kidal Cercle archives indicates 
that sedentarisation projects were indeed high on the local agenda during the 
Keita Regime. In reports to their superiors, local administrators on Arrondisse-
ment and Cercle level paid much attention to the topic. But in assessing the 
outcome of the effort, it is hard to discern between discourse and practice. 
Reading administrative reports from the Keita period is similar to reading a 
communist manifesto. Much paper is used in phraseology; far less is used to 
give concrete results. No figures are given on sedentarised nomads. Neverthe-
less, existing material draws at least a rough outline. Sedentarisation policies 
were non-existent prior to the 1963 revolt, despite the regime’s rhetoric. The 
sedentarisation process gained impetus after the revolt was over in 1964, and 
gained more speed at the end of the Keita Regime in 1967. It can only be 
guessed whether the growing numbers of sedentarised nomads were due to the 
regime’s efforts, or to the then already rising deficit in rainfall, culminating in 
the drought of 1973. The regime’s success in settling the nomads in the Kidal 
area seems to have been restricted to the central Arrondissement of Kidal itself, 
and the Arrondissement of Boughessa, where the Wadi Telabit and the proxi-
mity of the Tigharghar Mountains, with their more permanent water sources, 
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made sedentary life less hazardous. The most western Arrondissement of Ti-n-
Essako was rightly seen as totally unsuitable for sedentary life, since the plains 
of the Tamesna had no permanent or even temporary water wells. Even if some 
Kel Adagh settled in villages, this was only on a temporary basis. To the an-
noyance of the administration, nomads would settle during the dry season, cul-
tivating small gardens, only to leave again after the rainy season had started. 
Commandant de Cercle Diarra noted in August 1967: 
Many settled nomads, who consider nomadism these days as a holiday, have aban-
doned the villages and their gardens in favour of the tents, thus compromising the 
success of the first part of our agricultural plan. We have been obliged to redistribute 
the abandoned gardens among the workers who remained, especially to a bellah 
fraction which made demands for a collective garden.41 
Nevertheless, some nomads settled for at least part of the year. Places like 
Aguelhok, Boughessa, Telabit and Anefis, until then mere names on a map, 
became real villages after 1964. A few figures give us an idea of this process. In 
1967, the village of Aguelhok counted 122 inhabitants.42 Kidal town grew from 
460 inhabitants in 1960 to 1,945 inhabitants in 1967.43 However, it is unclear 
how many of these inhabitants were sedentarised nomads and how many were 
civil and military servicemen and their families who were strongly present in 
the Adagh after the 1964 rebellion. The earliest reliable data we have for the 
numbers of sedentary inhabitants and the numbers of nomadic inhabitants in the 
Adagh after independence dates from 1974. In that year the census counted a 
total of 15,489 people, of whom 3,544 were sedentary villagers and 11,945 no-
mads. But the number of town dwellers is likely to have been inflated by the 
number of drought refugees who took up nomadic existence again when con-
ditions were favourable. In Kidal city, it seems the only settled Kel Adagh were 
the goumiers with their families, amounting to 417 people, and 146 former 
slaves who had settled in town. In Aguelhoc and Telabit there lived, in all, 76 
villagers of unspecified origins. In Tessalit there lived 808 town dwellers, of 
which the majority is likely to have been of Algerian origins.44 
Above I have briefly sketched the outcomes of the French colonial educa-
tional policies in the North. The Malian attitude towards educating the Kel 
Tamasheq was entirely different. It was perceived as a first necessity to bring 
the Kel Tamasheq within the modern progressive world, liberating them from 
                                                 
41  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois d’août 1967. ACK. 
42  Arrondissement d’Aguelhoc, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de mai 
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their ‘backwardness’. Compared to the colonial efforts in education, the Malian 
results are impressive indeed. A large increase in the number of pupils was due 
to the rebellion ravaging the Cercle in 1963-1964. It left the boarding school in 
Kidal town with approximately 400 orphaned children in permanent residence. 
But this was not the only cause of the increase. Whereas by the end of the 
colonial period only one school had existed in the Cercle of Kidal, at In 
Tedeyni, the Keita Regime left an additional five at Kidal, Tessalit, Boughessa, 
Aguelhoc, and Ti-n-Essako. In the educational year 1967-68, a total of 910 
children attended school, drawn from a dispersed nomadic population of around 
15,000 in all.45 The educational curriculum under the Keita Regime went be-
yond mere courses in literacy and mathematics. Its first aim was to inculcate 
youngsters with a patriotic spirit and a sense of national consciousness. At 
school, speaking Tamasheq was forbidden. Only French and Bamanakan were 
allowed. The Mandefication of the state was in full swing in the Adagh. Next to 
patriotism, the children were taught the sense of equality of all Malian citizens. 
The feudal lords and the feudal system needed to be abolished. After school 
hours, children were occupied with the Pioneers, a national scouting corps, 
where they were taught how to camp and shoot rifles, strange occupations 
indeed given the distrust the Government had of the nomad anarchist Tamasheq 
warriors. In addition to the Pioneers, the troupes artistiques, folk groups 
performing theatre, songs and dances, played an important educational role. 
These troupes artistiques had a uniquely Southern repertoire of Mande origins. 
The theatre pieces were meant to educate and uplift both performers and 
audience on a large variety of social issues. In Northern Mali, theatre often had 
slavery and feudalism as its main themes. The troupes artistiques also per-
formed outside the Adagh. Captain Diby Sillas Diarra was of the opinion that, 
in this way, the Kel Adagh children would get to know their country and would 
get to appreciate the efforts the Party made for their education. 
Education and sedentarisation were not enough to transform the nomad into 
a hard-working member of Malian society. Work ethics needed to be changed 
as well. This was promoted in the same ways as it was elsewhere in Mali: 
Through the so-called ‘human investment’ and the creation of the Service 
Civique.46 The ‘chantiers d’honneur’ in the North were not only meant to create 
new buildings, but also to install a sense of civil duty and a particular work 
ethic in the nomad population. From the Rapports Mensuels one gets the 
impression that nearly every administrative building in the Kidal area has been 
built through fasobara after independence. The Service Civique, organised into 
brigades, had very likely been installed in the Adagh as well on a small scale. 
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Fasobara and the Service Civique have left bitter memories among all Malians 
who lived those days, as they resembled the colonial forced labour and the 
deuxième portion. However, to the Kel Tamasheq of free origins, both fasobara 
and the deuxième portion were unknown since they had been exempted from 
forced labour and military recruitment of any kind in colonial times. To them, 
the state demands in labour were an entirely new experience, and so were the 
works they were forced to do: Building houses and tending gardens. What made 
things worse from a Tamasheq perspective, was that the regime forced women 
to work as well. In an ideal Tamasheq discourse on work and activity, women 
of free descent do not work. Only younger women of lower social status might 
be active as goat herders. Women are only responsible for putting up the tents 
(which are theirs) and cooking. The house slaves provide all other necessary 
labour. If these are absent, men and boys fetch firewood and water, tasks that in 
a Mande household would be women’s labour. Although in reality many 
Tamasheq women worked, labour divisions and practices were still different 
from those in the South. This was much to the contempt of southern admini-
strators. As one Lieutenant Mamadou Traoré, Chef d’Arrondissement in Ti-n-
Essako observed: 
Here, men are revolted by manual labour. Their efforts are restricted to watering the 
animals and fetching water. In certain classes and by weakness of character, they 
voluntarily consent to perform household tasks instead of their spouses. (...) Previ-
ously isolated from the outside world, the nomad woman is now involved in certain 
activities: Fetching water and tending the animals. She evolves more rapidly than 
the men do.47 
Thus, women were put to work making clay bricks at the sites of human 
investment. This practice seems to have been put in place after February 1964, 
when the Malian army installed the ‘zone of retreat’ (see Chapter 3), concen-
trating the civil population – especially the women – in urban centres. This is 
still remembered with great resentment in the Adagh. 
Mali put women in prison. He [Mali] forced them to make bricks. If they didn’t 
make bricks, he killed them and flogged them. Tamasheq women who, before, did 
not even pick up with their own hand what was in front of their eyes!48 
The fact that women were forced to work was not the only source of re-
sentment. Forced labour on the sites of human investment was exactly seen as 
such, and this experience was then put to words in the local discourse on 
domination: That of slavery. This in turn would upset the Southern admini-
strators who felt attacked in their dignity. 
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The chief of the fraction Imrad wan Adjous is honoured to inform you that certain 
individuals, (...) on their turn to work on the human investments have said to others 
of the same fraction that they do not work for captives.49 
The scale of human investment in the Adagh can still be seen. Reports from 
towns such as Telabit and Aguelhoc also frequently mention the creation of 
schools and other buildings by ‘human investment’ and these buildings are still 
standing. The sports stadium in central Kidal – a large, walled, levelled terrain 
with a terrace, a basketball field and soccer posts – was constructed in this way 
as well. Ironically and perhaps to erase the bad memory, construction of this 
much used public space is now attributed by most Kel Adagh to their favourite 
colonial administrator, Jean Clauzel. 
Educated, sedentarised, and hard working, the Kel Tamasheq would be able 
to raise their living standards by supplementing their improved pastoral tech-
niques with horticulture and agriculture. In September 1958 a Sudanese dele-
gation headed by Modibo Keita paid a ten-day visit to Israel on the invitation of 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir.50 The delegation visited the Ki-
bitzes in the Negev, which would make a lasting impression. The mission 
reported to the US-RDA territorial conference of October 1958, where Keita 
summed up the reasons for Israeli success in desert farming as follows: 
This economic take off is most of all the result of belief. Belief in the ideal of the 
resurrection of a country, of the rehabilitation of a persecuted and shattered people 
willing to regain its unity, which it has already gained by rallying around that what 
binds: The soil. (...) Fatherland, to them, is first and foremost land, and this notion, 
considered sentimental by some, makes Israel today the only socially equal and truly 
independent country in the Middle East.51 
The impressions of the US-RDA mission to Israel would form the basis of 
the Malian agricultural policy, finding direct expression in the ‘Retour à la 
Terre’ and ‘Action Rurale’ policies proclaimed directly after the 1958 territorial 
conference, and strongly influencing the first five-year plan. But it would be 
especially influential on the Malian ideal of desert agriculture expressed in the 
Malian North in the years to come. In those days the miracle of the Israeli 
socialist democracy and its accomplishments in desert farming served as an 
example to many arid countries. It showed that fertilizing the desert, growing 
citrus fruits and cereals, even in sufficient quantities for export, was possible 
after all. The Malian visitors were equally impressed. However, they forgot one 
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crucial point: Israel had permanent sources of surface water, which Northern 
Mali did not. Nevertheless, the regime was determined to launch agricultural 
and horticultural schemes in the North. At present a small number of shrub-like 
orange trees in Ménaka and a few mango trees in Kidal still bear testimony to 
this enterprise. 
Under the guidance of the Malian army, installed in the Adagh in large 
numbers after 1963, the local administration launched agricultural projects. In 
1965 five production brigades were created in the Arrondissements of Kidal, 
Tessalit, and Aguelhoc, each consisting of twelve people. These brigades were 
very likely to have been a variety of the Service Civique mentioned above.52 
Most of these new farmers were former slaves. Their incorporation in the 
brigades not only served the cause of agricultural production and civic coercion, 
but also their own emancipation. The brigades were responsible for most of the 
agricultural production in the Adagh in the last years of the Keita Regime but 
besides these brigades collective gardens were created at each school; at army 
bases; in each village; and for some fractions. Women’s groups too had their 
own gardens.53 Dates, potatoes, wheat, maize, tomatoes and tobacco were 
planted, and sometimes harvested. At the local economic conference of Gao in 
1965 Commandant de Cercle Diarra outlined a bright and optimistic picture of 
horticultural results in the Adagh. 
After the one hundred percent conclusive experience of more than 15 posts spread 
over the Cercle; of the quantitatively and qualitatively satisfactory harvests at Kidal, 
Tessalit, Aguelhoc and Telabit; we formally affirm that at the conclusion of his 
education and initiation the nomad of our circumscription ceases to be the symbol of 
misery and razzias, because of the possibilities he will have to sow and to harvest 
potatoes in quantity and quality. (...) Our primary goal is to convince the nomad that 
not only should he continue to perfect and enrich his pastoral methods, but also to 
balance his economic life, while avoiding to look elsewhere, especially abroad, for 
what he can produce in the family gardens. Some date palms, some beds of wheat, 
potatoes, and tobacco suffice to strongly elevate the subsistence level of the nomad 
in the Adrar. With the help of our example and education, we are sure he will get 
there.54 
This presentation of horticultural results is likely to have been exaggerated 
and overoptimistic. First of all, as far as horticulture was possible in the Adagh, 
it was only so in the oasis towns mentioned. Here, horticulture had already been 
                                                 
52  ag Mohamed, A. 1977: 16-18. Ag Mohamed calls these units brigades de promo-
tion. From his description it becomes clear that they were organised along the lines 
of the Service Civique. 
53  Ibid.: 16-18. 
54  Typescript of speech by Commandant de Cercle Diarra at the 7th conférence 
régionale, Gao 22 to 24 august 1966. (n.d.). ACK. 
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practised since the foundation of these towns. In the case of Tessalit and Kidal, 
date palm groves and tobacco gardens had been erected and owned by Bidân 
well before colonial conquest.55 In colonial times, European and African admi-
nistrative staff alike grew potatoes and vegetables with moderate success for 
their own consumption. The vast majority of the Kel Adagh however, had 
always refused to alter their nomadic life in the slightest way to tend gardens. 
Date palm projects started by French Commandant de Cercle Clauzel in the 
early 1950s had all failed miserably due to lack of local interest.56 The agricul-
tural projects started by the Malian army as an example to the local population 
in the Adagh only worked under threat of arms. Many of those families who 
had fallen victim to the repression of the 1963-1964 rebellion, either by losing 
their herds or by forced settlement in the villages in the ‘zone of retreat’, had no 
other choice than to try and grow vegetables. Only in this way could the 
formerly idle wandering nomads be transformed into Malians. 
But growing vegetables and eating them are two different matters. The ad-
ministration was not only concerned with the horticultural endeavours of the 
sedentarised nomads, but also with their consumption of their own products. 
Vegetables did not form part of the traditional nomadic diet. In order to sti-
mulate the population to grow them anyway the administration decided to buy 
the crops from the gardeners at subsidised prices.57 This policy seems to have 
born some fruit. In February 1967 the inhabitants of Kidal, organising their first 
agricultural market, could bring sixty tons of potatoes to the market, produced 
by two hundred farmers. A feature proudly announced by Commandant de 
Cercle Diarra as ‘the Adagh’s most revolutionary act’. 
During this month the consumption of vegetables has increased considerably, as 
well as the consumption of potatoes, which shows an unprecedented engagement in 
agriculture of all social classes in the Cercle.58 
The analogy of the parent trying to force his unruly child to eat vegetables 
for his own good is almost too banal to make, if it wasn’t for the fact that much 
colonial discourse is framed in precisely that language of paternalism, and that 
this paternalism is generally seen as the hallmark of European colonial domi-
                                                 
55  The French military explorer of the Adagh Cortier states that before colonial times a 
small number of farmers existed in the Adagh. They cultivated dates, tobacco and 
wheat, but their numbers had declined. Cortier, M. & R. Chudeau, 1925: 10. Ac-
cording to ag Mohamed, agriculture was stamped out by the colonial administration, 
which was afraid the nomads would settle. Ag Mohamed, A. 1977: 16. 
56  Inspection des Affaires Administratives du Cercle de Kidal, 1937-1957. ANM – 
FRD-20/1957. 
57  Interview with former Lt. Samaké. Bamako, 03/11/1998. 
58  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de février 1967. ACK. 
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nation in the 19th and 20th century. There is hardly any stronger proof possible 
for the paternalistic and colonial attitude of uplift and betterment of the lives of 
the poor natives from the side of the Keita Regime than this attempt to make the 
nomads eat vegetables. 
The optimistic horticultural situation in the Adagh outlined by Diarra can be 
juxtaposed with the presentation of a report on agriculture one year earlier by 
his colleague Muphtah ag Hairy in riverain Bourem at the regional conference 
in August 1966. 
We abstain from advancing figures for the good reason that until now they do not 
represent reality. Indeed our experiences so far show us that the agricultural agents 
invent them at their desk, multiplying random yields per hectare to a random 
cultivated surface. (...) It should, however, be recognised that even in good years, 
the Cercle is not self sufficient and always needs exterior help. (...) The second 
phenomenon, not less dangerous, is the tendency of the farmer to become a pas-
toralist and to abandon the soil. (...) This year, laudable efforts have been made in 
the horticultural domain in which the riverain villages take more and more interest. 
The consumption of vegetables still not having entered the alimentary habits of our 
masses, we fear our gardeners will face a sales problem in the near future. Rural 
cooperatives have been installed in all villages, but it should be admitted that they 
do not function. The collective fields, with some small exceptions, have not pro-
duced anything, and funding is so minimal that they do not allow for important 
operations.59 
This grim but honest picture is likely to represent the situation in the Adagh 
as much as it represents the state of affairs in riverain Bourem. As a provisional 
conclusion it can be said that the efforts undertaken by the Keita Regime to 
sedentarise the Kel Tamasheq and to transform them into hard-working farmers 
were a failure. In 1966, in all, three hundred people practised horticulture in the 
Cercle. This number probably consisted mostly of administrative and military 
staff.60 
After the fall of the Keita Regime the Traoré regime quickly decided to stop 
all efforts in forced sedentarisation and agriculture in the Sahara.61 The agri-
cultural brigades ceased to exist and even the agricultural service withdrew 
itself from Kidal. Only in the village of Tessalit, which already had a small 
tradition of growing dates and tobacco before colonial times, was the experi-
ment somewhat successful.62 However, involuntary settlement rose dramatically 
with the drought of 1973, and again with that of 1984. The decimating effect on 
herds of these droughts made most of the Kel Adagh either flee the region or 
                                                 
59  Rapport du Cercle de Bourem, présenté à la 7ème conférence régionale, Gao 22 au 
24 août 1966. ACK. 
60  ag Mohamed, A. 1977: 17. 
61  Vallet, M. 1970, CHEAM 4374. 
62  ag Mohamed, A. 1977: 19. 
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forced them to settle down in the provisional refugee camps. Some of them 
probably remembered the days when the Government helped the sedentarised 
nomads to grow vegetables, which they could sell to stay alive. Cynically 
enough, demands made in the 1970s by some spokesmen of the community to 
be equipped with farming material were not at all heeded.63 
The revenues: Cattle and tax 
Although I have tried to make clear that ‘the civilisation of the backward nomad 
population’ was a goal in itself, the policies in the North were partly geared 
toward the increase in state revenues form livestock. The main option for the 
Government to command revenues from livestock production was control over 
cattle export, which was then still in the hands of private merchants. These 
bought cattle from their producers and then hired professional herdsman to 
drive them on foot to the neighbouring countries. Formally, export taxes had to 
be paid, but these could be easily circumvented by lack of border control. This 
changed in 1962 with the creation of the Malian Franc. The new currency had 
the same value as the CFA Franc, but currency exchange was only possible at 
the Malian National Bank, which forced the merchants to declare their imports, 
exports, and revenues. The creation of the Malian Franc struck a major blow to 
the merchant community, but not to the Kel Adagh who exported most of their 
livestock themselves to the Algerian Touat, exchanging their animals directly 
for consumer goods on the local market. This could not be prevented by the 
new monetary measures. Another measure taken by the Government to augment 
state revenues from animal husbandry was the heavy increase of the cattle tax in 
1962. The increase in cattle tax was announced ex ante in the national news-
paper L’Essor on 20 February 1962. 
Cattle are without doubt one of the greatest riches of our nation (...) its value in 
capital amounts probably to the sum of 50 billion francs. Yet, the returns on cattle 
tax were thus far ludicrous. The reasons for this insufficiency in returns are known. 
Whatever the case, we should distance ourselves from former mistakes such as 
simply retaking the numbers from last year, without taking into account the inter-
mediary increase, and to tax the big cattle owners for an infinitely small part of their 
herds, while the small and average pastoralists find themselves taxed on the totality 
of their production (...) in reality, the percentage of taxation varies between 1.5% 
and 3% of the market value of the animals. The effort demanded from pastoralists is 
thus smaller than that of other categories of contributors and they can, without much 
inconvenience, contribute about 3% of their riches in tax, and sometimes even less.64 
                                                 
63  Ibid.: 28-29. 
64  “M. Attaher Maiga, ministre des finances expose les grandes lignes du budget natio-
nal”, L’Essor, 20/02/1962. 
140 CHAPTER 3 
Officially the new tax rates on livestock were effective on 1 January 1962, 
but they came into effect in the 1963 budget. The rise of the cattle tax in 1963 
has been put forward as the main explanation for the 1963 revolt in the Adagh. 
Nomadic existence is hit hard by an increase in cattle tax, as livestock is not 
only a source of income but also a means of production. Let us look at the 
figures available. Indeed, theoretically, when the cattle tax increase came into 
effect, the amount of tax paid should rise dramatically. Per head, the tax on 
cattle rose 150%, on donkeys 100%, on horses 33%, on camels a huge 207%, 
and on sheep and goats again 100%. The dramatic effect of this increase was 
greatly enhanced by coming after years of stability since the small increase in 
1956. However, there are several reasons why I would like to refute the idea 
that the tax increase, even when it came in exactly the right year – 1963 – was 
the primary reason for revolt in the Adagh. On the basis of Tables 3.1 to 3.3, I 
have calculated the number of animals (by species) per taxable head of the 
population in the various Cercles of the North, and the average amount of tax 
they should pay in sum for their herd in 1963. These figures are presented in 
Table 3.4. It is clear that the tax on camels rose most spectacularly, and despite 
the fact that in Kidal the amount of cattle tax to be paid was among the highest 
in the Région, we cannot say the Kel Adagh were hit the hardest by the tax 
increase. The Cercle of Kidal ranks third in the classification of possible tax re-
venues. Stockbreeders in Gourma Rharous and Ménaka especially, had to pay 
even more. Their considerably higher average number of cattle per capita partly 
made up for their lower numbers of camels, which in Ménaka was not much 
lower than in Kidal in the first place. Despite being hit less hard than Kidal, the 
Cercle of Ansongo still shows a dramatically higher amount of cattle tax to be 
paid than the last five Cercles: Bourem, Diré, Goundam, Gao and Timbuktu. 
Yet, the Kel Tamasheq and other stockbreeders in these three hard hit Cercles – 
Ansongo, Rharous and Ménaka – did not rise in revolt. Second, the total amount 
of cattle in the entire North amounted to 513,748 head. The total amount of 
cattle in all of Mali advanced by Cissé was 4,200,000.65 Hence, only 12% of all 
cattle could be found in the North. The vast majority of Malian cattle herds 
could be found in the Région of Mopti. If the tax increase was a strong reason to 
revolt against the Government, certainly, the hardest resistance would be found 
in this area, where a large part of the population was also largely dependent on 
livestock for its existence, unless, of course, this population had a stronger 
sense of civic duty and loyalty to the tax-imposing state. The third and perhaps 
strongest argument against tax increase being the main incentive for revolt in 
the Adagh can be found in a poem: 
 
                                                 
65  Cissé, M.N. 1964, CHEAM 3935. 
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Table 3.1 Cattle tax in Soudan Français and Mali 1955-1963 in CFA Francs and 
Franc Malien 
Tax per head per 
year in CFA (=FM) 
 
    cattle 
 
    asses 
 
   horses 
 
   camels 
 
  sheep/goats 
1955 110 55 275 110 20 
1956-1962 120 60 300 130 25 
1963 300 120 400 400 50 
Source: Projet de budget, Cercle de Kidal, 1960. ACK. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Numbers of livestock and budgeted cattle tax revenues per Cercle, Région 
of Gao, 1963 
      budgeted  
Cercle cattle asses   horses camels sheep/goat revenues  
 (300) (120)   (400) (400) (50) 1963 
Ansongo 79,529 9,322 1,067 8,486 236,489 41,262,190 
Bourem 67,885 13,982 3,026 12,867 127,581 36,595,190 
Dire 22,202 3,575 1,333 52 74,947 12,401,750 
Gao 59,229 7,390 2,295 3,225 111,958 27,858,400 
Goundam 60,000 10,000 1,200 2,800 190,000 31,065,000 
Kidal 14,015 6,371 13 14,203 102,112 15,768,820 
Ménaka 53,999 16,904 222 24,271 230,293 44,673,320 
Rharous 131,704 11,157 1,530 1,535 395,177 62,762,890 
Timbuktu 25,185 7,159 547 9,542 124,728 19,014,780 
Total 513,748 86,860 11,243 77,031 1,593,265 291,382,250 
Source: Région de Gao, Budget regional 1963, taxe sur le bétail. ACK. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Regional per capita tax, Région of Gao, 1963 
Cercle amount 1963* population revenues 1963** 
Ansongo 120 and 100 34,160 3,793,680 
Bourem 120 and 100 51,263 6,691,440 
Diré 120 34,424 4,130,880 
Gao 120 and 100 39,559 3,820,560 
Goundam 120 and 100 56,200 6,204,000 
Kidal 120 and 100 11,034 1,137,720 
Ménaka 120 and 100 21,477 2,161,360 
Rharous 120 and 100 41,501 4,321,480 
Timbuktu 120 and 100 25,637 3,621,500 
Total  315,255 35,882,620 
Source: Région de Gao, Budget Régional 1963, taxe sur le bétail. ACK. 
* Amount of tax to be paid by sedentary population: 120 FM, nomads: 100 FM. 
** This is the budgeted revenue, not the levied revenue. 
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Table 3.4 Average number of head of livestock per taxable head of population and 
average amount of cattle tax to be paid sum total in Région of Gao, 1963 
Cercle   cattle   asses    camels sheep/goats  average cattle  
     tax sum total 
Ansongo 2.32 0.27 0.24 6.92 1170.04 FM 
Bourem 1.32 0.27 0.25 2.48   652.40 FM 
Diré 0.64 0.16 0.001 2.17   320.10 FM 
Gao 1.49 0.18 0.08 2.83   642.10 FM 
Goundam 1.06 0.17 0.04 3.38   523.40 FM 
Kidal 1.27 0.57 1.28 9.25 1423.90 FM 
Ménaka 2.51 0.78 1.13 10.72 1861.78 FM 
Rharous 3.17 0.26 0.03 9.52 1470.20 FM 
Timbuktu 0.98 0.27 0.37 4.86   717.40 FM 
Source: Based on Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
 
 
Ahelelu is behind the mountain with his camp 
They pay no tax 
Mali goes to the wars against the Iforas to punish them 
They pay no tax 
But the Iforas have guns and bullets, they kill the military of Mali 
Iforas pay no tax 
Ahelelu is dead, but his son takes his place 
Iforas pay no tax.66 
 
Here, the reasons for revolt are turned upside down. It was not so much the 
increase in taxes that sparked the Kel Adagh to revolt, but the fact that they did 
not pay any taxes in the first place that set the Malian army to punish them. The 
idea that the Ifoghas did not pay tax can be easily supported. Virtually every 
report from the colonial administration mentions the resistance against the 
levying of taxes. The delay in payment is constant. The same goes for the scant 
evidence available for the Malian administration. In spring 1967, only a rough 
15% (FM 3,659,725 of FM 23,873,060) of national taxes and a rough 65% (FM 
490,740 of FM 768,720) of regional taxes had been collected in the Cercle of 
Kidal for the running fiscal year, with regional and national taxes for the fiscal 
years 1966 and 1965 still not fully collected.67 Ifoghas paid no tax. 
                                                 
66  Nicolaisen, J. & I. Nicolaisen 1997: 581. 
67  Based on: Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de février 
1967; Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois d’avril 1967; and 
Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de mai 1967. ACK. 
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Fear and rumours in Kidal: The buildup to rebellion 
So far, this chapter has discussed the relation between the Keita Regime and the 
Kel Tamasheq in a more general way, looking at policies toward all nomads and 
their impact, albeit with much evidence coming from the Cercle of Kidal. Here, 
I would like to deal with the Adagh in particular in the years prior to Alfellaga, 
the rebellion of 1963. After independence, relations between state officials and 
the local elite in the Adagh were strained almost from the start. The Malian 
administrators, on the one hand, had a fearful perception of the Kel Adagh as a 
people under the sway of French neo-colonialism, unhappy with their inclusion 
in the Malian state, and therefore liable to rebel. On the other hand, the Kel 
Adagh loathed the Malian administration which to them represented a govern-
ment which broke its promises on the form Kel Adagh inclusion in Mali would 
take, which consisted of infidels and mere slaves, and which had been unwanted 
from the start. I will argue that, again, the lack of communication and misunder-
standing were based on deep-seated mutual negative stereotypes, this time lead-
ing to, and enhanced by, rumours spreading on both sides. 
Rumour is not so much about its subject as it is about trust and distrust, 
about familiarity and distance. Rumour is not necessarily a misinterpretation of 
things not well understood, nor is it necessarily fed by the absence of informa-
tion. It is an interpretation within the realities of the interpreter, and an appre-
ciation of the trustworthiness of the information and the trustworthiness of its 
source. There is a marked difference between the well-known African radio 
trottoir, which shares a number of the qualities of rumour, and rumour itself. 
Radio trottoir is essentially regarded as news. That is to say: A rendering of 
actual reality conveyed through, and emanating from, trustworthy sources. Ru-
mour conveys an inherent message of uncertainty and lack of trustworthiness. 
Rumour is perforce about tension, excitement in the case of positive rumour, 
and anxiety in the case of negative rumour. Rumours are telling about social 
and political relations and power structures. As a very off-hand rule of thumb, 
one could say that the intensity and persistence of rumours rise and fall in 
proportion with the level of power relations and the acceptance of its structures, 
while they react in a manner inversely proportional to the level of intensity of 
the social and political contact that is at the basis of the subject of rumour. 
Rumours can be about good or bad things, and in both cases the rule of thumb 
applies. Also, the wilder the rumour, the further one is removed from the or-
ganisation. Rumours are not untrustworthy sources; they are just tricky to inter-
pret correctly. As Luise White put it: ‘The imaginary makes the real, just as it 
makes more imaginings: It is the inclusion of both that gives depth to historical 
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analyses, and, if not some certainty, at least solid grounds on which to assess 
motivations, causes, and ideas’.68 
The national and international setting further complicated the political situ-
ation in the Adagh. Nationally the new regime was not sure of its command 
over the newly independent country. The Dioula protest over the Malian Franc, 
resulting in the political elimination of the former PSP leadership, and the 
Dogon rebellion discussed previously were the clearest signals of this lack of 
full control. The Keita Regime was therefore prone to overreact in tense situ-
ations. Internationally, continued French presence in the Adagh and in the 
countries surrounding Mali, notably the Algerian Sahara, made the regime 
uncomfortable on one hand, and on the other hand it was seen by some Kel 
Adagh as a sign that not all hopes of an independent Tamasheq existence with 
French help were lost. 
Under the policy of Africanisation of the administration inaugurated prior to 
formal independence, the top ranking civil and military commanders serving in 
the Adagh were chosen from what came closest to the local population. By May 
1960 the Commandant de Cercle of Kidal was a local man from Goundam: Mo-
hamed ould Mohamed Najim of mixed Bidân and Kel Intessar origins. The 
Chef de Poste at Tessalit, Mohamed Mahmoud, was a Bidân. The commander 
of the Kidal goum police corps, Mohamed Belkacem, was from the Adagh 
itself. The commander of the main army platoon in the area, the Groupement 
Nomade du Timetrine (GNT), was second lieutenant Mohamed ag Mohamed 
Alhadi, nicknamed Zoulbeyba, a Kel Intessar. The new local commanders, 
particularly those of the goum, tried to gain the confidence of the population in 
the same way the French had done. On each patrol they took such luxury items 
like medicines, tea and sugar with them to distribute as presents in the visited 
camps. Another way to gain popularity was the elimination of predatory ani-
mals that caused so much loss of domestic animals in the area. The task of the 
goum to gain confidence was not an easy one. In colonial times, the goumiers 
were the epitome of all that was bad in the state: They collected taxes; kid-
napped children to bring them to the French schools; and claimed riding camels 
from the population for their work. They had only been kept in check by the 
French commanders, who were now gone. The presence of Tamasheq admini-
strators at the head of the Cercle meant that all language barriers between rulers 
and ruled had fallen away, but despite the possibility of clear communication 
the relations between the Malian administration and the Kel Adagh were fed by 
rumours. Nothing seemed tangible; everything depended on hearsay, misinter-
preted statements, shreds of information and fear on both sides. 
                                                 
68  White, L. 2000: 308. 
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The regime’s fear of troubles in the Adagh was enhanced by the political 
circumstances in the bordering countries. The Adagh borders Algeria to the 
north and Niger to the east. Where Mali had opted for the socialist road, and 
was eager to break with ‘neo-colonial dependency relations’, Niger opted for 
stronger ties with France. The country remained part of the OCRS which had 
survived West African independence as a development organization, resulting 
in French investments in Northern Niger and a prolonged administration by 
French Commandants of the Nigerien Sahara. The last French Commandant in 
Agadez only resigned from his post in 1964. The result was that Malian Ta-
masheq citizens living in the border area were eager to migrate to Niger, much 
to Malian resentment. In Mauritania, French troops were still present at the 
request of the Mauritanian President Mokhtar ould Daddah, to ensure the new 
Mauritanian state’s security against unrelenting Moroccan claims on its terri-
tory. The reality of this threat was proven by various smaller attacks against 
Mauritanian officials throughout 1960 and 1961. French troops were also em-
ployed against smaller pro-Moroccan uprisings within Mauritania during those 
years, in the Hodh and in the Cercle of Nema.69 In Algeria the war of indepen-
dence had still not reached the Tamasheq south, despite efforts made to include 
the Kel Hoggar and the Kel Ajjer in the ranks of the FLN.70 French rule in the 
Saharan part of the country was still strong. French military presence was only 
on the increase. The development of de Gaulle's French nuclear strike force 
started in 1957 with the construction of nuclear test bases in the Hoggar at I-n-
Ekker, Reggane and Takormiasse. These bases were constructed by locally 
recruited workers and workers from Soudan Français, since Algerians were not 
trusted for fear of FLN affiliation. The working conditions were harsh, but work 
was well paid and attracted quite a few Kel Adagh who were eagerly em-
ployed.71 The nuclear bases were to remain under full French control until 1967. 
Moreover, some French officers who had served in the Malian North and some 
officers from the Administration des Affaires Musulmanes had been transferred 
to the Algerian South.72 Clauzel, one of the longest serving French Comman-
dants of the Adagh now served in Tamanrasset, where he would stay until Al-
                                                 
69  Guillemin, J. 1982. 
70  Based on Blin, L. 1990; Renaud, 1993; Vallet, M. 1990. 
71  Tschumy, J. n.d., CHEAM 3937.The first base was built at Reggane in 1957, where 
above ground test explosions were carried out in 1960. The second base was con-
structed at I-n-Ekker, where below ground test explosions took place. The third base 
was built at Takormiasse. 
72  From 1958 onwards, Marcel Cardaire, former head of the Administration des Af-
faires Musulmanes in Soudan Français, was stationed in Southern Algeria, Annexe 
du Tidikelt Hoggar, until an unknown date. Affaires politiques, Mauritanie, admini-
stration générale 1958. ANSOM – 1affpol/2172/5. Under embargo. 
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gerian independence. The presence of Clauzel and other former colonial officers 
who had served in Soudan Français inspired distrust. Would they stay in Al-
geria, uninterested in Mali, or would they take the opportunity to spark unrest 
and rekindle the OCRS fire within the Adagh? Although the Malian Govern-
ment lacked any tangible evidence of their further interest in Northern Mali, 
clearly these ‘agents of neo-colonialism’ could not be trusted. In October 1960, 
Minister of the Interior Madeira Keita wrote a circular to the Commandants in 
the North about the possible presence of French spies and agitators in Mali. 
I have the honour to inform you that it has been brought to my attention that French-
men disguised as Bidân might have been sent from Senegal through Mauritania, in 
order to spread subversion in the Republic of Mali. The elements concerned have 
served a long time in the Sahel and speak Bidân without accent. To mislead the 
population, the elements concerned could visit the mosques, nomad camps, they 
could act piously, recruit informers, select reconnaissance posts, introduce and dis-
tribute firearms, explosives and radio transmitters and receivers.73 
These French subverters would be accompanied by young Kel Intessar who 
had been educated abroad in Libya and at al-Azhar through the efforts of the 
‘anti-national’ Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar. In this atmosphere, any rumour 
concerning the French was directly reported. Another document in the Kidal 
archives contained a statement by Touhaya ag Bacrine, questioned by Moha-
med Mahmoud, Chef de Poste at Tessalit, upon his return from Tamanrasset 
where he worked for a French official. 
I came back definitively to my country which is Mali, because I heard the Europeans 
at Tamanrasset say a war will break out between the French and the Malians to keep 
the Efelings leaders in power in Mali. Yesterday night, upon leaving Timiaouene, I 
left [I saw] two aeroplanes, which brought arms and ammunitions to the base. (...) 
Upon our arrival at Tamanrasset, commander Clozé [Clauzel] and Captain Dogare 
[Godart] received us and invited us to tell them on Mali, that they would each give 
us 10,000 metropolitan francs. Moussa and I gave them some information (here is 
what we said to those two French officers, Mali is poor, we die of famine, there is 
no grain, we eat the excrements of donkeys, there is no work, there are some Malian 
soldiers who occupy the French air base at Tessalit. The Efeling leaders are nume-
rous in Mali, especially in Kidal and Tessalit). (...) In my presence, Captain Dogare 
has sent Agaly ag Boubacar to Kidal to inquire what is happening in Mali. Agaly ag 
Boubacar returned saying to the Captain that Mali does no longer exist and that the 
Efelings rule from now on.74 
                                                 
73  Missive confidentielle Ministre de l’Administration Territorial et de Sûreté à tous 
Cercles et Subdivisions, 18/10/1960. ACK. Indeed, in 1961, the French army inter-
fered militarily in Mauritania. Guillemin, J. 1982: 136. 
74  Déclaration de Touhaya ag Bacrine à Chef de Poste Tessalit, n.d. (September 1961). 
ACK. It is unclear who exactly Touahya meant with ‘efelings’. They could be either 
of two parties: The FLN or the Kel Effele, the Ifoghas fraction to which the family 
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Upon this declaration, Touhaya was arrested and sent to Kidal for further ques-
tioning. He would eventually join the rebellion in 1963. 
To make matters worse, international complications and neo-colonial agents 
did not stay abroad. Both parties entangled in the Algerian war of independence 
were physically present in the Malian Adagh! In the 1950s the French had built 
a small military air base near Tessalit. Between 1957 and July 1961 it accom-
modated about 150 air force men.75 After independence in 1960, the base re-
mained in French hands, like three other military bases did, until the summer of 
1961, a presence that France saw as crucial in its strategy to secure southern 
Algeria.76 But from February 1961 onwards, an FLN training camp was in-
stalled next to this French air base. The US-RDA was among the most ardent 
supporters of the Algerian cause. Even before Malian independence, Modibo 
Keita had made no secret of his point of view concerning the situation in 
Algeria. After 1960, moral support gave way to active help. At the Casablanca 
conference of African states, Keita declared the Malian border open to the cause 
of the Algerian people. The FLN was allowed to open training camps in the 
Adagh, which were located in and around Gao, Tessalit, Aguelhoc and in Kidal 
itself. To students of the Algerian war of liberation, Northern Mali is known as 
Wilaya VII. The names of the men commanding Wilaya VII are still known to 
many Kel Adagh, but also to the rest of the world. The current Algerian 
President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, stood at the head of the FLN organisation in 
Mali, seconded by revolutionary, novelist, psychiatrist and philosopher Franz 
Fanon, who was responsible for contact between the FLN and the Malian 
Government and the local population. The FLN members in Mali were provided 
with Malian passports and presented themselves locally as merchants of the 
Algerian Touat.77 They were equipped with arms and vehicles, and were free to 
move around. In Tessalit, they cultivated gardens and, every now and then, they 
organised feasts for the local population. In order to enlarge their ranks and 
make operations more effective, the FLN recruited with some success among 
the real Touati merchant community in the Adagh and among the Kel Adagh 
                                                 
of the amenokal belongs. In both cases, rumour had it that France would attack Mali, 
either to support their former allies or to attack their enemies now believed to be in 
power in the Adagh. 
75  Rapports des tournées dans le Cercle de Kidal. ANM – FN 1E-1227. 
76  The Tessalit air base was evacuated and handed over to the Malian authorities on the 
2nd of July 1961. The air base at Gao was evacuated in August 1961, while the last 
army base in Kati was evacuated in September 1961. Centre des Archives Diplo-
matiques, Nantes (CADN) – Bamako 15 – Evacuation des bases 1961. 
77  Organisation administrative du poste de Tessalit. ACK. This file contained some 
documents dealing with the FLN base at Tessalit. Most of these documents were 
without date or signature.  
148 CHAPTER 3 
themselves. The French occupants of the Tessalit air base knew of the existence 
of their FLN neighbours and vice versa. But in order for the French to continue 
their own air force presence at Tessalit, they could not complain. After all, since 
September 1960, they were only guests in Mali. As for the Malian commanders, 
they of course knew of the situation, but it seems they were not allowed to 
interfere in any way. Control over both the French base and the FLN camps 
seems to have been placed on a higher level. The only ones who could try to 
effectively manipulate the presence of both foreign armies were the Kel Adagh. 
The Malian Government had put a number of men from the Groupement No-
made du Timetrine, an army unit largely consisting of Kel Tamasheq, at the 
disposal of the FLN as guides in the area.78 The local population was regularly 
treated on free meals by the FLN forces in Tessalit, and some had even joined 
their ranks. In an essay entitled ‘Cette Afrique à venir’, published in his col-
lection Pour la révolution africaine, Fanon even sketched a furtive plan to 
launch a new front in the Algerian war from Northern Mali using locally re-
cruited Kel Tamasheq.79 The FLN thus presented another source of rumour and 
concern. 
I have the honour to inform you about the following. Information received from a 
trustworthy person on the whereabouts and behaviour of the Algerians in de cir-
cumscriptions of the Région of Gao. It concerns the Algerian military stationed at 
Kidal, Tessalit, Aguelhoc and Anefis. It seems these Algerian nationals, whom we 
consider to be real brothers, are distributing arms to all the nomads in the Gao 
Région, Cercles and Arrondissements cited above. They are staging an anti-Malian 
campaign among the nomads, trying to convince them that they are of white skin 
and therefore their brothers in the white race. Several nomads have enrolled in the 
National Liberation Army.80 
Zeyd’s visit to Algeria in 1961 too was, not without reason, regarded with 
suspicion by the Malian regime. After all, he had been talking to French agents 
as well as to the Nigerien Minister of Nomad Affairs, and, possibly, with FLN 
leadership. Again, rumours ran high. 
I have the honour to send to you Assafah ag Mohamed, one of the suspects in the 
Zeyd affair. He admits to have visited the latter, but he did not want to say anything 
serious. With respect to the current rumours he declares that Halou Saloum who, on 
his return from In Djezzal, has spread the word that he carries a message in which 
                                                 
78  Fanon, F. 1964: 211. 
79  Ibid.: 214. 
80  Sous-Lieutenant Abidine Maïga, Commandant le compagnie de gendarmerie de 
Gao, à Commandant de gendarmerie nationale du Mali, Bamako. Gao, 18/04/1962. 
Objet: Activité algérienne dans circonscription région Gao. ACK. 
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Zeyd informs you of the impending bombardment of the Cercle of Kidal by the 
French forces.81 
Rumours and panic were not the prerogative of the Malian administration. 
The Kel Adagh were just as much informed by rumours about what exactly the 
Malian Government wanted to do. In February 1962, the increase in cattle tax 
was announced. In July that year, the Malian Franc was created to curtail illegal 
exports, especially of cattle. But the Kel Adagh exported their cattle outside the 
West African monetary economy. They drove their herds to Algeria and ex-
changed their revenues directly for consumer goods, without ever seeing a cus-
toms officer. Therefore they had to be persuaded to stop this practice and sell 
their cattle within Mali, a policy that was only partly understood. In October 
1962, the rumour spread that Mali wanted to nationalise all livestock. What was 
understood as nationalisation was the requisition of all cattle by the Govern-
ment. At that stage requisition or nationalisation of cattle as means of pro-
duction was not included in government plans at all. This rumour was not 
confined to the Adagh. Zeyd ag Attaher and a delegation of Ifoghas notables 
brought the matter forward to Commandant de Cercle Mohamed Najim. Not 
believing his explanations, they set out to Gao to have a clarification on the 
matter. Badi ould Hammoadi, the cheick of the Kounta federation brought the 
issue to Bamako to receive an explanation.82 To counter the rumour, the Minis-
ter of Finance, Attaher Maiga, and Modibo Keita himself toured the North 
throughout November to inform the population on the true nature of Mali’s 
livestock politics and the need to sell cattle within Mali, instead of in Algeria 
and Niger.83 
In this climate of fear and distrust, small incidents could well be blown out 
of proportion into a blazing rebellion. A few months before independence a 
goumier collecting taxes had an argument with a certain Inadjelim ag Ebanzen, 
a notable of the Iforgoumoussen tribe.84 During the argument Inadjelim drew his 
sword in anger, upon which the goumier either shot him in the thigh or killed 
him on the spot. In any case, Inadjelim did not survive the incident. The 
goumier was not punished for this, although inquiries were made about his 
actions.85 In the following days however, a delegation of Ifoghas complained to 
Commandant de Cercle Mohamed Najim about the killing of Inadjelim, and the 
                                                 
81  Chef d’Arrondissement d’Aguel’hoc à Cdt. Cercle Kidal. 01/09/ 1961, no 44/CF/ 
AA. ACK. 
82  Chef d’Arrondissement de Tessalit à Cdt. Cercle Kidal. 27/08/62, Confidentiel no./ 
AT/CF. ACK. 
83  L’Essor, 07/11/1962. 
84  Télégramme officiel de Subdivision de Kidal à Chef de Subdivisdion de Kidal à 
Tessalit, no 351/Ki. 16/05/1960. ACK. 
85  Bâ Baba à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, n.d. ACK. 
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ways in which tax collections were carried out. The Ifoghas accused Najim of 
wanting to collect the taxes ‘by the bullet’.86 In the meantime, a family member 
of Inadjelim had avenged his death by attacking the goumier. Fear of a revolt 
grew. In the following days a kind of state of emergency was declared. Gov-
ernor Bakary Diallo ordered Najim to organise shooting exercises twice a 
week.87 The arsenal should be well guarded, as well as the goum’s camel herds, 
since ‘an intelligent rebellion might start by depriving us of our means’.88 The 
older goumiers in the Cercle were to be replaced by younger ones, a platoon of 
25 goumiers was sent from Ansongo as reinforcement, and another patrol of 20 
men was sent to Kidal from Ménaka. Besides these goumiers, the new Repub-
lican Guard of the three nearest Subdivisions at the Niger River were sent 
north.89 
The prevalence of rumours, panicky reactions and overblown events outlined 
above says a lot about the reign of preconceived stereotypes, and the lack of 
communication between all parties involved. If there ever was a period in which 
direct contact and communication between the Kel Tamasheq and the state was 
possible, it was in these few years. Except for Jean Clauzel, who is fondly 
remembered in the Adagh for speaking correct Tamasheq, contact between state 
and society in colonial times had mostly run through intermediaries: Inter-
preters, chiefs and goumiers who spoke some French. When the language 
barrier was removed, the culture barrier remained. With the appointment of 
Mohamed Najim and Mohamed Mahmoud as administrators, and the promotion 
of Mohamed Belkacem and Zoulbeyba as commanders of the goum and the 
Groupement Nomade, both the language and cultural barrier had fallen. It is 
therefore all the more surprising that communication, so helpful in countering 
rumours and smoothing misunderstandings, was entirely lacking. It can only be 
explained by unwillingness on the side of at least a part of the Kel Adagh to see 
the Government and its representatives as valid interlocutors, and unwillingness 
on the side of the new regime to see the Kel Adagh as anything other than 
unruly and unintelligent nomads. 
Understandably, US-RDA’s fears of ‘French neo-colonialist’ attacks on Mali 
ran high. The accusation of French plotting in Dakar during the break-up of the 
Mali federation and the presence of French troops in Mauritania, Niger and 
Algeria can be seen in that light. It is revealing that Madeira Keita himself 
believed in the possibility of French subversion in the Sahara, as we have seen 
                                                 
86  Regnier, J. 1960, CHEAM 3457. The accusation that Najim wanted to arrange taxes 
‘by the bullet’ was expressed to Regnier by Kel Adagh travelling in Algeria that 
summer and is very likely to have been connected to this incident. 
87  Based on letters Gov. Gao à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 20/05/1960 and 26/05/1960. ACK. 
88  Gov. Gao à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 20/05/1960. ACK. 
89  Gov. Gao à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 26/05/1960. ACK. 
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above in his anxious warnings against French elements penetrating Mali 
through Mauritania to arm the nomads. The ghost of the OCRS had not yet been 
fully exorcised. Whether or not the French did send ‘agents of subversion’ to 
Northern Mali is irrelevant from this perspective. As for the accusations to the 
FLN in arming nomads and inviting them to join their ranks as ‘brothers in the 
white race’, I do not doubt that the ‘trustworthy person’ who conveyed this 
information to the Second Lieutenant Maïga would have invoked the idea that 
both the Algerians and the Kel Tamasheq are white. Neither do I doubt that 
Maïga and his superiors would take this argument seriously. What the message 
shows is a concern for a possible FLN – Kel Tamasheq alliance based on 
racialist notions and stereotypes of the other held by the administration and the 
Kel Tamasheq alike. 
Epilogue 
So far this has largely been an archive-based narrative. Most of the smaller 
events described above have been forgotten and, as happens, the rumours have 
been replaced with newer ones, more urgent in order to assess the situation of 
the day. But the events and rumours of these days have been distilled into a 
single essence that is today still very much living history in the Adagh, feeding 
into local discourses on state Tamasheq relations. This single essence is ap-
parent in the following short lecture I received one day in Kidal from Moussa 
Baswish, a local intellectual who had studied in Algeria and who knew much 
about local history. After he had prepared a first glass of tea, he asked me what 
I was interested in. I told Moussa that I concerned myself with a very simple 
question: What had happened in the Adagh in 1963? 
Moussa: That is very simple indeed. Right, what happened in 1945? 
Me: The start of decolonisation in AOF, on the basis of the Brazzaville declara-
tion, Felix Eboué and de Gaulle. 
Moussa: Exactly. And what happened in 1957? 
Me: The OCRS. 
Moussa: Exactly, the OCRS. 1963 comes from the failure of the OCRS, which was 
instigated by Mohamed Mahmoud ould Cheick al-Timbukti, and supported 
by Mohamed Ali and Amegha ag Sherif. Further, it comes from the broken 
promise made by General Messmer in Gao to the assembled tribal chiefs 
that the Kel Tamasheq would form an independent unit within a federation. 
The promise of a federation and the establishment of the shari’a made by 
Madeira Keita were very important to the Kel Tamasheq in those days. 
Well, the federation broke up on the twenty second of September 1960, and 
the shari’a has never been employed. That is where the dissatisfaction with 
Modibo Keita’s regime came from. Then there was the promise of support 
to Zeyd’s cause made by the FLN. They had a base here in Kidal, in the 
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Intekoua ward. Have you seen it? It was led by the current Algerian Presi-
dent Bouteflika himself! Well, this promise was betrayed, just like the 
promises by the French, by the local commander. Do you really believe the 
French commanders and the FLN would promise to cooperate with Zeyd’s 
rebels? Come on! Only, the whole thing started too soon. It was Elledi who, 
at Timeaouine, took the gun of the goumiers who had beheaded his father. 
That’s the direct cause of 1963, which has nothing to do with what Zeyd 
and Amegha did. There you are. In short, that is what has happened in the 
Adagh in 1963. 
 Moussa sipped his tea and it was clear that the subject was now closed.90 
There you are indeed. It is not so much the density of the story that is in-
teresting, but Moussa’s surprise about me asking in the first place. It is all so 
obvious and clear, nothing to inquire about. To the Kel Adagh, dissatisfaction 
with the Keita Regime – as with other Malian regimes – is almost natural. They 
should never have been part of Mali in the first place, since the French had 
promised them independence, and then they were deceived, as could be ex-
pected from Malians, and French, and the FLN alike. With the hindsight of the 
historian, it is now clear to Moussa that the Kel Adagh had miscalculated the 
international setting they found themselves in. But in the early 1960s with the 
French still in Mali and Algeria, and the Arab brothers of the FLN around the 
corner, anything seemed possible, or so rumour had it.  
 
                                                 
90  Interview with Moussa Baswish. Kidal, January 1999. 
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Alfellaga 
Declaration received from the goumier Ahiyaya ag Ouarzeza: 
We had left for Timiaouïne to get our mission order [ordre de mission] signed by 
Souleymane. He made us tea. After tea, we got up to pray when two young Ifoghas, 
Alladi ag Allah and Tuteka ag Alladi, seized our guns and equipment (...) Directly 
after prayers, I pursued them, alone. While walking, I encountered them around 
19:00 hrs. One of them was in firing position and the other was tying up the camel. 
The one who was in firing position shot at me and the bullet passed over my head. I 
replied and they fled with their arms, taking their camel with them. (...) The next 
morning I was walking when one of them, Alladi, stopped me. He told me to climb 
off my camel, his weapon with fixed bayonet pointed at me. I climbed off my camel, 
after which he told me to take off my burnous and to hand over the camel with its 
saddle. I told him I would not give him the camel, after which he told me to take off 
my accoutrements. I kept refusing, whereupon his companion came close and told 
me again to take off my accoutrements. I did not want to be shot, so I took off my 
accoutrements. He then told me to drop them and to be off. After I had distanced 
myself, he told me to ‘go and tell the slaves at Boughessa that we are here’. This 
happened in the Wadi Atelaf this morning 15/5/63.1 
By stealing the gun and equipment from the goumier Ahiyaya ag Ouarzeza, 
Elledi ag Alla and Touteka ag Effad started what is now known among the Kel 
Tamasheq as Alfellaga, ‘The Rebellion’. To the rest of the world, the 1963 re-
bellion is generally known as ‘The First Tuareg Rebellion’ with the rebellion of 
the 1990s then called ‘The Second Tuareg Rebellion’, while the current situ-
ation in the Région of Kidal, from 2006 onwards, could then be referred to as 
‘The Renewed Rebellion’. These rebellions are indeed intimately linked in 
practice, ideology and historical memory. Kel Adagh historical discourse em-
phasizes a continuum of resistance against foreign domination stretching from 
                                                 
1  Déclaration recueillie auprès du milicien Ahiyaya ag Ouarzeza, n.d. (15/05/1963). 
ACK. 
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the defiance of Alla ag Albachir and his band in the colonial period; through 
Alfellaga; to al-Jebha, the rebellion of the 1990s and the recent events from 
2006 to 2009. 
This chapter has three aims. The first is to give a comprehensive narrative of 
Alfellaga. The second is to show how Tamasheq concepts of masculinity and 
warfare determined patterns of warfare during Alfellaga, as well as the military 
tactics used by the rebels. The third is to show how in Tamasheq historical dis-
course Alfellaga is intertwined with other historical events and embedded in an 
explanatory narrative of resistance. This chapter focuses on those topics pre-
sented as relevant in Kel Adagh historical discourse: Historical continuity of 
resistance; masculine values of honour and combat; the fighting itself; and es-
pecially the suffering of the population under the repression of the Malian 
Armed Forces. 
There is one notable exception to following Kel Adagh narrative lines. Kel 
Adagh informants, both those who lived through Alfellaga and those who parti-
cipated in the 1990 rebellion, stress the unprepared nature of the first rebellion, 
its lack of organisation, and its lack of a clearly formulated goal. This is in stark 
contrast with my main archive sources on Alfellaga; the RAC messages from 
the Malian Armed Forces and the interrogation reports of various captured 
fighters found in the Cercle of Kidal Archives. From this information it seems 
the rebels were prepared and organised to a much larger extent than they are 
now perceived to have been, and that they knew their goal: Independence, 
reached through an armed conflict with the support of Algeria and, if possible, 
France. The rebels hoped that by starting their armed uprising these two powers 
would come to their aid as they had promised to do in the previous years. At 
least the principal rebel leader Zeyd ag Attaher thought that these two countries 
had promised support, which was not the case. I realise that one of these two 
sources, the interrogation reports, is problematic as it is unclear under what 
circumstance exactly these statements were made. It is well known that Captain 
Diby Sillas Diarra, who led most interrogations, used torture in some cases. I 
nevertheless believe that the content of the information the rebels gave on their 
organisation and their tactics and armament are sufficiently accurate to be used. 
Using such material is questionable, but I know that the Kel Adagh themselves 
want the story of Alfellaga to be known and there are few sources to know it 
through. 
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part presents a history of Alla 
ag Albachir, a notorious rebel-bandit in colonial times, which in Kel Adagh 
historical discourse serves to outline both their reasons for resistance and to 
present Alfellaga as but one important chapter in a continuing story of revolt. In 
this section I will introduce the all-important Tamasheq notion of egha, re-
venge. It is crucial to understand the importance of honour and revenge in 
 ALFELLAGA 155 
Tamasheq society in order to understand the discursive continuity in Tamasheq 
revolt underlying continued military resistance against the state. The second 
part deals with preparations for revolt, the goal and strategy of the rebels, and 
support from inside and outside Tamasheq society. This part is generally down-
played in Kel Adagh accounts. The third part deals with combat itself. I will 
here focus on Tamasheq masculine ethics of warfare and its code of conduct, 
which structured and regulated the actions of the rebels. They will be contrasted 
with the acts of the Malian regular armed forces in the fourth part, which deals 
with army repression and retaliation on Kel Adagh civilians. This, although not 
often narrated in detail, is seen as the most important aspect of the revolt. To 
most Kel Adagh, it was not the fighting between rebels and army but the heavy 
army retaliation on civilians that matters in Alfellaga. In the fifth part I will 
come back to the question of how memories of Alfellaga are given meaning in a 
continuing story of resistance and struggle for independence, linking it to the 
second rebellion dealt with in Chapter 6. 
A continuum of resistance 
‘Old leatherpants’, the great chief 
When he approached the wells of Indjezal 
Even the tishghen and idhan trees would move aside 
The donkeys would balk, the cows would bellow 
From Tidjim to Adrar, the wardrums would sound 
The above is a translation of part of a poem from the 1950s in honour of 
Intidgagen: ‘Old leatherpants’, a nickname for Alla ag Albachir. The poem was 
set to music and recorded by the al-guitara band Terakaft from Kidal on their 
2008 CD Akh Issudar.2 When I was discussing the 1963 revolt with Kel 
Tamasheq there seemed to be an almost natural connection between Alla ag Al-
bachir and his men, who defied the French authorities in colonial times, and his 
son Elledi ag Alla, the instigator and one of the main leaders of Alfellaga. This 
connection is not coincidental. It is made with the explicit aim to create a 
continuous line of Kel Adagh resistance against foreign rule from colonial times 
to al-Jebha in the 1990s, via Alfellaga. 
Alla ag Albachir was a member of one of the Adagh’s leading clans or 
tewsiten: The Irayaken. According to Kel Adagh history, the Irayaken had once 
headed the Ifoghas, the tewsit leading all of the Kel Adagh, of which they are a 
subgroup. Alla ag Albachir refused to obey any power, both that of the French 
and that of amenokal Attaher ag Illi. Instead, he lived as an outlaw with a 
                                                 
2  “Intidgagen”. Composed by the Kel Adagh poet Magdi in the 1950s. Available on 
Terakaft, 2008. Akh Issudar. World Village, B001EC23S0. 
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number of his relatives, defying French rule and regularly clashing with the 
forces of order. Alla’s activities as outlaw and his widespread popularity as a 
local hero among the Kel Adagh during his lifetime made him a stain on the 
prestige and honour of the French administration and their capacity to maintain 
la paix française. Therefore they wanted Alla’s head. The goumiers finally 
caught him in July 1954. According to Tamasheq history, Alla was decapitated 
after his elimination, and his head was exposed in Boughessa to convince the 
Kel Adagh of his death.3 Alla's story is known in all of the Adagh and beyond. 
Kel Adagh warrior qualities and their resistance against foreign rule in post-
colonial times are well established through Alfellaga. However, for colonial 
times, Kel Adagh history has to compete with stories of resistance against the 
French from other federations. The Kel Adagh had always been faithful allies of 
the French. They had even helped the French to defeat the Ouillimiden uprising 
in 1916. But, as former rebel Amegha ag Sherif put it: ‘Ever since the French 
colonisation there were people who rebelled, like Alla ag Albachir and the 
others of his group who have resisted France’.4 Amegha clearly underlines the 
political meaning of Alla and his men in the Adagh. They were not simple 
bandits but resistance fighters, the direct predecessors to Alfellaga and al-Jebha. 
According to Amegha, the French never had full control over the Kel Adagh, 
since there always were people who resisted power with violence. This tradition 
of resistance was passed down to Alla’s son Elledi who started Alfellaga by 
avenging his father’s death. 
Alla ag Albachir was killed by decapitation after a chase, when Elledi was about 
seven years old. Years later he was at a well with his herd, milking his animals, 
when a group of soldiers passed. It was a kind of law that when you were at a well 
and soldiers passed, you immediately had to fill their containers for them. Elledi said 
he was busy milking his camel and that he would fill their containers after. One of 
the soldiers said that he knew who he was and if he didn't do it right away they 
would do the same to him as they had done to his father. That is how Elledi knew 
who had killed his father. He wanted to revenge his father’s death. He wanted to kill 
his assassins, both the Tamasheq – because there were Tamasheq among the killers 
                                                 
3  French reports do not explicitly mentions Alla’s beheading for obvious reasons, but 
the administration did want to make Alla’s death quite clear to the Kel Adagh:  
‘I have sent away a patrol of one group with Zuber to try to bring Alla’s corpse to 
Bouressa for the civil population of the region to see it and I have announced that 
the members of the band who are still in the Tidjem Mountains and its surroundings 
should turn themselves in with their arms in the shortest possible term’. Affaires 
politiques, Soudan, service publique police, maintien de l’ordre, incidents 1948-
1955, Affaire Alla ag Elbacher. ANSOM – 1affpol/2197/14. 
4  Interview with Amegha ag Sherif. Brussels, October 1994. 
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– and the others. He wanted to kill them all without exceptions. This revenge was 
what the revolt of Kidal was.5 
The story of continuity of resistance against external rule and the struggle for 
independence is presented in the most binding grid of Tamasheq historical 
production: Genealogical continuity. First Alla ag Albachir led resistance 
against France, then his son Elledi led resistance against Mali. By connecting 
the events surrounding Alla to the events surrounding Elledi, present-day Ta-
masheq historical discourse overcomes an artificial mark in time – independ-
ence – which is blurred in a non-stop presence of outside forces to fight against. 
Elledi’s father Alla ag Albachir had been – in Eric Hobsbawm’s terms – a social 
bandit who refused to obey French colonial and Tamasheq power. 6 But in Kel 
Adagh political historical narrative, his actions serve to redefine Kel Adagh 
history under colonial rule from one of compliance with, to one of resistance 
against foreign rule. Although Elledi ag Alla’s goal had only been to avenge his 
father, he soon became the rebellion’s most prestigious leader. Tamasheq his-
torical discourse now explicitly interprets his avenging action as a political act. 
The event that triggered the rebellion is seen as a continuation of resistance 
against foreign domination. The story of Elledi avenging his father introduces 
an element linking the various periods of resistance: Revenge, a shorthand 
translation of the more complicated Tamasheq concept of egha. The importance 
of egha as a discursive continuum of resistance cannot be overestimated. I will 
discuss egha at great length in Chapter 6 in connection to the organisation of the 
rebellion of the 1990s, but a few preliminary remarks should be made here. 
Egha is closely connected to two other important concepts in Tamasheq society; 
eshik, honour, and takaraket, shame. Egha is a debt one contracts against those 
who have stained one’s honour, and who have thus caused one shame. Both the 
damaged honour and subsequent shame, and the contracted egha can be either 
individual or on the collective level of the clan (tewsit). It is important to note 
that honour can only be stained by those perceived to be on an equal footing 
with those whose honour is stained: The free and noble. Until the attack on 
one’s honour is countered, the contracted debt of egha remains open. It can only 
be repaid in violence. In this light we can see the history of Alla ag Albachir 
and his son Elledi gaining importance. Alla, in a sense, can be seen as repaying 
the Kel Adagh honour debt of colonial subjugation towards the French. The 
violation of his body damaged Alla’s honour and through him that of his whole 
tewsit, the Irayaken, or even that of all the Kel Adagh. The goumiers who were 
involved in Alla’s killing then proceeded to insult Elledi by referring to his 
father’s decapitation, implying they had the same fate in store for Elledi him-
                                                 
5  Conversation with S. Paris, 09/01/1996. 
6  Hobsbawm, E.J. 1959. 
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self. Elledi could do nothing else than to repay this double egha debt: The 
shame brought upon him; and that brought upon his father. After his arrest in 
1964, when asked for his motives for rebellion Elledi answered:  
I became a rebel to avenge my father, killed by the French administration, and to 
personally avenge myself for what the security agents of the Malian security post at 
Boughessa kept repeating at me: that if I did not stay quiet I would be slain like my 
father had been. (...) I have but my personal motives cited above.7 
Alfellaga 
In the previous chapter I have tried to show that the Kel Adagh in particular did 
not want to be part of Mali. After independence came about, all they wanted 
was their independence from Mali and they were ready to fight for it. In 
October 1963, a mission of US-RDA officials and tribal chiefs was sent to 
negotiate with the rebels. They met at the wells of In Tamake. After the mem-
bers of the mission had explained the grave error in revolting against the Malian 
state, the rebels replied. 
We fight for our independence. We don’t want any of this Mali. The leaders have no 
patience. They throw us in prison for no reason. There are heavy taxes and exag-
gerated customs duties. We are beaten and chained in front of our women and 
children. There is also the marriage act, which does not conform to Muslim custom. 
We are against Mali because all its institutions are anti-religious and against us. We 
want our independence, that is all we look for, but we cannot stay with Mali. We are 
against all the principles of the Party and the Government.8 
If the rebels conveyed this message as it is presented here, it surpasses a 
mere wish for independence from Mali. As I argued in Chapter 3, the Kel 
Adagh knew more about Mali and its new regime than what is generally 
thought. The first two years of independence had given the Kel Adagh a first 
glance at what might be expected from the new state. The taxes and customs 
duties would hinder them in their cattle export to Algeria, which was the main 
lifeline of the Adagh. The newly instated marriage law, put into effect in 
February 1962, was apparently known and disapproved of as being anti-Islamic, 
or at least against local customs. It is unlikely that the ifulagen knew all about 
‘all the principles of the Party and the Government’, but they had had a glimpse 
of it, and it had been enough to confirm the pre-existing ideas the Kel Adagh 
had of the new regime. That pre-existing stereotypes played their part as well 
becomes crystal clear from the way the reasons for the rebellion are summed up 
by captured rebel Amouksou ag Azandeher. 
                                                 
7  Interrogatoire du prisonnier rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le Capitaine Diby Sillas Diarra, 
Commandant d’armes et du Cercle de Kidal, 13/03/1964. ACK.  
8  Dicko, Procès verbal de compte rendu de mission. n.d. (+/- 30/10/1963). ACK. 
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The reasons are numerous, but the main ones are: 
1º  We, nomads of the white race, can neither conceive nor accept to be com-
manded by blacks whom we always had as servants and slaves. 
2º  We Ifoghas, do not accept or conceive of the equality between races and men 
Mali wants to impose on us, starting with taking our imghad and bellah away 
from us. 
3º  We gain nothing from Malian independence, but heavy taxes and customs 
duties to pay. 
4º  The Malian Government thinks it is superior to our Chief Zeyd and does not 
listen to him. 
5º  The Malian gendarmerie mistreats us irrespective of whether they are wrong or 
right’.9 
The source in question is problematic, as it is a report of interrogation. It is 
not unlikely that torture was involved. According to Michel Vallet, a former 
French colonial officer still serving in Southern Algeria during Alfellaga, com-
mander Diby Sillas Diarra had been trained in torture in the French colonial 
army while serving in Indo-China.10 The statements made might very well re-
flect what his interrogators wanted to believe and hear. Part of the statement 
given by Amouksou might be a very loose interpretation of his words by Cap-
tain Diby Sillas Diarra. I must now bring into play the paranoid double bound 
of stereotypical thinking and its analysis. Diby Sillas Diarra saw the Kel 
Tamasheq as intoxicated by neo-colonial racism.11 Hence, in his analysis the 
rebellion must spring from racism toward the Southern populations, whether 
this was the case or not. The point that one indeed encounters racist discourse 
among the Kel Tamasheq makes this analysis more difficult. Does the statement 
of Amouksou ag Azandeher contain a statement on the racially inspired motives 
of the rebellion because Diby Sillas Diarra read that into his words, or because 
he effectively made this statement, and if he did, was it because he knew that 
Diby Sillas Diarra wanted to hear this, or because he really meant it? Never-
theless a few observations can be drawn from Amouksou’s statement. The 
rebellion seemed not so much directed in favour of but rather against some-
thing: Malian rule. As former rebel Bibi ag Ghassi later analysed his actions: 
                                                 
9  Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de 
Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK. 
10  Personal communication by Michel Vallet. Paris 18/06/1994. 
11  In an interview he gave to the magazine Le Mali, Diarra stated that the neo-colonial 
enemies of Mali had ‘preached themes of intoxication according to which (…) The 
black man, normally the “slave” of the “Targui”, cannot become his master espe-
cially since the histories of the two races are totally different’. ‘Interview accordée à 
la revue “Le Mali” par le Commandant Diby Sillas, Commandant de Cercle de 
Kidal’. Le Mali, 02/02/1966. 
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We had no ideological concepts that come with a revolution. We were essentially 
motivated to save our identity and by the wish to reconquer the independence the 
French had given to us, and which the Malians had confiscated to their own bene-
fit.12 
But what did independence mean? The question arises whether we should 
see Alfellaga as an expression of Tamasheq nationalism. The answer to this 
question depends on whether or not one is prepared to see nationalism dis-
connected from the state. Without a doubt, the ifulagen wanted independence 
for the Kel Tamasheq nation. But their concept of independence was framed in 
visions on leadership, political order and the structure of society as they had 
come to know it through French colonial rule and the pre-colonial histories of 
their society. Only the reasoning of political science and, for want of a better 
term, ‘Western’ political concepts explicitly link ‘nation’ to ‘state’. The exact 
contents of these concepts were then still largely alien to most Kel Tamasheq. 
From a military point of view the armed uprising of a few dozen lightly 
armed men against a few thousand soldiers equipped with tanks, airplanes and 
heavy artillery could have amounted to suicide if it wasn’t for the advantages 
the rebels had in their knowledge of the terrain and their partisan-style tactics 
(infra). But the tactical advantages of the rebels could never make up for their 
simple lack of men and means. A rebel military victory was out of the question. 
What then, was the strategic goal of the armed rebellion? First of all, by waging 
war on the Malian state, the rebels manifested their discontent with the regime 
towards that regime and towards the population. Undoubtedly, the rebels hoped 
for support from other Kel Tamasheq groups, both in Mali and perhaps in 
Niger, as had been the case during the massive Kel Tamasheq revolts against 
the French colonial forces in 1916. But it seems that the rebels mainly hoped 
that Algeria and France would come to their help. This becomes clear from the 
statements of Amouksou ag Azandeher on the ways the rebels hoped to win 
their cause: 
XIII  In what time schedule have you planned to win from Mali? 
R  There is no time limit, but we intend to fight to the day of our victory or to the 
day we are convinced that we have lost the cause. 
XIV  Are you not convinced that Mali is much stronger than you are? 
R  We are convinced of this as long as you have more arms than we have, but we 
nevertheless believe that we can win one day. 
XV  On who do you count to reach that goal? What do you expect exactly from 
outside support? 
R  We count first and foremost on Algerian support, but also on France. As for 
Algeria, its territory is our greatest support. We also expect arms from Algeria, 
                                                 
12  Interview by Sidi Mohamed ag Zimrou with Bibi ag Ghassi, n.d. n.p. Courtesy of 
Georg Klute. 
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as we do from the French. But we also expect Algeria to arbitrate between us 
and Mali when the moment comes.13 
The underlying strategy of the armed rebellion was not based on expecta-
tions of a military victory, but on a possible military or diplomatic victory of 
Algeria and France on their behalf once the fight and cause of the Kel Adagh 
had become known to the outside world. Fighting a well-equipped army with so 
few men and material only served the purpose of fighting itself, in the hope of 
outside reinforcement. Some hoped France would return to rule their country. 
The OCRS and what it might have stood for was not forgotten. By starting their 
armed conflict the rebels hoped for French intervention on their behalf, which 
of course never materialised. Others opted for inclusion of the Adagh in Alge-
ria, as had already been suggested in the last years of French rule by amenokal 
Attaher ag Illi. The trips his son Zeyd made to Algeria in 1961, and again in 
1963, to muster Algerian support should be seen in this light as well. This 
support never materialised either. The outside world remained unknowing of 
the Kel Adagh struggle or kept its knowledge hidden. Of course, the rebels had 
gravely misjudged the workings of international politics. Zeyd ag Attaher’s 
diplomatic skills and political experience did not surpass the regional setting of 
Northern Mali and Southern Algeria through the few contacts he had had with 
the Algerian FLN and French administrative personnel. From a Kel Tamasheq 
perspective, where personal contacts in politics are of the highest importance, 
his judgment of the situation and his chances on support might have been over-
optimistic and extremely naïve, but not altogether incomprehensible. But in the 
world of international politics, his expectations made no sense at all. Algerian-
Malian relations were characterised by the closest of friendships. France was 
still contemplating its defeat in the Algerian liberation war and could hardly be 
asked to risk its nuclear test bases, their last and very important interests in 
Southern Algeria, in favour of its old but now useless ally. Therefore, the rebels 
stayed alone in their fight for an ill conceived but heart felt independence. 
 
Men and material 
As we have seen in previous chapters, some men had fiercely resisted the in-
corporation of the Kel Tamasheq in Mali since the 1950s. Some of these men 
actively prepared for revolt between 1961 and 1963. The deposed amenokal 
Zeyd ag Attaher had gathered a group of men who shared his idea that the 
Tamasheq country in general and the Adagh in particular should not form part 
of Mali. Zeyd was in close contact with Amegha ag Sherif, one of the very few 
Kel Adagh who had attended French schools. His education completed, Ame-
                                                 
13  Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de 
Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK.  
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gha engaged himself in the struggle for Tamasheq independence, which made 
him suspect of subversive activity. He was arrested and released shortly after 
independence in 1960. He then went to Algeria where he found a job at the 
French nuclear base at Takormiasse in 1962.14 He managed to bring in other Kel 
Adagh employees at the base. In return, the employed Kel Adagh gave part of 
their wages to Amegha, which he used to buy weapons in Tamanrasset for the 
future revolt.15 Zeyd’s group was not limited to the Kel Adagh. They kept 
contact with Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar who encouraged and supported 
Zeyd’s plans. In Zeyd’s following were also Younes and Ilyas ag Ayyouba, the 
sons of the very wealthy Ayyouba ag Mohamed Adargajouj, the chief of the 
Daoussahak, a tribe living in the Tamesna plains south-east of the Adagh. With 
their help and money Zeyd bought about thirty rifles in the Tamanrasset area 
from a Frenchman working there.16 The rifles were hidden until the start of the 
revolt. Former goumier Sidi Alamine ag Cheick and his brother Issouf ag 
Cheick were at the head of a second group. In January 1963 Issouf broke into an 
arms depot in Timbuktu and took some guns, ammunition and battle fatigues 
destined for the future uprising.17 With this material the two brothers fled to 
Algeria where they joined Amegha and Zeyd’s group at the French nuclear base 
at Takormiasse.18 In January 1963 this group of men decided to start an armed 
revolt, although no date was set. A second reunion was held in the Adagh at 
Tidjim in June 1963.19 Elledi ag Alla, who had by then declared his intentions 
of vengeance to the goumier Ahiyaya ag Ouarzeza described at the start of this 
chapter, knew about Zeyd’s presence at Tidjim and joined him there. After he 
had explained his action to those assembled it was decided that this was a good 
moment to start the rebellion. 
                                                 
14  The French nuclear test base in the Algerian Hoggar Mountains, generally referred 
to as Reggane, was in fact multi sited, spread between three localities: Reggane, In 
Ekker and Takormiasse. The first ground surface nuclear test explosion took place 
on February 13th, 1960, with two more following in April and December that year. 
The local population was assembled in places on a distance of about 12 Km, equip-
ped with radiation dosimeters and guarded by French army personnel. Many feared 
for their lives as the explosion had been explained to them as “similar to the end of 
the world”. Rozier, J. 2007. Later tests at the base were subterranean. The base re-
mained functional until 1964. 
15  Interview with Amegha ag Sherif. Bamako, 10/02/1998. 
16  Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de 
Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK. 
17  Chef d’Arrondissement d’Aguelhoc à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 14/01/1963. ACK. 
18  Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de 
Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK. 
19  Ibid. 
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The initial group of about ten men around Zeyd ag Attaher grew rapidly. 
Still, the number of ifulagen was never high. From all data at my disposal I 
could calculate that at most 250 men were involved during the rebellion. How-
ever, the number of ifulagen at any precise point during the rebellion must have 
been lower. These men lacked sufficient material to fight the Malian forces. 
Mounted on camels in their flowing indigo robes and armed mostly with out-
dated rifles they are easily depicted as a hopeless band of warriors of old. How-
ever, this picture is besides the truth. Many of the warriors were not dressed in 
flowing indigo robes, but in green battle dress. Why would the ifulagen spend 
their resources on obtaining these outfits? An explanation could be that wearing 
battle dress exemplified the movement’s concern to present themselves as a 
liberation army. To most Kel Tamasheq, dress is a highly valorised means of 
expression. Dress should reflect presumed (or desired) status. If the Kel Adagh 
fighters wanted to present themselves as the rightful army of Tamasheq inde-
pendence, they had to dress accordingly. In keeping with this idea they adopted 
a new dress code for combat. Another explanation for wearing French battle 
dress might be that it served to make the Malian army think the country was 
being invaded by French troops, or that at least French troops were supporting 
the Kel Adagh. Whether this was their intention or not, not surprisingly the 
Malian officers were quick to believe the French were indeed involved. 
I have been informed that these fellagas are directed by French units including 
Clauzel, Jean, and a certain Bretodeau, who formerly served in Timbuktu, Gao and 
Ménaka, and who was responsible for Muslim affairs in colonial times.20 
Camels were the only available means of transport all fighters could use. 
However, they are also highly effective in the Adagh. Part of the Adagh surface 
is covered with boulder formations or by small but sharply broken stones. These 
terrains can be crossed by camels, but not by cars. The Malian motorised forces 
were only effective in open terrain and wadis. As for arms, they were easily and 
cheaply obtained in Algeria where a lively smuggling of light arms existed ever 
since World War II.21 In the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s the most obtainable 
firearms were ‘Mausers’ and ‘Bouceta’s’ (a local name for Manlicher-Carcano), 
German and Italian repeating rifles of WWII stocks, and French MAS-36 rifles. 
By acquiring these cheap and known arms, more men could be armed than if 
more expensive and harder to handle modern rifles were bought. Nevertheless, 
the ifulagen were equipped with some more advanced weapons. Mohamed Ali 
ag Attaher Insar had managed to ship a small amount of material from Morocco 
                                                 
20  Chef d’Arrondissement d’Aguelhoc à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 20/8/1963. ACK. 
21  Rapports des tournées Kidal 1944. ANM 1E-24 / 1944. 
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to the rebels in Algeria, consisting of thirty battle dresses, and five Egyptian 
automatic rifles with ammunition.22 
 
Support and defiance 
The official Algerian and French support the rebels hoped for never materi-
alised, but they did receive some support from these two countries. Algerian 
support was unofficial and given on the initiative of local Algerian commanders 
who lacked the means to halt rebel incursion in Algeria anyway. The ifulagen 
were therefore allowed to dwell in Algeria and sometimes had their wounded 
treated in Algerian infirmaries. The rebels were allowed to stay at the French 
nuclear base at Takormiasse where they had pitched a tent to store their sup-
plies. They received marginal help from the French employees at the base who 
sold or gave them ammunition, medication, battle gear and a few privately own-
ed arms. The French doctor present at the base treated some of the wounded.23 
But it seems that most material had to be bought on the local markets, 
especially arms. Evidence of official French or Algerian support is lacking.  
As for internal support, the reaction of the Kel Adagh was not unanimously 
in favour of revolt. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the death of 
amenokal Attaher ag Illi had caused a split within the Ifoghas tribe over his 
succession, which was linked to the pretenders’ view on Mali. Although Zeyd’s 
supporters seem to have been in the majority, a number of Ifoghas supported 
Intalla. Since Attaher ag Illi had been the amenokal of all the Kel Adagh, other 
tribes were involved in the dispute over his succession as well. The split among 
the Ifoghas on this issue continued throughout the revolt. 
There are two groups of Ifoghas: Those who are loyal to Zeyd, and those who are 
loyal to Intalla. To us, who are loyal to Zeyd, Intalla is reprehensible and we for-
mally condemn his position since he does not follow us. We regret that our tribe is 
divided into two equal groups between Zeyd and Intalla. In fact, we have seen that 
all the Ifoghas fractions of the south and west follow Intalla while those of the north 
and east follow Zeyd.24 
Intalla was not the only tribal chief loyal to the Malian Government. The 
tribal chiefs were employed to make contact with the rebels and to persuade 
them to surrender. In October 1963 Intalla, in the company of Bissaada ag 
Khakad, chief of the Idnan; Hamzata ag Alkassoum, chief of the Kel Telabit; 
and Baye ag Atikbel, chief of the Telguetrat, were sent on such a mission. Kola 
                                                 
22  Interrogatoire du prisonnier rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le Capitaine Diby Sillas Diarra, 
Commandant d’armes et du Cercle de Kidal, 13/03/1964. ACK. 
23  Déclaration de Kaza ag Larlar. Kidal, 08/02/1964. ACK; and interview with Ame-
gha ag Sherif. Brussels, October 1994. 
24  Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de 
Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK. 
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ag Saghid, chief of the Irayakan, performed similar missions. The actions of 
these men should be seen in the light of their double bound position as inter-
mediaries between state and society. It is not at all said that they approved of 
the actions of either side. Both the rebellion and the repressive counter actions 
of the army went against their interest, which was peaceful continuation of 
existence under their intermediary rule. The violence also stirred their feelings 
as men and Kel Adagh. Many of the rebels were their close relatives, as were 
the victims of repression. The ifulagen highly mistrusted the chiefs. After all, 
they were servants of the Malian Government. One of the first victims of the 
rebellion on the ‘Malian’ side was Enawnaw, the chief of the Irreguenaten, who 
was shot by Elledi ag Alla for collaborating with the Malian Armed Forces. The 
same double bind as Kel Tamasheq and servants of the administration goes for 
the goumiers who were deployed against the ifulagen, and thus forced to shoot 
at their own kin. But the Malian Armed Forces also mistrusted both the chiefs 
and the goumiers. They were thus under double threat when they contacted or 
fought rebels, even if this was by order of the Malian officers.25  
The ifulagen took material from the Malian army whenever they could. But 
as the revolt continued also they took more and more camels from the Kel 
Adagh themselves. The principal victims of these raids on livestock were gou-
miers and tribal chiefs. With the continuation of the revolt however, other 
people suffered losses in animals by rebel raids as well. Many Kel Adagh 
contributed means to the rebellion in the form of food, animals or cloth. Not 
necessarily because they were in favour of the rebellion, but also to avoid being 
raided by the rebels. Of course, genuine voluntary contributions were also 
made. The rebels’ actions towards the population will not have enhanced their 
popularity. As former rebel Bibi ag Ghassi put it: ‘The rest of the population 
had sided with the authorities and considered us a bunch of thieves’.26 A raid on 
civilian camel herds led by Elledi ag Alla in February 1964 failed since its 
owners collectively managed to chase the ifulagen away.27 Although many 
joined the rebels in Algeria or in Mali because of the army repression, one 
cannot uphold that this was always done with enthusiasm. Many were simply 
left with no choice. 
Another issue is the lack of support for the revolt outside the Adagh. Pierre 
Boilley has explained why the revolt was limited to within the Adagh from a 
                                                 
25  Le Sous-Lieutenant Mohamed ag Mohamed Elhadi, Commandant du GNIG de Tar-
kimt à chef d’escadron Commandant la Gendarmerie Nationale du Mali à Bamako. 
10/02/64. ACK. 
26  Interview held by Sidi Mohamed ag Zimrou with Bibi ag Ghassi. n.p. n.d. Courtesy 
of Georg Klute. 
27  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de mars 1964. ACK. 
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geographical and historical perspective.28 The position of the Adagh near the 
Algerian border permitted the ifulagen to retreat into Algeria after attacks. 
However, relations between Mali and Niger were far less fraternal than between 
Mali and Algeria, and fighters could well have retreated there too. The moun-
tainous landscape of the Adagh gives a second explanation. The ridges and 
boulders in the Adagh made pursuit of the ifulagen by the motorised army units 
difficult. In the more flat and sandy area of the Azawad, this advantage was 
lost. But neither explanation accounts for the lack of other Kel Tamasheq war-
riors coming to the Adagh to join the rebellion in the Adagh itself. Boilley 
explains the lack of participation by other groups as a result of their memory of 
military defeat in the period of colonial conquest. Indeed, this explanation is 
still given today by the Ouillimiden for remaining aside in both post-colonial 
revolts. However, some Kel Tamasheq from outside the Adagh had joined the 
ifulagen. Younes and Ilyas ag Ayyouba were Daoussahak, a group which had 
never been part of the Kel Adagh. One of the main political leaders was Mo-
hamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, the former amenokal of the Kel Intessar. Some of 
his men did most likely join the ifulagen in Algeria. Besides these leaders a 
number of others had joined the ifulagen from the Bourem, Ansongo and 
Ménaka Cercles.29 We cannot estimate the total number of people from outside 
the Adagh who participated in the revolt but they were most likely a minority 
within the movement. Nevertheless, they were there. 
 
Organisation 
The ifulagen were organised into several units ranging in size between twenty 
and thirty men under shifting leadership. Often only half the unit consisted of 
fighters. The other members – unarmed and in civilian dress – served as scouts 
who contacted people for information on army movements. As the rebellion 
progressed, new groups of men rallied collectively under the leadership of one 
of their own and operated as a new unit. Sometimes units merged to direct a 
general attack on an army post or column. The ifulagen divided the Adagh into 
three zones of operation from north to south but this was not taken too strictly. 
Around thirty men were active in each zone. The first zone consisted of the 
Timetrine, a plain west of the actual Adagh Mountains. Operations in this zone 
were generally led by the brothers Sidi Alamine and Issouf ag Cheick. The 
second zone went from Mount Tigharghar and Mount Doriet to Boughessa, and 
                                                 
28  Boilley, P. 1999: 346-348. 
29  Questions posées par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de 
Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher. Kidal, 04/10/1963. ACK. Participation 
of men of the Ishidenharen tribe from the Ménaka area was emphatically stressed 
during various conversations I had with members of that tribe. 
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southward to Kidal. Here, operations were led by Elledi ag Alla and Ikhlou 
Saloum. The third zone extended from Mount Ouzzein southwards, where ope-
rations were led by Azzezen ag Iksa and Mohamed ag Amane.30 The division 
into zones and units, and the assumed leadership in each zone is striking. It is 
logical that those who were most familiar with the area led units and that other 
unit members should be familiar with the terrain as well, but it seems unit 
composition was partly organised according to tribal affiliation. The area be-
tween Mount Tigharghar and Mount Doriet, Boughessa and Mount Ouzzein is 
where most Irayaken live. Elledi ag Alla and Ikhlou Saloum, both Irayaken, led 
operations during Alfellaga in this zone. Azzezen ag Iksa, a Telgetghat, led 
operations in the Ouzzein area, but he did so together with Mohamed ag Ama-
ne, an Arayak. The Timetrine is an area generally inhabited by the Idnan, the 
tribe to which Sidi Alamine and Issouf ag Cheick belonged. Their group was 
significantly smaller than the groups around Elledi ag Alla and Azzezen ag 
Iksa, fifteen men at most. 
Operations were planned at the rebel base in Algeria at Takormiasse. Most 
planned attacks consisted of raids on camel herds or fixed army posts. Units 
were selected, mounts, arms and ammunition were distributed, and routes to 
Mali and back were discussed. The road to take depended on information on the 
presence of Malian forces (to attack or to avoid) and the situation at the wells 
the ifulagen used to take in water. The units mostly travelled by night, spending 
the day in hiding while scouts gathered information. Ambushes on encountered 
army columns were decided upon on the spot. It was a general tactic to only 
attack small forces disadvantaged by the terrain. When a rebel was captured, the 
planned operation was cancelled in fear of the captured rebel disclosing the plan 
of attack. Operations in Mali were kept as short as possible, followed by retreat 
into Algeria where the rebels were safe from the Malian forces.31 
 
The Malian Armed Forces 
The basic unit of the Malian Armed Forces was the Compagnie de Commandos 
Autonomes (CCA).32 Each CCA consisted of one command section; four com-
mando units of about sixty men each; an artillery unit; about forty vehicles and 
five armoured cars. In all there existed ten CCA units, which formed the core of 
the Malian Armed Forces, complemented with a separate tank squadron, an air-
borne squadron, and several paramilitary organisations. The former colonial 
                                                 
30  Ibid. 
31  Interrogatoire du prisonnier rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le Capitaine Diby Sillas Diarra, 
Commandant d’armes et du Cercle de Kidal, 13/03/1964. ACK. 
32  This paragraph is entirely based on: Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publi-
ques du Mali au 1er mai 1964. CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. 
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military goum units of Timbuktu and the Adagh were transformed into the 
Groupes Nomade d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie (GNIG) of around fifty 
men. In May 1963, the 8th and 10th CCA were stationed in the Adagh, together 
with the GNIG14 under Lieutenant Mohamed ‘Zulbeyba’ ag Elhadi, around 650 
men in all. 
In the first months of the rebellion, only the GNIG14 and the local goum 
police forces were employed against the rebels.33 By August 1963, it was clear 
that the goum forces could not suppress the rebellion. Therefore, the 8th CCA 
was employed as well. Shortly after, the 10th CCA became active. Soon, forces 
employed in the Adagh were on the increase. By the end of September 1963, 
three units from the 1st CCA stationed at Segu were in the Adagh as well. Two 
new units were created especially for service in the Adagh: An artillery unit; 
and the Commando Saharien Motorisé (CSM), under the command of Captain 
Diby Sillas Diarra. The CSM consisted of about four hundred men. It had more 
vehicles at its disposal than the average CCA, and five armoured cars. In Oc-
tober 1963, the 2nd, 3rd and 6th CCA were sent up North as well. Two air-
planes were sent to Kidal to evacuate troops and wounded men to Gao. Thus, in 
October 1963, an average of 2,200 men, 35 armoured cars, 2 airplanes and an 
assorted number of heavy arms were fighting rebel forces numbering about 200 
men at most. By March 1964, the amount of troops and material deployed in the 
Adagh had dropped. The 1st, 3rd and 8th CCA were retreated, but the 2nd and 
6th CCA and the CSM were strongly reinforced with another twenty armoured 
 
 
Table 4.1 Number of Malian forces employed in the Adagh during Alfellaga 
Date Units Men Vehicles Combat  
    vehicles 
May 1963 CCA8 /CCA10 /GNIG14 650 80 10 
Sept. 1963 3 units CCA1 / CCA8 / 1,230 180 20 
 CCA10 / GNIG14 / CSM / 
 Artillery  
Oct. 1963 CCA1 / CCA2 / CCA3 /  2,200 300 35 
 CCA6 / CCA8 / CCA10 /    2 airplanes 
 GNIG14 / CSM /  
 Artillery unit  
March 1964 CCA2 / CCA6 / CCA10 /  1,500 160 40 
 GNIG14 / CSM / Tanks    1 airplane 
 batallion/ Artillery unit  
Source: Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 1964. CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. 
 
                                                 
33  Both the camel-mounted units of the Tirailleurs Sénégalais and the camel-mounted 
police forces recruited locally were known as goum. The military units were trans-
formed in the GNIG, the local police units remained known as goum. 
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cars from the Bamako based tank squadron. In all, army presence in the Adagh 
still amounted to about 1,500 men, 40 armoured cars and around 160 vehicles 
(trucks, jeeps, fuel trucks, et cetera). To keep men and material rolling 200,000 
litres of fuel and food for a 1,000 men for 3 months had to be shipped to Kidal. 
Raids, skirmishes and ambushes 
Despite the deployment of more than half of its effective strength, the Malian 
Armed Forces could not bring the rebellion to an end. First of all, cars were 
highly ineffective in large parts of the Adagh. Most of the Adagh consists of 
very rough terrain; sharp rocks and boulders and sudden steep climbs. The 
rough terrain demobilised the vehicles, which were under constant repair, and 
spare parts were lacking. Logistical problems in the transport of water for the 
troops and fuel for the vehicles further hampered the mobility and effectiveness 
of the Malian Armed Forces. The Adagh consists of a number of important 
mountain ranges separated by wadis and valleys. Most clashes between army 
and rebels took place in three of these mountains: Mount Tigharghar; Mount 
Doriet to the west of Mount Tigharghar; and Mount Ouzzein. This landscape is 
ideal for ambush tactics. It is especially advantageous when fighting motorised 
forces. The relatively flat and sandy wadis are the only suitable terrain for cars, 
which had great trouble on the stony surface of the mountains. The wadis are 
generally closed in by boulder formations, sand dunes, or low but steep moun-
tains. The Malian Armed Forces largest weapon was basically an armoured per-
sonnel carrier equipped with heavy machine guns, but with an open top. It was 
not difficult for the ifulagen to shoot at the soldiers inside from their high 
ground positions. 
The ifulagen did not suffer from the disadvantages of motorised vehicles. 
Their camels had far less difficulty with the stony surface of the Adagh. After 
an attack the camel-mounted ifulagen could easily retreat over the rocks into the 
mountains, where the heavy armoured cars, truck and jeeps were unable to 
follow them. Lack of water and fuel supplies did not hamper them in retreat in 
the way it hampered the Malian Armed Forces. Of course, this advantage was 
lost when the rebels had to fight the equally camel-mounted goum forces. In 
fact, the only unit the rebels feared was the GNIG14; the goum unit, mounted 
on camels and armed with the same MAS-36 rifles the ifulagen used, and 
headed by a Kel Tamasheq officer. The attacks of the ifulagen against the 
Malian forces were therefore mostly directed against the camel herds of the 
goum forces to deprive them of their means of combat and pursuit. In August 
1963, a group of about fifty ifulagen under Sidi Alamine ag Cheick and Ikhlou 
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Saloum raided the goum camels at Boughessa, capturing 25 animals.34 A second 
and third raid at the goum herds of Kidal led by Sidi Alamine and near Ti-n-
Zaouaten led by Elledi ag Alla were just as successful.35 As well as raiding the 
goum herds, the rebels ambushed army patrols. The rebel ambushes did not take 
the form of hit-and-run actions.36 Rather, series of protracted skirmishes, re-
treats and pursuits took place. Between 17 and 19 September 1963 a prolonged 
skirmish took place around the wells at Arli and Djourmel in the Wadi Ouzzein, 
at the edge of Mount Ouzzein. The rebels managed to cause serious damage to 
the army. Ten wounded soldiers had to be evacuated by airplane to Gao. A 
second skirmish took place at Arli at the end of September; when the Malian 
forces counted three wounded. But the most important result of this encounter 
was the defection of nineteen goumiers to the rebel side, taking their mounts, 
personal arms and a heavy machine gun (which they knew how to operate) with 
them. On 11 October 1963 a fight took place at the west side of Mount Tighar-
ghar. The rebels were pursued and retreated to Mount Doriet where the cycle of 
skirmishes and retreats was continued until the pursuing Malian units had to 
give up for lack of water. In November 1963 a similar skirmish took place at the 
Wadi Taghlit, which is surrounded by mountains on two sides. Here, the ifu-
lagen managed to destroy an armoured car. One soldier was killed and five 
more were wounded. 
Rebel attacks intensified at the start of 1964. On 18 January 1964, a group of 
ifulagen attacked the village of Tessalit. They were guided by Najim ag Sidi, a 
goumier who had served at the Tessalit post. Since the army had accused him of 
being a rebel accomplice, he had defected and joined the rebels. The raid was 
very successful. Attacking at night, the rebels managed to break into the 
Tessalit arsenal, taking with them fifty arms, twenty of which were modern 
Czech rifles. With this new equipment a total of about eighty ifulagen, divided 
into five units were active in the Adagh throughout that month. On 29 January 
1964 this group staged a well-prepared ambush at the Tin Tedjnouten Pass, 
which is now seen as the rebels’ finest moment. The fight ended with the death 
of the commanding officer of the army unit involved, Lieutenant Konimba. 
About fifty rebels took part. Mohamed wan Daghada recounts that day. 
We arrived late in the afternoon. Our chiefs, Sidi Alamine and Magdi, called us and 
Sidi Alamine told us, El Khader and me, that he thought we had better wait in the 
canyon and dig a ditch. He explained that if we dug a hole and covered it up as a 
trap, any vehicle falling into it would overturn. Once this was done, we should wait 
                                                 
34  Chef d’Arrondissement d’Aguelhoc à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 20/08/1963. ACK. 
35  Interrogatoire du prisonnier rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le capitaine Diby Sillas Diarra, 
Commandant d’armes et du Cercle de Kidal, 13/04/1964. ACK. 
36  Based on; Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 
1964. CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. 
 ALFELLAGA 171 
attentively, and in the event of an alert we should retreat in different groups behind 
the hills. (...) If there were many vehicles we should let the first one pass since the 
men looked like the ground [were hidden] and the enemy could not suspect 
anything. Magdi, who died in this ambush (and who is the father of Bachir who you 
probably know), called us, El Khader, Aghmadou and myself, to ask us to go to the 
opposite hill to dig trenches. That’s all. We went to the hill where we stayed until 
the morning. (...) We spent the night there and during afternoon prayers, Atiyoub 
served as Imam. After prayers, someone ventured it was Atiyoub who withheld the 
vehicles from arriving. Everyone asked Atiyoub to do something to make the 
vehicles come. Atiyoub stood up from where he was praying, turned to the group 
and said to them: “Is that all you want”? He wore a burnous, which he started to flap 
around. Immediately someone said he heard the sound of a motor. The opinions on 
this were divided until everyone saw a dust cloud. We directly dispersed and when 
the vehicles arrived some of us were on the hills and others were in the canyons. The 
first vehicles that arrived were a Zil [truck] transporting soldiers, a Land Rover and 
a tank. The vehicles followed each other, the Land Rover first, the tank after it and 
the Zil brought up the rear. El Khader and me, we hid behind the rocks. We 
immediately opened fire and the tank, which was hit, had turned around. (...) When 
the tank was hit and turned around, many of us said to ourselves that it was returning 
to Kidal while really it had retreated to join the Zil that was following it. It took a 
good number of soldiers from the Zil on board while the rest had to march towards 
our positions. Like a cow from which one tries to take away its calf, the furious tank 
attacked us. The sustained fire of our fighters seemed to have no effect. The tank 
fired until it killed two of our men. We were greatly upset by this loss. I stood up to 
observe the tank at close hand and Inkatouf signalled to me that I should hide from 
the tank’s fire. Looking from above, I saw the heads of the soldiers lined up like 
melons inside the tank, which was not closed. As the tank was open, its occupants 
were well visible. I aimed my rifle and I took two down. One of the tank soldiers 
immediately shouted to his chief and the tank withdrew and stayed immobile until 
the evening. (...) I had a Mauser of quality that day.37 
Mohamed wan Daghada’s account exemplifies some Tamasheq concepts on 
war and masculinity: Ruse; patience; trust in God; and bravery in the fight. He 
explains with great detail how the ifulagen set up a well-prepared trap for the 
Malian army. The trenches are not explained as a means of protection, but as a 
way to lure the army into advance without suspicion. Then they sat in wait for 
the army. When it arrived, the fighters had to withhold fire until the first vehicle 
had passed. Before the fight, after normal prayers, the men invoked God’s help 
in the fight to come. In fact, they longed for combat and invoked divine as-
sistance to make the enemy appear. At that moment, the army arrived and was 
subsequently defeated. In this way, Mohamed shows that trust in God will be 
rewarded. Combat is engaged and at this point ruse is abandoned for bravery. 
Mohamed gets up from his trench, despite heavy enemy fire and the warnings 
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of his comrade, and thus manages to kill two enemies. His contempt for his own 
possible death helped him in killing the enemy forces. These four concepts are 
most important when actual combat is engaged. However, in how to wage war 
and on whom, other concepts and rules are involved. 
Aqqa, or the rules of conflict 
Like everywhere else, warfare is controlled and regulated in Tamasheq society. 
The regulating principles however, are of a different nature than in most Euro-
pean approaches. Warfare is not about territorial conquest, but about people, 
material and honour, with the latter forming the main classifying principle. A 
first form of warfare is aqqa, which Hélène Claudot-Hawad translates as a 
‘countering movement’ or ‘counter attack’.38 Aqqa is a raid intended to avenge 
an attack on the honour of the group sustained by one or more of its members. It 
is thus the way in which egha is acted out. But aqqa is regulated through rather 
strict rules, the breaking of which does not lead to repaying egha, but in further 
staining one’s honour itself. Only those who are on equal footing can stain 
honour and can therefore be subject to an aqqa counter attack. This excludes 
women, children, slaves and craftsmen. Religious groups should also be ex-
cluded from an aqqa attack. The principal goal of an aqqa attack is not to kill 
the enemy, but rather to capture its herds, and possibly its slaves (which could 
be captured but not killed, and who were often released for ransom afterwards). 
The raid is most successful if the attackers can capture their bounty without a 
fight, but if combat is engaged, then only the enemy’s able-bodied warriors 
should be involved. Civilians (women, children, religious personae and crafts-
men) should be left unharmed. A second form of warfare is called tewet. More 
or less the same rules as in aqqa are applied with two main differences: An 
aqqa attack should be announced to the adversary while a tewet attack does not 
have to be; and the main aim of a tewet attack is not to restore or gain honour, 
but simply to acquire booty. A third form of warfare is akafal, which has been 
described as ‘barbarism against barbarism’ by both Claudot-Hawad and 
Berge.39 While aqqa and tewet attacks are only carried out against people seen 
as on an equal footing with the attackers, and are bound to certain rules and 
goals, akafal is war against outsiders who are not seen as on equal footing. In 
akafal there are no rules, honour is not at stake, only defence and booty. 
The ifulagen tried to apply concepts of honourable conduct in warfare. Non-
combatants should not be harmed in the fighting itself, and a minimum of civil 
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behaviour and warrior conduct was still expected from the Malian forces, as 
becomes clear from the following account by Mohamed wan Daghada. 
Interviewer: You, who have experienced the conflict of 1963, does the present one 
remind you of it? Are things better at present in your opinion? 
Mohamedd wan Daghada: They are two different wars that do not resemble each 
other at all. The first conflict, which was ours, was played out in broad daylight. (...) 
As soon as they brought me the news [of a skirmish near a camp], we took to the 
road, at night, and we travelled all night to arrive. In the early morning we were 
joined by other groups; Elledi’s, Azzezen’s, and Didari wan Ibelouten’s group. I told 
the group that the soldiers were very close to the camps and in those conditions we 
could not attack them. The others replied they agreed and that we should warn the 
soldiers. I went to look for two women, Badaweise and her little sister Tichya – the 
mother of this young man – whom I asked to go and warn the soldiers. I told the 
women to go and tell them there was a group of men with bad intentions and that 
they should leave. Badaweise went to see them and she called aside a goumier of the 
Idnan tribe who is called Mohamed wan Kharam Kharam, to whom she said: 
“Today, I have seen a group of men who do not belong to you and who are scary”. 
The goumier asked her who they were and the women replied that it was a large 
group from which she knew no one and which prepared for attack. The goumier 
asked: “What are we going to do (...) Should we run away”? The women replied that 
no, they should not flee. While Mohamed – the father of this young man – and 
myself took positions, surrounding the enemy, one of ours, Ikhlou Saloum opened 
fire and the fight started immediately. The firing had alerted the people in the camp 
who fled. Combat went on until the destruction of one of the vehicles of the enemy. 
They had wounded men too, which forced them to fight in retreat.40 
Mohamed wan Daghada makes clear that his war does not resemble the 
second rebellion at all. His war was fought in broad daylight, in open combat 
(apparently in contrast to the behaviour of the new generation of fighters), and 
after announcement. He makes clear that he and his fellow ifulagen made sure 
no civilians fell victim in the fight if they could help it. They would not fight 
the Malian army in the vicinity of camps. Thus, he first went to the camp to 
warn the inhabitants, and then had a message sent to the Malians soldiers to 
invite them for combat elsewhere. This message was passed through the inter-
mediary of a woman to whom, the ifulagen trusted, no harm would be done. 
Only then the ifulagen engaged in combat, leaving time for the civilians to bring 
themselves to safety. In the first months of the conflict, the main aims of attack 
also followed the rules of aqqa and tewet. The ifulagen primarily raided the 
camel herds of the goum units of Kidal and the GNIG14, probably without 
announcement and with the aim to loot, which made them tewet attacks. A first 
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successful raid was held around Boughessa.41 A second raid was held at Farar, 
near Kidal, where the ifulagen captured forty camels of the Kidal goum.42 Many 
more raids would follow. The raids had a tactical value. Not only did they pro-
vide means for the ifulagen themselves – well-trained mounts for their fighters 
and livestock to be exchanged for weapons – it also deprived their adversaries 
of their means of warfare. But the raids on the goum’s camels also adhered to 
the rules of aqqa; they were intended to restore honour. The sole objective 
Elledi ag Alla had with his attack on Ahiyaya ag Ouarzeza that started the 
revolt, was to restore the honour of his family. He wanted to erase his honour 
debt with the goumiers, who had dishonoured his father. Other ifulagen too had 
their honour at stake in the events around Alla ag Albachir. Rebel leader Ikhlou 
Saloum had been part of Alla’s band for a while before becoming a goumier 
himself. Since the goumiers were able-bodied warriors par excellence, and on 
an equal footing with the ifulagen as free men, they were legitimate targets for 
aqqa. Hence, the raids on their animals were also in revenge for the stained 
honour of Elledi and Ikhlou Saloum (and many others) in the mutilation of Alla 
ag Albachir’s body by the goumiers. Individual goumiers were raided for their 
own animals as well. Still, the values of honourable warfare were upheld. In 
November 1963, a group of ifulagen attacked the camp of a certain Akly, who 
lodged the goumier Sidarmor ould Mini. At first, the ifulagen wanted to kill 
Sidarmor, but after the intervention of Akly and his wife, they spared his life 
and only took his arms, clothes (in humiliation) and camels. The leader of the 
group then told Sidarmor: 
We wanted to make you suffer the same ordeals to which our people are victim. We 
will not give you back this gun, which would be employed against us. You say you 
want peace. We don’t want it. (...) We have no fear. Day and night we will be 
everywhere. We have no need to hide ourselves and don’t you think we will not 
come back. Even if you go to the river we will follow you there.43 
The language used is one of masculine honour and bravery. The ifulagen 
insist that they fight in the open and will continue doing so. Instead of killing 
the adversary, his life is spared in request of his host (and not heading this re-
quest would damage honour as the safety of the guest is the honour of the host), 
and he is left in humiliation to get the message across. The ifulagen invite the 
goum to battle in the open. They have no reason to hide and will find their 
adversaries wherever they go. The fight is between equals, who are dealt with 
as such. Until August 1963, only the goum and the GNIG14 pursued the rebels. 
Thus, only attacks on valid adversaries were made. However, by August 1963 it 
                                                 
41  Chef d’Arrondissement d’Aguelhoc à Cdt. Cercle Kidal, 20/08/1963. ACK. 
42  Boilley, P. 1999: 326. 
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was clear to the Malian Government that the goum and the GNIG14 alone could 
not end the rebellion. Therefore the CCA's of the Malian Armed Forces were 
sent in. All parties involved until that moment, the ifulagen, the goumiers and 
the Kel Adagh in general were quick to learn that the new adversary would not 
fight by the rules. Women and religious persons were arrested or killed, and so 
were men who had not participated in combat. Wells were poisoned and cattle 
were killed. It therefore comes as no surprise that many goumiers deserted the 
Malian forces to join the ifulagen. One of the first to do so was Azzezen ag 
Iksa. Having first fought against the ifulagen, he would become one of their 
main military leaders and the last to surrender his arms.44 At the end of 
September 1963, after (or during) a battle between the rebels and the army at 
the well of Arli, in the Wadi Ouzzein, a group of nineteen goumiers defected to 
the rebels.45 The methods applied by the Malian Armed Forces went against 
their ethics as warriors and their feelings of belonging to the Kel Adagh. After 
all, the people under attack were ‘their people’ and the people who attacked 
them were not. Moreover, the Malian Armed Forces attacked the wrong people, 
the civilians, instead of the warriors. That the Southern Malian officers had no 
high opinion of their effectiveness will not have helped to sustain their loyalty 
either, in contrast with the ifulagen who knew with whom they were dealing. 
Concepts of egha and subsequent aqqa counter attacks do not exclude feelings 
of respect or tribal affiliation. 
With the change in tactics by the Malian forces, the tactics of the ifulagen 
altered similarly. The camel herds of the goum forces were no longer the sole 
focus of their raids. The tribal chiefs who assisted the regime to talk the rebels 
into surrender were raided as well. Above all, even the herds of the civilian 
population in and outside the Adagh were now targeted. The indignation of the 
fighters about the atrocities of the army on one hand and their own plundering 
on the other hand seem to be in striking contradiction. But by that stage the 
Malian forces had clearly abandoned the code of conduct of civilised warfare as 
it was known in the Adagh. The concept of aqqa was no longer valid. The 
rebels’ later attacks on all and sundry are akafal: Barbarism against barbarism.46 
On one hand, akafal means war against non-Kel Tamasheq, which this clearly 
was. In these wars, honour was not at stake and could therefore not be damaged 
by one’s own actions. Therefore, no pardon or rule was necessary. On the other 
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hand, akafal is the lawlessness imposed by barbarism. In a war were the 
adversary is not Kel Tamasheq, who does not know the internal martial code of 
conduct and behaves accordingly brutally, one has no other option than to react 
similarly in order to survive.  
Repression and retaliation 
After operations in Mali, the ifulagen retreated into Algeria. There they were 
relatively safe from the pursuing Malian Armed Forces. This changed con-
siderably when the Malian forces obtained the right to pursue the rebels, or 
whoever was perceived as such, on Algerian territory. When and how exactly is 
still not clear, but between November 1963 and February 1964 Mali and Al-
geria concluded an agreement according the Malian Armed Forces the right to 
pursue the rebels in Algeria as far as necessary.47 The Malian right of pursuit in 
Algeria proved to be dramatic. First of all, it made clear to the rebels that their 
strategy – starting the conflict in the hope that Algeria would come to their aid – 
would not work out. Second, the main tactic of the rebels – retreat into safety 
behind the Algerian border – was now seriously undermined. On 15 February 
1964, a group of ifulagen engaged the Malian Armed Forces at Mount Tikiane 
in Algeria.48 The rebels retreated further into Algeria, leaving five of their men 
dead and one captured. In a second skirmish at Agedem, just across the Alge-
rian border, the rebels left three of their most valuable fighters in combat and 
two captured.49 Third, not only the rebels suffered under the Malian incursions. 
The Kel Adagh who had fled to Algeria to escape the violence were also con-
fronted with the pursuing Malian forces who considered the refugees as rebel 
accomplices. In November 1963, more than 400 cows and 250 camels were 
massacred together with their herdsmen at the wells of In Ouzzel, a few hun-
dred kilometres into Algeria.50 
 
The forbidden zone 
Whether in Algeria or in Mali, the ifulagen were hard to track down. The 
Malian Armed Forces therefore quickly resorted to retaliation on the Kel Adagh 
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civilians, whom they viewed as accomplices and potential rebels. On 27 Sep-
tember 1963, the army decided to try to cut the rebels off from their support by 
declaring the Adagh north to Kidal a forbidden zone (zone interdite). This 
meant that all of the Adagh was forbidden territory for its inhabitants since 
Kidal is situated at the southernmost limit of the Adagh. Anyone found in the 
area was considered a rebel and could be shot on sight. But evacuating all the 
Kel Adagh to the utmost south of the Adagh was unfeasible. In January 1964, 
the policy was probably reformulated. The population was now to be concen-
trated in so-called regrouping zones (zones de regroupement) south and west of 
Kidal and around administrative posts and army bases at Aguelhoc, Telabit, 
Boughessa and Tessalit. The rest of the Adagh remained a ‘forbidden zone’.51 It 
is not clear how and to what extent the population was informed on these poli-
cies. We have to keep in mind that communication with a nomadic population is 
difficult, despite the existence of population concentrations in the best inhabit-
able parts of the Adagh: The wadis, which were accessible to army vehicles. In 
December 1963, a campaign was organised to inform the population on 
(...) the social policy of our Party and at the same time their proper interests. In 
general, the nomadic populations, following the psychological political work of our 
troops and the call to the rebels by our head of State, divide themselves between two 
opposing groups, in opinion as well as on the ground. The first group, and by far the 
most numerous, underwent the dynamic actions of our officers who are in charge of 
their political education, whereas the second group, situated in Algeria, has re-
mained under the influence of the propaganda of the rebels, to whom they are, ex-
plicitly or not, accomplices.52 
Thus, part of the population knew about the new measures. But knowing 
about them and being able to comply with them are two different matters. The 
concentration of the population would cause tremendous difficulties in the 
allocation of sufficient water and pastures to support the herds in such small 
areas as those designated by the army. Thus, those Kel Adagh who knew about 
the ‘forbidden zone’ were faced with the choice between complying – and 
watching their herds perish within the regrouping zones – or risking their lives 
and those of their livestock by staying where they were. 
Question – Why did you flee from the soldiers when you saw them? They had to 
shoot your mounts to arrest you. 
                                                 
51  Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 1964. 
CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. The idea that this policy was slightly altered in January 
1964 is based on: Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle du mois de février 1964. ACK, 
which speaks of a zône de regroupement to the south and west of Kidal. 
52  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de décembre 1963. 
ACK. 
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Reply – We fled from the soldiers because at the last Party meeting at Tessalit (...) 
we had been warned that the sector is forbidden, that all those who go to that zone 
will be killed. So, when we crossed the soldiers in that sector, we tried to flee from 
the soldiers to head back to Tessalit, but unfortunately our camels were shot and we 
were arrested by the soldiers’.53 
A third and most popular option was to escape to Algeria. The ifulagen too 
knew about the ‘forbidden zone’ tactics and responded by trying to escort as 
many people as they could out of the Adagh on their way to Algeria. Thus, in 
December 1963, around 400 families and their herds fled to Algeria to escape 
persecution.54 Many more would follow. By the end of the conflict, an esti-
mated 5,000 of a total population of no more than 20,000 Kel Adagh had in-
stalled themselves in Southern Algeria with no intention of returning to Mali. 
By then, most of those who had preferred to return to Mali had already done so. 
The army responded to the exodus by pursuing and killing those on their way to 
Algeria (or even those already in Algeria), or by evacuating even more people 
to its zones of control. In January 1964, the population of the area around 
Tarkimt, almost on the banks of the Niger and the base camp of the GNIG14, 
was evacuated to the south on rumours that they planned to flee to Algeria.55 
For those Kel Adagh who remained in the ‘forbidden zone’, life must have 
been hell. The army systematically poisoned wells throughout the Adagh since 
the rebels depended on wells to provision themselves, but so did the local 
population. The army just as systematically shot herds and herdsmen to keep 
them out of rebel hands. For those in the regrouping zones, life was not much 
better. Women and children were not deliberately executed, although many died 
of poisoned water. Instead, they were taken to villages in the regrouping zones 
such as Kidal, Tessalit and Boughessa where they were put to work.  
I was lucky, because the army did not kill women at the time, tss tss, no no. They 
only put them in prison, to make bricks and all that. Building things. But they didn’t 
kill women and children. Only men. There were many people who died, eh!?56 
This sounds more innocent than it was for at least some of these women. As 
pointed out earlier, in Tamasheq concepts of work, class and gender, noble 
women should not carry out manual labour, and concepts of female beauty in-
                                                 
53  Rapport d’interrogation, Arrondissement de Tessalit, Cercle de Kidal, 08/02/1964. 
ACK. 
54  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de décembre 1963. 
ACK. 
55  Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 1964. 
CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. 
56  Interview with Takhnouna. Bamako, 08/02/1998. 
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clude extreme obesity brought about by fattening from early adolescence.57 
Many Kel Adagh tried to live up to these noble values with devastating effects 
for the women involved when forced to perform hard physical labour. Even for 
those women who were accustomed to work within the Tamasheq household 
economy, fabricating clay bricks was a totally alien occupation that struck them 
as utterly humiliating. Not unsurprisingly, many women had to endure physical 
and sexual harassment by their guards. Some were forced into marriage or 
concubinage since their husbands or male relatives were (presumed) rebels, 
prisoners, or dead. 
I have the honour to send to you Atakora Oueled Sikema, originating from your 
Arrondissement, for the following reasons: (...) In fact, the concerned is at present 
under the threat of the knife of one of the co-wives of the gendarme Mallet Keïta 
who insists on marrying her despite her irregular situation. It is most important to 
consider that the presence of this woman in Tessalit is harmful to Mister Mallet 
Keïta’s family and risks producing grave consequences in the future, since the man 
adamantly insists on making her live in his house without entering into a legal mar-
riage contract.58 
The forced marriages were unbearable in many ways. First of all, some of 
these women were already married or engaged, but with their husbands and 
male relatives away or dead, they had no choice but to accept their situation. I 
once heard a story about the Kel Adagh wife of a former officer who served in 
the Adagh during Alfellaga. Her husband imposed his marriage proposal by 
killing most of her male relatives in front of her eyes. Whether this story is true 
or apocryphal is beside the point here. The existence of these stories informs us 
on what Kel Adagh think has happened and on their opinion on the Malian 
Armed Forces’ lack of civilisation in warfare and the taking of booty. Apo-
cryphal or not, it is certainly true that many Malian soldiers and officers who 
served in the Adagh married Kel Adagh women, especially of free descent and 
of pale complexion, whom they regarded as prestigious prizes to take home to 
the South. In the 1970s and 1980s, marrying a career soldier serving in the 
North became an exit strategy out of misery for many Kel Tamasheq women, 
causing much disturbance among Tamasheq men who regarded these marriages 
as a further cause of collective social shame. Second, in Kel Adagh society, as 
in all Tamasheq societies, monogamy is the norm. To these Kel Adagh women, 
their status as co-wife must have been equivalent to being a concubine, a po-
sition previously only held by women of slave origins. Her new role as wife to a 
non-Tamasheq also brought her tasks she was unaccustomed to performing: 
                                                 
57  So far this important aspect of Tamasheq and Bidân culture has generated only one 
serious study. Popenoe, R. 2004. 
58  Chef d’Arrondissement de Tessalit à Chef d’Arrondissement d’Aguelhoc, 25/02/ 
1965. ACK. 
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pounding grain, fetching firewood, and sweeping the compound. Sometimes the 
(non)marital situation even grew dangerous as the above quote shows. Impri-
soning women had the effect the authorities desired. Many families returned 
from their exile in Algeria to plead for the liberation of their womenfolk.59 
 
The arrest of the leaders 
If the Malian right of pursuit on Algerian territory had not made it clear to the 
rebels that their strategy to start the fight in the hope for external support had 
failed, the fate of Zeyd ag Attaher’s mission to Algeria to explicitly demand 
Algerian support would certainly have done so. In the autumn of 1963, Zeyd ag 
Attaher decided to contact the Algerian Government to remind it of what he 
perceived as its promise, made during his visit in 1961 to the Hoggar, to support 
his cause.60 He travelled to Tamanrasset, where he asked to meet the Governor. 
During the meeting Zeyd requested to speak to the Algerian President, Ahmed 
Ben Bella, and to be provided with transport to Algiers. The request was 
granted, but Malian diplomacy had been ahead of Zeyd. On 28 September 1963 
the Malian Chief of Staff, Abdoulaye Soumaré, had visited Algiers to speak 
with the authorities about the uprising.61 Soumaré managed to convince the 
Algerian authorities of the necessity of arresting Zeyd or other rebels when they 
presented themselves. At their arrival in Colomb-Béchar, Zeyd and his com-
panion Ilyas ag Ayyouba were arrested. The car in which they travelled turned 
around and drove them to Tessalit. There, they were put on an airplane to Kidal 
where they arrived on 1 November.62 
In the same period, the ground was laid for the arrest of Mohamed Ali ag 
Attaher Insar who had lived in exile in Morocco since the 1950s. Again, inter-
national relations worked against the rebels. In October 1963, Morocco was at 
war with Algeria over the border area around Tindouf. The area was Algerian 
territory, but Morocco claimed it on historical grounds as al-Maghreb al-Aksâ, 
Greater Morocco. The conflict was resolved with the help of Modibo Keita, 
whose diplomatic skills and international prestige made him a valid interme-
                                                 
59  Le Sous-Lieutenant Mohamed ag Mohamed Elhadi, Commandant du GNIG de 
Tarkimt, au chef d’escadron Commandant la Gendarmerie Nationale du Mali à 
Bamako. Objet: Compte rendu sur une tournée du 14 au 21 Avril 1964. ACK. 
60  The following is based on three interviews with Amegha ag Sherif, Brussels, Octo-
ber 1994; Bamako 08/02/1998; and Bamako, 10/02/1998. For a similar account, 
based on the reminiscence of the same witness, see Boilley, P. 1999: 318. 
61  Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 1964. 
CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. 
62  Boilley (1999), 338. 15 November is given as the date of Zeyd’s arrest in Algeria in 
Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 1964. 
CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c. 
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diary. In return for his help, Morocco arrested and expelled Mohamed Ali ag 
Attaher Insar in March 1964.63 
After the expulsion and arrest of Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, another 
more major blow was struck to the ifulagen: The capture of Elledi ag Alla by 
Malian forces on 9 March 1964 at Intachara, Algeria. Elledi was perhaps not the 
most important military leader, but as the son of a famous rebel against France 
and the instigator of the conflict, his prestige and renown was greater than that 
of any other combatant. After his arrest and severe torture, Elledi was given the 
option between collaboration and direct execution. He chose the former. Thus, 
the Malian army was able to make further arrests within the network of rebels in 
Mali. 
 
Psychological warfare 
The arrested leaders were used in a campaign to demoralise both the supportive 
population and the remaining fighters. Zeyd ag Attaher and Ilyas ag Ayyouba 
were paraded through Kidal and the Adagh in a campaign of public humiliation. 
As is visible in Photo 4.1, Zeyd’s veil was draped around his neck as a shawl. 
Ilyas ag Ayyouba does not wear a veil at all. In those times, nothing was more 
humiliating and dishonourable for a man than to show his face in public. If 
Zeyd had had to walk the streets with his pants around his ankles the effect 
would not have been greater. But Zeyd was not simply unveiled. In the ela-
borate language of honour that men express through their veil, draping it as a 
shawl expresses utter defeat and distress.64 The same fate was bestowed upon 
Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar. His picture was taken while he was unveiled 
and shown in the Adagh and elsewhere.65 Thus the Malian forces wanted to 
make sure the message came through, and it did. 
And what did Mali do? This is what the Tuareg have never been able to digest. They 
undressed them, Zeyd and Mohamed Ali, and they exposed them throughout Tama-
sheq country as if to say: “Here are the men you counted on”. They did this in 
Goundam, they did this in Timbuktu, in all of the country. The soldiers spat on 
them, they undressed them (...) undressed them. This is what the Tuareg could never 
digest. They were the most respected among men. Doing something like that is like 
killing someone’s soul.66 
                                                 
63  The date of Mohamed Ali’s expulsion is based on: Interrogatoire du prisonnier 
rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le Capitaine Diby Sillas Diarra, Commandant d’armes et du 
Cercle de Kidal, 13/04/1964. ACK. The explanation that his arrest and expulsion to 
Mali are linked to Modibo Keita’s intervention in the Moroccan–Algerian conflict is 
common in the Adagh and elsewhere in the Tamasheq world. 
64  Claudot-Hawad, H. 1993d. 
65  Ibid.: 32. 
66  Interview with Amegha ag Sherif. Brussels, October 1994. 
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Photo 4.1 
Captured rebel leaders Zeyd ag Attaher (middle), Ilyas ag Ayyouba (right) and 
Mohammed Ali ag Attaher Insar’s messenger Mohammed Ali (left), are paraded in 
victory through Kidal. 
[Source: Archives du Cercle de Kidal. Courtesy of the Archives Nationales du Mali.] 
 
 
 
Photo 4.2 
Mohammed Ali ag Attaher Insar shortly after his extradition from Morocco in 1964. 
[Source: Archives du Cercle de Kidal. Courtesy of the Archives Nationales du Mali.] 
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To those who could not witness the public exposure of the leaders, the army 
wrote a note, which was dropped by airplane over the Adagh. 
 
 
LAST WARNING TO THE REBELS 
 
1º/ YOU ARE CUT OFF FROM YOUR FAMILIES 
YOU ARE CUT OFF FROM YOUR PEOPLE   
YOU ARE CUT OFF FROM YOUR LEADERS 
YOU ARE CUT OFF FROM THE WHOLE WORLD 
 
2º/ ALGERIA PURSUES YOU AND ARRESTS YOU AT ITS BORDERS TO HAND 
YOU OVER TO MALI 
 
3º/ YOU STILL HAVE A LAST CHANCE - THAT IS TO SURRENDER 
YOURSELVES WITH YOUR ARMS AT THE NEAREST MILITARY 
POST WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS 
 
MISSING THIS LAST CHANCE THAT MALI OFFERS YOU WILL MEAN: 
 
NAPALM BOMBS 
CANONS 
MACHINE GUNS DESTROYING YOU IN ONE DAY 
 
4º/ ZEID AG ATTAHER AND HIS MAIN COLLABORATORS HAVE BEEN IN 
OUR HANDS SINCE 10 DAYS AGO 
 
450 REBELS WERE ARRESTED BY ALGERIA AND HANDED OVER TO MALI 
 
LONG LIVE MALI 
   LONG LIVE THE MALIAN ARMY!67 
 
 
The message could not have had a large impact, as almost none of the Kel 
Adagh could read French. But other means where employed as well to convince 
the population and the rebels of the hopelessness of their struggle. The army 
had a mobile cinema, which toured the regrouping zone in May 1964. The 
movie showed Modibo Keita and the Algerian President Ben Bella embracing 
each other as proof of Malian-Algerian solidarity.68 Again, much probably 
needed to be explained, as the Kel Adagh knew the image of neither man. 
 
 
                                                 
67  Flyer found in ACK. 
68  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de mai 1964. ACK. 
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Diby’s oven 
Worst of all the means employed in this ‘psychological war’, were the totally 
random executions of both the population and leading personae in the Adagh. 
Opposite the commander’s office in Kidal, on the other side of the wadi, is a 
low rocky ridge. Within the ridge is a sand-filled recess, which some refer to as 
‘Diby’s oven’ after the Commanding officer of the Cercle of Kidal, Diby Sillas 
Diarra. A pit was dug in this recess, which was filled with blazing embers. 
Executions took place at the edge of this pit, after which the body was thrown in 
and covered with sand. Meat and bread are cooked in the same way in the 
Sahara, something that cannot escape the attention of those who know this 
story. To those who understand Bamanakan, the pun on this form of execution, 
and the man who invented it, is as apparent as it is macabre. In Bamanakan, 
‘dibi’ means grilled meat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4.3 
Captain Diby Sillas Diarra 
[Source: Le Mali, 02/02/1966. Courtesy of the Archives Nationales du Mali.] 
 
 
On 16 February 1964, the army executed the venerated marabout Sidi Mo-
hamed Embakoua ag Oumayyata who had studied with cheick Baye al-Kounti, 
the most important Kounta cheick in Northern Mali in the first quarter of the 
20th century.69 In the 1940s it was Embakoua who had replaced the descendants 
of cheick Baye as the spiritual leader of the Ifoghas. His execution struck the 
Adagh with terror, as was intended. Commandant de Cercle Diarra was of the 
opinion that ‘the spectacular sanctions applied against the agents of subversion 
would have the merit of discouraging duplicity and complicity in all their 
forms’.70 On 25 March 1964, Sidi Haïballa ould Abidine, a venerated Kounta 
                                                 
69  Cercle de Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de février 1964. ACK. 
70  Ibid. 
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cheick, and one of the most influential religious leaders in the Adagh, was 
arrested and interrogated. He was accused of having made charms for the 
ifulagen to protect them from bullets, which he denied having done. No proof 
was found against Sidi Haïballa or his son Sidi Mohamed. Of the latter it was 
even noted that ‘despite the accusations against him, the concerned has always 
informed us [of the whereabouts of the ifulagen] in the western sector’.71 
Nevertheless, according to Diarra, Sidi Haïballa had done nothing to prevent the 
rebellion and had not used his influence to stop the rebels in their actions. Thus 
he was guilty by compliance and a rebel himself. The public execution of Sidi 
Haïballa and his son Sidi Mohamed caused tremendous grief. That year, the 
Kounta in the Adagh and elsewhere, in mourning for his death, did not celebrate 
‘aid al-’adhâ’, the most important celebration in Islam. Chiefs who did not 
collaborate with the army were shot as well, like Ayyouba ag Mohamed Adar-
gajouj, chief of the Daoussahak, and the father of Younes and Ilyas ag Ay-
youba. Ayyouba, who lived in the Cercle of Ménaka, was arrested and sent to 
Kidal, where he was executed on the grounds that his sons were rebel leaders 
and that he himself had furnished camels to them. But not only local leaders 
were executed. In February 1964, the army discovered ‘intelligence networks’ 
in and around Kidal, Telabit and Aguelhoc amongst the population held in the 
regrouping zones. This was taken as a pretext for summary executions among 
the regrouped population.72 
The last months 
The arrest of the main leaders, the executions and the imprisonment of the 
population did provoke a drop in morale among the fighters.  
So, after what I’ve said before – the psychological work they had done by showing 
the chiefs Mohamed Ali and Zeyd through all the villages – many men abandoned 
their arms. They returned. Many returned to Algeria. There were few fighters left 
with sufficient means.73 
Within the ranks of the ifulagen, two options prevailed. One group supported 
abandoning the fight and seeking refuge in Algeria under the protection of 
either the French at their military bases, or under protection of the Algerian 
Government. The largest group however opted for returning to Mali and 
surrendering unconditionally to its authorities since they knew that those who 
                                                 
71  PV d’écoute concernant Sidi Mohamed ould Sidi Haïballa, 18/03/1964. ACK. 
72  Cercle Kidal, Revue mensuelle des évènements du mois de février 1964. ACK. 
73  Interview with Amegha ag Sherif. Brussels, October 1994. 
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had been taken prisoner had not been killed.74 Elledi, Zeyd and others were still 
alive. In May and June 1964, Intalla ag Attaher toured the Adagh west of 
Boughessa to persuade the ifulagen to surrender. Intalla’s efforts were intended 
to gain the confidence of the rebels he encountered, but some came to him to 
surrender on their own initiative. Those who did were disarmed and remained 
with Intalla to convince others to surrender as well. The tours were successful 
as a total of forty-eight men gave up the fight.75 The remaining fighters were 
mostly men of the first hour such as Sidi Alamine and Issouf ag Cheick, 
Azzezen ag Iksa and Ikhlou Saloum. Not all rebels gave up the fight imme-
diately, despite the hopelessness of their situation. In June 1964, the group 
around Sidi Alamine and Issouf ag Cheick was spotted in the Timetrine by the 
GNIG14.76 After a long, drawn out pursuit through the Timetrine, the group was 
finally tracked down. On 27 July, Sidi Alamine ag Cheick was killed on the 
run.77 His brother Issouf ag Cheick fled to Algeria with the rest of the sur-
vivors.78 With Sidi Alamine’s group out of action, rebel military activity came 
to a low point. 
On 15 August 1964, the Malian Government officially declared the rebellion 
vanquished in the national newspaper L’Essor. To the few readers of the paper, 
the news of the end of the rebellion was probably more shocking than the news 
of the rebellion in the first place. The announcement was the third article ever 
written in the Malian press on the revolt, and the first to call it a rebellion. 
Victory was celebrated in Kidal on 22 September 1964, on the third National 
Independence Day. The festivities were attended by Mali’s military top brass: 
the Secretary General at the Ministry of Defence Mamadou Diakité; the Gov-
ernor of the Région of Gao Bakary Diallo; and the commander of the Bataillon 
Sahélien de l’Est, Bokar Sada Diallo, next to all the officers in command of the 
administration and the army in the Kidal area. The goumiers and the various 
CCA units paraded through Kidal. Flowers were placed at the monument for the 
                                                 
74  Déclarations des deux rebelles rendus avec leurs armes le 10 juillet 1964 au Chef de 
Tribu Bissaada – I/Déclarations du nommé Salia ag Bakarine, fraction Imerade 
Intalla. ACK. 
75  Compte rendu de la mission d’Intalla au Commandant la C.S.M. n.d. (July 1964). 
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76  RAC message: Origine Commandant GNT télégramme officiel à Commandant 
BSE. Info Base GNT à Commandant le 10e CCA – Telabit; and RAC message: 
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77  RAC message: Lieutenant Cissoko télégramme officiel à Commandant de la C.S.M., 
29/7/64. ACK. 
78  RAC message: 28/7/64 FM Commandant la gendarmerie de Tarkimt télégramme 
officiel au Commandant de la C.S.M. ACK. 
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dead, followed by the ceremony of the flag, after which the regimental flag of 
the Bataillon Sahélien de l’Est was hoisted. A minute of silence was twice ob-
served in memory of ‘the valiant builders of the Malian nation who fell here in 
defence of national unity and integrity’.79 The forty captured rebels who were 
present were symbolically unshackled and pardoned for their acts. The message 
conveyed in this military symbolism was Malian victory, a victory over ‘a 
feudal society, convinced of the rule of the strongest, an anarchist society with-
out attachments and without sedentary spirit, a society relishing adventure, a 
society of hate and complexes, which the French administration had left to the 
Republic of Mali’.80 In his speech, the Secretary General of the Ministry of De-
fence Mamadou Diakité passed on a message from Modibo Keita who pardoned 
‘all those who, understanding their error, had laid down their arms. They may 
thus consider themselves to be free citizens in all respects in a Mali that makes 
no distinction among its children. But it is necessary that they remember, and I 
am sure everybody will remember’.81 Keita was absolutely right. 
Epilogue 
The fact that those Kel Adagh who lived through the events of 1963-1964 
would remember them vividly needs no explanation. An outsider with an in-
clination to dissect factual events from historical discourse could easily discard 
the connection made here in a way similar to ones disconnecting Gavrillo Prin-
cip’s assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand from the real causes of the 
First World War. But history does not work that way. Historical narratives are 
produced at a specific moment, under specific circumstances, in a specific cul-
tural context. When I conducted my research, Tamasheq society was recovering 
from the second rebellion, between 1990 and 1996. Years of renewed resistance 
against the state are part of the circumstances creating the link between resist-
ance in colonial times, Alfellaga, and the second rebellion. However, almost all 
of those who are likely to have witnessed the events were reluctant to speak 
about them. Some of them simply said they were not in the Adagh at the time, 
which could be true given both the massive retreat of the Kel Adagh into 
Algeria during those years and the Malian tactics of the regrouping zones. But 
other reasons for silence are more likely. Tamasheq speech is bound by honour. 
One should measure one’s words and preferably speak in a concealing language 
called tengelt. Emotions should be restrained to preserve dignity. All this is 
quite impossible when invited to tell a tale of horror. I must admit I had great 
                                                 
79  ‘Kidal a célébré la fête nationale avec un éclat particulier’, L’Essor Hebdomadaire, 
28/09/1964. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
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difficulties in pressing further when confronted with reluctance to revisit the 
events I was interested in. The fact that I was a stranger could also have played 
a large part in form and content of (non-)communication. However, those who 
had witnessed Alfellaga and wanted to speak about the subject invariably told 
me the story of Paul Ahmed Nardy ‘the Frenchman’. Nardy was actually of 
mixed Algerian and French origins. After independence, he stayed in Mali 
where he worked as administrator of the customs service in Gao. He was, right-
ly or not, accused by Commandant Diby Sillas Diarra of being the head of the 
resistance movement’s information network in Gao. Nardy was arrested in 
March 1964. 
(...) but he had nothing to do with the revolt, he was an innocent type. He was 
imprisoned together with my older sister who survived. They let him die of thirst. 
He asked someone to moisten the tip of his veil so he could have some water, but it 
was refused. When he died after three days there was a bright light on the spot were 
he was, like a lamp. Only it wasn’t a lamp, it was a miracle. That was because he 
was a good Muslim and a perfectly innocent man. He had nothing to do with the 
rebellion. They only killed him because he was French, and they thought he had 
spied for the rebels. He was a brave person.82 
Nardy’s story was not only told because of our presumedly shared French 
(European) origins. To those who told it, somehow, it was an outstanding 
example of the barbarisms of the Malian Armed Forces. As mentioned above, in 
the Tamasheq concept of honourable war – aqqa – certain social categories 
should be left unharmed: women; children; the free unprotected craftsmen; reli-
gious groups (ineslemen); and strangers. Nardy fitted the last two categories. He 
was a Frenchman who had converted to Islam, and he was apparently reputed 
for his piety. He was certainly not the only victim of the Malian Armed Forces 
who, according to the rules of aqqa, should have been left unharmed. The 
public execution of the Adagh’s men of religion still provokes resentment. 
The imprisonment of women and children in the towns and the labour they 
were forced to carry out constitutes another source of bitter recollection. In Kel 
Adagh memory, many of the arbitrary acts committed against the population 
and their chiefs after the rebellion are now placed within the context of the 
rebellion, or they are believed to have taken place in those days. The arrest and 
humiliation of Bissaada ag Khakad, Hamzata ag Sidi and Ebeug ag Elmouack 
in 1967, described in Chapter 3, is now remembered as having taken place 
during the rebellion as well. The whole Keita period is seen as not only one of 
great suffering, but also one of continued resistance and rebellion. It is as if 
Alfellaga did not take place between 1963 and 1964, but between 1960 and 
1968, from the coming of Mali to the coup d’état by Moussa Traoré. The im-
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portance of Alfellaga as a time of great suffering stretches even further and is 
connected to later catastrophes. Not without reason the poverty of the Adagh 
after the rebellion is blamed on the destruction of herds by the Malian Armed 
Forces. 
Before Alfellaga the Adagh was rich. There were no Tuareg beggars. There were 
many camels. There were people who had never tasted grain. They only lived on 
milk, dates and meat. Only after Alfellaga did they learn to eat rice. The soldiers 
brought rice, since there were no herds left. The women did not even know how to 
swallow this rice. They were not used to it. When the army found a herd [makes a 
shooting gesture] they gunned them down. They killed many animals, camels and 
goats.83 
The extermination of herds and the destruction of the environment, the 
poisoning of wells and the cutting down of trees by the Malian Armed Forces 
are even presented as direct causes for the drought of the 1970s. 
Before Alfellaga, the Adagh was green. All the wadis were covered in trees. The 
army cut them down and that brought the drought.84 
Not only those who lived the events remember Alfellaga. Poems and songs 
have been composed in remembrance by those who lived those times, but also 
by the ishumar, the young men and women preparing the rebellion of the 1990s. 
These songs and poems are known throughout the Tamasheq world. Poetry is 
the main vehicle of historical knowledge. One stanza in particular was recited to 
me in and outside the Adagh. It compares French and Malian rule. Even the 
men who epitomised the bad side of French presence – the goumiers – are now 
remembered with some fondness when compared to their Malian counterparts. 
The goumiers of old 
those of the French 
were beautiful 
With their white-haired camels 
How should the worth and wickedness 
of Sidi Ongoiba be judged? 
If not by the massacre 
If not by the silly hats85 
This particular stanza was recited to me twice in the Adagh and twice 
outside the Adagh by different people on different occasions. ‘Sidi’ Ongoiba 
served as Second Lieutenant in the Adagh during the rebellion, and afterwards 
as Chef d’Arrondissement at Boughessa and commander of the goum. The ‘silly 
hats’ refers to the caps worn by Malian soldiers, which are compared to the 
                                                 
83  Conversation with Takhnouna. Bamako, 08/02/1998. 
84  Conversation with Amegha ag Sherif. Bamako, 08/02/1998. 
85  Part of a poem by Akhmudan ag Meddi. 
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Tamasheq veil and turban, the eghewid that conveys honour and proper be-
haviour. Later generations and other groups not only know of the events 
through poems and songs. Some witnessed certain events as children; others 
heard stories about it from parents or relatives. 
Stories about Alfellaga have spread beyond the Adagh. Today they are rele-
vant knowledge of history for all the populations of Northern Mali. Alfellaga is 
seen as the origin of the second rebellion, which involved all Northern Mali. 
Thus, stories about Alfellaga have been incorporated in an explanatory narrative 
on the second rebellion. Those from outside the Adagh involved in the second 
rebellion will stress not only the continuity between the two revolts, but if 
possible even the participation of non-Kel Adagh in Alfellaga. Informants of the 
tewsit Ishidenharen residing in the Cercle of Ménaka insisted that at least 
fourteen of their men had joined Alfellaga. They could mention one by name: 
Bahoni, the father of Moussa ag Bahoni, one of the most important Ishiden-
haren leaders of the second rebellion. Albachir, a Daoussahak from the Ménaka 
area, explained that ‘If one told the scientific truth, one would give paternity of 
Alfellaga to the Daoussahak. In 1962, it was well and truly with Ilyas ag 
Ayyouba’s money that the rebellion took place with the Ifoghas in Kidal’.86 
That Younes ag Ayyouba and his brother, Ilyas, were most likely the only two 
Daoussahak involved in Alfellaga is less relevant to Albachir. Their involve-
ment justifies a claim to early resistance and participation in later events for his 
own group. Thus, even outside the Adagh, continuity between Alfellaga and the 
second rebellion is assured along the genealogical lines of tribe and fraction. 
Just how widespread stories about Alfellaga are becomes clear from a con-
versation I had in Ménaka with Almoustapha, a young Songhay man from Gao. 
Almoustapha knew I was a historian, and he asked me the reasons for the 
second rebellion. I answered I didn’t know and asked for his opinion. He gave 
me his personal opinion. 
Among other things, it has to do with taxes. In the French period taxes were levied 
arbitrarily. Those who could not pay their taxes were put in the sun from eight in the 
morning to nightfall, or they were beaten. With independence we thought these 
shameless practices would come to an end. Unfortunately there was the “famous”, 
or rather infamous leader of Kidal after independence, Diby Sillas Diarra. He caused 
a complete massacre. He killed many people in Kidal. Those who could not pay 
their taxes were instantly executed. (...) One day, Diby passed a merchant on the 
road. Diby drew his pistol to shoot him. Do you know why he wanted to shoot him? 
Because in walking by, the merchant had caused dust to fall on him. Only with the 
greatest effort could Diby’s following withhold him from killing the man. “Very 
                                                 
86  Interview with Albachir. Bamako, 24/01/1998. Ilyas and Younes ag Ayyouba had 
sold part of their father’s herds to finance the purchase of arms in Algeria before the 
start of the rebellion. 
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well, Diby said, I shall not kill him, but when I have drawn my pistol I cannot 
holster it without shooting. Bring me a donkey so I can fire the bullet meant for the 
merchant on that animal.”87 
Like the Kel Adagh, but with different arguments, Almoustapha draws an 
immediate parallel between French colonial rule, Malian rule in the Adagh 
under the Keita Regime, and the reasons for the second rebellion. The explicit 
line of reasoning is not only a good example of created continuity over time, but 
the story told is also a good example of a particular colonial genre. The reason 
why Commandant de Cercle Diby Sillas Diarra wanted to shoot the passing 
merchant echoes similar stories about the injustice and power of the Comman-
dants de Cercle under French colonial rule. Almoustapha thus invokes a parallel 
between colonial times and newly independent Mali. However, the beating of 
passers-by for lack of respect was uncommon in the Adagh, but not in Al-
moustaphas home, the Cercle of Gao. The way in which Almoustapha creates a 
parallel between colonial and Malian rule is an example of what Charlotte 
Linde has called ‘narrative induction’, which is ‘a process of being encouraged 
or required to hear, understand, and use someone else’s story as one’s own’.88 
This is brought about by what she calls ‘non-participant narrative’: ‘An oral 
story told to someone not present at the events narrated’.89 Almoustapha’s 
example shows that appropriated narratives will be transformed in ways to fit a 
historical experience closer to the narrator. Undoubtedly, he will have heard 
stories of wicked colonial officers from his own family. 
We see here how various non-participant narratives have been blended into a 
new whole with the aim of appropriating historical events and their significance 
for non-Kel Tamasheq: The outbreak of the second rebellion. The Kel Adagh, 
who see Malian rule as a continuation of colonial dominance, would not deny 
the parallel drawn by Almoustapha. In the coming chapters I will discuss the 
causes and effects of narrative induction on non-participants of Alfellaga at 
greater length. I will try to demonstrate how Alfellaga is linked to the rebellion 
of the 1990s in ways similar to those linking Alla ag Albachir to Alfellaga. 
Memories of the brutal repression of Alfellaga by the Malian Armed Forces 
described in this chapter are vital elements in explaining the preparations and 
outbreak of the second rebellion. In this historical link, the same explanatory 
elements are used: Individual action; genealogical continuity; and revenge.  
 
                                                 
87  Conversation with Almoustapha Maïga. Ménaka, 24/03/1999. 
88  Linde, C. 2000: 613. 
89  Ibid.: 609. 
 5 
Revolution: Teshumara and  
and Tanekra (1968-1990) 
This chapter describes the radical changes Tamasheq society went through be-
tween the late 1960s and the 1990s and their political translations. Of course, 
changes in Tamasheq life had occurred throughout the 20th century, but not on 
such a tremendous scale, and in such a short period, as the changes described 
here. The Keita Regime declared itself revolutionary and despite continuities 
with the colonial regime, in many ways it was. But the efficacy of that revo-
lution was limited. Despite the use of military force in the Adagh, the Keita 
Regime was not able to alter Tamasheq society significantly during its reign, 
although the successful introduction of western style education would leave a 
particular legacy. The men of the Tanekra, the group responsible for the organi-
sation of the rebellion of the 1990s, often refer to their work as al-Thawra, ‘the 
revolution’ in Arabic. Their goals were certainly revolutionary, but I will des-
cribe later how they were not attained. But the droughts that struck the Sahel in 
the 1970s and 1980s caused such devastation that radical change was simply 
forced upon Tamasheq society without any possible escape. The real revolution 
in Tamasheq society took place in the decades after the Keita period, and before 
the rebellion of the 1990s. In these decades Tamasheq society changed from a 
rural society to an urban society; from an economy based on pastoral household 
self-sufficiency and direct exchange of a limited range of goods to one of wage 
labour and the introduction of new consumer items. It also changed from a 
society living in a geographically limited (if large) and coherent region, to a 
scattered diaspora of community pockets around West Africa, the Maghreb and 
Europe. These major changes in location and economy brought about shifts in 
gender relations; cultural forms of expression; education; and politics. 
The first part of this chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the economic, 
social and cultural changes that occurred between the late 1960s and 1990s. The 
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description I give here of the new Teshumara culture of these days is far from 
exhaustive. The subject merits a book on its own. I will here only highlight and 
exemplify some of the main social, economic and cultural changes to give an 
indication of the scale of change. The second part of this chapter describes the 
political reflexions within the Teshumara culture and the creation of the for-
malised nationalist movement that prepared for this 1990 rebellion. The Malian 
Kel Tamasheq generally refer to this movement as Tanekra, the uprising. Three 
elements will be central in the description and analysis of the Tanekra move-
ment. The first element is the Tanekra conception of nation and state. Whereas 
the Kel Tamasheq community has been imagined – in Benedict Anderson’s 
meaning of the term – for centuries as a community of people related by 
(fictive) blood ties, the movement chose to imagine the nation as a community 
bound by territory. To some extent, I will invert Benedict Anderson’s argument 
that nations, through primordial kinship terms, imagine themselves as old, while 
they are in fact new constructions.1 In this case, social cohesion of the nation-to-
be had always been expressed through kinship ties. However, the Tamasheq 
nationalists carefully avoided imagining their nation according to these ties as 
they perceived them as an obstacle to national political unity. Instead of through 
the language of kinship, national sentiment was expressed primarily through the 
language of territory. Despite nationalist discourse and ideas of territory, con-
cepts of kinship, expressed through the tewsiten – the clans and tribes – kept 
structuring political practice, interfering with the ideology of Tamasheq unity. 
Political thinking along clan lines eventually led to the near collapse of the 
movement in the ‘Tamanrasset War’ of 1985. The second element is the Tama-
sheq concept of egha, hatred and revenge of stained honour. The Tanekra 
movement was multiform in its outlooks and goals. It was, however, kept 
together through a common hatred for Mali and the desire to avenge the wrong-
doings of the state in previous decades. Egha was not the sole motivation to join 
the movement, but it was the binding factor for all Kel Tamasheq. The move-
ment made explicit use of memories of Alfellaga and the feelings of hatred it 
had left to muster support for the movement among young men. A third element 
is the possible legacy of the Keita Regime. The political ideas of the Keita 
Regime on social change were partly incorporated in the political ideology of 
the Tanekra movement. The Keita Regime tried to actively and ostentatiously 
reform Tamasheq society. But where it failed in immediately imbuing social-
ism, the children educated in the schools of the Keita Regime inadvertently 
might have internalised certain socialist ideals despite their hatred for ‘Mali’. I 
will first sketch the political ideals and concepts of the Tanekra movement, and 
then I will describe its organisation and internal struggles. 
                                                 
1  Anderson, B. 1991: 141-54. 
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Teshumara 
The Tamasheq name for the new way of life that was shaped in this period is 
telling for its economic origins. It is called Teshumara, a Tamasheq derivative 
of the French ‘chômage’, meaning unemployment. The adherents to this new 
way of life were called ishumar (masculine singular ashamor, feminine singular 
tashamort, feminine plural tishumarin), meaning unemployed. Or at least this 
ionterpretation, based on the writings of Tamasheq poet and former ashamor 
Mahmudan Hawad, is the generally accepted origin of the word.2 However, 
some ishumar ascribe the orgins of this word to the Tamasheq word ashmar: To 
endure with patience.3 In any case, an ashamor was first of all someone who 
had abandoned pastoral life in favour of employment in other economic sectors. 
In large parts of the Tamasheq world, this meant migration outside the Ta-
masheq world, since no economic options outside pastoralism existed within the 
community. When unemployed, an ashamor would travel, looking for new jobs. 
As the number of people looking for jobs outside the pastoral realm and outside 
the Tamasheq world grew, the Teshumara became more than an economic way 
of life. It became a culture in itself. From the 1980s onwards, those ishumar 
involved in the preparation for armed rebellion saw themselves as a revolution-
ary military vanguard, who would lead their people to independence. They can 
also be seen as an organic intellectual elite in the Gramscian sense, as they put 
their thoughts on migration, modernity, and politics, to words in the poems and 
songs of the Teshumara movement. They produced knowledge, even if part of 
this knowledge was based on experiences they had in common with their less 
articulate audience. The ishumar were not the only Kel Tamasheq who claimed 
a new form of elite status within Tamasheq society to the detriment of the older 
elites, the noble imushagh and the religious ineslemen. A growing group of Kel 
Tamasheq were educated in universities in Africa and beyond. They worked for 
the Government or the NGOs that established themselves in numbers in Mali 
after the droughts, and tried to give new meaning and new course to Tamasheq 
social economic existence as well. These évolués as they are generally called – 
a name that ironically echoes colonial society – shared in the Teshumara expe-
rience and many later joined the rebel movement. I will first look at the early 
origins of the Teshumara and the origins of those who were to shape it. I will 
then look at the economic and political background of the Teshumara, found in 
the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. Then I will present ishumar life as it 
developed in its economic and cultural aspects, with special attention to the 
changes in economic existence; attitudes to work; urbanisation and sedentari-
                                                 
2  Hawad, M. 1990. 
3  Kidalinfo, forum. Subject: Ishmaren ou chomeurs? Author: Kigat Posted: 26/02/ 
2006 19H12. http://www.kidal.info/Forum/FRv1/lire.php?msg=4245 
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sation; gender relations; and cultural expressions, notably a new musical and 
poetical genre called al-guitara, now known to audiences worldwide as ‘desert 
blues’. I will show that the changes in Tamasheq societies in this period were 
far from homogenous. Various routes led to various new ways of life. 
 
Origins 
Cultures do not come into existence at one given moment. They develop slowly 
and it is hard to pinpoint their origins. Nevertheless, it would be convenient to 
point to a few points in space-time. The first is the late 1940s, when Mohamed 
Ali ag Attaher Insar travelled the Middle East with a few of his tribe’s young 
men to have them educated abroad. Mohamed Ali was not the only one to travel 
to Mecca. Since the late 1940s, throughout the 1950s and up till present, many 
Kel Tamasheq moved permanently to Saudi Arabia where a large Tamasheq 
community still exists. Many travellers had religious motives in the 1940s, but 
in the 1950s political motives came into play when a number of Kel Tamasheq 
moved to Saudi Arabia as they did not want to live in an independent African 
country where they would form a minority. Just as in the early colonial period, 
the pilgrimage to Mecca became a flight, a hijra to the sacred land of Islam. 
Since the 1970s, economic reasons became more important as labour demands 
in Mecca and Medina grew under the ever-increasing number of pilgrims, as 
they did in the oil-rich Saudi kingdom in general. A second movement from 
another place of origin occurred in the late 1950s, when a number of Kel 
Tamasheq migrated from Soudan Français to Southern Algeria where they 
looked for employment in the construction sector. These men found work at the 
sites where the French built their future nuclear test bases: I-n-Ekker, Reggane 
and Takormiasse.4 The French did not trust labour from North Algeria as it 
might be infiltrated by the FLN. Young Kel Tamasheq from the Adagh and the 
Azawad were easily recruited and made good money on the construction of the 
very base they would later use as their refuge during Alfellaga. During and after 
Alfellaga, a substantial amount of Kel Adagh migrated as refugees to Southern 
Algeria. A number of them returned, but an estimated 500 families would 
remain in Southern Algeria after the end of the rebellion. These families became 
a semi-sedentary community between the Algerian border cities with Mali and 
the Algerian Hoggar. These disparate groups formed the first nuclei of what 
would become a large Tamasheq diaspora after the drought in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
The most important group of ishumar however, the ones who stood at the 
basis of its conception as a culture and a way of life, were those Kel Adagh 
born between the late 1950s and early 1960s. The major legacy of Alfellaga was 
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a number of young children who are now generally called ‘the orphans’ or ‘the 
children of 1963’. Often traumatised by what they had witnessed during Alfel-
laga, these orphans would make up the core of the Tamasheq revolutionary 
movement. Likewise, their experiences will form the core of this chapter and 
the next. They were both the nucleus of the Teshumara culture as well as the 
inner core of the Tanekra revolutionary movement. A number of these orphans 
migrated to Algeria with their families, but about 400 of them were kept in 
boarding schools in Mali.5 Whereas other children were allowed to visit their 
parents during the holidays, the four hundred ‘orphans’ were permanently kept 
in Kidal during their school career. One can imagine what years of forced 
boarding school does to group formation and cohesion. It can also be imagined 
what being kept against one’s will in a system responsible for the death of one’s 
parents does to one’s emotional state. 
 
The droughts 
The late colonial period was not only a golden age for the Kel Tamasheq be-
cause of their improved relations with the colonial state. It was especially an 
age of material prosperity. Pictures taken in that decade by ethnographers such 
as Johannes Nicolaisen, as well as their ethnographic work on Tamasheq mate-
rial culture, speak of that abundance.6 This was largely the effect of favourable 
climatic conditions. Discussing the paleoclimate and the present climate in 
West Africa, Roderick McIntosh proposes to call a particular climatic pattern of 
unpredictability with regards to rainfall ‘Dènkejugu’, the Mande rascal prank-
ster boy. In the decades between the late 1940s and the mid 1980s, McIntosh’s 
Dènkejugu (a phenomenon analogous to El Niño) produced a climate of ab-
normal abundance followed by equally abnormal extreme droughts.7 Rainfall in 
the 1950s was more than abundant and seasons were mild. Pastures increased 
and so did the number of livestock, which was further augmented by the new 
French development schemes in the Sahara and Sahel. New wells were dug, 
opening up new pastures otherwise out of reach. Veterinary assistance toward 
the nomad populations improved, and la paix française meant that the need to 
spread the herds to keep a high degree of mobility as a defence against razzias 
had fallen away. However, the abundant rainfalls and the growing populations 
in the Sahel meant that farmers brought more and more previously marginal 
lands under cultivation, with the encouragement of the colonial administration, 
which gave prevalence to agricultural production over livestock, despite their 
                                                 
5  Cdt. Cercle Kidal à Gov. Gao, 09/06/1966. Objet: Demande de maintien de la can-
tine scolaire pour enfants sans parents. ACK. 
6  Nicolaisen, J. 1963. 
7  McIntosh, R. 2004: 23. 
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efforts in the latter. This policy and the growing agricultural possibilities on 
marginal lands probably inspired the Keita Regime’s agricultural efforts in the 
desert as well. Growing disputes over land tenure in these marginal areas were 
almost always settled in favour of the new farmers and to the detriment of the 
nomad rights to pasture, which, in turn, forced the latter to turn to previously 
marginal, now more promising, but still very insecure pastures in an increasing-
ly fragile ecosystem.8 During the 1960s, this favourable trend reversed, slowly 
developing towards a catastrophic period of drought in the early 1970s, reach-
ing its peak in 1974. As the details of climatology and ecological impact have 
been well covered elsewhere, I will here briefly sum up the cycle of devastating 
effects.9 Alfellaga had provoked a dramatic slaughter of animals by the Malian 
army in the Adagh, leaving herds depleted. Under the most favourable condi-
tions, a camel reproduces every two years. Therefore, the herds of the mostly 
camel breeding Kel Adagh had not yet recovered from the impact of Alfellaga 
when the drought hit hardest only ten years later. The annual decline in rainfall 
slowly but surely dried up wells and temporary lakes, while pasture decreased. 
Periods of poorer climatic conditions are normal in the Sahara, and reacting 
to them in a timely and adequate way is an integral part of nomadic life. In a 
period of drought, families or clans would normally first settle around tempo-
rary wells, and in the case of continuing drought, they would normally either 
migrate southwards to the Azawad or Niger Bend areas with their herds, or 
move northwards towards Algeria to sell surplus animals. The revenues would 
be spent on extra grain stocks replacing the falling lactation yields of the 
undernourished herds. But conditions had changed considerably. First of all, in 
the past decade many nomads had been forced away from their pastures that 
had been brought under cultivation. When rains failed, these more marginal 
pastures were the first to be depleted, while the former pastures brought under 
cultivation would not yield harvests or grow pasture. Hence, more pastures 
were in fact lost than would have been the case if the previous abundance of the 
1950s had not led to expanded agriculture. Second, transhumance was more 
strictly monitored by the authorities in the years after Alfellaga than it had been 
before, which hampered movement and caused many to wait until the last 
moment before moving out of their own area. Herdsmen had to compete with 
the few agriculturalists for water at the permanent wells, with favour being 
given to the latter. They also had to compete with each other over access to a 
smaller number of wells and pastures. Third, the Azawad and Niger Bend areas 
                                                 
8  Lecocq, B. 2003. 
9  For detailed analysis of the economic and ecological impact of the droughts on 
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were struck just as hard by rainfall deficits, offering no relief to the already 
hard-hit herds. There was therefore a collective move towards the river Niger, 
as had taken place during the droughts of 1947 and 1914.10 This was to no avail. 
The river had dried to a trickling stream, leaving the sedentary population with 
failed crops and the pastoralists without pasture for the animals. Fourth, the 
move towards Algeria to sell surplus livestock was impossible as there was no 
surplus livestock left to sell.11 Livestock losses were estimated at around 80%. 
Early warnings by academic specialists in the field were, as usual, not heeded.12 
When it dawned on governments and international agencies that a disaster was 
taking place in the Sahel, relief aid was organised, but largely ineffectively.13 
The bureaucracies of agencies such as FAO and USAID were highly ineffective 
and unprepared. The FAO early warning system signalled food shortages in the 
Sahel in September 1972, but it took FAO director Adde Boerma until May 
1973 to react to this warning by installing the Office of Sahelian Relief 
Operation (OSRO) that came to the conclusion that at least 1,000,000 tons of 
grain were needed to avoid total disaster. This conclusion was reached by 
autumn 1973. Only by February 1974 did the FAO start its campaign, a delay 
partly due to the FAO staff Christmas holiday.14 Most relief aid came from the 
United States, but their food aid distribution was bound to Law 480 stipulating 
that US food aid stocks should first be bought from surplus production within 
the US, thus subsidising US farmers. To aggravate matters, most of the US 
1972 harvest surplus and the shipping capacity to transport it had already been 
bought by the USSR. USAID also took an extraordinary amount of time to as-
semble its relief efforts, partly due to internal competition within the organisa-
tion, and through competition with FAO. When sufficient amounts of foodstuffs 
and medicine were finally assembled, they were shipped to the ports of West 
Africa without taking into account the handling capacities of these ports and the 
difficulties in transporting the goods from these ports to the landlocked Sahel 
countries. Transport was not only handicapped by lack of infrastructure in the 
concerned countries, but also by a lack of means of transport. What transport 
was available was in the hand of government agents who demanded outrageous 
prices for transportation of relief aid. The result of this disastrous course of 
events was a massive exodus of Kel Tamasheq seeking refuge elsewhere. 
                                                 
10  ag Sidiyene, E. & G. Klute 1989; Spittler, G. 1993. 
11  Swift however, reports that Algerian merchants residing in Gao still bought live-
stock for export to Algeria in the early 1970s. Swift, J. 1979: 297. 
12  In 1973 the French development anthropologist and Tamasheq specialist Edmond 
Bernus published a first article on the ongoing drought and its effects, based on 
fieldwork dating from 1972 and previous. Bernus, E. & G. Savonnet 1973. 
13  Derrick, J. 1977; Glantz, M., ed., 1976; Sheets, H. & R. Morris 1974. 
14  Stol, A. 1975: 100. 
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Taking the ‘normal’ course of migration towards the Azawad, many inhabitants 
of the Adagh, the Azawad and the Niger Bend ended up fleeing without live-
stock to Niger. There, they populated refugee camps called Lazaret I and II, 
which were guarded by the Nigerien army that tried to keep away the world 
press flocking in droves to film and photograph the hunger without much real 
explanation of the causes to the public confronted with these images. In 1974, 
an estimated 18,000 Malian refugees, mostly Kel Tamasheq, inhabited the 
camps, divided into wards organised by region of origin. Water was delivered 
by trucks once a day, food and medical care were well arranged by the 
International Red Cross and the UNHCR. The first camp, close to Niamey, was 
evacuated and rebuilt 20 kilometres outside the city as the inhabitants roamed 
the streets of Niamey trying to sell what goods they had left, or making some 
extra money by prostituting themselves.15 In 1975, an estimated 13,000 Kel 
Tamasheq still inhabited this camp, although by then the rains had returned and 
the worst of the drought was over.16 But what was there to return to when all 
livestock had perished and no money was left to replace them with imports 
from elsewhere? At present the majority of the Tamasheq community in 
Niamey consists of former Malian refugees, mostly from the Niger Bend, who 
settled permanently, making a living as guards or day labourers. Others took the 
road to Algeria, where they populated refugee camps at the border towns of 
Timiaouen and Bordj Mokhtar, where an estimated 12,000 Kel Tamasheq 
sought help.17 Some moved on to Tamanrasset and other cities in Southern 
Algeria, where they were helped by relatives who had fled during Alfellaga. 
Others went to the South of Mali and from there to cities throughout West 
Africa, as far away as Abidjan and Lagos. But the vast majority of the Kel 
Tamasheq did not have the strength or the means to leave. They had to stay on, 
waiting for help that never arrived in the towns of Northern Mali. Their num-
bers were estimated at 47,000, dispersed over thirty refugee camps in the Gao 
and Timbuktu Régions.18 Most victims were children who, weakened by mal-
nutrition, died of seemingly innocent diseases like measles, or more direct ef-
fects of hunger such as oedema. Choleric diarrhoea did the rest. Both relief aid 
organisations and journalists had only limited access to these camps. The Traoré 
Government was of the opinion that food and medical supplies were necessary, 
but that their distribution and the further organisation of the relief effort could 
be left to them. Import taxations, levies, forms and paperwork that needed 
‘greasing’ to be completed, all manners of ‘eating’ in the relief supplies were 
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common practice by all bureaucrats who could. It should be noted that the few 
high-ranking officials of Kel Tamasheq origins were no better in that respect. 
Many a villa in Bamako and Timbuktu, indicated by the public as ‘chateaux de 
la sécheresse’, rose on the foundations of embezzled relief aid. What food 
arrived in the refugee camps and drought-struck areas, arrived too late and was 
often of a kind or quality unfit for human consumption. But when it arrived, it 
passed from the hands of the providing agencies into the care of the local 
authorities who were in charge of its distribution. Again, corruption took its toll. 
Most of the offered foodstuffs were not freely distributed as was intended, but 
sold by functionaries at local markets at high prices. Aid that was freely 
distributed was distributed unequally between the sedentary population and the 
nomads. The monitoring groups from the US Center for Disease Control sur-
veying the famine in the Sahel and reporting to the US Government concluded 
that: 
Survey data from 3,500 children emphasise the fact that undernutrition in the four 
country area is to be found more among nomads than sedentary persons, and more in 
the North than in the South. Children from nomad clusters ranged on the average ten 
to seventeen percent below the threshold while those from sedentary or Southern 
groups were approximately three to seven percent below. The existence of pockets 
of extreme undernutrition is supported by data from all countries but particularly 
from Mali where up to 80% of children from one nomad cluster were acutely under-
nourished. The above statements on the nutritional status of children must be con-
sidered conservative.19 
Information on what happened on the ground in Mali was scarce. Most 
agencies and governments relied for information on the few journalists who 
went to the Sahel and managed to get access to the refugee camps. Their ac-
counts may have been scant, but not necessarily incorrect. Le Monde reporter 
Philippe Decreane might have been the best informed, given his networks 
among former colonial officers in France.20 Invoking the pre-colonial relations 
between nomads and sedentary populations; racial issues; the OCRS; and even 
the 1963 rebellion in the Adagh, Decraene concluded that ‘Bamako’ was taking 
the opportunity to settle ‘the nomad problem’ once and for all.  
The army can have its way in the 6th Région. The area is geographically isolated and 
sparsely inhabited. There live only about a dozen Europeans, and the ‘sand curtain’ 
veils the region from the rest of the world. Who manages to pass through that 
curtain is met with the silence of the Government officials. (…) Our guide refuses us 
access to the food warehouses. Some shops sell the relief aid grain supplies. It is 
                                                 
19  Kloth, I. 1974. Nutritional Surveillance in West Africa. Atlanta: US Public Health 
Service, Center for Disease Control. In: Sheets, H. & R. Morris 1974: 132. 
20  Decreane started his career in journalism as Africa correspondent for Le Monde in 
1958 and became the director of the former colonial institute CHEAM in 1983. 
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therefore no wonder that some indicate the position of Colonel Moussa Traoré’s re-
gime towards the Tuareg as ‘the final solution to the Tuareg problem’.21 
The CDC commission cited above reached similar conclusions and impres-
sions of existing ‘traditional enmities between nomadic and sedentary popula-
tions’. The conclusions might have been exaggerated, but a few things cannot 
be denied. The conclusions of ‘traditional enmities between nomads and seden-
tary populations’ made by the CDC were not totally unfounded. In times of 
tension the division between nomads and sedentary populations becomes 
stronger. The drought and its effects on the Kel Tamasheq might not have been 
unwelcome to the Traoré Regime at the time. 
The drought of 1973 meant a near total collapse of the pastoral economy in 
Northern Mali. Anything that was left was then taken away by a second period 
of severe drought in the early 1980s, culminating in 1984. If the Adagh was hit 
less hard this second time, the onslaught was even heavier in more Southern 
regions. This time the wave of refugees came particularly from the Azawad and 
moved mostly to Algeria and Libya. Otherwise, an almost identical devastating 
pattern repeated itself. The second drought of the 1980s brought more and more 
effective relief aid to the Niger Bend. Many NGOs, such as the Norwegian 
AEN, set up lasting and large-scale development projects. However, in the per-
ception of many of these NGOs, development could only be brought to seden-
tary people. As in 1974 the reaction from all sides, including the Kel Tamasheq 
évolués, was that pastoral nomad existence was no longer feasible, and espe-
cially undesired. Sedentarisation facilitates the control over the nomad popula-
tions by the Government and relief work to their benefit by the NGOs. As for 
the Kel Tamasheq themselves, many tried to pick up nomad pastoral existence 
with their depleted herds as good as possible, repleting their animals by imports 
and traditional systems of mutual aid, such as borrowing livestock under vari-
ous conditions.22 Their success was marginal and to hardly any avail, especially 
after the drought of the 1970s as it was followed by that of the 1980s, again 
decimating the still precarious herds. 
The number of people who died in both catastrophes cannot be estimated, 
but they were in the hundreds of thousands. Even if Philippe Decraene’s accu-
sations to the regime in Bamako were incorrect, they very likely expressed the 
thoughts of those Kel Tamasheq who witnessed their children die of malnutri-
tion and disease in the aid-abandoned camps. Unsurprisingly, many left the 
country with no intention to return even after the drought was over. 
 
                                                 
21  Decraene, Ph. ‘L’Afrique subira les effets d’une sécheresse plus dramatique’, Le 
Monde, 06/02/1974. 
22  Bourgeot, A. 1975. 
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Migration 
The droughts reshaped Tamasheq existence in drastic ways. By force and over-
night, Tamasheq life changed from rural and pastoral to urban and wage earn-
ing. Among the Western-educated Tamasheq elite, many of whom worked for 
international NGOs active in the drought relief and redevelopment of the Sahel 
economy, the drought led to a rethinking of pastoral life. Many young Kel 
Tamasheq reached the conclusion that pastoral existence had no future. 
Pastoralism as we have always practised it is no longer an honourable option in our 
days. For different reasons it is condemned to be abandoned, or at least to be re-
structured. It is not a goal in itself, and a Tuareg is not in the least predestined to be 
born and to die as a pastoralist.23 
The Tamasheq-inhabited Sahara and Sahel are characterized by a long his-
tory of urban culture and identity. Some of the oldest cities of sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as Gao and Agadez, are part of the Tamasheq world. Ruins of 
cities in the Sahara such as Essuq Tademekkat and Tamentit form further evi-
dence of a long urban tradition of which the Kel Tamasheq form an integral 
part.24 Nomadic existence is deeply connected to urbanity in the Sahara and 
Sahel. As hardly anything is produced in the nomad economy outside the pas-
toral domain, the nomad is depending on city markets to procure most neces-
sities. The Kel Tamasheq dominated the caravan trade connecting the cities, and 
even the village markets of the Sahel and Sahara. Kel Ewey, Kel Ferwan, Ahl 
Araouane and other caravan drivers and merchants have dwelt in Timbuktu, 
Taoudennit, In Salah, Agadez, Bilma, Teguida n Tesimt, Kano, Ghat, Murzuk 
and Tripoli for centuries. In fact, caravan trade is about the connection of urban 
centres. Caravans traverse the desert in order to arrive at cities. It is a part of 
Saharan city culture par excellence. The historicity of Kel Tamasheq city dwell-
ing is documented to at least the 10th century AD.25 Even seemingly colonial 
cities have deeper histories. The city of Kidal is often thought of as founded by 
the French, where it in fact was founded by the Dabakar, a tribe that has since 
moved, but who used the oasis as a date grove, and had small allotments of 
tobacco and peppers there, besides stone houses which might date back to the 
same era as Essuq Tademekkat. Tessalit too is a village with a considerable date 
grove of around 6,000 trees founded prior to colonial conquest.26 The historical 
link between Kel Tamasheq and city life becomes even more evident in the 
name Kel Essuq, referring to a group of not necessarily related tribes that derive 
                                                 
23  Anonymous, Quand le chef travaille, le peuple le suit (n.d. 1990). Document circu-
lating in Niamey in 1990 among Kel Tamasheq intellectuals. 
24  Hunwick, J. 2003; Moraes Farias, de, P.F. 2003. 
25  Ibn Hauqal 1964. 
26  Cauvin, C. & M. Cortier 1908. 
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their identity from Islamic learning. Their name refers directly to the city of 
Essuq Tademekkat, which they all claim to be their place of origin. Hence, in 
Tamasheq discourse, as in that of many other peoples, Muslim scholarship is 
intimately linked to urban culture. In short: city, intercity caravan trade, and the 
wider Muslim world have been part of Tamasheq culture for at least a millen-
nium. In that view, urban life and an outward look are not new. But the colonial 
period had changed things. The French focus on Tamasheq existence as nomad 
existence, to the detriment of urban life; the competition of European trade 
houses against the caravan trade; and the creation of colonial borders: These 
developments had contributed to a retreat into pastoral nomad existence during 
the 20th century. And of course, the droughts had taken away the means to 
pursue traditional caravan trading to the cities or villages of the Sahara and 
Sahel. Tamasheq city life had to be reinvented. 
As many other young Malians, many young Kel Tamasheq became involved 
in a seasonal migration towards the cities to look for temporary jobs known as 
l’exode.27 But as few new durable means of existence could be found in North-
ern Mali, many drought refugees stayed in their places of exile in Algeria, 
Libya, Niger and the rest of West Africa. The first Kel Tamasheq to migrate to 
Algeria were the Kel Adagh fleeing army retaliation during Alfellaga. They 
settled in the border towns of Bordj Mokhtar, Ti-n-Zaouatene and especially 
Timeaouene, from where they could venture back into Mali with their herds to 
their pasture grounds, to retreat back into Algeria where they were protected 
from the Malian administration. Although these refugees became semi-seden-
tarised, they remained as close to home and as close to their way of life as 
possible. It should be noted that, as elsewhere on the planet, cities can only 
expand to the capacity of economic and infrastructural possibilities. Work or 
commerce, water, food and energy should be available in pace with the growing 
population. Many Kel Tamasheq chose their dwelling place according to the 
availability of sufficient water and firewood, until the introduction of modern 
wells and pumps reaching the Saharan aquifers, subsidised food, transport and 
horticulture, and canned butane gas for cooking. From Ti-n-Zaouatene, Timi-
aouene and Bordj Mokhtar, the Kel Tamasheq diaspora spread out in a haph-
azard way, depending on family and tribal affiliation, the availability of work 
and means to live on, the spread of technique and commerce.28 
Since the 1970s, the towns of the central Sahara, both in Algeria and Libya 
are booming. Conscious efforts to develop the Sahara and the Saharan towns by 
the Algerian and Libyan Governments resulted in the attraction of migrant 
labour from sub-Sahara Africa, notably the Sahel countries. By far the most 
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important of these central Saharan towns is Tamanrasset. Centrally located in 
the Hoggar Mountains, it became the administrative capital of the Algerian 
South; the centre of Sahara tourism in Algeria; and of the Algerian oil industry 
in the South. The growth rate of this town is telling of the speed of urban devel-
opment in the Sahara. In 1920, the city had 50 inhabitants. In 1973, there were 
8,000. In 1974 the city became the capital of the Wilaya Sud, the administrative 
region of the Hoggar. By then the speed of the population growth was almost 
out of control: 15,000 inhabitants in 1976 and 42,000 only a year later. By 
2003, the city had an estimated population of 180,000 inhabitants, with an 
unknown number of illegal immigrants on their way to the coast of the Medi-
terranean living on the outskirts of town.29 At present, Tamanrasset is inhabited 
by a plethora of at least 45 different nationalities from all over Africa, the 
Middle East and South Asia, serving for many as a springboard to ‘Fortress 
Europe’, but the first migrants to arrive in the city were the ishumar. The first to 
reach Tamanrasset were a number of Kel Adagh tishumarin, women who had 
previously settled in Timiaouene and who occasionally prostituted themselves 
to the Algerian employees of the SONAREM mining company who took them 
to Tamanrasset.30 Their migration and professional occupation deserves em-
phasis. Most Kel Tamasheq moved to the city as refugees during the droughts. 
These refugees were mostly women, children and elderly persons, as the men 
either stayed on to save the herds or had already moved to look for work. 
Young women travelled to the cities of Southern Algeria looking for a better 
life. They often travelled alone. The mobility and independence of these tishu-
marin made many Algerian men look with disfavour upon the refugees. Parti-
cularly the Kel Hoggar, the Kel Tamasheq inhabiting Southern Algeria, had a 
denigrating attitude towards the Malian and Nigerien newcomers, which was 
expressed in a discourse on the looseness of the refugee women, a discourse 
that found its justification in the prostitution activities of some.31 
In the 1970s a whole new shantytown arose after the drought, inhabited by 
the Malian Kel Tamasheq. It was called Tahaggart-shumara, which would trans-
late as ‘unemployed in the Hoggar’, the Algerian mountain range in which 
Tamanrasset is situated. Similar neighbourhoods arose in Djanet, Adrar, and in 
Libyan cities, such as Ghat and Ghadames.32 Tamanrasset was the main desti-
nation in Algeria for the Malian Kel Tamasheq. Djanet was the main destination 
for the Nigerien Kel Tamasheq. In Libya, there was a mix of all communities. 
In these neighbourhoods, the Teshumara developed. To the Kel Tamasheq, city 
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life is characterised by a number of traits: Salaried employment and unemploy-
ment; living in houses; the availability of consumer goods (not per se to the 
impoverished newcomers); and a multilingual and multicultural environment. 
For those who are used to living in a tent, living in a house is a constricting 
experience. A Tamasheq tent is open at least to one side, often more, giving a 
view over the vast plains or mountains. Tamasheq camps are often small, con-
sisting of about five tents, spaced about 50 metres apart. The next camp can be 
kilometres away. Urban space is thus a stark contrast to nomad space. Houses 
are walled and roofed on all sides, situated at smaller intervals and only looking 
out on the court walls or on other houses. Houses are square, small wattle-and-
daub constructions with a flat roof. The house is surrounded by a large walled 
court with a toilet in one of the corners. In the middle of the court a tent can 
often be found where people live and sleep. The house is used to store house-
hold items but it is not a living space. In the early days of Tahaggart-shumara 
the court walls and houses were lacking. It was a ramshackle town of 
improvised tents. Although at present many Kel Tamasheq are city-born, the 
unease about living indoors is still prevalent. 
Even if I wanted to live in a house 
always locked with a key 
where there is no cooling breeze 
The body does not benefit from its shade 
It has no use but for resignation.33 
The ishumar looked for employment in sectors that were at first totally alien 
to them, such as salaried herding; agriculture in the oasis towns of the Sahara; 
the guarding of villas (notably those of expatriates); construction work and 
masonry; car mechanics; and, in coastal West Africa, even fishery. Most jobs 
were temporary, and many moved from town to town, from job to job. Many 
Kel Tamasheq still believed that hard manual labour was unbefitting for a free 
person. A free man should occupy himself only with pastoral affairs, trade, reli-
gion, or warfare. Depending on region and caste, free women should not work 
at all or engage only in pastoral activities, religion, or the household. Due to the 
droughts, pastoralism became regarded as a hazardous and even impossible 
occupation. The preferred professions, however, were derived from this labour 
ethic.34 Being a car driver or mechanic is seen as a modern equivalent to being 
involved in pastoral affairs. Commerce, especially transnational smuggling, is 
seen as a logical follow-up to the caravan trade. However, these occupations 
and jobs were scarce, which left many men of free origins with no other choice 
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but to take up manual labour, which they saw as degrading. These occupational 
restraints did not hold for former slaves who were free to take up any job 
available. At present, for instance, a community of bellah (and some imghad) is 
successfully retailing fish in Abidjan, an unimaginable occupation for other Kel 
Tamasheq.35 Since Kel Tamasheq of free origins perceived manual labour to be 
dishonouring, they saw themselves forced to ask their protégés for economic 
assistance, thus involuntarily reversing social relations and still dishonouring 
themselves. In the eyes of the deprived free, the choice was between dishonour 
through accepting menial jobs – which would mean public humiliation – and 
privately asking their former dependents and slaves for assistance, which was a 
private humiliation that could be personally justified as ‘enforcing one’s rights 
over one’s bellah’. However, former slaves perceived this strategy of their 
former masters as trying to live on their backs, something they had done in the 
past too. They believed that their former masters should take up work as they 
themselves had done. Thus, the discourse on the absence of honour and shame 
was turned to the advantage of the unfree in a circular way. Their lack of 
honour and shame ensured their economic survival, and the free should take this 
example, abandoning their honour in favour of work, instead of dishonouring 
themselves by living at the expense of their former slaves.36 This radical change 
in relations between bellah and free Kel Tamasheq, and the shift in attitudes 
towards work, was quickly settled in the lands of migration. 
A more profitable, but far more dangerous occupation many ishumar took 
up, was trafficking between Algeria, Libya, Mali and Niger. The Algerian and 
Libyan states subsidised basic goods, such as flour; bread; sugar; oil; tea; dates; 
and petrol under world market price levels, whereas they were often lacking in 
Mali and Niger.37 The ishumar smuggled these goods southwards to Mali and 
Niger on foot or on the backs of donkeys or camels. They were then sold for 
CFA Francs in Mali and Niger, which were taken back to Algeria.38 As Algeria 
suffered from a lack of foreign currency and as the CFA Franc was easily 
exchanged for French Francs at fixed rates, CFA Francs were in high demand, 
often going for six times their official exchange rates at the Algerian black 
market. The profit in smuggling was thus doubled. Goods were sold in Mali and 
Niger, and the small profit made was then quadrupled in Algeria.39 A third 
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benefit of this trafficking was that the remaining inhabitants of Northern Mali 
and Niger were provided with basic products, unavailable at reasonable prices 
in the state-run shops at home. Most ishumar would spend the money earned on 
luxury items, such as watches, stereos, sunglasses or other consumer goods. 
Others would save their money and invest it in more trafficking; buying trucks 
and off road vehicles to facilitate transport. The experience in trafficking con-
sumer goods that many ishumar acquired during the 1970s and 1980s proved to 
be of immense value during the rebellion, when petrol, food and weapons had 
to be brought into Mali. Many ishumar varied their economic existence, taking 
up jobs as herdsmen or gardeners, moving on to masonry, saving some money, 
which would then be invested in smuggling. Or they would set up legitimate 
businesses if they had access to the Algerian or Libyan administration to obtain 
the necessary papers. 
Whenever the host states could, they tried to expel the unwelcome Kel 
Tamasheq. In the late 1960s, the Algerian local authorities had discussed the 
possibility of sending back those Kel Adagh who had fled from Alfellaga. At 
the time, a number of these Kel Adagh had volunteered to return, as the first 
signs of the upcoming great drought were already noticeable in Algeria. The 
Malian authorities, however, refused to have them back. Since they had opted 
for Algeria as their fatherland, the Kel Adagh had to bear the consequences of 
this decision for better or worse. Nevertheless, in 1970, a first group of Kel 
Adagh was expelled from Algeria to Mali, without the consent of the Malian 
authorities that closely monitored the returnees.40 In 1974 and again in 1983, 
haphazard returns of drought refugees were organised in Niger as well as in 
Algeria.41 The largest expulsion from Algeria would come in April 1986, when 
at least 6,000 Kel Tamasheq from Mali and 2,000 from Niger were rounded up 
in Tamanrasset and transported to the borders on trucks. At the borders they 
were left to their own devices, without water or food. The expulsions had been 
merciless and were exposed in the international media. From 1987 onwards, the 
Algerian Government started a larger, better-planned project to reintegrate the 
drought refugees in their countries of origin with the help of UN-FIDA. The 
programme came into effect at the end of 1989.42 In Libya, the Kel Tamasheq 
were slightly more welcome, especially after a speech by Colonel Mu’ammar 
Qadhafi in 1982, in which he declared Libya to be the home country and place 
of origin of all the Kel Tamasheq, which gave them the undeniable right to 
‘return’ there. In practice the Kel Tamasheq were confronted with Libyan 
racism and discrimination. Many Kel Tamasheq migrants were arrested and 
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molested at the Libyan border. As immigrant workers, only the lowest jobs 
were open to them and they were insulted in the streets. Legal papers remained 
hard to get, which kept the ishumar in Libya in a precarious illegal situation. 
But Libyan citizenship was not popular, as Libyan citizens were not easily al-
lowed to travel abroad. Even when it was available to them, most ishumar 
chose the hardships of a free migrant existence over the more comfortable state-
supported but enclosed life of a Libyan national. 
Ishumar life 
As the ishumar earned money, new consumer items became available to them. 
Dietary habits changed. To a pastoral Kel Tamasheq, the ideal repast consists of 
fresh milk and fat meat, with three glasses of sweet tea for dessert. When fresh 
milk and meat are scarce this diet is completed with dairy products, cheese, 
buttermilk and butter; wild or cultivated grains; dates and gathered fruits. Food 
taboos exist. Fish is out of the question even when available. Poultry is only 
eaten by children who hunt them in the bush. This ideal diet was abandoned 
during the droughts and again during the second rebellion, when the Kel Ta-
masheq were even forced to eat fish, as canned herrings were shipped to the 
desert as relief aid. But the diet also changed in exile. It can only be the irony of 
history that the Kel Tamasheq now adopted the diet that they had at first refused 
when forced upon them by the Keita Regime. As fresh fruits and vegetables 
were available, they slowly adopted them. At present, many repatriated (if this 
is the correct term) youngsters in Kidal relish the memory of fresh apples and 
grapes, available at the markets of Algeria and Libya. Yams, potatoes, toma-
toes, onions, cabbage and lettuce have found their way into Tamasheq dishes. 
Fresh dairy products were harder to get. Fresh milk was substituted with milk 
powder and butter with olive or peanut oil. Even those Kel Tamasheq who 
stayed in Mali were now prepared to take up gardening. The Kel Adagh them-
selves investigated the possibilities of horticulture in their mountains. In 1977, 
Acherif ag Mohamed, a Kel Adagh, graduated at the Ecole Normale Supérieure 
in Bamako on a thesis entitled ‘Les possibilités agricoles dans le Cercle de 
Kidal’. His thesis is a plea for agricultural development in the Adagh, despite 
possible resistance from the population. 
During the search for a theoretical solution to the social problem posed by the 
drought and its consequences, I thought of the agricultural possibilities in the Cercle 
of Kidal. In fact, these possibilities exist and their exploitation is necessary to save 
thousands of human lives.43 
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Photo 5.1 
Two young Ishumar have their picture taken, somewhere in Libya in the mid 1970s: 
Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall (left) and Iyad ag Ghali (right). Note the ‘soul 
boots’, the ‘flared’ trousers and the absence of a turban. 
[Courtesy of Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall] 
 
 
In a way, Acherif pleaded for the reintroduction of the agricultural ende-
avours of the Keita Regime. The efforts in relief aid and subsequent develop-
ment in the drought devastated Sahel concentrated on the (semi-)sedentarisation 
of the nomad population and their reconversion into agro-pastoralists. Most 
development experts at the time were convinced that pastoral overproduction of 
animals and subsequent overgrazing were the root cause of the drought. Agri-
culture would be the solution against future overgrazing and halt the subsequent 
desertification. It remains to be seen how far these settlement schemes and 
agricultural projects in the Niger Bend in the 1970s were part of the cause of the 
drought of the 1980s. Be that as it may, horticulture and agriculture, and the 
consumption of vegetables, were successfully introduced among the Kel Tama-
sheq. Ironically enough however, Acherif ag Mohamed's plea for horticultural 
projects in the Adagh was not heeded at all, as the Traoré Regime probably 
remembered the agricultural échec of the 1960s. 
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Not only dietary habits changed, clothing habits changed as well. Most 
women who had migrated to the Maghreb stuck to their customary dress: A 
pagne and a tasirnest (melhafa in Arabic), a long veil wrapped around the body, 
knotted on the shoulders, with the end forming a loosely draped headscarf. 
Their face remained unveiled, a practice that grew more and more contested 
during the 1990s with the rise of fundamentalist Islam, but which remained 
largely customary nevertheless. Women who had migrated to coastal West Afri-
ca were quicker to adopt local dress codes, wearing boubous and headscarves in 
West African fashion. The male ishumar dress code differed sharply from 
traditional dress. Sandals were exchanged for sneakers or high-heeled boots. 
Wide trousers gave way to jeans or ‘flared’ trousers. T-shirts and collared shirts, 
sometimes completed with a gandoura – a thin burnous – covered the upper 
part of their body. More telling were the changes in wearing the eghewid or 
tagelmust, the male turban and veil.44 In Tamasheq culture, the eghewid is the 
most direct instrument available to express male personal honour, dignity and 
pride. In general, the less of the face visible, the more a man is preserving his 
honour. To a Tamasheq, his mouth is a private part. The veiling of a man’s face 
is most important in the presence of female company, especially female in-laws 
and cousins. The eghewid has always been subject to fashion changes, expres-
sing the wealth and prestige of the owner. Late 19th and early 20th century 
images depict it as one cloth wrapped around a cone shaped hat or fez (tikunbut 
in Tamasheq), while in the mid twentieth century the eghewid became a wrap-
ping of two or more cloths, one white muslin and one indigo alasho cloth 
woven in Kano, which could be as long as twenty metres or more. The ishumar 
deliberately expressed the turmoil they found their society to be in and their 
desire for radical changes in the way they dealt with the eghewid. The multiple 
layers were abandoned for a single cloth of cheap south Asian import, generally 
referred to as Bukstan (Pakistan). The length of this cloth was reduced con-
siderably to about four metres, which expressed their chosen status as young 
and irresponsible men without wealth, but also the loss of honour Tamasheq 
society had faced. This shortened eghewid was wrapped around the head in a 
careless fashion, which expressed the turmoil of society and their rebellious 
state of mind.45 The mouth was carefully exposed, instead of covered, as a re-
minder of the loss of honour Tamasheq society had undergone in the last de-
cades: A lost rebellion; and two droughts forcing them into exile and mendicity, 
on show to the world as TV crews passed the refugee camps. The lowered veil 
exposed a moustache and shaved chin, an abhorrence to elder men, who shaved 
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their moustache and grew beards following the example of the prophet Muham-
mad. Some ishumar even went further. They wrapped the shortened eghewid 
around their necks as a shawl – an expression of utter despair – or gave up 
wearing an eghewid altogether, even in the presence of women.46 
This is but one small aspect of the notable changes in gender relations also 
taking shape in the 1970s and 1980s, due to the change from a pastoral to an 
urban wage economy.47 Most telling about changing perceptions of gender rela-
tions, productivity and the female body, but perhaps also expressing a changing 
perception of the economic and ecologic environment, was the diminishing 
practice of female fattening. Fewer women would try to become as big as pos-
sible, which would involve consuming no longer available amounts of calories, 
while the fattened body would hamper their mobility and activity in a world of 
migration where slaves and men were no longer available to depend upon in an 
immobile life without work.48 Besides, standards of beauty and sexual attract-
iveness changed in general. While round female bodies are still seen as em-
bodying female social beauty, fertility and sexual activity, as the pillar of the 
household, Western influences on the perception of the female body slowly 
crept in, leading men to express preference for women who are not too slim and 
not too fat either.49 But with increased mobility in an urban landscape came the 
loss of female control over domestic space through a loss of ownership of the 
domestic space par excellence. In pastoral society, the tent and accompanying 
household items are a woman’s possession, presented to her at her first mar-
riage by her mother and female relatives. Her husband is only living in it, until 
the marriage is dissolved, when he becomes homeless. In urban society, the 
house is often built or rented by a man, who then lodges his wife. In the case of 
divorce, it is she who has to look for other living space. The dowry changed 
considerably as well, especially among the wealthier évolué city dwellers, much 
less so among the ‘true’ ishumar. Where it used to consist of practical house-
hold utensils, it now became fashionable among those who had found a more 
fixed residence to include a large wooden cabinet filled with all kinds of trin-
kets: A mixture of china, small statues, picture frames, silk flowers, small ‘tra-
ditional’ Tamasheq leather objects, mosque shaped clocks, or snow globes with 
                                                 
46  At present, a reverse trend is visible. Many former ishumar took to wearing the 
eghewid again after the end of the rebellion of the 1990s. This might well be an 
indication of a general sense of reinstated honour. Kohl argues that in present-day 
ishumar culture standards of beauty and vestimentary habits have gained importance 
but show a clear shift away from western clothing, although soccer shirts and train-
ers remain popular among men. Kohl, I. 2009: 22. 
47  Achterberg, van, A. 1988. 
48  Popenoe, R. 2004: 121-122. 
49  Kohl, I. 2009: 68-75. 
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the Kaaba in Mecca or the Eifel Tower, and other souvenir items brought from 
travels. A more opulent sign of sedentary consumerism would be hard to find. 
Part of the walls of migrant houses would be decorated with Tamasheq leather 
bags, and reed mats, a memory of nomad tent dwellings, while the furniture 
would be a mixture of Maghrebi diwans and Northern Atlantic sofas. Ideas of 
gendered wealth also changed, partly expressing the new consumerism in Ta-
masheq culture. In pastoral society, the future husband and his relatives pay the 
bride price in livestock. In urban society, the bride price is paid in money, 
which is then either used to buy new household utensils, or gold jewellery 
(instead of the formerly preferred silver). When needed, jewellery could be 
sold. The expected virtues of future brides also changed gradually. In contrast to 
most of the surrounding cultures, Tamasheq female sexual conduct or purity is 
not related to group or masculine honour. Female virginity is not highly prized. 
Extra-marital affairs are only a cause of shame when an unmarried woman 
becomes pregnant. Today, virginity is still not related to group or masculine 
honour, but many men individually disapprove of what they have come to look 
upon as ‘loose’ sexual morals or ‘knowledge of (too many) men’ from their 
future wives.50 A last, notable, change in gender relations is the gradual accept-
ance of polygamous marriages. Tamasheq society characteristically has a strong 
preference for (serial) monogamy. Although the legality of polygamy in Islam 
is known and accepted, it was highly disapproved of. Polygamous practice was 
limited to a few affluent members of the religious part of society, the ineslemen. 
Recently, the move towards polygamy amongst richer city-dwellers is growing, 
despite still being regarded as ‘not done’.  
 
Al-guitara 
The evenings in Tahaggart-shumara and other ishumar neighbourhoods were 
regularly enlivened with parties called zahuten (from the Arabic zahu, distract-
ion).51 The parties were staged at the houses of young women or, as the parties 
began to attract more police attention, outside the city. The men would provide 
the necessities: Food; tea; sugar; tobacco; and cigarettes. People flirted with 
each other, sported their newest gadgets, danced, and women would sing songs 
and poetry, accompanying themselves on the imzad, the Tamasheq one-string 
violin made and played by women only. Or the tindé would be played; a drum 
made out of a wettened leather skin, a mortar and two pestles. A woman would 
sing to the rhythm, improvising the lyrics as she went along. More women 
would sit around the drum and singer, accompanying drum and song with 
handclapping, while men might form a background chorus of melodious rhyth-
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mic humming called tabahohumt.52 A famous singer of these early days of the 
Teshumara, was Lalla Badi, a young Kel Adagh tashamort woman. Her house 
in Tahaggart-shumara attracted many ishumar. She sang traditional songs, as 
well as songs which related the life of the ishumar. These songs were taped on 
cassettes and copied for those who were not present. 
A new phenomenon in Tamasheq party culture was the introduction of the 
aggiwin. The aggiwin originally came from the Timbuktu area where they had 
for long been part of Tamasheq culture, but they were previously unknown in 
other areas of the Tamasheq world. Now, in the melting pot of migrant ishumar 
culture, they rapidly gained popularity. The aggiwin can best be compared to 
the West African griots: musicians of caste origins who accompany themselves 
on a teherdent, a four-string lute, while they recite oral histories or sing family 
praises to those who pay them to do so. They would be accompanied on drums 
made of upturned gourds in a syncopated 5/4 rhythm known as takamba. The 
rhythm and the music and dancing style of the same name are of Songhay 
origins, but they became popular in the Tamasheq world since the late 1960s. 
The ishumar spent fortunes on these aggiwin at the takamba parties they staged, 
paying them to sing the praise of their exploits and travels. By the late 1970s 
their activities were condemned as ‘anti-revolutionary’ by the politically active 
ishumar of the Tanekra movement, although takamba music remained highly 
popular. 
In the late 1970s, a new musical genre came into existence: Al-guitara. 
Contrary to imzad and tindé, al-guitara is a primarily male genre developed by 
ishumar in Libya and Algeria.53 In these countries, but also in the Malian 
troupes artistiques, the ishumar became familiar with guitars (from which the 
style derives it name), and rock music. The first to make al-guitara music were 
a few Kel Adagh men from the Irreguenaten tribe, notably Ibrahim ag Alkhabib, 
nicknamed Abaraybone. Abaraybone started his musical career playing a self-
made instrument out of a plastic jerrycan and some strings. He obtained his first 
acoustic guitar in Tamanrasset from a Sahraoui man who played the revolu-
tionary songs of the POLISARIO. He was joined by other now famous artists 
such as Inteyedin, Keddu ag Osad, Mohamed ‘Japonais’ ag Itlal, Ghabdallah, 
Sweyloum and Abenneben. Together, these men formed a band called Taghreft 
Tinariwen: ‘Reconstruct the Deserts’, which would later be shortened to Tina-
riwen. They were accompanied by women doing background vocals in a ques-
tion and answer lyrical poetry, while being accompanied on an improvised 
jerrycan drum. Musical inspiration came from their former teachers in the trou-
pes artistiques such as famous Kar Kar and Ali Farka Touré, the POLISARIO 
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guitar music, the takamba of the aggiwin, Maghrebi raï and chaabi, the virtuous 
solos of Jimmy Hendrix and the simple clear chord schemes of Dire Straits. Al-
guitara developed into an original sound reflecting a Saharan globalisation and 
cosmopolitanism from below that now influences and inspires rock bands from 
the northern Atlantic, as Tinariwen and bands of former Tinariwen founding 
members, such as Keddu ag Ossad’s band Terakaft, tour the international 
stages, with their hit CDs available in your record store. However, the sound 
that gained them their international reputation long after the rebellion they 
announced was over remained long subordinate to their message of reflection 
on Tamasheq existence. It developed from a ‘bluesy’ perspective on misery into 
a call for active revolution to all the Kel Tamasheq. The first known song dates 
from 1978. It reflects the misery of Tamasheq existence: 
The world changes, we sit in ruins54 
But slowly the message changed from one of despair to one of hope for a better 
future through common action: 
We pull up our trousers and fasten our belts,  
we no longer accept the mistreatment we have endured55 
In the coming decades, the music from the band Tinariwen or its individual 
members would accompany all major stages of the Teshumara and Tanekra 
resistance movement. But Tinariwen had no monopoly on poetical expression. 
It is open to all members of Tamasheq society. Those who are gifted for poetry 
only gain more renown. All major concepts of the Teshumara and, more im-
portant, the Tanekra movement were expressed in poetry by some of its main 
participants. The lyrics of the Teshumara poets and songwriters, sometimes per-
formed by Tinariwen in their name, described the position of the Kel Tamasheq 
in their world created by the rise of the African independent state, man-made 
ecological disaster, and globalising culture, as well as the rebellion and its 
various stages. 
Alternatives to the Teshumara 
It should be strongly emphasised that the Teshumara was not uniform, and not 
the only alternative to pastoral nomad existence the Kel Tamasheq had. I will 
here deal with some of the aspects of Teshumara diversity and with alternatives 
to Teshumara existence, notably the path of formal education. Then again, the 
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latter path did not exclude Teshumara existence. The two paths could be com-
plementary, as both contributed to the construction of the revolutionary move-
ment, but in practice they were often at odds. 
The region of exile chosen by various Kel Tamasheq had a large influence 
on the form their lives took. The Teshumara described above is particular to 
those who migrated to the Maghreb. The Kel Tamasheq who moved to the cities 
of coastal West Africa had different influences transforming their way of life. 
The Malian Kel Tamasheq who moved to the Ivory Coast, for example, found 
employment on the coffee and cocoa plantations where they worked alongside 
other Malian immigrants. Under these circumstances, a particular Tamasheq 
culture such as the Teshumara, even if it did develop, could hardly be ex-
pressed. Naturally, cultural influences were different as well. Different origins 
within Tamasheq society also influenced personal experiences, or at least the 
chances one was given in a new environment. The number of Kel Tamasheq of 
slave origins moving to the Maghreb was small compared to their numbers 
moving to West Africa. I have noted above that the ishumar in Libya were 
confronted with racism and discrimination. In Libya, those Kel Tamasheq who 
considered themselves as ‘white’ were confronted with a contrary opinion on 
their racial belonging. To the average Libyan, a ‘white’ Kel Tamasheq was 
simply a ‘black’ African. The racial prejudice the ‘black’ Kel Tamasheq of 
slave origins were confronted with in the Maghreb was multiplied, since skin 
colour is differentiated in the Maghreb as in other parts of the world, which 
made them even more ‘black’ than they were in Tamasheq society. The situ-
ation was entirely different in West African places of exile. Here, the ‘black’ 
Kel Tamasheq of slave origins easily blended into the local environment, as 
their physical appearance did not betray them as Kel Tamasheq. The ‘white’ 
Kel Tamasheq on the other hand, stuck out strongly as immigrants. Although 
one might expect that the common experience of ‘otherness’ and foreign racism 
would enhance common ties between Kel Tamasheq of all castes, this proved 
not to be the case, as I discuss in the next chapter. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I indicated that large groups of Kel 
Tamasheq had migrated to Saudi Arabia in the 1940s. Most of these immigrants 
were religious specialists who came particularly from the Kel Essuq tribes. 
Their trajectories differed considerably from those of the ishumar. At present, a 
large Tamasheq community is living in Saudi Arabia, notably in the holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina. Many took up religious professions, teaching Arabic or 
instructing in the Qur’ân. Some even managed to gain positions of considerable 
prestige and wealth. The religious path did not only lead to Mecca and Medina. 
During colonial times (and probably even before), a number of Kel Tamasheq 
had travelled to Egypt where they studied at the prestigious al-Azhar university. 
This institution linked the Kel Tamasheq with developments in the wider Mus-
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lim world and the new directions of Muslim thought in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies, which were known in colonial times as Wahhabism, a term which has 
recently resurfaced to denote ‘fundamentalist Islam’. This particular current 
within reformist Islam gained tremendous popularity in Northern Mali after the 
droughts.56 Not only Western NGOs became active in the region. Muslim 
NGOs such as Secours Islamique became just as active. Although locally they 
were sometimes mockingly referred to as ONG-Mosqué, the impact of these 
NGOs remains largely underestimated. The majority of ishumar was confronted 
with developments in the Muslim world as well in their Maghreb diaspora. 
Although it should be said that the Teshumara has a profoundly worldly 
character, some ishumar were nevertheless influenced by Muslim ways of 
thinking. The Kel Adagh, who until the 1980s formed the majority of ishumar, 
had always been renowned in the Tamasheq world as pious and learned 
Muslims. Their piousness and Muslim learning had originally given them their 
status and place in the overall hierarchy of the Tamasheq community. Even at 
present, piety and punctuality in ritual performance form an important part of 
their identity. It is no wonder that some of the most influential members of the 
Tanekra nationalist movement stressed the importance for Muslim ideas on 
social organisation and the restructuring and rebuilding of Tamasheq society. 
A more important alternative to the Teshumara was the path of formal edu-
cation. In colonial times, completion of primary education was the end of one’s 
education, as the French did not allow the Kel Tamasheq to study further, 
because they thought this would alienate the Kel Tamasheq from their natural 
environment and life as pastoralists. This changed in independent Mali. Inside 
and outside the Adagh and Azawad, the number of Tamasheq Lycéens rose over 
the years. A number of these Lycéens managed to enter higher education in 
Mali at Bamako’s Ecole Nationale Supérieure or the Ecole Nationale de 
l’Administration. Only the Ecole Nationale Inter-Armes – the Malian military 
academy – remained closed to them, as the regime still feared the possible 
effects of well-trained Kel Tamasheq soldiers on the security of the state. A 
large number of Kel Tamasheq pursued higher education outside Mali, mostly 
in Algeria, but sometimes as far away as Khartoum, Nouakchott, France, West 
and East Germany, or the USSR. The educated could join the civil service or 
they could offer their services to Western or Muslim NGOs, which abounded in 
Northern Mali after the droughts. These Kel Tamasheq also lived in cities, were 
exposed to new cultures and ways of thinking, new consumer goods, and forms 
of organisation. But the outcome would be totally different from the Teshumara 
experience. Whereas the ishumar would develop a more and more radical poli-
tical outlook, calling for revolution and independence, the educated Kel Tama-
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sheq had a far more moderate standpoint with regards to the state, but a far 
more radical outlook on the necessary changes within Tamasheq society itself. 
Teshumara and formal education were not mutually exclusive but the 
educational efforts of the ishumar were hard to sustain due to their illegal, 
migratory existence. Most of their interests were in practical skills such as 
mechanics, masonry or electronics, which they acquired on the job. Besides, 
their education was in Arabic (which accounted for part of the Muslim 
influences within the Teshumara), whereas those educated in Mali were 
instructed in French. This greatly hampered communication on intellectual 
matters. Both groups simply used other terms and vocabulary to express them-
selves. To the ishumar, education meant something different than reading, 
writing and calculus. To them, education meant political education and aware-
ness about the situation Tamasheq society found itself in. On the other hand, a 
number of educated Kel Tamasheq lived an ishumar existence for a part of their 
lives as migrants in Algeria, Libya or elsewhere. Although they had more 
steady jobs – often as teachers – they too were confronted with illegality, 
discrimination, expulsions and the other Teshumara experiences. A number of 
these évolué-cum-ishumar would become influential members of the Tanekra 
movement during one period or another. Students based in Europe in particular 
would come to hold a special position during the rebellion, as they dispersed 
information on the rebellion in Europe and provided contact between the rebels 
and various organisations. Nevertheless, animosity between these educated Kel 
Tamasheq and the ‘true’ ishumar ran high. 
I’ve heard you are educated 
We have not seen the benefit 
Our history is known to all 
But you bear no witness 
The tears of the old burn all living hearts 
And the image of children who lost all 
Searching for water without halt 
At deep, dried-up wells 
And you tell me you live normally 
An organised, quiet life 
Since your birth you run in vain 
Surrounded by enemies 
The easy life always escapes you 
Unless you make some effort to commit yourself 
To reach that truth that belongs to you57 
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The nicknames tagged onto the educated by their ishumar counterparts are 
revealing. They were called the ‘Ondit’ or ‘Entoutcas’, after the French expres-
sions on dit que and en tout cas they often used, even when speaking Tama-
sheq.58 They were accused of having knowledge, but not using it for the benefit 
of the Kel Tamasheq; or even of outright betrayal to the Tamasheq cause. 
Finally, they were accused of being acculturated, a strange accusation that could 
easily be inversed. On their part, the educated reproached the ishumar for being 
ignorant of the realities of the world; uncivilised; and pursuing an irrelevant 
cause: National independence for the Kel Tamasheq. Changing society was 
necessary, but not along the vague and half-conceived ideas of the ishumar. The 
educated, in turn, called the ishumar ‘Mazbuten’ from their favourite colloquial 
Arabic expression mazbut, ‘right’, ‘OK’.59 The animosity between both groups 
would reach a head during the rebellion, when the rebels had no choice but to 
let the educated negotiate with the Malian Government in their place, as the 
rebels saw themselves unfit to do so or had been side-tracked by the Malian 
authorities. In any case, in this dispute between ishumar and the educated I have 
entered the arena of political debates within Tamasheq society. 
Tanekra 
The disasters hitting the Kel Tamasheq since the 1960s made it all the more 
clear to the ishumar that Tamasheq independence was necessary. Some of these 
calamities would not have struck if the Kel Tamasheq had been granted their 
own independence, or so the ishumar thought. The Tanekra movement was all 
about regaining that independence, expressed in ideas on territory – akal – and 
the Tamasheq as a people or nation – temust, or tumast. These concepts found 
their essential expression in the Tanekra creed akal iyyan, ittus iyyan, temust 
iyyat: One country, one goal, one people. The slogan is awkwardly similar to 
the Malian national creed ‘un peuple un but une foi’: One people, one goal, one 
religion. Its similarity to the Malian slogan is not coincidental. National slogans 
all over the world resemble each other. The language of nationalism lacks 
originality, but this is made up for in zeal. The zealously pursued goal of the 
Tanekra was to reunite the Tamasheq nation in a liberated independent country. 
Scholars studying Tamasheq society have long argued whether or not a 
Tamasheq country ever existed as a political unity.60 Those in defence of the 
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idea that Tamasheq country forms a political unit focus on the argument that 
political unity lays in common social cultural concepts of politics within a given 
space. Those refuting Tamasheq political unity focus on the lack of central 
political authority in the Tamasheq world with a form of power over all Ta-
masheq country. In other words: The absence of a state. Indeed, it is hard to 
detect a moment prior to the Tanekra nationalist movement in which Tamasheq 
society formed a state-like political entity but the question should be asked 
whether or not one should judge political unity solely on criteria of state 
formation. Where, for example, would that leave the European Union? Political 
unity has never been the prerogative of the state as those in defence of 
Tamasheq political unity argue. But if one does apply state formation criteria as 
a litmus test for political unity in the Tamasheq case, a few observations can be 
made. Prior to colonial conquest, the territorial integrity of Tamasheq country 
had never been under threat, and neither had been their political supremacy in it. 
Although one central power was lacking within the Tamasheq political constel-
lation, the Kel Tamasheq ruled their land with a strong political influence over 
their neighbours, even if these were more or less strong states, such as the 
Fulani jihad-states of Macina or Sokoto. The French colonial armies had con-
quered Tamasheq country with tremendous military superiority over the de-
fenders, and with a speed forestalling Tamasheq attempts to unite in defence, 
which were made nevertheless. When the French retreated, the Kel Tamasheq 
made great efforts to regain independence as a unified Saharan state, if need be 
under French tutelage in the form of the OCRS, or inclusion in Algeria or 
‘Greater Morocco’. This was not achieved and the Kel Tamasheq were faced 
with the dismemberment of their territory between five former colonial states. 
Only then was the need first felt to find ways to regain territorial and national 
independence, and it was concluded that this could only be done if all Kel 
Tamasheq were united. 
The Tamasheq pronoun ‘Kel’, the first part of the name of most tribes and 
clans, literally means ‘those of’ or ‘those from’. Kel Hoggar, Kel Ajjer, Kel 
Adagh, Kel Aïr, or Kel Udalan: Those from the Hoggar, the Ajjer, the Adagh, 
the Aïr, or the Udalan. Since the 1960s, national belonging has slowly crept into 
ideas of identity. The pronoun Kel is now not only used to indicate specific 
social-political groups internal to Tamasheq space, but also to denote one’s 
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belonging to a state. Kel Alger, Kel Libya, Kel Mali, Kel Niger, or Kel Burkina: 
Those from Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger, or Burkina Faso. The Tanekra move-
ment sought to counter this idea of state belonging by developing the idea of 
their own country through the term akal, earth, ground or political territory. In 
the latter meaning it could indicate the territory of a tribal federation. The title 
of the federation’s paramount leader, the amenokal, literally means the ‘owner 
of the land’. But akal could also denote the whole space inhabited by the Kel 
Tamasheq: Akal n Kel Tamasheq, or akal n temust, the land of the people. In 
this meaning too, it had political connotations. Akal n Kel Tamasheq meant the 
country where the Kel Tamasheq rule. This idea can be taken in two ways. It 
can mean the whole territory where Kel Tamasheq exercise some form of 
political power. It can also mean a part of the Tamasheq country where a 
federation or confederation exercises power, independent of other parts of the 
Tamasheq world. Within the Tanekra movement the idea of akal came to 
embody the territory of all the Kel Tamasheq on which an independent state 
was to be created. This idea was already expressed in 1978, at the start of the 
Tanekra, in one of the oldest al-guitara songs: 
Friends, hear and understand me 
You know, there is one country 
one goal, one religion 
And unity, hand in hand 
Friends, you know 
there is only one stake to which you are fettered 
and only unity can break it61 
The concept of akal did not only come to mean country in the sense of a 
unified political territory. The concept came to mean home country or father-
land in the nationalist sense: A country where one’s ancestors had lived, where 
history had been acted out, from which one was now driven away, but to which 
one should return from exile, a fatherland to be loved despite its shortcomings. 
In al-guitara songs, it was referred to as ‘the desert’, ténéré. 
I live in deserts 
where there are no trees and no shades 
Veiled friends, leave indigo [turban] and veil 
You should be in the desert 
where the blood of kindred has been spilled 
That desert is our country 
and in it is our future62 
                                                 
61  Poem by Intakhmuda ag Sidi Mohamed, 1978. Klute, G. 2001, poem 1, Belalimat, 
1996, poem 1. In lines 7 and 8, the poet invokes the idea that the Kel Tamasheq are 
fettered to a stake, which is customarily done with young goats or animals in lac-
tation. It is an idea of imprisonment. 
 REVOLUTION: TESHUMARA AND TANEKRA 221 
In Tamasheq, ténéré has two meanings: Wasteland and solitude. It is the 
barren land, the sand dunes and empty rocks, the ‘real’ desert where life is 
impossible. This is in general not where the Kel Tamasheq live. They inhabit 
the valleys and mountains of the central Sahara where life is possible. The 
ténéré is a threat to physical, mental and social existence. As life is not possible, 
society or socialised space is not present. Inversely, all space where Tamasheq 
social life is absent is ténéré. The drought had transformed much of Tamasheq 
social space, where life had been acted out, to a physical and social desert. 
Physically, because much of the vegetation was destroyed, leaving but barren 
land; and socially, as the Kel Tamasheq had been forced to flee and therefore 
could no longer uphold their community. Socially also, as the herds had 
perished and with them social economic existence as it had been known. The 
second meaning of ténéré is silence or solitude. Those who had to cross the 
desert or had to dwell in it, notably caravan traders, were confronted with this 
silence. Enduring ténéré – silence or solitude, an absence of social structure – is 
one of the harshest experiences a Kel Tamasheq could endure.63 The two 
meanings of the word ténéré became intimately linked in exile. The droughts of 
the 1970s and 1980s had not only shattered Tamasheq existence economically, 
but the resulting dispersion over West Africa and the Maghreb threatened the 
very fabric of Tamasheq existence as a community of people. Most seasonal 
migrants, refugees and ishumar stuck together in their diaspora. As Klute ar-
gues, within their places of exile, the Kel Tamasheq created a cultural and 
economic existence that stayed as close as possible to ‘home’ and their previous 
ways of life.64 But close to home is not home itself, and ténéré, desert, is not 
social space, akal. The droughts and other events had transformed their country 
into a desert and had shattered Tamasheq society. The absence of international 
support for their cause during Alfellaga; the fraud committed with relief aid 
during the droughts; the expulsions from Algeria; the discrimination in Libya; 
and the general lack of welcome in Mali and Niger made one thing clear to the 
ishumar: The Kel Tamasheq had no allies; no exterior help; no welcome; no 
resources. 
The Kel Tamasheq saw that they were alone. The blacks, even the stupid ones, are 
supported because they are numerous. They are organised. If a poor country has a 
problem, the others support it. The same goes for the Arabs. If Mauritania is poor, 
                                                 
62  Poem by Ibrahim ag Alkhabib, 1979. Klute, G. 2001, poem 2. Belalimat attributes 
this poem to the poet Swalam, 1981. Belalimat, N. 1996, poem 4. 
63  Based on Casajus, D. 1987. 
64  Klute, G. 2001: 235-236. 
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the rich Arabs support it. The Kel Tamasheq are one group, closed in on itself in the 
Sahara.65 
The Kel Tamasheq were in the desert and in solitude, wherever they were. 
Under these circumstances, their own country, with all its deficits, took on a 
sanctified air. It was a desert, but it was their desert. And if they could return 
there, rebuilding the country and securing Tamasheq social existence, that 
desert would cease to be one, and would become instead a fertile social space, a 
home country: Akal n temust. 
Etymologically, temust or tumast is a derivation of imas: ‘nature’ or ‘es-
sence’. In the first instance, temust or tumast means ‘identity’ or ‘self’ in Ta-
masheq. Now, temust came to mean ‘nation’, embodied through Tamasheq 
unity in culture. The idea of temust was thus first and foremost cultural, but it 
acquired political meanings later on. Cultural unity was stressed through ele-
ments that had always been criteria of unity within the Tamasheq world, nota-
bly the Tamasheq language and alphabet, called tifinagh. ‘Kel Tamasheq’ 
means ‘those who speak the Tamasheq language’. It was language that had 
always provided both a common identity and a way to express it. Through this 
common language and alphabet, a revived Kel Tamasheq nation was imagined 
which found expression in the politization of the term temust. 
The foundation of our identity is TAMAJAQ. Our language, the central axis of our 
society, is the most precious thing we have to preserve. We can lose everything, but 
if we can save the Tamajaq, we save our specificity. Nothing distinguishes a people 
more from another people than language!66 
In these decades both évolués and ishumar developed the idea that ‘tri-
balism’ or the political competition between federations, clans and castes, had 
foreclosed political unity in the face of colonial conquest, and was now fore-
closing political unity and social change. 
On the eve of the 21st century we more than ever need to ban the caste system that 
has undermined our unity for too long. (...) At the risk of repeating ourselves, we 
insist on certain values, which besides conservation deserve special attention. One of 
those is the political unity of the Tuareg that has suffered so much. (...) One of our 
greatest misfortunes is that we have never succeeded to form a united front. It is 
time we understand that the resistance of a broom is proportional to its number of 
bristles. We should therefore dismiss certain sectarian concepts that honour neither 
those in their defence nor the Kel Tamajaq as a whole.67 
                                                 
65  Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 23/05/1999. 
66  Anonymous, Quand le chef travaille, le peuple le suit (n.d. 1990). Document circu-
lating in Niamey in 1990 among Kel Tamasheq intellectuals. 
67  Ibid. 
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The postcolonial state structure was not the only problem the Teshumara 
perceived as an obstacle to Tamasheq existence. Society itself needed to be 
changed as well. The primary schools founded by the Keita Regime in Mali had 
vehemently propagated socialism. Together with the events of 1963 in the 
Adagh, the Malian educational system left its legacy to the Tanekra movement: 
Social equality. The major issues were the position of the tribal chiefs, the tribes 
and tribal affiliation, and the caste system. The Keita Regime had depicted the 
chiefs as colonial feudal lords working against the interests of the labouring 
Malian masses. The tribal chiefs, who owed their legitimacy to state appoint-
ment, had grown synonymous with the collection of taxes, the forced education 
of children and other forms of coercion. To the members of the Tanekra 
movement the chiefs were part and parcel of what they perceived as the 
persistence of colonialism under new masters. They thus had to be eradicated, 
together with the tribal structure they represented and controlled. Interestingly 
enough, the pre-existing stereotyped views of Tamasheq society held by the 
Malian administration, which had been at the basis of Malian politics in the 
1960s, were now taken over and internalised by members of Tamasheq society. 
Caste identity is based on four main behavioural types: That of the noble; the 
religious expert; the craftsman; and the slave. Of these four, only that of the 
noble had been given a name: Temushagha or noble behaviour (but see infra). It 
is taken for granted that all Kel Tamasheq, even the former slaves aspire to live 
according to the concept of temushagha.68 The proverb ‘ellellu ulhe’ – ‘nobility 
comes from the heart’ (hence not from birth) – is often taken to mean that all 
can acquire nobility and all seek to do so. Temushagha as an expression of the 
fundamental inequality within Tamasheq society became severely contested in 
the 1970s, both implicitly and explicitly. Implicitly because the cultural and 
social habitus of former slaves had profound advantages. Not restrained by 
temushagha the former slaves could take up any job and therewith ensure their 
immediate economic survival. Explicitly because the Tanekra attacked the 
exemplary basis of temushagha power: The tribal structure of society and the 
tribal chiefs at its head. 
Tamasheq society is generally endogamous and tewsit or clan identity is 
connected to caste identity. One’s identity is first and foremost derived from 
one’s tewsit, one’s tribe and clan. It is primarily to these social groups that one 
is loyal. Tewsiten are grouped together in federations, ittebelen. In pre-colonial 
Tamasheq society there existed a constant competition over relative status and 
hierarchy within the expanding circles of power – family, clan, tribe and fede-
ration – based upon personal merit; prestige of one’s lineage; the historical des-
cent of one’s tribe; the number of clans in a tribe; economic wealth (herds); 
                                                 
68  Bourgeot, A. 1990. 
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military power; religious learning; etc. Tewsit identity can be a large bone of 
contention. It is perforce a definition of self, constructed in permanent com-
petition with others, and it is therefore no basis for communal belonging on a 
larger scale. Most ishumar abhorred the clan system. They derived their identity 
from a common experience of marginalisation within their host societies, and 
within Mali and Niger, to which tewsit affiliation had no meaning. At the 
margins of Algerian and Libyan society, the Teshumara formed a network of 
men and women who largely depended on trust in each other and their common 
situation for economic and social survival. Coming as they did from all parts of 
Mali and Niger, and from all the various tewsiten, clan affiliation could not 
serve as a common factor establishing social coherence and group loyalty 
among ishumar. On the contrary, the constant competition over hierarchy 
between tewsiten could only sow discord in their ranks. It should therefore be 
abolished. One of the main rules of the Teshumara was that one should never 
mention someone’s tewsit affiliation. Only the use of someone’s name or nick-
name was allowed. 
One should keep in mind that the problems of Tamasheq society and their 
answers are presented here from the viewpoint of the évolués and the ishumar. 
These groups saw themselves as having escaped these problems, or trying to 
escape them, while they persisted among those Kel Tamasheq still living their 
life as pastoralists. Both the discourse about the problems as well as the various 
discourses about possible solutions are those of an ‘enlightened’ city-dwelling 
elite abroad towards the ‘disadvantaged’ members of their society; the people in 
the bush back home. Having said this, I should immediately soften this state-
ment. Reflections on the problems of society were not reserved for the new 
elites. Consider the following part of a poem composed in the early 1980s by a 
man who was part of neither new elite. He was a simple ‘bush dweller’. 
There are no friends left to count on 
Each for himself and God for all 
From the biggest chief to the smallest child 
I hope the worthy are blessed 
The best for us is righteousness, honour and patience 
The wrong path leads to failure 
A change is needed or the worst will come 
The young say it all, without omission 
But it is left in oblivion 
Not being serious is an evil 
that runs everywhere, grows and spreads 
We need a remedy before it hurts us 
These are my thoughts on a solution 
Where will it be without the respected ones 
who know the right choice and banish evil 
who don’t like the road of lies and banditry 
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Awful is he who thinks he is superior 
who forgets the ties of his mother69 
The poem does not only speak of the wrongs of society, it addresses those 
who propose a solution, the ishumar – ‘the young say it all without omission’. It 
is clear the poet has heard the message of the revolutionary-minded, but he is 
not without reserve towards this message – ‘not being serious is an evil’. The 
Teshumara was not seen as a serious answer to the problems besetting Tama-
sheq society by all ‘bush dwellers’ for whose benefit the revolution was in-
tended. Many regarded the ishumar with their illegal activities in smuggling and 
their revolutionary ideas as a possible cause of more problems, and condemned 
their behaviour – awful is he who thinks he is superior, who forgets the ties of 
his mother.70 
 
Egha, the motor behind the Tanekra 
Shame, honour and revenge are topics with which most anthropologists work-
ing on the Mediterranean region are highly familiar.71 The essence of most 
writing so far, is that these three concepts are intimately linked. My concern 
with these topics is their explanatory value as the motor behind political and 
military action undertaken by the Kel Tamasheq from the early 1970s to the 
second rebellion in the 1990s. I will first explain what egha means. The concept 
has a broad range of meanings that are not easily covered with one term or 
translation. Above I have outlined only a few of the various new political and 
social ideas that took root in Teshumara culture. These various political views 
and projects were sometimes at odds with each other. Egha was the sole feeling 
uniting the ishumar in the idea that something had to be done. 
Egha can well be explained with the recent thinking on anger and revenge 
developed by Peter Sloterdijk. In his book Zorn und Zeit (Anger and time), 
Sloterdijk explores the creation in Europe of a moral economy, and a moneti-
zation of some kind, of pride, anger and revenge, leading to their distillation in 
a discourse of debt and repayment – ‘anger transactions’ – in which anger and 
revenge finally become debit and credit in an ‘anger bank’, where immediately 
experienced anger is conversed in projects of revenge with a possibly higher 
‘return’ in the shape of ‘“programs” claiming world political meaning’.72  
                                                 
69  Part of a poem by Hamayni ag Essadayane, early 1980s. Translated by Lamine ag 
Bilal and myself. 
70  Here, ‘the ties of his mother’ refers to the cross cousins – the iboubashen – to whom 
one owes both economic support and absolute loyalty. 
71  See for this subject: Black-Michaud, J. 1975; Blok, A. 1994; Gilmore, D.D. 1987; 
Jamous, R. 1981; Peristiany, J., ed., 1966; Peristiany, J. & J. Pitt-Rivers, eds, 1992. 
72  Sloterdijk, P. 2007: 74. My translation into English from the Dutch translation of the 
original German. 
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The Nietzsche-inspired critic of the General Economy comes to realise that the 
current economic system is based on the transformation of moral guilt in financial 
debts. It is almost self-evident that the triumphal march of capitalism could only 
begin with this shift. The time of guilt is characterised by the haunting of a 
perpetrator by the consequences of his deeds: Logically, he ends up expiating these 
consequences. ‘Being in debt’, to the contrary, means to spend a time characterised 
by the obligations of repayment. But while guilt burdens us, debts revive us, at least 
when they are accompanied by enterprising energy. Guilt and debts share a crucial 
characteristic: Both produce the effect that the life of those on which they are 
imposed remains tied to the past. Together they create a backward oriented com-
pulsion to connect with the past, causing that past to retain its power over coming 
events.73 
Although in this crucial passage of Sloterdijk’s Nietzsche-inspired thoughts 
he speaks of the transformation of guilt into debts, my understanding of his 
argument leads me to believe that he could just as well speak of the trans-
formation into debt of shame, which is generally seen as guilt’s twin, with 
dishonour being their little sibling. The construction of revenge as a tie that 
connects perceptions of a painful, shameful, anger provoking past with a deter-
mined vision of future repayment works through the transformation of anger in 
hateful revenge projects, on an anger account filled with wrath. This is exactly 
what egha is. Apparently, the Kel Tamasheq preceded Sloterdijk’s thinking in 
analogy on ‘anger banking’. At least when they speak French and use the stand-
ing French expression ‘des comptes à régler’. 
Me: What is egha? 
Keyni: Egha is when you have fought and you have not made up afterwards, you 
have not acquiesced, you have not shaken hands. Then, something remains 
open. That is egha. 
Me: It is an open account? 
Keyni: Exactly, that's it, a settlement of scores. 
Me: Can that take long? Years? 
Keyni: Oh yes, sure, more than that. 
Me: All your life? 
Keyni: Absolutely. 
Me: Even several generations? 
Keyni: Absolutely. Oh, the Tuareg have too many open accounts. There are always 
accounts to balance. That happens too much among the Tuareg. 
Me: Was 1990 egha? 
Keyni: No there was no egha between the Tuareg. Only more recently egha has 
come between us. But there was definitely egha between the Tuareg and the 
blacks. 
Me: Between the Tuareg and Mali? 
                                                 
73  Ibid.: 42. 
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Keyni: Absolutely, only between the Tuareg and the blacks.74 
Egha is first of all an emotion, or rather a complex set of emotions. These 
emotions arise from the perceived inability to counter an act against one’s dig-
nity and honour. When an attack against one’s honour can be immediately 
countered, egha does not arise. The sentiment of egha can be individual in the 
case of an attack against oneself. But egha can also be felt, or be made felt, 
collectively in the case of an attack against a group or an attack against a 
member of the group that is felt as damaging the group. Egha comprises shame 
about having lost face or respect, powerlessness towards the perpetrator, and 
hatred for the perpetrator.75 So far, the concept of egha does not deviate from 
common ideas in the anthropology of honour or the role of revenge. It is a way 
to uphold or restore honour. But egha can be disconnected from honour. In a 
disconnected perception, crucial to understanding the role and use of egha in 
the two Tamasheq rebellions, egha only means powerlessness, the restoration of 
power, and hatred. Let me present an al-guitara song that explicitly deals with 
Alfellaga, the rebellion of 1963: 
Nineteen sixty-three came, and goes on 
Its days came, leaving memories 
It crossed wadis, killing cattle 
It killed the elderly and newborn children 
The brave men died 
Until no one we knew was left 
Only graveyards and loneliness came of it76 
The opening verse of the song is the most crucial: Nineteen sixty-three 
came, and goes on. The verse links the events of Alfellaga directly to the 
moment of composition. What goes on is not the fighting, but the memories it 
invoked, mentioned in line two. The rest of the poem is dedicated to what these 
memories essentially are: The death of loved ones. What the poem does not 
invoke is honour. Although many other poems implicitly appeal to the honour 
of the Kel Tamasheq community, not one does so explicitly. Most poems deal 
with a situation of powerlessness, the wish to regain control over the future of 
Tamasheq existence through revolutionary action and a hatred for those who 
have taken away the capacity to control existence. 
We are mangled between the Arabs and the West 
But even more so by Mali against whom we fight 
                                                 
74  Interview with Keyni ag Sherif. Kidal, 25/05/1999. 
75  This is almost ad verbatim the explanation given to me by Mohamed Lamine ag 
Mohamed Fall during one of our many conversations. 
76  Part of the lyrics of Soixante-trois (1963). Cheick ag Aoussa, Lebanon, 1982. Avail-
able on: Tinariwen, 2007. Aman Iman. World Village, 468067. 
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I have a question for my brothers in my nation 
Consider the situation you are in77 
Egha can thus be seen as an emotion in itself: Hatred and the pain of 
powerlessness and revenge for any wrong committed, not just a wrong against 
one’s honour. In Chapter 4, I have briefly explained the role of egha in Alfel-
laga, the 1963 rebellion. It is possible that feelings of egha were not strongly 
present among the former ifulagen after the rebellion was over. After all, as 
warriors they had been able to immediately counter the strikes of the Malian 
army. But it is clear that those who witnessed Alfellaga as victims, and who 
survived, took strong feelings of egha towards those they saw as ‘the Malians’ 
or ‘Mali’. These victims were the women and children, who hold feelings of 
egha but do not have the social means to act out revenge since they cannot 
wield arms. Revenge is in violence only. Many of these children would later 
join the Teshumara and the Tanekra movement. 
In 1963, Mali rose in its entirety against the Kel Tamasheq and started to kill people. 
They killed the camels too, and put everyone in prison in Kidal. The Kel Tamasheq 
lived through a war that was really (...) a real massacre. And me, I grew up seeing 
all this, and in my youthfulness I grew a really, really strong hatred. In those years 
an incredibly grave obligation fell upon us. It was they who owned us, like hostages. 
All young people of my age in that period had the same hatred, the same sentiment 
of being recolonised, and that caused a great feeling of hate in us.78 
Acts of revenge are not necessarily committed against those who caused the 
original feelings of wrath. They can be inflicted upon others who embody the 
same entity that caused wrath. Thus, the killing of Malian soldiers by the rebels 
in 1990 avenged the death of their parents killed by the Malian army in 1963. 
Of course, revenge provokes new feelings of hatred among those against whom 
revenge has been taken, which can cause new reasons for vengeance. The Kel 
Tamasheq are fully aware of this cycle, but it seems to be accepted as inevi-
table. It is better to avenge and await new actions than to remain passive.  
At first sight, feelings of egha about Alfellaga and the contracted debt with 
Mali would be limited to the Kel Adagh and those few groups outside the 
Adagh who assisted them. It could therefore be argued that the Tanekra 
movement should have been limited to the Kel Adagh if egha was the main 
explanation for the Tanekra and the second rebellion. There are a number of 
arguments to counter this idea. First, as we shall see below, the Kel Adagh 
indeed played a leading role in the Tanekra movement for long, and some even 
                                                 
77  Part of the lyrics of Matedjem Yinmixan (What is this division). Keddu ag Ossad, 
Mali, 1994. Available on: Tinariwen, 2007. Aman Iman. World Village, 468067. 
78  Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 27/12/1998. In the 
Tamasheq original the word egha was used where it is here translated as hatred or 
hate. 
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considered the Tanekra as only their affair, but they were not the only ones 
involved. At the start of the second rebellion, they did not even form the 
majority of fighters. Second, a process of imagining and reification in political 
discourse had assured that egha over Alfellaga had been extended to all of 
Tamasheq society. The bloody crushing of Alfellaga by ‘Mali’ had not only 
touched those directly involved. It had been an attack on the honour and dignity 
of a large part of society, and by extension it had left a feeling of powerlessness 
with all the Kel Tamasheq. In discussing the memories on Alfellaga in Chapter 
4, I have introduced Charlotte Linde’s term ‘induced narrative’. This is exactly 
what happened with stories about Alfellaga among other Kel Tamasheq. Within 
the Tanekra, all were confronted with the pain of the Kel Adagh over Alfellaga 
and, together with its’ stories and poems, made it their own. It was the reifying 
and essentialist language of nationalism, in which large social bodies and poli-
tical entities can be represented as almost anthropomorphic beings that enabled 
the collective feeling of egha to be expressed. In Tamasheq nationalist imagin-
ing, egha over Alfellaga was a contracted debt between Tamasheq society and 
Mali and Niger. Third, Alfellaga was not the only cause of shame, pain and 
powerlessness. The unfolding of events after the droughts of the 1970s – the 
lack of governmental cooperation in strategies to counter the effects of drought, 
and the corruption of civil servants responsible for the distribution of relief aid 
– was set against the national discourse of the Malian state as one of ‘brothers 
in unity’.  
I listen to Mali. He says: “one People, one Goal, one Religion”. I say nothing. I say 
nothing!79 
On the contrary, the Kel Tamasheq had the sentiment that they were on their 
own. In exile after the droughts, the ishumar could compare the wealth of their 
hosts to that of their countries of origin and their own poverty. Many ishumar 
came to see their society as backward, in need of education and more modern 
political organisation. All the problems described above were seen as humili-
ations and signs of Tamasheq impotence. 
The young Kel Tamasheq had seen that Algeria had its independence, the South of 
our country [Mali] had its independence. The Kel Tamasheq had not had their in-
dependence. They had become the slaves of the blacks. The young Kel Tamasheq 
had seen that the other countries in the 1960s and 1970s were constructing villages, 
were modernising, while they remained nomads. That too caused hatred. In the year 
of the drought, they had seen that they had nothing but themselves to protect them. 
There was no country that came to their rescue. That too created hatred.80 
                                                 
79  Interview with Taghlift. Ménaka, 19/04/1999. 
80  Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 23/05/1999. 
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The various currents within the Tanekra movement did not agree on various 
political issues and goals, but what they all had in common was a feeling of 
powerlessness against Mali and Niger. A feeling that Tamasheq society had 
been robbed of its honour in the public exposure of their distress during the 
droughts, the forced begging for food in the refuge camps. A feeling of outrage 
for the massacres perpetrated by the Malian army against civilians during 
Alfellaga, and hatred for the riches of the modern world they somehow could 
not reach. 
Egha as an emotion can be reified and instrumentalised to connect a past 
with a future, via the present, as Sloterdijk’s thoughts on the ‘anger bank’ make 
clear. The anger debt, transformed into hate, remains open until an act of re-
venge has been carried out. In this sense egha had the power to give the 
ishumar meaning to their suffering in the past; their destitution and marginality 
in the present; and a purpose for their future: To unify in a political movement 
that would settle the debt with Mali in kind. They did this in 1990, after fifteen 
years of preparation, carefully managing their anger, their hatred, their wrath, 
their egha. 
Organising the Tanekra, a narrative 
Alfellaga ended in the summer of 1964 with three of its most important leaders 
imprisoned: Zeyd ag Attaher; Ilyas ag Ayyouba; and Elledi ag Alla. Three 
others had managed to escape to Algeria: Younes ag Ayyouba; Amegha ag 
Sherif; and Issouf ag Cheick. In the early 1970s, or perhaps already in the 
1960s, Issouf ag Cheick and Amegha ag Sherif were contacted by the Algerian 
secret services which regarded both men as of possible use in the future and 
therefore to be surveilled.81 Both Issouf ag Cheick and Amegha ag Sherif 
obtained jobs within the Algerian administration, which permitted them to help 
those Kel Adagh who came to Algeria after the end of Alfellaga and during the 
droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. At the end of 1974, Elledi ag Alla, one of the 
two most charismatic and notorious leaders of Alfellaga, managed to escape 
from Bamako where he had been kept under house arrest.82 Travelling by truck, 
                                                 
81  The contacts between Issouf ag Cheick, Amegha ag Sherif and the Algerian secret 
services were confirmed by archive material in Kidal and various interlocutors. 
However, stories about the Tanekra abound with secret services and agents, betrayal 
and individual projects. 
82  After a few initial years of imprisonment, the captive rebel leaders had been put 
under house arrest in Bamako. They were allowed to leave their house on certain 
days, but they were not to leave Bamako. This house arrest was part of the pro-
gramme for national reconciliation set up by the Traoré regime to restore some of 
the wrongs done by the Keita regime. In 1978 Zeyd ag Attaher and the last re-
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Elledi reached Algeria, where he was welcomed by his former brothers in arms 
Issouf and Amegha. Shortly after Elledi’s arrival, a meeting was held in 
Ouargla at the house of Amegha ag Sherif. The meeting was attended by a few 
young Kel Adagh in exile in Algeria and the former leaders of Alfellaga. The 
main issue was the continuation of the struggle for independence from Mali. 
This meeting was the informal foundation of the Tanekra movement. 
Tanekra and Teshumara were not uniform. One cannot speak of one Tane-
kra or one Teshumara movement, but of a number of them. Nigerien ishumar 
had their own networks and their own plans. Dissidents or opponents of the 
Malian and Nigerien regimes from other walks of life were sometimes involved 
in the Tanekra too, while pursuing their own goals again later on. The Tanekra 
in the late 1970s should be seen as a network of like-minded men, who travelled 
from job to job, from town to town. Those ishumar who at one moment lived in 
Libya could live in or travel to Algeria, or to their families in Mali, at another. 
One should not look at the movement as based at a location. Structures 
remained in flux until the 1980s, when they became more fixed. I here present 
the story from the perspective of a Kel Adagh-centred Tanekra, with other 
groups joining them at various times. But a variety of different stories of the 
Tanekra could be told from different perspectives. 
In the early 1970s no formal structure existed yet. The former leaders of 
Alfellaga informally held leadership, particularly Issouf ag Cheick. The main 
decision made at the initial meeting was that a new rebellion should be 
organised in an unspecified future, and that the Kel Tamasheq should be made 
aware of their situation. To these men, the situation was one of egha with Mali. 
It was not taken for granted that all ishumar or refugees would have a political 
understanding of their situation. Therefore they needed to be made aware. The 
verb used in Tamasheq to describe the process of raising awareness is sefham: 
To make understand, from the Arabic fahima, to understand. In French the verb 
sensibiliser and its noun sensibilisation were used. It meant invoking the 
memories of Alfellaga and exposing the current situation the Kel Tamasheq 
found themselves in. The concept of egha was then put in the context of the 
current situation. Consider the following excerpt from an interview with Sallah, 
a cousin to Younes ag Ayyouba, one of the leaders of Alfellaga and one of the 
first organisers of the Tanekra. 
 
 
                                                 
maining rebels were formally tried and sentenced to death. They were not executed. 
Instead, they were immediately liberated under the same national reconciliation 
programme. 
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Me: Why did you enter the Libyan army? 
Sallah: Because my uncle had enturbanned me. My uncle had sent me. I was very 
young. The army is a sort of kindergarten, right? To make the army spirit 
enter your mind and body. 
Me: And what did you think of that, that he sent you to Libya? 
Sallah: (Thinks for a long time) I thought ‘better death than dishonour’. A wound 
heals, but evil does not heal. If a bullet passes through (points at his leg), it 
will heal, but [the memory of the death of] parents do[es] not heal. 
Clearly, Younes ag Ayyouba had invoked memories to Sallah of what had 
happened to Sallah’s family during Alfellaga: The Malian army had executed 
Sallah’s ‘grandfather’ (his uncle’s grandfather) Mohamed Adargajouj in Kidal. 
Sallah had been ‘enturbanned’ by his uncle, which means his uncle had been 
responsible for Sallah’s education as a man of honour. By dressing Sallah with 
his first turban, Younes ag Ayyouba had bestowed male honour upon Sallah, 
which could not be upheld when the egha of the family had not been paid.83 
If a person was perceived to be receptive to the message (and many were), 
and if he was considered to be trustworthy, he would be recruited. The new 
recruit had to swear an oath on the Qur’ân that he would do anything in his 
power to further the cause and that he would not betray the secret existence of 
the movement. Breaking this oath would mean death through the swelling and 
exploding of one’s intestines. Secrecy was of the highest importance. In fact, 
the Tanekra movement was obsessed with secrecy and riddled with rumours 
about secret agents of all kinds who would betray the movement and arrest its 
members. These rumours were not unfounded. Those who were sworn in raised 
consciousness in others on their turn. Ranks were informal or non-existent. 
Leadership was in the hands of a few respected men, such as the former 
ifulagen and a few early younger recruits. Meetings between members were 
informal and could hardly be distinguished from simple meetings between 
friends or ishumar parties at which politics, life and the predicament of the 
Teshumara were discussed. Within the Tanekra, many different opinions were 
brought forward. There were those who were not in favour of an armed up-
rising. There were those who were in favour of the inclusion of other social 
groups in Northern Mali apart from the Kel Tamasheq, such as the Daoussahak, 
the Bidân, the Fulbe and the Songhay. Notably the Daoussahak were in favour 
of this option. One of the main leaders of the Tanekra, former afuleg Younes ag 
Ayyouba, was a Daoussahak. Others were even against the inclusion within the 
movement of Kel Tamasheq from outside the Adagh. These issues were all 
hotly debated. In the end, those in favour of inclusion of other Kel Tamasheq 
won their plea, and from the late 1970s onwards, recruitment of members from 
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other clans and federations accelerated, although many Kel Adagh ignored this 
‘external’ recruitment. Sallah, who I cited above, for example, would leave the 
movement before rebellion broke out, as he was against the idea that the move-
ment would fight for Tamasheq independence only, and not for all the peoples 
in Northern Mali.84 Exclusion went even so far that very few former slaves 
joined the movement. This exclusion is largely explained by fear of betrayal. 
The consequences of this exclusivity would become apparent during the rebel-
lion and after, when the rebels could not count on support from outside their 
own networks. 
The members of the Tanekra soon felt they lacked forms of education that 
could help them in analysing the social-political situation the Tamasheq world 
found itself in. They also felt a lack of educated members who could further the 
movement’s cause. Primarily directed towards action, the movement felt a need 
for ‘politicians’. Therefore, Tanekra members sought contacts with those who 
were educated, the évolués. In the first instance these were sought among the 
Kel Intessar pupils of Mohamed Ali ag Attaher Insar, who had been enrolled in 
the Libyan educational system in the 1940s and 1950s. A number of these still 
resided in Libya. However, they refused to join the movement for fear of losing 
their privileged positions within Libyan society. A number of Kel Tamasheq 
who had been educated in Mali and in Algeria did join the movement. These 
men were involved in contacts with the Algerian and Libyan authorities and, 
later, in the peace negotiations with the Malian state. Some of them, like Ab-
derrahmane ag Galla, Cheick ag Bay, Ibrahim ag Litny, and Acherif ag Mo-
hamed would become influential leaders of the movement. 
In late May 1976, a second meeting was organised in the Algerian town of 
Adrar. At this meeting a name for the movement was established: Mouvement 
de Libération de l’Azawad. The Azawad is a wide valley formed by two large 
wadis, the Azawad and Azawagh, which flow between the Adagh and the Air 
Mountains on the northeast bank of the river Niger, in which they end. Not 
without coincidence, the ishumar saw this valley, stretching over the border 
between Mali and Niger, as the heartland of the Kel Tamasheq. By extension, 
Azawad became synonymous to akal n temust, the Kel Tamasheq homeland. 
The name Azawad can be found in the names of practically all the rebel 
movements that came into existence after the outbreak of rebellion in Mali and 
Niger, even when they were not based in the Azawad. The choice for Azawad 
over, for example, temust (people, nation) indicates that the movement, 
although then still dominated by the Kel Adagh, sought to incorporate other Kel 
Tamasheq. The name chosen is also an indication that the Tanekra had 
incorporated the territorial thinking of a state in its outlook on independence. 
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The importance of territorial sovereignty was inscribed on the movement 
through the logic of the existing states of Mali and Niger. At the heart of the 
problem of Tamasheq unity lay its division between various states, and the 
Tanekra sought to overcome this division through independence from these. 
Therefore, the Tanekra insisted on a name referring to land that would blot out 
all possible divisions between states and therefore between tribes. However, the 
political construct of the existing states appeared too strong to be countered. In 
the 1980s, ishumar from both Mali and Niger found each other in diaspora in 
Algeria and Libya. Both ‘Kel Mali’ and ‘Kel Niger’ joined the movement and 
entered the training camps provided by the Libyan army. In order to counter the 
identity determined by the states they came from, a new name was invented in 
the early 1980s: Kel Nimagiler, a garble of Mali and Niger. Ironically, the name 
taken to indicate the unity of all ishumar opposing the postcolonial states was 
derived exactly from these states. Only in the later days of the rebellions in both 
countries, when the once united movement was at its most fragmented along 
lines of state and tribe did one newly created Nigerien movement refer to the 
Tamasheq nation, the Front de Libération Temust (FLT), in what seemed to be 
an attempt to reinvigorate the idea of the Tamasheq nation. 
Some other important decisions were made in 1976 in the city of Adrar, and 
embedded in the rules of the movement.85 The coming war against Mali would 
be one without peace. The ultimate goal was total independence. The begin-
nings of an organisation were set up. The ishumar world was divided into geo-
graphical sectors: Ouargla; Ghardaia; Adrar; Tindouf; Timeaouine, Djanet and 
Libya; and Mali.86 In each sector, one of the attendants of the meeting would be 
responsible for the organisation of the Tanekra. This person would control fi-
nance; he would be responsible for raising awareness; and he would be the main 
contact person for the movement’s members in his sector. The treasury of each 
sector was funded by a kind of tax. Those sworn in would henceforth contribute 
part of their earnings to the Tanekra organisation. At first, their money served 
to pay for travel; to help out needy comrades; and to buy some material. Later 
the money was used to buy cars and military equipment, which were to be kept 
in hiding until the moment the uprising would start. 
 
Algeria and the POLISARIO 
Despite the sworn secrecy, outside forces were informed about the existence of 
the Tanekra movement. The Algerian ‘secret services’ were in contact with the 
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initial leaders of the movement, the former leaders of Alfellaga.87 In the first 
years after the creation of the Tanekra, the Algerian authorities proposed to its 
leaders that the ishumar would be recruited in the POLISARIO, the movement 
fighting for the Liberation of the Seguiet al-Hamra and Rio d’Oro, or Western 
Sahara. Until 1974 this area remained formally under nominal Spanish admini-
stration, which was restricted to some coastal towns. In 1975, King Hassan II of 
Morocco had organised the occupation of the northern part of the Western Sa-
hara in the famous ‘Green March’, in agreement with Mauritania, which took 
the Southern part. Mauritania withdrew in 1978, after which Morocco occupied 
the remaining part. All this was without the implication of, and to the discontent 
of, the inhabitants of the Western Sahara: The Arab Rgaybat, Tajakant and 
Tekna federations. Their spokesmen had previously negotiated independence 
with Spain. After the Moroccan occupation, the West Saharan independence 
movement POLISARIO, together with a substantial part of the Rgaybat and 
Tajakant population, withdrew to the Algerian town of Tindouf. With Algerian 
support they organised a well-equipped and trained army which at first defeated 
Moroccan occupation forces, but with a heavy loss of life. These lost lives 
could now be replaced with fresh troops: The members of the Tanekra. The 
offer the Algerians made might have provided a welcome way for the Tanekra 
members to gain military experience, but after hot debate, it was declined. The 
main reason for refusal was that the Tanekra felt they had nothing to do with 
either Morocco or the Western Sahara. Their fight was with Mali only. A 
second reason might have been that the Kel Adagh and the Rgaybat of the 
Western Sahara and Drâa valley shared a history of enmity, dating from the 
Rgaybat raids in the Adagh in the 1920s. A third reason for the refusal to join 
POLISARIO was that the younger members of the Tanekra did not trust the 
motives of the former ifulagen in sending their men to this movement as re-
cruits.  
I went to Tamanrasset, where I found Ibrahim ag Agellokelok with his group. They 
explained to me that, in fact, Issouf [ag Cheick, former afuleg and Tanekra leader] 
had not been honest, that he works with the Algerian secret services, that the secret 
services had betrayed Issouf, and that Issouf betrayed us. (...) Algeria needed men, 
they spoke to Issouf, and Issouf said that O.K., he had men and could provide them, 
so that he could receive a commission or an important job.88 
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A first conflict within the Tanekra movement was born only shortly after its 
creation: The conflict between generations. The former ifulagen, the leaders of 
the 1963 revolt, had held power within the movement on the basis of their 
prestige as veteran freedom fighters. But their relations with the Algerian state 
disqualified them in the eyes of the marginalised ishumar. This generational 
conflict had its impact on historical discourse and appreciation of actions later 
on. Former ifulagen complained to me during our talks that the younger men 
had no respect for them and had no esteem for their actions in 1963. 
We only had this problem with the young men who went to Libya, because Libya 
has played an important part in this. It tried to sort of brainwash them. It first tried to 
divide them to better control them for its own purposes. (...) They told them “the old 
men have a colonial mind. You should no longer take into account what they say. 
You should be revolutionary. You should no longer take these men into account”.89 
This was admitted by former ishumar who stated that Alfellaga could not be 
compared to their own actions. The ifulagen had lacked a clear political goal, a 
revolutionary spirit, military skills and tactics. Without wanting to take sides or 
defend anyone, I hope to have made clear in previous chapters that the latter 
accusations are without foundation. The endeavours of the first Tamasheq and 
Bidân politicians in the 1950s, the actions of the ifulagen and those of the 
ishumar generation form a continuity of resistance against outside interference 
in Tamasheq society and a wish for independence. That this wish took various 
shapes and was reformulated according to the historical context does not change 
this. Continuity in resistance is also a powerful historical discourse for most Kel 
Tamasheq. ‘Alfellaga and 1990 are one and the same thing’ was a remark made 
by many of my interlocutors, regardless of their walk in life. But this con-
structed continuity in historical discourse could not prevent internal conflict in 
the moment. 
 
Libya 
Originally set up and centred in Algeria, the Tanekra movement would gain 
strength in Libya in the 1980s. The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahuriyya, as the country is officially called, is rich in one particular re-
source: Oil, but severely lacks another: Labour. In the 1970s, the country’s 
population grew from roughly 1,986,000 to 3,042,000, which included a rough 
estimate of 500,000 African immigrants.90 The latter are desperately needed to 
make up for the shortages in labour, despite the social tension their presence 
created due to their sometimes higher level of education and, strangely enough, 
their cultural similarity (most migrants are from the Arab world and Pakistan), 
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which makes them competitive in the same job market as the Libyans them-
selves.91 In the late 1970s, a large number of ishumar preferred working in 
Libya to working in Algeria, as both the chances of finding employment and the 
offered wages were higher than in Algeria. From the late 1970s onwards the 
Libyan leader Qadhafi and the Libyan secret services supported the Tamasheq 
national movement but, as the Algerians had before them, Libya intended to use 
the Tanekra for its own international adventures, in Chad and Lebanon, and as a 
trump card in its own regional politics, notably towards Niger. When no longer 
needed, the Libyan authorities dropped the Tanekra movement or actively 
worked against its existence. But where the Algerians had failed to use the Ta-
nekra in its POLISARIO policy, the Libyans succeeded to co-opt the Tanekra 
with the agreement of the organisation itself. The Tanekra activists knew very 
well that they were being used, but looked upon Libyan support as a chance to 
receive military training and combat experience, and to organise their own 
movement. Contrary to popular belief, Libya never provided the movement 
with arms or supported it actively when hostilities finally broke out in Mali or 
in Niger. Their only remaining support in the 1990s was the continued use the 
movement could make of training camps on Libyan territory. From 1979 on-
wards, contacts between Tanekra members and representatives of the Libyan 
authorities would lead to the establishment of a more formally structured move-
ment. At the end of 1979, through the mediation of Malian Bidân, the Libyan 
representatives of the Tanekra met a Libyan researcher at the Libyan Research 
Centre for Saharan Affairs. This researcher, Mohamed Sa’îd al-Qashât had 
previously been a Libyan contact for POLISARIO. During the 1980s al-Qashât 
would collaborate with a number of Tamasheq intellectuals and Tanekra mem-
bers. The result of this collaboration was the publication of a book in 1989 en-
titled at-Tawâriq, ‘arabu s-Sahrâ’i l-Kubrâ’ (The Tuareg, Arabs of the Great 
Sahara). This book is one of the very few widely distributed books on the Kel 
Tamasheq they read themselves. Although the book has a highly folkloristic 
content, it does mention the fights of the Kel Tamasheq against colonial occu-
pation, including a small chapter on what was then the most recent struggle: 
Alfellaga, including a short interview with former afuleg, Elledi ag Alla. The 
book is in some respects a source of nationalist inspiration. However, the book 
is not the most important contribution al-Qashât made to the Tamasheq cause. 
His most valuable asset was his connection to the Libyan authorities, which 
resulted in structural support of the Libyan Jamahuriyya to the Tanekra organi-
sation. 
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The creation of the FPLSAC 
In 1980, the organisation of the Tanekra gained momentum. A first contact be-
tween the Tanekra and the Libyan authorities was made through Mohamed al-
Qashât, but other contacts were made with the Libyan army. The organisation 
also came in contact with other dissidents such as Nigerien Arabs and Kel 
Tamasheq ishumar; Nigerien Sawabists, an outlawed Nigerien opposition party; 
and the survivors of the aborted Nigerien coup d’état of 1976. In their turn, 
many of these dissidents were in contact with either Mohamed al-Qashât or the 
Libyan army. In September 1979, about seventy delegates of all these informal 
opposition networks gathered in the Libyan city of El Homs, under the aegis of 
Mohamed al-Qashât, to discuss their various projects and to weld them together 
into one movement. The congress of El Homs resulted in the creation of al-
Jebha ash-Sha’biyya li Tahrîr as-Sahara’ al-Kubra al-’arabiyya al-Wasta: The 
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Greater Arab Central Sahara, which is 
best known by the French acronym FPLSAC: Front Populaire pour la Libé-
ration du Sahara Arabe Central. At the head of this movement were elected a 
number of Nigerien Arabs and Kel Tamasheq. The presidency fell to Limam 
Chafi, a merchant of mixed Bidân and Tamasheq descent, based in Niger and 
Mauritania, who had allegedly been involved in the aborted coup d’état in Niger 
in 1976, and who did not have much standing or reputation among the ishumar. 
Military matters were delegated to a certain Hassuna Jafri, a Nigerien Arab. 
Hassan Faraji, a Malian Bidân who had integrated the Tanekra at an early stage, 
was responsible for development. The Libyan authorities furnished the move-
ment with an official office in Tripoli. 
Two things stand out in the creation of the FPLSAC. First, the name of the 
movement speaks of the Arab Central Sahara. No reference is made to the Kel 
Tamasheq. Second, leadership and dominance within the movement lay with 
the Nigerien Arabs and not to the Malian Kel Tamasheq. One can first of all see 
a Libyan logic behind this structure. Libya shares a border with Niger, but not 
with Mali. The dominance of Nigerien elements within the FPLSAC can be 
explained through the interest Libya had in influencing the policies of its direct 
southern neighbour. Libyan interests in the movement were in furthering a pan-
African-Arab cause, the goals of Libyan international politics at that moment.92 
In the 1970s Libya had promoted the pan-Arab cause in trying to unify the 
Jamahuriyya with a number of other Arab states: Egypt; Syria; Tunisia and 
Morocco among others. These unifications all ended without ever being very 
effective. Qadhafi now turned to sub-Sahara Africa, but without forgetting the 
Arab element. His aim was to unify African countries, starting on the common 
base of geography (Africa), religion (Islam) and language (Arabic). The pre-
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sence of a large number of Arab peoples in Africa could unify the Arab and 
African world. The FPLSAC, explicitly referring to a native Arab presence in 
Sub Sahara Africa, fitted with this policy.  
The FPLSAC was not only given an office for its political bureau, the move-
ment got access to military training camps as well. In the 1980s, Libya hosted 
several liberation movements, the best known being the IRA, the ANC and 
several Palestinian groups. In theory, each group had its own camp under 
Libyan auspices, but in practice the Libyans provided infrastructure, material 
and food only. A first training camp for the Kel Tamasheq, called Camp an-
Nasr, was opened in December 1980 near the village of Ben Walid (therefore 
the camp was also known as Ben Walid). By March 1981 the camp lodged an 
estimated 2,700 recruits. When the camp was closed to the Kel Tamasheq in 
late 1981, an estimated 4,000 recruits had received basic military training.93 The 
camps were not only a male experience. In the camps, Tamasheq women, but 
also other African women, cooked and cared for the recruits, as the camp was 
shared with freedom fighters for other causes, such as the Sudanese. The re-
cruits were trained by Libyan, Palestinian and Lebanese officers. The training 
included instruction in personal arms and unarmed combat but focused most on 
physical endurance through long marches. On a voluntary basis, recruits could 
take evening classes in literacy, history and revolutionary instruction, mostly 
through Qadhafi’s Green Book. In early 1981, a second camp was opened, 
Camp Badr, which lodged the families of the recruits. 
 
Lebanon 
By the end of 1981, the camp at Ben Walid was closed. There are a number of 
possible explanations for this closure. Pierre Boilley has inscribed the logic of 
the closure within the international setting of Libyan politics. Qadhafi’s in-
volvement in the Chadian Aouzou conflict, together with the involvement of the 
Nigerien Kel Tamasheq in the Tanekra, notably the former leaders of the 1976 
coup attempt, had deteriorated Qadhafi’s relations with Niger, leading to diplo-
matic rupture in 1981. The subsequent attacks of Kel Tamasheq commandos in 
Mali at Fanfi and at the uranium mines of Arlit in Niger (infra) further damaged 
strained relations. Finally, in 1982, Libya stopped its support for the Kel Tama-
sheq and perhaps other African movements in view of the 19th OAU summit, 
which Qadhafi intended to host.94 My Kel Adagh informants also placed the 
closure of the camp in an international context, but did not fail to link it with 
their own activities. According to Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall, the 
camp was closed for the following reason. In January 1981, the FPLSAC exe-
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cutive office met with Elledi ag Alla and Issouf ag Cheick, the leaders of the 
Tanekra movement in Algeria. Elledi and Issouf proposed to ask the Algerian 
Government to start the war of liberation from Algerian territory. To this end, 
they wrote a formal request to the Algerian Government, which was transmitted 
by the Libyan authorities in the movement’s name. The Algerian Government 
refused and threatened to break its relations with Libya if the Libyans would not 
stop their support for the movement. When Camp an-Nasr closed down the 
recruits were presented with a number of options: Return to Mali or Niger; stay 
in Libya as migrant workers; enroll in the regular Libyan army (as Libyan 
nationals); or enlist for training and combat in Lebanon with the Palestinian 
forces. An estimated five hundred recruits chose the last option. They were first 
sent to Syria for intensive training. Arriving in Damascus, about three hundred 
recruits backed out. They had either become fearful of what lay ahead of them 
or, as one informant (who had left) stated, because they had not been informed 
about where they were going and why they were going there in the first place 
when they joined the group.95 They presented themselves at the Algerian em-
bassy and asked for repatriation to Algeria, which was arranged. About two 
hundred fighters remained in the Middle East. They were first trained in the use 
of heavy arms, armoured vehicles and tanks, and then sent to Lebanon, where 
they joined various Palestinian units. 
We had accepted our enrolment in the Palestinian revolution. We accepted 
it. Five hundred people had signed documents for this in Libya. We left with 
five hundred people on a military aircraft to Syria, where the Palestinian bases 
were. We were with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General 
Command. Its Secretary General: Ahmed Jibril. We stayed there until we had 
finished our training in heavy arms: Tanks, howitzers, Katyushas 40 and 12 
calibres, Russian 130 mm howitzers, Russian tanks, machine guns, anti-aircraft 
missiles, American cannons that shoot tanks, calibre 106. We did heavy arms 
and rockets, anti-vehicle mines and anti-personnel mines. Five hundred com-
batants. We were divided. Three hundred were discouraged and asked for their 
return to Algeria. The Secretary General Ahmed Jibril accepted this. They re-
turned to Algeria, to Tamanrasset. After six months they were discharged. We 
stayed there, me and my friends Iyad, Latfi, and Abdurahman, we stayed in the 
war. We were divided into groups of twenty, thirty, forty, ten, between the 
movement’s posts at the Israeli-Lebanese border. From the start of the war until 
the end of the war, we stayed.96 
To those veterans of the Lebanese period, their enrollment in the Palestinian 
movement had nothing to do with loyalty to Qadhafi, sympathy to the Palesti-
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nians or hatred for Israel. It was simply a chance to gain further military skills 
and combat experience, needed for their own fight to come with the Malian 
army. After their training, the fighters were based in Beirut or in the Bekaa 
valley, where they served mostly at air defence units, together with other Li-
byan volunteers. 
Eight days we suffered 
F-16 flew here, it shot, we shot 
We had arms but we were few 
The Minta roared like thunder 
Six SAM launchers were erect 
They were bombed, F-16 flew over 
This is no affair for a boy who says 
he studied history and pretends to know 
Friends, I give you the news 
F-16 is hot as hell fire 
Hey, he who has one million Dollars 
should buy an F-16 and hide it 
until the day we battle all Africans together97 
The Lebanese experience would end rather well for the involved ishumar. In 
June 1982, Israel launched operation Peace for Galilee, which would end the 
military presence of the PLO in Southern Lebanon after heavy fighting in both 
the Bekaa valley and Beirut, where the units of the ishumar were centred. With 
the withdrawal of the PLO came an end to Tanekra presence in the Middle East 
as well. How exactly is unclear, but the Tamasheq battalion was shipped with 
other expelled PLO fighters to Tunis, where the PLO set up its new head-
quarters and from where the ishumar returned to Libya. They had lost one man 
in battle, while five had been taken prisoner by the Israelis during their Le-
banese adventure. These prisoners were eventually released, allegedly through 
the mediation of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba’s wife Wassila, and 
returned to Libya as well.98 In return, the two hundred Lebanon veterans had 
gained military skills and tactical knowledge that would be of great value in the 
rebellion to come. 
 
Restructuring the movement 
Ishumar narratives about the years of preparation in exile are rife with secret 
services and secret agents of unspecified kinds, mostly from Algeria and Libya. 
Most of these vaguely defined outside forces are called in when historical 
gossip and stories of distrust and treason are told. They are often the supporters 
or instigators of quarrels and outright fights between various ishumar factions. 
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They serve as an explanation for a development that still puzzles and embitters 
many former organisers of the Tanekra: Why was there so much infighting, 
discord and outright hostility within the movement? Whereas in theory the 
Tanekra strove towards the unity of all the Kel Tamasheq in one national 
movement, in practice this unity was not reached at all. What foreclosed unity 
between all the Kel Tamasheq was a substratum of older political practices 
within Tamasheq society: The wish for hierarchy; and the validation of group 
affiliation through confrontation along the faultlines of tribe and clan. Internal 
political culture ingrained the idea that unity had to be reached under the aegis 
of one group. But which group? That would remain constantly open to dispute, 
leading to open friction and even conflict between factions, based on tribal 
affiliation. 
The FPLSAC episode had as its only salutary effect the training of a large 
number of Kel Tamasheq soldiers. But most of the Malian and Nigerien 
ishumar, especially those who had volunteered for Lebanon, did not see the 
FPLSAC representing their cause. In Lebanon, the ishumar had maintained an 
organisation of their own, in close contact with Palestinian hosts of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A few documents on the structure of both 
FPLSAC and the organisation in Lebanon survived as correspondence in the 
PLO archives, which were captured by the Israeli army during operation Peace 
for Galilee.99 From the documents, it becomes clear that the Tanekra organi-
sation in Lebanon had gained organisational strength, and that it had discon-
nected itself from the defunct FPLSAC. The official dominancy of Nigeriens 
and Arabs within the FPLSAC, as well as the name of the movement itself, 
were looked upon with disfavour by many Kel Adagh Tanekra leaders. As the 
volunteers in Lebanon wrote to their Palestinian superiors:  
At the congress of el-Homs, at which the organisation was founded, the selected 
representatives did not represent the people, neither in their personalities, nor in 
their targets. And it happened that they did not listen to the representatives of the 
people, despite what they said as members of the executive office. As an example of 
this: The person that was appointed as general secretary of the organisation was not 
present at this congress and was not known among the people, nor among its repre-
sentatives.100 
During the early 1980s, the Tanekra movement in Libya and Algeria re-
mained divided and loosely structured. Treason and internal mistrust had frac-
tured the fragile FPLSAC structure. Limam Chafi, its Secretary General, had 
been arrested in Algeria. The Malian Government had been informed of the 
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Tamasheq movement, were published. Israeli, R., ed., 1983. Documents 56, 57, 58. 
100  Letter by the Tanekra representatives in Lebanon to the PLO. Document 56A-1 
(dated October 1981). In: Ibid. 195. Translated by Paul Schrijver. 
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existence of the movement, notably by a premeditated strike in Mali and Niger 
by a small group of ishumar in 1982. These men, apparently on their own ini-
tiative, had attacked an administrative post at the village of Fanfi, Mali, and at 
the uranium mines at Arlit, in Niger. Whereas the attackers at Fanfi were 
largely unarmed, those at Arlit had firearms.101 Both attacks failed and a number 
of assailants were arrested and interrogated, which to some extent exposed the 
existence of the Kel Tamasheq network. As a result, the FPLSAC office at 
Tripoli was closed and a number of its members were arrested. 
However, in March 1983 two new training camps were opened in Libya for 
Kel Tamasheq recruits: Camp Ithnân Mars and Camp Rawd, both in the vicinity 
of Tripoli. This time, the camps were explicitly open only to Nigerien Kel Ta-
masheq, but a number of the Lebanon veterans integrated the camps, and soon 
they were responsible for organisation and part of the instruction. Many of the 
new recruits were Malian Kel Tamasheq holding Nigerien passports. The re-
cruits were deployed in Qadhafi’s campaigns in Chad where he was heavily 
immixed in the complicated policies of rebellion in that country.102 Again, the 
Libyans used the Kel Tamasheq for their own political intentions. The ishumar 
were fully aware of this, but they did not mind. Their gain was military 
experience, and the creation of a well-trained army of their own. The Kel 
Tamasheq who soldiered in the Libyan campaigns in Chad received a salary of 
30,000 Libyan Dinar. One third of this salary was handed over to the organi-
sation of the newly recreated movement, which was now called al-Jebha li 
Takhrîr ash-Shimâl al-Mali: The Liberation Front of Northern Mali.103 The 
movement’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, and a number of his comrades had moved 
back to Algeria and Mali. The money that was raised among the Kel Tamasheq 
soldiers was used to buy cars in which the leaders toured Northern Mali to find 
new recruits. These were amply available, due to the second drought that struck 
Mali and Niger in those years. The disaster of 1973 repeating itself on a smaller 
scale, paired with the same problems of unequal aid distribution and corruption, 
gave ample proof to the Kel Tamasheq of the need to topple the Traoré Govern-
ment and to break loose from Mali. 
Despite the organisational efficiency of the Lebanon veterans internal di-
visions and treason undermined the effective organisation of the Tanekra. The 
Tanekra started out as a movement of the Kel Adagh looking for a way to uplift 
egha and to rekindle the rebellion they had started in 1963. From the beginning, 
a small number of Kel Tamasheq from other clans or federations had joined. 
                                                 
101  Interviews with Fituk. Ménaka, 30/03/1999; and Alhadi Alhaji, Niger 1995. Courte-
sy of Nadia Belalimat who conducted this second interview. 
102  The recruits were most likely deployed in support of the GUNT’s attempts to take 
over the BET region and Faya Largeau, 1983, 1984. Buijtenhuijs, R. 1987: 377-385.  
103  Interview with Taghlift. Ménaka, 19/04/1999. 
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Leadership remained in the hands of the Kel Adagh, but it was contested from 
the 1980s onwards, especially after the opening of the two new training camps 
in 1983. While leadership in the newly restructured movement and within the 
camps rested in the hands of Lebanon veterans of Kel Adagh origins, a sub-
stantial number of the new recruits came from other clans form the Azawad or, 
to a smaller extent, from the Timbuktu area. These new recruits contested Kel 
Adagh supremacy within the movement. They did so on the basis of the very 
revolutionary principles developed within the movement on social equality. If 
all are equal and the clans should be abolished, then why should leadership 
remain in the hands of men from one particular tribal federation? Dissent and 
private initiatives abounded, due to the internal friction between the tribes. Dis-
trusting the aims of the Kel Adagh, Tanekra members from outside the Adagh 
organised into separate groups and started to buy arms at the Libyan border 
with Chad and Niger, at the notorious arms market at the El Salvador Pass.104 
The ongoing conflicts in Chad and Sudan and the high turnover of weaponry 
provided the local arms markets with ample supply in Kalashnikovs and ammu-
nition. 
There were problems, there were constraints. We, Iyad and the others, we wanted 
the Kel Adagh Kel Tamasheq to do it all. When I speak of the Adagh, at the time, 
we had an idea. That is to say that we believed it to be a work for the Adagh people. 
This work did not even concern the other Kel Tamasheq, because it was us, it was 
our job to revolt and we believed the other Kel Tamasheq would not agree with that 
and that they thought it concerned them as well, that it concerned all. To us, it was 
the Kel Tamasheq of the Adagh who were most concerned.105 
The Nigerien members of the movement also reorganised themselves on the 
basis of their region of origin and common nationality in the Front Populaire 
pour la Libération du Niger: FPLN. Because Camp Ithnân Mars and camp 
Rawd, which had been explicitly opened for the Nigeriens, had been taken over 
by the restructured Malian Tanekra, the FPLN was provided with a new camp 
near the city of Waw al-Kabir in 1984. In this camp, the Nigeriens formed the 
majority and thus the division between ‘Kel Mali’ and ‘Kel Niger’ was finally 
established, the united Kel Nimagiler did no longer exist.106 Internal friction 
was not limited to Malian and Nigerien nationals, or between members of 
different Malian tribes or social groups with a different status. Within the Kel 
Adagh leadership of the Tanekra, friction and fighting occurred as well, on 
various levels. The most strenuous conflict was between the tribes of the Idnan 
and Ifoghas. In Kel Adagh historical narrative, the history of Idnan-Ifoghas 
                                                 
104  Interviews with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall, Kidal 27/12/1998; and with 
Baye ag Alhassan, Ménaka 11/04/1999. 
105  Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 27/12/1998. 
106  Interview with Alhadi Alhaji. Niger, 1995. Courtesy of Nadia Belalimat. 
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animosity is now presented as complicated and dating from the early colonial 
days. The Ifoghas form the largest tewsit within the Adagh, followed by the 
Idnan. At the advent of colonial conquest, both tribes held a precarious power 
balance, which was upset when the colonial administration gave preference and 
political power to the Ifoghas. Their leader, Attaher ag Illi, was made amenokal 
over the federation and therefore held power over the chiefs of other tewsiten. 
The Ifoghas at present contend they had held formal power well before the 
arrival of the French. They had created an ettebel, or political federation, in the 
early 19th century. The Idnan do not deny the existence of this Ifoghas fede-
ration, but they do deny that it had power over the Idnan. Some Idnan even 
argue that they had made their own ettebel – the drum, symbol of political 
power – shortly before French arrival, but that the French denied this ettebel its 
legitimacy as symbol of supremacy over the other tribes because they preferred 
the Ifoghas at the head of the federated Kel Adagh. In short, the struggle over 
power within and over the Kel Adagh federation is presented to date back at 
least a century. This power struggle gained new historical context and meaning 
in the 1980s in the struggle over leadership within the Tanekra. In reading the 
following interview excerpt with Kel Ifoghas Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed 
Fall, one has to keep in mind that of the four initial leaders of the Tanekra – the 
former ifulagen Issouf ag Cheick, Amegha ag Sherif, Younes ag Ayyouba and 
Elledi ag Alla – the two most important were Idnan and that the younger men in 
the movement, notably those of Ifoghas descent, challenged their power and 
intentions. 
In 1985, Algeria started to understand what was happening. Algeria still worked 
with Issouf and they asked Issouf: “you told us that you were the leader of all the 
Kel Tamasheq and now we see that the movement develops more and more”. Issouf 
told them: “That is because of the Ifoghas. They are stronger than I am, I cannot 
command them”. The Algerians asked him what to do. He replied that they should 
be weakened and to weaken them, all their leaders should be arrested. The rest 
would be weak. They arrested about eighty men among the leaders. The soldiers 
burned all the houses at Tamanrasset, at Timiaouene, at Djanet, the houses of the 
Ifoghas. They started to beat people up and to arrest the Ifoghas or their parents. The 
Ifoghas left for Libya and for other countries. That was in October 1985. It con-
tinued until August 1986.107 
This is generally known as the ‘Tamanrasset War’, after its main location in 
this Algerian town. The story is here presented from an Ifoghas point of view, 
and the allegations made at the address of the Idnan should be seen in this light. 
What is clear, however, is that during 1985 a large number of Ifoghas and other 
Kel Tamasheq in Tamanrasset were arrested. Also, a small number of murders 
                                                 
107  Interview with Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall. Kidal, 27/12/1998. Idnan inter-
locutors were less inclined to elaborate on this episode. 
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or ‘executions of traitors’ were committed that year.108 In 1986, the Algerian 
Government forcefully expelled about 6,000 Malian Kel Tamasheq and another 
2,000 Kel Tamasheq from Niger to their respective countries. Perhaps these 
expulsions too can be seen in the light of the ongoing conflicts between ishumar 
in Algeria, which threatened the security in Tamanrasset and other Algerian 
cities. Whatever the facts may have been, the story is now interpreted in the 
context of the ongoing struggles for power and dominancy within the move-
ment of various currents, and especially between various tewsiten. Despite all 
ideals, discourse and rhetoric on ‘one country, one goal, one people’, unity was 
far from a daily reality. Among the ishumar as among their less revolutionary 
inclined kindred, tewsit infa temust: Tribe prevailed over nation. 
The later years of the Tanekra 
Despite dissent within the movement, the organisation slowly gained strength. 
The number of trained fighters with ample combat experience steadily increased 
until the return in 1986 of the Tamasheq units who had fought in Chad in the 
Libyan campaigns. In 1987, the movement was again renewed, now also 
spreading to Mali. Small groups of ishumar returned there and settled in and 
around Kidal, Gao and Ménaka. Weapons were bought and hidden in Mali for 
the moment rebellion would break out. Nevertheless, the inter-tribal conflicts 
had resulted in a more or less formalised division of the fighters into units based 
on tribal affiliation. The fighters were grouped in three battalions. The Kidal 
battalion consisted of Kel Adagh. The Ménaka battalion consisted of fighters 
from that area. A third battalion, the Gao battalion, consisted of fighters from 
the surroundings of Gao city. Members of these battalions, as well as part of the 
movement’s leadership positioned themselves in their respective areas. How-
ever, the Malian regime had remained on alert with regards to the movements of 
the ishumar in Mali. The failed attacks in Mali and Niger in 1982 and the attack 
in Niger in 1985, together with constant cases of treason within the movement, 
had made the Traoré Regime aware that something was planned. Possibly, con-
tacts between the movement and the Libyan and Algerian secret services, and 
their respective contacts with the Malian and French secret services, had con-
tributed to Malian knowledge of the movement. On 9 April 1990, the regional 
security service in Gao arrested a member of the organisation. After interro-
gation he admitted to membership of the Tanekra movement. On 23 May 1990, 
the arrest of seven other members and the capture of an arms deposit further 
damaged the movement’s plans.109 The Malian security forces also arrested the 
                                                 
108  Bourgeot, A. 1990. 
109  ‘Etat d’urgence à Gao’. Les Echos, 28/09/1990. 
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larger part of the Kidal battalion put in place over the previous year. By luck, 
the Ménaka battalion was spared, but it was sparsely armed. The movement 
now had to choose between starting preparations all over again and attacking. 
On 27 June 1990 the Ménaka battalion successfully attacked several posts of the 
army and the administration in the Ménaka area. The second rebellion had 
begun. 
Epilogue  
Hot on the heels of the Tinariwen Tunng caravanserai around the UK in March, the 
full 7 piece Tinariwen band will head off to Australia for four dates, including 
Sydney Opera House and Byron Bay Blues Festival. After that it’s a hop across the 
Pacific to play at San Francisco Jazz Festival and Coachella, the premium American 
rock fest.110 
While Teshumara is no longer a very popular concept in Northern Mali, its 
worldwide renown has only grown after the rebellion of the 1990s ended. 
Idealised as the original ‘African blues’ or ‘desert blues’, the music of the 
Teshumara now forms an inspiration to a number of bands and performers from 
the Northern Atlantic in search of new sounds, such as Arctic Monkeys, Soul 
Williams, or Tunng. In the late 1990s the Tamasheq community had to be re-
conciled with itself after years of internal bloodshed (infra). The musicians of 
the Teshumara played in smaller groups or individually at parties that were 
staged in the houses of the influential members of the Tamasheq community in 
Bamako, Kidal, Tessalit or Tamanrasset. As a band, Tinariwen played at the 
various tribal gatherings called takoubilt in Tamasheq, that were organised in 
the major cities in the North, under the aegis and with the financial support of 
various embassies, notably the US, Canada, the Netherlands, and France. There, 
disputes were solved, arms were handed over in an effort to promote safety for 
the nomad community, and festive races and matches were organised in an 
effort of reconciliation. In 1997 the members of Tinariwen met with the French 
band Lo’Jo in Bamako, who were impressed with their sound and who invited 
them to the Festival Toucouleur in France in 1999. The takoubilt of 1999 in 
Tahabanat remained a local affair but in 2000 the takoubilt was organised in Ti-
n-Essako at the edge of the Adagh under the name Festival au Désert. The 
festival attracted a small number of tourists and journalists and featured Lo’Jo 
as the first foreign act. With their help, Tinariwen recorded its first CD, the 
Radio Tisdas Sessions (2001), named after the local radio station in Kidal. It 
was only then that Tinariwen started to include percussion and bass in their 
previously strictly guitar and vocals-based music. The 2001 issue of the Festival 
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248 CHAPTER 5 
au Désert in Tessalit remained local again, while the takoubilt of Anderambou-
kane, called Tamadasht (horserace in Tamasheq, the main festive event) was of 
greater importance. The Tamadasht would grow into an annual festival, which 
remained true to the original character of the takoubilt: A tribal and political 
gathering to settle local matters. In 2002, the Festival au Désert was organised 
in Essakane, near Timbuktu. The emphasis was no longer on reconciliation and 
local affairs, but on tourism as the festival was organised by the Tamasheq tour 
operators of Timbuktu, who had gained experience in these events during the 
‘Timbuktu 2000 Caravan’ event, organised at the eve of the new millenium. By 
that time the mythical city had already been discovered by tourists, who had 
been introduced to the ‘desert blues’ of Ali Farka Touré through his album with 
blues guitarist Ry Cooder: Talking Timbuktu. The fame of the Festival au 
Désert had quickly spread among the planetary muscial elite for its setting, its 
intimacy and the local bands. Among the participating artists at the 2002 
Festival au Désert was legendary Led Zeppelin lead singer Robert Plant, who 
introduced Tinariwen and their sound to the Anglophone world of rock music. 
In 2005 Tinariwen won the prestigious BBC Radio 3 World Music Award. 
Touring the world stages, playing to crowds of over 50,000, Tinariwen aban-
doned their jeans, T-shirts and sneakers for more ‘traditional’ festive garments: 
Two- or three-piece boubous and huge indigo eghewid, the very same indigo 
veils and turbans they once urged their brothers to abandon. Every counter-
culture becomes mainstream. As their fans outside the Tamasheq world do not 
understand their lyrics, sound and image become more important. The Tinari-
wen website (www.tinariwen.com) therefore emphasises the history of the band 
and the meaning of their lyrics. The songs that are recorded on Tinariwen’s four 
studio CD’s and one live DVD, and on those of a number of bands of former 
Tinariwen members and other ishumar, such as Terakaft and Toumast, are 
largely still the songs from the days of the Teshumara and the rebellion. With-
out knowing it, a worldwide audience listens to a recording of decades of Kel 
Tamasheq history. 
 
 6 
Rebellion: Al-Jebha (1990-1996) 
On 28 June 1990 started what is now known in Mali as ‘The Second Tuareg 
Rebellion’, or ‘The Problems of The North’. The Kel Tamasheq, especially the 
Tanekra members involved, refer to this period in their history as al-Jebha: the 
Arabic term for front or rebellion, but also as Tanekra, the Tamasheq word for 
uprising. The rebellion would last until March 1996, when the conflict was 
ceremoniously ended with ‘The Flame of Peace’: the burning of around 3,000 
weapons, handed in by the rebel fighters, at a Timbuktu marketplace. 
One can discern four partly overlapping phases in the conflict. I have 
labelled the first phase, from June 1990 to January 1991, the ‘real rebellion’. In 
this first half year, a united rebel movement fought the Malian Armed Forces, 
winning a series of military victories culminating in the ‘Battle at Toximine’, 
the rebels’ most decisive defeat of the Malian Armed Forces. The victory at 
Toximine, together with strong rising opposition to the Traoré Regime resulted 
in negotiations leading to a ceasefire: the Tamanrasset Agreement. The conflict 
entered a second phase in January 1991, lasting until early1994. This three-year 
period was characterised by factionalism and constant negotiation over peace 
with the Malian Government. I have therefore labelled it the ‘confused re-
bellion’. Both the Malian state and the Tamasheq movement were faced with 
internal conflicts and changes. I will describe and analyse this complex set of 
alterations in the second part of this chapter. In 1994 the rebellion entered a 
third phase. The obstruction of the National Pact – a peace agreement signed in 
1992 – and the absence of the state in Northern Mali, combined with continued 
army retaliation, led the movements to reorganise themselves almost strictly 
along tewsit lines, which then engaged in hostilities over the structure of the 
Tamasheq political landscape. In April 1994 a new player entered the conflict. 
The Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy – MPGK, created in April 1994 – was 
a vigilante brigade created in Gao by deserted army officers in reaction to 
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repeated attacks by rebel forces on the villages in the Niger Bend and even on 
Gao itself. Observers of the conflict between the Ganda Koy and the rebel 
movements, inside and outside Mali, have argued that it was an ethnic conflict. 
I argue that Ganda Koy discourses on the rebellion, Malian and Tamasheq 
society and the Ganda Koy itself, are best explained by looking at the discourse 
and images used internally, which were based on concepts of race and on fierce 
nationalism. Ganda Koy means ‘Masters of the Land’ in Songhay. I have 
therefore called this section of the chapter likewise. The last phase of the 
rebellion, between October 1994 and March 1996, is formed by a gradual return 
to peace, which was finally concluded on 26 March 1996 with the ceremonial 
burning of about 3,000 weapons in the marketplace of Timbuktu. This Flamme 
de la Paix, ‘Flame of Peace’ was organised by the Malian Government in 
collaboration with the United Nations. However, both the conception and 
implementation of this peace initiative were the result of local initiatives, which 
emanated from civil society leaders: the tribal chiefs and village heads. I will 
not linger too long on this last phase of the conflict, the return of the chiefs. 
Others, particularly within the world of international organisations and NGOs, 
have written sufficiently on the subject. I will simply narrate how and under 
what conditions peace was brought about. 
One of the aims of this book is to show the workings of contemporary 
Tamasheq politics. Therefore, much attention will be paid to the internal pro-
cesses within the rebel movement during the second rebellion. All issues that 
have so far been central in this book were magnified and played out in violent 
ways throughout the six years of rebellion. As in the previous chapters, we will 
find a number of key groups in the political landscape of the Kel Tamasheq: the 
ishumar, the évolués, the bellah, the tribal chiefs, the sedentary population of 
the North, and the Malian national political elite. These groups were not in-
ternally homogenous. One can differentiate between those who were in favour 
of rebellion and those who were against it; those, within the rebellion, who were 
‘hardliners’ in favour of independence, and those who were ‘moderates’ in 
favour of autonomy within Mali; and finally, those who were in favour of social 
changes within Tamasheq society and those who were in favour of strengthen-
ing the existing structure of society. Within the movement, discussions and 
conflicts centred on the desirability and realisation of a Tamasheq nation-state, 
and on the nature of Tamasheq social structure and the need to change or pre-
serve it. While these were the discussions and conflicts of opinion, the events in 
the field showed different matters: the inescapability of clan thinking, structure 
and hierarchy; and the primacy of (fictive) kinship over imagining a nation on a 
territorial basis. The various opinions on the goals of the rebellion were ex-
pressed in various break-ups, violent conflicts and renewed alliances. The story 
told here is one of factionalism, alliances and various political currents. The 
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movement progressed from a strengthened unity, which had long been sought, 
during the first months of the rebellion, towards factionalism over the course of 
the second phase of the conflict, leading to extreme fragmentation on the basis 
of existing clan and fraction structures, and to increased violence in the third 
phase. Many of these movements were created along the faultlines of the tribal 
landscape in Northern Mali. In order to prevent confusion, I present the main 
movements and the differences that created them in the table on pages xxi-xxii. 
The violence in the North between rebel movements, the Ganda Koy and the 
army led to a state of general insecurity for all inhabitants of the North, which 
brought civic leaders from all groups involved, notably the Kel Tamasheq and 
the Songhay, to undertake measures to improve security conditions, irrespective 
of the state or the movements. A local peace agreement on the initiative of tribal 
leaders and village heads in the Cercle of Bourem would finally form the 
blueprint for a constructive peace process. The movements’ leaders, realising 
the loss of support for both their own negotiations with the state, and their 
violent encounters with each other, ended up joining this peace initiative at the 
instigation of the tribal leaders, which strengthened the latter’s position within 
society as the rightful mediators between state and society, bypassing the rebels 
and thus dealing a final blow to initiatives to change Tamasheq society. 
The reaction of the Malian Government, army and population oscillated 
between violent outbursts on the one hand, and reasoned discussions on what 
the rebellion was about and who the rebels were, on the other hand. Within the 
context of the Malian nation-state, its government and its inhabitants, the Ta-
masheq rebellion provoked a revival of the Malian national imagination, and the 
return of stereotyped images of self and other, of Malian and Kel Tamasheq. In 
practice, but also in national discourse, the rebellion also contributed to a 
change in the political shape of the Malian state from a dictatorship to a multi-
party democracy. In the last phase of the rebellion, a new movement of the local 
sedentary population gave birth to a resurgence and reconceptualisation of race 
in the North. Discourse on inclusion and exclusion in the Malian nation and the 
image of the Kel Tamasheq as Malian or foreign was fully developed by the 
Ganda Koy, which can be seen as the vox populi about the rebellion. Starting 
with a depiction of the Kel Tamasheq as never having belonged to the Malian 
historical nation and of the rebels as foreign mercenaries, Ganda Koy discourse 
changed towards inclusion of the Kel Tamasheq ‘cousins’ within the Malian 
nation through mythical history and the concept of senankuya – joking rela-
tionships – as the process towards peace began in November 1994. Exclusion 
by the Ganda Koy of the Kel Tamasheq from the Malian nation and depiction of 
the Kel Tamasheq as ‘foreign’ was largely based on a discourse on race and ra-
cism. By accusing the Kel Tamasheq of being ‘white slavers’ and as ‘Qhadafi’s 
Arab mercenaries’ they were depicted as foreign elements seeking to dominate 
252 CHAPTER 6 
the autochtonous Malian population. By stressing the rebels’ ‘whiteness’, the 
Ganda Koy managed to develop an othering discourse that left aside those 
elements of Tamasheq society that were not ‘white’: the bellah or former slaves 
who could and did join the Ganda Koy ranks. Indeed, the bellah had been 
largely and conspicuously absent within the Tanekra. From their side, rebel 
spokesmen rightly accused the Ganda Koy of developing a racist and national 
discourse of the Kel Tamasheq other. But contrary to the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Kel Tamasheq community now had the means to defend itself against these 
stereotypes: Kel Tamasheq intellectuals countered the Ganda Koy’s polemical 
language and denied it by stressing the positive consequence of their rebellion: 
the end of dictatorship in Mali and the establishment of a multi-party demo-
cracy. 
The ‘real’ rebellion: June to December 1990 
The start of the rebellion was originally planned for around 1992 or even 1993, 
but some men and material had already been moved to Mali by 1989, organised 
in three battalions stationed in Kidal, Ménaka, and Gao.1 However, the Malian 
Armed Forces had been informed of the Tanekra plans. In May 1990, members 
of the Kidal and Gao battalions were arrested, and their arms depots con-
fiscated. Only the Ménaka battalion of about 30 men was left unharmed, but it 
had very few arms. The commander of the Kidal battalion, Iyad ag Ghali, had 
managed to escape and fled to the Ménaka battalion, based in the village of 
Ikadewan. Upon arrival in Ikadewan, Iyad ag Ghali was accused of treason by 
the men of the Ménaka battalion and nearly executed. After convincing the 
Ménaka battalion of his good intentions and diverting execution by his com-
rades, Iyad and the Ménaka commanders discussed the situation the movement 
found itself in. With some of their most important leaders arrested and their 
arms confiscated, the fighters could either cancel all plans and start from 
scratch, or they could move forward in attack. They chose the latter option and 
set the start of the rebellion for the 4th of July, the celebration that year of ‘aid 
al-fitr, the end of Ramadan. But this plan failed as well. On 27 June 1990 a 
Malian border patrol looking for smugglers intercepted a rebel vehicle carrying 
men and arms. After a short fight, the patrol managed to immobilise the vehicle, 
while its occupants escaped. Apart from arms, the vehicle contained a document 
on the plan of attack. Members of the movement, stationed in their regions of 
origins were supposed to attack the administrative and military posts in their 
                                                 
1  The following is based on: Lettre 1er adjoint Cdt. Cercle Kidal à Gov. Gao. Sujet –
Mouvement de Liberation des Terres Tamacheq. 12/07/1990. Courtesy of Pierre 
Boilley; and Interview with Baye ag Alhassan. Ménaka, 11/04/1999. 
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area simultaneously at 04:00 PM. The intercepted car was to attack the military 
camp at Kidal itself. Arrests followed, but someone must have been able to 
communicate the interception and subsequent arrests to the Ménaka battalion at 
Ikadewan because the next day, 28 June the Ménaka battalion came into action, 
attacking the administrative posts and military camp in Tidarmène. At the wells 
of Tejerert, four cars belonging to the NGO World Vision were taken over. In 
Ménaka, the same NGO and the Italian organisation Zooconsult lost eight more 
cars. The next day, the administrative posts at Ikadewan were attacked. The 
attacks were successful in their aim: Seizing material, as the movement had lost 
most of its stocks. The administrative posts and military camps were looted for 
arms, food and petrol, providing the movement with the necessary means to 
start their fight.2 After their successful attacks the rebels retreated to Mount I-n-
Taykaren, a solitary mountain at the southern edge of the Tamesna plain, in the 
northern part of the Cercle of Ménaka. 
Between June and October 1990 the rebels were constantly on the move, 
attacking army camps and administrative posts on all sides of the Adagh and 
parts of the Azawad. On 2 July the military post at Ti-n-Essako was attacked, 
leaving three soldiers and one rebel dead. On 16 July the rebels attacked the 
gendarmerie at Tarkimt; 28 July: the military post at Abeïbara; 11 August: the 
military post at Ti-n-Zaouatene; 15 August: those at Tadjoujemet; 17 August: 
those at Telabit; 25 August: a military convoy near I-n-Ekker was ambushed. In 
September, attacks on the military posts at Abeïbara, I-n-Tedeyni, and I-n-Ghar 
followed. Skirmishes between rebel and army units occurred at the end of 
September and the beginning of October at Tadjoujemet and Tadjnout in the 
Tigharghar Mountains.3 The tactics of the rebels were to attack as often as 
possible, in as many different places as possible. The underlying strategy was 
first of all to give the impression that they were numerous and well organised, 
thus confusing the enemy, and secondly, to secure the Algerian border in order 
to ensure access to supplies. Except for Tarkimt, all the military posts attacked 
were situated in the Adagh, near the border with Algeria, the same region of 
combat as during Alfellaga. The Malian army’s withdrawal from the border area 
would secure the rebels free passage to Algeria to stock supplies; bring 
wounded or fatigued fighters to a safe haven; and, in the case of necessity, to 
retreat altogether. A third aim was to seize more material – weapons, ammu-
nition, petrol, cars, and food – as they were still short in supply and the number 
of rebels had increased over the weeks. In the first few months of the rebellion, 
                                                 
2  Nous, Touaregs du Mali (Paris 1990). 
3  Based on: Cheick ag Baye, ‘Chronologie des événements liés à la Rébellion Toua-
règue au Mali’ (hereafter, chronologie Cheick), in annex to Klute, G. 2001; Boilley, 
P. 1999: 446-447; and Klute, G. 2001: 440-441. 
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the practically unarmed fighters managed to take a large number of arms from 
their adversaries, and contrary to their predecessors, the ifulagen of 1963, the 
fighters knew how to handle these weapons and could thus successfully pursue 
their campaign. 
The tactics of the rebels worked in their favour. All the attacks mentioned 
above ended in victory for the rebels, who lost few men compared to the losses 
of the Malian Armed Forces.4 The Malian Armed Forces, present in the Kidal 
area with around 500 soldiers, were completely on the defensive and no match 
for their adversary. Contrary to the Tamasheq fighters who had years of training 
and combat experience in guerrilla warfare in Lebanon and Chad, the Malian 
soldiers had hardly any training and no combat experience. The heavy and slow 
material employed in the Adagh by the Malian forces – armoured cars and 
artillery – were no match either for the fast and agile four-wheel-drive vehicles 
used by the experienced Tamasheq drivers who had gained their marks in the 
years of smuggle. 
In 1963, the army’s heavy armoured cars and jeeps proved almost useless 
against the ifulagen in the Adagh, except in the wadis. The camel mounted 
ifulagen could quickly withdraw over terrain inaccessible to the tanks and jeeps 
of the army. This time, the rebels also mostly made use of cars, transformed 
into so called tecnicals: All-terrain vehicles, equipped with extra fuel and water 
tanks, and mounted with heavy machine guns and rocket launchers. The drivers 
would make use of the terrain and the winds to create a dust cloud, obfuscating 
the enemy’s view, then discharging an independently operating fighter unit of 
around twelve men that would fight afoot, encircling the enemy, while the 
tecnicals heavy machine guns and rocket launchers provided cover fire. The 
technique of tecnicals was not new or unique to the Tamasheq fighters, who had 
first learned their use in Chad, where the troops of Goukouni Wedey and Idriss 
Deby had made use of them. 
Both sides also differed in their experience and ability to kill. The Malian 
soldiers were trained for regular combat in large attacks with coordinated fire. 
In practice, this means a soldier does not learn how to aim and shoot as a sniper, 
but to ‘spray’ bullets in sustained fire, creating a wide ‘death zone’. The Tama-
sheq fighters were trained to aim and shoot at single enemies. In addition, the 
Tamasheq fighters were trained and experienced in man-to-man combat with 
personal arms. The first attacks at Ménaka and Tidarmène were made with a 
highly restricted number of rifles, and mostly by men armed with knives and 
                                                 
4  Cheick ag Baye estimates the number of military casualties on Malian side in the 
first half year of the rebellion at 441, and casualties on rebel side at 28; ‘Chrono-
logie Cheick’. Klute estimates the number of military casualties at 429, and rebel 
casualties at 17 during this period. ‘Opferzahlen (Mali)’, annex Klute, G. 2001. 
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traditional swords. To this form of fighting, in which the Tamasheq excelled, 
the Malian soldiers had no answer. 
A last, but not the least important element in favour of the rebels was their 
motivation to fight. The Malian soldiers were only professional soldiers in the 
literal sense. They were paid for their duty. A stable income, a career prospect, 
and a few advantages in civil life were the largest instigations for a Malian to 
join the army under the military regime of Moussa Traoré. Patriotic motives or 
an acutely felt necessity to fight were not considered relevant. The opposite 
goes for the Tamasheq fighters. The ishumar did not fight for a salary, but for a 
cause: the liberation of the Tamasheq homeland from Malian occupation. 
Having started their rebellion without any means at their disposal and with only 
a small number of fighters, they had but two options: to fight and win or to 
perish in retreat and abandon the uprising with all the consequences that would 
bring to the Tamasheq community. Where years of preparation had not been 
able to establish unity in the ranks of the Tanekra, the actual fighting in these 
first months of rebellion succeeded. The ishumar fighting in Northern Mali 
achieved unity under the pressure of combat and immediate survival. Years of 
military discipline, which meant obeying orders when given, did the rest. As 
former rebel Baye ag Alhassan put it with some pride, ‘At that moment, there 
was no movement in the country, no way. There was only one thing: The 
Tamasheq Revolution’.5 
The fighters struck up their first base camp in the I-n-Taykaren Mountain, a 
monolith at the edge of the Tamesna plain near the village of Tejerert. It can 
only be accessed through a small number of wadis, passing through a number of 
gorges, and embanked by fields of short, sharp stones, cliffs and boulder forma-
tions that render the terrain virtually impassable by vehicle. It is impossible to 
reach the interior of the mountain other than through these known passages. In 
the interior of the mountain is a small number of accessible plains surrounded 
and cross-cut by ridges and heaps of large boulders. A second base was put in 
operation at Essali, near Boughessa, in the Adagh, a few weeks later. A third 
one was located at Mount Tigharghar, a place that had already served as the 
base for the honour bandit Alla ag Albachir in the 1940s and 1950s, and for the 
ifulagen in 1963 (and it would again host rebels in 2006). In the later stages of 
the rebellion, the number of bases came to around fifteen throughout Northern 
Mali.6 Such a base should not be imagined as a classical military base: A 
structure concentrated at one point with fortified bunkers and fixed defence 
lines. Rather, the whole mountain served as a base. Only the outer edges and 
passages would be defended if necessary, but they could be abandoned to take 
                                                 
5  Interview with Baye ag Alhassan. Ménaka, 01/04/1999. 
6  Boilley, P. 1999: 507. 
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up other positions within the mountain. The only vital points within the base 
were the wells, to be defended and held at all costs. Any infrastructure that was 
built consisted of a few mud-brick houses serving as shelter and meetingpoints. 
Most material inside the bases was buried or left in small caves. These bases 
had four main aims. First of all, they served as places where the rebels could 
hide men and material. Second, by making the location of the bases known to 
the army, the rebels hoped to avoid repression against civilians by the army, as 
there was no reason for it. The army knew where to find the rebels and could 
not mistake civil camps for rebel units. Third, by making the location known to 
the population and other ishumar who had not yet joined the fighters, but who 
had received military training at some point in the 1980s, they hoped to attract 
new recruits and material support. Also, if the army attacked against civilians, 
these knew where they could hide under rebel protection. Finally, by setting up 
bases within Mali, instead of retreating into Algeria after attacks as the ifulagen 
had done in 1963, the rebels hoped to gain more support from the local 
population. These would notice that the rebels did not abandon them to their 
fate after stirring problems, while they themselves remained behind for the 
army to come. Clearly, the rebels had learned some tactical and strategic lessons 
from their ifulagen predecessors. 
After the attacks at Ménaka and Tidarmène the rebels left messages for the 
army indicating their location. This message was repeated over the radio at the 
conquered gendarmerie post at Tarkimt. The message was basically inviting the 
Malian army to combat, an invitation that could be expected from Tamasheq 
warriors following the honourable aqqa conduct of warfare. The ethics of the 
ishumar in warfare were just as much informed by Tamasheq war ethics and 
honourable conduct as that of the ifulagen had been in 1963. The ishumar saw 
themselves as the new illellan: the strong protectors of society who should 
defend the tilaqqiwin, the weak. By staying in the neighbourhood and offering 
protection sites, the rebels ascribed to their perceived ellellu status in taking 
measures to protect the weak and dependent. And only through aqqa attacks 
could egha – revenge for humiliation – be acted out. 
In the first few months of the rebellion, the strategy underlying the creation 
of fixed bases was partly successful. The Malian army accepted the invitation to 
come and fight at I-n-Taykaren. On 17 July 1990 a large section of the Malian 
Armed Forces arrived at I-n-Taykaren to fight the rebel forces. The army 
employed four hundred infantry and artillery units armed with truck-mounted 
rocket launchers at their siege of the base. After four days of shelling, the 
unharmed rebels easily countered the infantry assault. The shelling had been too 
random and too small in scale to do any harm. The rebel forces awaited the end 
of Malian fire from the safety of the rocks and caves, planning to resume their 
positions when the infantry advanced. When the infantry attack finally came, 
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they were shot one by one. A day of sniper activity left the Malian Armed 
Forces with forty men dead, which was enough to have them retreat. The 
operation was repeated at the end of July and the beginning of August, with an 
even more disastrous effect. Despite hundreds of shells being fired at I-n-
Taykaren in a week, the following infantry attack failed again, leaving a 
hundred Malian soldiers dead on the field.7 A similar attack at the rebel base of 
Essali near Boughessa was equally unsuccessful. Here, the rebels simply left the 
base for the surrounding mountains, only to return when the Army retreated, 
without doing battle. The Army was quick to learn that rebel bases were in-
vincible when defended and not worth going to or staying in when abandoned. 
The Malian Army also quickly learned that when it set up a base itself, it was 
prone to deadly attacks by rebel forces. The largest victory the rebels had over 
the Malian forces, recognised as their worst defeat by the Army itself, came on 
the night of 4 September 1990 at the wells of Toximine near Mount Tigharghar. 
Here, a force of around 45 rebels, armed with knives and hand grenades, took 
on an army unit of around 450 soldiers, supported by armoured cars, mortars 
and rocket launchers. Making use of the terrain, the internal organisation of the 
military camp and the element of surprise, the rebel unit entered the camp; 
engaged in close combat with the Malian soldiers; captured the heavy firearms 
which they deployed immediately against further removed quarters of the camp; 
and finally dispersed the Malian forces in panic. Afterwards, rebels claimed to 
have killed more than a hundred soldiers at Toximine, whereas they suffered a 
loss of fifteen men.8 
The reaction of the Army to the rebellion was at first very similar to the 
options chosen during Alfellaga. The tactic of installing a ‘forbidden zone’ 
could not be employed effectively as the terrain of operation was no longer 
confined to the Adagh, but included all of North-Eastern Mali. Nevertheless, the 
Army tried to install ‘concentration zones’ around the main cities and villages 
of the North and ‘zones of free circulation’, next to ‘combat zones’.9 By the end 
of July 1990, the state of emergency and a curfew after 23:00 hours were 
declared in all of Northern Mali.10 Transport by four-wheel-drive vehicles was 
forbidden, as this was the rebels’ chosen means of transport.11 Trucks needed 
                                                 
7  Nous, Touaregs du Mali (Paris 1990). 
8  Klute, G. 2001: 480-486. 
9  Ibid.: 414, mentions the concentration and combat zones. The zones of free circu-
lation are mentioned in annex Comission ad – hoc sur les évènements du nord (ses-
sions des 18, 19, 20 Octobre 1990), Boilley, P. 1994: 846-851. 
10  ‘Des nouvelles atrocités auraient été commises contre les civils touaregs’, Le Mon-
de, 05/09/1990. 
11  Annex Transcriptions de messages radio de l’armée malienne (Documents prove-
nant de la serviette du sous-lieutenant Diawara Gollé, commandant du poste de Bou-
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special permits, as did other cars. In practice this meant a stop to most motor-
ised transport since almost all vehicles used in the North are four-wheel-drives 
or trucks. Random civilians were interrogated and executed. When these exe-
cutions made the Malian and European press, the Malian authorities ascribed 
them to ‘uncontrolled elements of the Army’. Some of these executions might 
indeed have been the result of frustration and stress among the Malian soldiers. 
The majority of these executions however, were part of a deliberate terror 
campaign to undermine support for the rebellion and to discourage the fighters. 
Spokesmen for the Tamasheq and Bidân civil population accused the Malian 
Armed Forces of having started a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Région of 
Timbuktu in July 1990, entitled Kokadjè in Bamanakan, which indeed means 
‘cleaning’.12 Whether or not this was actually the case, other sources confirm 
that Malian soldiers had no trouble in employing any means necessary to end 
the rebellion and to stop civilian support. The largest ‘cleaning operation’ took 
place at I-n-Abalan, near Ti-n-Essako in July 1990, where the Army killed an 
estimated 94 nomads.13 The ghastliness of these executions was in accordance 
with methods applied during Alfellaga as well. On 29 July 1990, a unit of 
airborne soldiers passing by the camp of the chief of the Idnan tribe, Attaher ag 
Bissaada, let the inhabitants of the camp dig their own grave, after which they 
were killed by throwing in hand grenades.14 An anonymous witness in a Le 
Monde article of 15 August 1990 stated that eleven people were executed in 
Gao. Their bodies were run over by a tank after which ‘the people picked up 
pieces of the corpses, one a finger, another a head, and went to wiggle them 
about in front of the doors of Tuareg families’.15 Estimates of the number of 
civilians killed by the Army during the first two months of rebellion alone range 
between 125 and 262.16 Georg Klute estimates that the number of civil victims 
                                                 
ressa. Saisie par les combattants touaregs après le succès de leur attaque du 9 août 
1990), Boilley, P. 1994: 841-845. 
12  ‘Les réfugiés touaregs au Burkina’, Liberté no 3, 1992. Kokadjè – ‘to wash tho-
roughly’ in Bamanakan – was the campaign slogan of the ADEMA party during the 
presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992. This might have caused confusion 
in the North as the Northern regions did not participate in these elections due to the 
rebellion. On the other hand, the term might well have been employed to indicate 
‘ethnic cleansing’ by Bamanakan speaking soldiers as well, in a stroke of soldieres-
que humour about democracy. 
13  Nous, Touaregs du Mali (Paris 1990). 
14  Ibid. and Amnesty International, Mali: Ethnic conflict and killings of civilians (21 
September 1994). 
15  ‘Des affrontements meurtriers auraient opposé l’armée aux Touaregs’, Le Monde, 
15/08/1990. 
16  The number of 125 is advanced in Le Monde, 15/08/1990. The number of 262 is 
advanced in ‘chronologie Cheick’ in annex to Klute, G. 2001. Klute himself esti-
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on both sides in the conflict ranges between 2,500 and 3,500. However, the 
number of Tamasheq civilians killed was at least ten times the number of 
sedentary victims. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Estimated number of civilian victims June 1990 – October 1995 
 Tamasheq Tamasheq Sedentary Sedentary 
 Confirmed Unconfirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed 
 Victims victims victims victims 
 2,374 734 178 272 
Source: Klute (2001), annex Opferzahlen (Mali). 
 
 
After ‘Toximine’, the morale of the Malian Armed Forces was deflated, just 
as the morale of the rebels was boosted. The Malian Armed Forces probably 
lost at least forty men, almost ten percent of their forces, which is generally 
regarded as the de facto destruction of a unit. The rebels lost a third of their 
unit, which would in standard army terms mean ‘annihilation’, but the rebels 
did not look at it in this way. These men were martyrs to the cause and they had 
died an honourable death in combat. ‘Toximine’ brought in a large amount of 
new weapons taken from the defeated troops, but especially an enormous 
victory in their form of warfare: A small group of extremely skilled warriors 
had been able to chase an army unit ten times its size, killing a large number of 
soldiers in true combat, man to man. It gave the rebels a feeling of military 
invincibility. Indeed, one can safely say that the Malian forces never defeated 
the Tamasheq rebels militarily. ‘Toximine’ proved that the regular army was no 
match to the guerrillas, and that a quick military end to the rebellion could not 
be reached. In the end, the Malian Armed Forces retreated to the main villages 
of North-Eastern Mali, leaving the land to the rebels. Many smaller army posts 
were entirely abandoned. The defeats of the Malian Armed Forces, combined 
with the troublesome situation the regime found itself in at the capital Bamako, 
led President Moussa Traoré to decide that negotiations with the rebels were 
necessary. 
Negotiations between the Malian Government and the Tanekra movement 
started in October 1990 with a first reconnaissance mission, and began in 
earnest in December 1990 on the initiative of The Traoré Regime. The Tama-
sheq rebellion was not the only problem the Traoré Regime had to face. In the 
capital Bamako, a democratic opposition and a free press were making both 
Traoré’s handling of the rebellion and his position in general more and more 
                                                 
mates the number of civilians killed in the first months at 181 in annex Opferzahlen 
(Mali). Klute, G. 2001. 
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problematic. In 1979, General Moussa Traoré had changed the military style of 
his regime to a civil one in founding a one-party state, governed by the Union 
Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) over which he presided. But the one-
party state was as undemocratic and oppressive as its predecessors. In 1990, the 
democratic movement gained momentum. Possibly under the influence of the 
Tamasheq rebellion, but certainly under the moral support of French President 
Mitterand’s speech at the Franco-African Summit at La Baule in May 1990, in 
which he linked development aid to ‘good governance’ and democratisation. On 
15 October 1990, fifteen young men took to the streets of Bamako to protest 
against the Traoré Regime, carrying banners with slogans such as ‘Down with 
the UDPM’.17 A few days later, the student union Association des Etudiants et 
Elèves Maliens (AEEM) was born. In the same month, two covert political 
parties founded in exile in France and Senegal came to the open; the Comité 
National d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID); and the Alliance pour la Démo-
cratie au Mali (ADEMA). The already existing national labour union Union 
National des Travaileurs Maliens (UNTM), hitherto an appendix to the regime, 
rallied to the side of the democrats. Together, these organisations formed a 
massive front against the Traoré Regime. But there was not only external oppo-
sition urging for democracy. Inside the UDPM, a large faction demanded multi-
party democracy, or at least a democratisation of the party itself. Although 
Traoré gave in to the wish to reform the party, demands for multi-party demo-
cracy were initially put aside.18 The pressure build-up in Bamako, together with 
the demoralizing defeats of the Army by the Tamasheq rebels, led to the 
opening of negotiations between the regime and the rebels. Probably, Moussa 
Traoré hoped to calm the situation in the North in order to have troops and 
attention free to deal with the democratic movement in the South. 
The reasons the rebels had to negotiate were just as practical as those of the 
Traoré Regime: they were exhausted. Having started the rebellion with nothing 
but a handful of guns, they desperately lacked resources by the end of 1990. 
The diminishing supply of petrol, ammunition and especially food hampered 
the continuation of attacks and even the possibilities of adequate defence. 
In fact, we had expected that a solution would be found within six months of com-
bat. And the Malians fell for our strategy. Six months, that was the maximum before 
the Army would recuperate, and we had to make a maximum of resounding victories 
to bring it home, to change mentalities in Mali, and to provoke all the upcoming 
changes. (...) We did not expect a longer fight, first because of a lack of means, also 
                                                 
17  Brenner, L. 1994. 
18  ‘Conseil national extraordinaire de l’UDPM: L’immobilisme’, Cauris, n.d. 1990. 
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because of strategic reasons it was impossible to continue the fight for more than six 
months.19 
First contact between the Tanekra and the state was made through the me-
diation of the tribal chiefs. The meeting took place in Tamanrasset between 10 
and 12 October 1990. The chiefs played their key role as intermediaries be-
tween state and society, a role the state recognised and legitimised in giving 
them this assignment. But to the members of the Tanekra organisation, the 
tribal chiefs had no legitimacy. First of all, a strong current within the Tanekra 
movement had always been in favour of the abolition of tribal chiefs and other 
hierarchies in Tamasheq society. Second, from the start of the rebellion, the 
most important tribal chiefs had made it perfectly clear that they were against 
the rebellion. In a declaration transmitted over radio and television in Septem-
ber 1990, they described the rebels as ‘(...) bandits and traitors, committing 
unimaginable follies disturbing the tranquillity and stability regained after years 
of merciless drought’.20 Intalla ag Attaher, chief of the Kel Ifoghas, and the 
other chiefs of the Adagh, had immediately volunteered to tour the Adagh to 
inform the population about the activities of the Army; to search for the rebels, 
and to bring the young men to their senses as they had done during Alfellaga. 
Unfortunately, a group of soldiers disarmed and molested the chiefs when they 
presented themselves to the Commandant de Cercle on the first day of the tour, 
as they held them to be rebels themselves. During their tour, the family of the 
Idnan chief Attaher ag Bissaada was killed by soldiers. Attaher ag Bissaada, 
speaking to Moussa Traoré afterwards, asked him not to mention this ‘incident’ 
as one should look to the future and not to the past.21 The Government could 
thus count on the loyalty of the chiefs and decided to send them as envoys to 
contact the rebels. The meeting was indecisive, as the chiefs’ delegates had no 
mandate to accept or refute the rebel demands. 
In December 1990 negotiations between the Tanekra and the Government 
were reopened, leading to the signing of a ceasefire and declaration of intent to 
continue negotiations for final peace on 6 January 1991. These documents are 
known as the ‘Tamanrasset Agreement’. This time, negotiations took place 
under mediation of the Algerian Government. The latter would remain the sole 
officially mediating state between the rebels and Mali throughout the conflict. 
Algeria had a direct interest in the conflict as the country hosted a large amount 
of new refugees and a large community of previously sedentarised Kel Tama-
                                                 
19  Interview by Pierre Boilley with Ibiya ag Sidi. Paris, 28/06/1994, 478.  
20  Declaration made by the Malian fraction chiefs and Tamasheq ranks of the Gao 
Région, 12/09/1990. Personal archives. The signing chiefs were all from the Kidal, 
Gao, Ménaka and Bourem Cercles, with the exception of Ehya ag Nokh, chief of the 
Immededdeghen. 
21  Poulton, R. & I. ag Youssouf 1998: 93. 
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sheq from Mali. Moreover, the movement used Southern Algeria as its ‘hinter-
land’ where they repleted their provisions, treated their injured, and went for 
‘rest and recreation’. Apart from these practical arguments the Algerian Gov-
ernment rose to the occasion to strengthen its importance as a regional power, to 
the detriment of what it considered its close rivals: France and Libya. 
The only common language for negotiations was French. This meant that the 
ishumar had to rely on the Tamasheq évolués who were sympathetic to the 
movement.22 From the side of the rebels, the negotiators included Cheick ag 
Baye, Acherif ag Mohamed and Ibrahim ag Litny, three intellectuals who had 
joined the movement from the beginning. These évolués, headed by military 
leader Iyad ag Ghali (himself a true ishumar, but with enough Francophone 
education to conduct negotiations in this language) had a more realist view of 
the situation than some of the more idealist ishumar. And of course, Iyad knew 
perfectly well in what state and condition his troops were. Nevertheless, the 
Tamanrasset Agreement showed a radical stance from the Tanekra side. It con-
sisted of a ceasefire, stipulating the mutual transfer of prisoners of war; the 
Army’s gradual withdrawal from the North; the transfer of administration to 
civil servants; the withdrawal of the rebel forces to their bases; the possibility 
for the fighters to integrate in the Malian Armed Forces; and the creation of 
commissions to monitor the application of the agreements made. The Taman-
rasset Agreement was never fully implemented, but it remained a blueprint for 
future negotiations. The importance of the agreement does not lie in what it was 
supposed to lead to, but in what it did lead to in practice. Most of my inter-
locutors who had participated in the Tanekra movement and the rebellion from 
its first days onwards insisted that the ‘real’ rebellion ended with the signing of 
the Tamanrasset Agreement. With the benefit of hindsight, one can indeed 
conclude from the developments after the signing of the Tamanrasset Agree-
ment, that this observation contains some truth. The ishumar reaction to the 
Tamanrasset Agreement can be summed up as negative for the most part. Many 
ishumar fighters were at least disappointed, but many more were outraged by 
what they perceived as a sell-out from the side of the évolués. After ‘Taman-
rasset’ the second phase of the rebellion started. The Tamasheq movement, 
united in the first six months of fighting, split internally over the goals of the 
rebellion. 
 
                                                 
22  From the side of the Government, the negotiators most likely included Issa Ongoiba 
(former right hand to Diby Sillas Diarra) and a number of tribal chiefs. 
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The ‘confused’ rebellion: January 1991 to February 1994 
In the first six months of the rebellion, the movement had no fixed name. The 
Arabic terms al-Jebha (the front) and ath-Thawra (the revolution), or the 
Tamasheq term Tanekra (the uprising), were used internally. To the outside 
world, the names Mouvement de Libération Touareg; Mouvement de Libération 
de l’Azawad; and even Mouvement de Libération Malien were used. The 
Tamanrasset Agreement changed this. Although only one man signed the agree-
ment on behalf of the rebels, Iyad ag Ghali, he did so in the name of two 
movements; the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA), and the Front 
Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA). Where the MPA represented the Kel 
Tamasheq, the FIAA represented the Bidân members of the movement. The 
Bidân feared that their contribution to the movement might be underestimated 
and that they would be left out of the negotiations with the Malian authorities, 
despite sharing the problems of their Tamasheq ishumar colleagues. This prob-
lem was solved by creating a separate movement with its own name to represent 
the Bidân section within the movement. The FIAA was nevertheless re-
presented by the paramount leader of the movement, Iyad ag Ghali. It is in fact 
unclear whether or not Bidân representatives were present during the Taman-
rasset negotiations. One informant even stated that the Bidân only joined the 
movement and the negotiations at the last moment, in fear of being left out. 
During the preliminary contacts between the movement and Tamasheq tribal 
chiefs no Bidân representative was present. However, during the later phases of 
the rebellion the FIAA and its representatives would play crucial roles. The 
creation of the MPA, both the name and the movement it came to represent, is 
more complicated. The Tamanrasset Agreement did not bring an end to hostili-
ties. In February 1991 rebel units attacked the village of Bourem. In March, the 
villages of Tonka and Goundam followed. The attacks were claimed by the 
Front Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad (FPLA), a name the movement had 
also sometimes used previous to the Tamanrasset Agreement. Where the cre-
ation of two movements during the negotiations in Tamanrasset – one Kel 
Tamasheq and one Bidân – had not been the result of a serious political or 
ideological divide within the movement, the creation of the MPA and FPLA can 
be analysed as resulting from ideological and political differences within the 
movement. These can be retraced through the negotiations leading to the 
Tamanrasset Agreement. The ideological conflict within the movement boiled 
down to the principles of the rebellion: Fighting for independence, or not. The 
start of a hot debate can already be read in the minutes of the meeting between 
the movement and the chief delegates of the Malian Government in October 
1990. 
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The year nineteen hundred and ninety, the 12th of October at two hours took place 
in Tamanrasset: The closure of the meeting between the Malian delegation (fraction 
chiefs and Tuareg representatives) and the delegation of the movement called Mou-
vement Populaire de l’Azawad – MPA (not having any territorial demands).23 
Placed casually between brackets, the movement’s envoys had apparently 
written off the initial goal of the movement: Tamasheq independence. While the 
October meeting had been inconsequential, the Tamanrasset Agreement was 
not. The minutes of the meeting between Malian and Tanekra envoys, which 
form the heart of the Tamanrasset Agreement, stated the view taken by both 
parties on the conflict. Representing the Malian Government, the Malian Chief 
of Staff Colonel Ousmane Coulibaly, ‘After having expressed the wish of the 
Malian Government to find a lasting solution to the painful situation, stressed 
the necessity to preserve national unity and Malian territorial integrity’.24 The 
formulation speaks for itself and needs no explanation. On behalf of the MPA 
and FIAA, Iyad ag Ghali ‘accentuated the principal reasons that led his move-
ment to take up arms against its country’.25 Diplomatic and subtle, Iyad ag 
Ghali implicitly recognised that his movement had taken up arms against its 
own country, a formula which placed the Kel Tamasheq within the framework 
of the Malian state, and thus abandoning Tamasheq nationalist separatist 
aspirations. If the initial talks between the movement and the chiefly envoys of 
the Government in October 1990 must have been hard to accept for many 
fighters, the endresult of the Tamanrasset Agreement was unacceptable to a 
number of hardliners. These hardliners remained within the FPLA. Confronted 
with this hard line within the movement, Iyad ag Ghali and other moderates 
carried on negotiating under the name MPA: Mouvement Populaire de l’Aza-
wad. The difference with regards to goals and means becomes clear from the 
names adopted. Whereas the FPLA stressed its military nature by adopting the 
term ‘Front’, the MPA insisted on politics and negotiations by adopting the 
term ‘Mouvement’. The idea was that, eventually, if the democratic movement 
in the South were to succeed in its goals, the MPA could transform itself into a 
political party within Mali. The FPLA, seeing itself as a front, remained focused 
on independence to be reached through military action. The FPLA hardliners 
declared that they had not been represented at the negotiations at Tamanrasset 
and were therefore not bound by the agreements made.  
                                                 
23  Procès verbal de la rencontre entre délégations à Tamanrasset du 10 au 12 octobre 
1990. Annexed in Boilley, P. 1994: 826-836. 
24  Procès verbal de la rencontre entre la Délégation du Gouvernement du Mali et la 
Délégation du Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad et du Front Islamique Arabe de 
l’Azaouad à Tamanrasset, les 5 et 6 Janvier 1991. Personal archive. 
25  Ibid. 
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We have created [the FPLA] after the failed treason of the Azawad people and we 
have called it the Front Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad, in reaction to what is 
called “the Tamanrasset Agreement” which seems to us to be a treason of some kind 
to our revolutionary principles: It is a reactionary position, our objective being the 
liberation of the people of the Azawad from the oppression it is suffering since the 
French have left.26  
From the start of the rebellion in June 1990 to the start of negotiations in 
Tamanrasset in December that year, almost all attacks against the Malian 
Armed Forces took place in the Adagh. This changed after the Tamanrasset 
Agreement in January 1991. The military campaign launched by the FPLA in 
February 1991 was concentrated on the Azawad plain and the villages on the 
banks of the Niger River. From there, the attacks spread further south and west, 
towards the Région of Timbuktu and the interior of the Niger Bend. In May 
1991, the FPLA even struck as far south as Gossi and Léré. The relocation of 
the conflict is linked to the schisms within the movement. The schism that 
brought about the FPLA in January 1991 meant a separation between the Kel 
Adagh and all the other Tamasheq fractions in the movement. However, local 
politics within the Tamasheq community, tewsit affiliation and the logic of 
Tamasheq society played their part as well. The larger part of the FPLA fighters 
came from fractions residing in the Azawad and Tamesna plains, and in the 
Niger Bend. The most important fractions and tribes represented in the FPLA 
were the Kel Intessar, the Chemennamas, the Ishidenharen, the Dabakar and the 
Daoussahak. The Kel Intessar had been at the heart of Tamasheq political life 
during the late colonial period. The Chemennamas, Ishidenharen and Dabakar 
fractions live in the Azawad and Tamesna plains east of the Adagh and towards 
Gao. In fact, Djebock, the hamlet falling victim to the FPLA’s second attack, is 
seen as the ‘capital’ of the Chemennamas. This is not coincidental either, as the 
leader of the FPLA, Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed, was a Chemennamas. In order to 
understand the division between the Kel Adagh and the other fractions we 
should look at the history of the movement and to the Tamanrasset Agreement. 
Until 1990 Tamasheq resistance against the Malian state had been largely a 
Kel Adagh affair. They had started Alfellaga in 1963; they had been at the basis 
of the creation of the Tanekra movement; they had delivered most volunteers 
for the Lebanon contingent; and after their return these fighters had revived and 
restructured the defunct movement in Libya. The Ifoghas claimed leadership 
within the movement. 
In fact, objectively, the Ifoghas are the spearhead of the Adagh and the Adagh n 
Ifoghas is the spearhead of the Tuareg in Mali in general. This is a fact. (...) The 
                                                 
26  ‘Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed, l’intransigeant colonel’, Mauritanie Nouvelles, July 
1992. 
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other side of reality is that the other tribes exist and that they are more numerous 
than the Ifoghas.27 
This leadership became strongly contested after the outbreak of the rebel-
lion. Particularly after the second drought of the 1980s, the participation of 
tribes from outside the Adagh had risen within the movement. The new recruits 
were mostly from the Chemennamas, Ishidenharen, Dabakar and other fractions 
from the Tamesna and Azawad, although a small number of them had joined 
earlier. These men had different experiences in the Tanekra and to them the 
leadership of the Kel Adagh was not a foregone conclusion. Most attacks in the 
first six months of the rebellion took place within the Adagh, which recon-
firmed Kel Adagh leadership over the movement, and gave the rebellion the 
look of ‘another Kel Adagh affair’, probably to the discontent of the fighters 
from the Ménaka battalion. The negotiations at Tamanrasset again proved Kel 
Adagh leadership. The majority of the negotiators on behalf of the movement 
were Kel Adagh, with Iyad ag Ghali signing the treaty. Leadership and hier-
archy among tewsiten and fractions form the core of Tamasheq social political 
life. The leadership position the Kel Adagh claimed within the movement could 
thus not be without consequences for internal hierarchy and organisation. Those 
men resisting Kel Adagh leadership and control over the movement simply 
opted out to create their own front. The outcome of the Tamanrasset Agreement 
can be put forward as a second reason for the division between the Kel Adagh 
and the other Kel Tamasheq. The moderates leading the negotiations in Taman-
rasset had opted for the acceptance of de facto Malian citizenship, on the 
condition that Northern Mali would gain a large amount of autonomy. This 
condition was met by the Malian state in the form of decentralisation of the 
hitherto highly centralised state. To phrase this mutual agreement, a rather 
strange formulation was used in the agreement. 
The two parties have agreed that the populations of the three Régions in Northern 
Mali will freely administer their regional and local affairs through the mediation of 
their representatives in the elected assemblies, in accordance with an exceptional 
status consented to by law.28 
At the time ‘Tamanrasset’ was signed, Northern Mali was administratively 
divided into only two Régions: Timbuktu, the VIth Région; and Gao, the VIIth 
Région, which included the Adagh as the Cercle of Kidal. What had been 
arranged for in Tamanrasset, was the promotion of the Cercle of Kidal to a fully 
                                                 
27  Interview by Pierre Boilley with Iyad ag Ghali. Bamako, 10/02/1994. Boilley, P. 
1999: 514. 
28  Procès verbal de la rencontre entre la délégation du Gouvernement du Mali et la 
Délégation du Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad et du Front Islamique Arabe de 
l’Azaouad à Tamanrasset du 10 au 12 octobre 1990. Personal Archive. 
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fledged VIIIth Région. The Tamanrasset Agreement speaks of three Régions as 
if the Région of Kidal was already existent. The new Région would come into 
de jure existence in August 1991, but de facto with the Tamanrasset Agree-
ment.29 Thus, the Kel Adagh had not only opted to remain part of Mali, but to 
do so apart from the other Kel Tamasheq communities. This manoeuvre did not 
earn the Kel Adagh any gratitude from the side of the other tewsiten in the 
movement, and will have undoubtedly contributed to the split between the Kel 
Adagh and the others. Apart from hardliners fighting for independence, the 
FPLA could attract those moderates who were not Kel Adagh. These had no 
interest in an administratively autonomous Région of Kidal since this would 
leave the Kel Tamasheq in the ‘old’ Région of Gao as a smaller minority against 
a majority of Songhay and other sedentary populations.  
In November 1991 the Kel Adagh movement MPA split in two between 
Ifoghas and those Kel Adagh of other tribal affiliation who founded the Armée 
Révolutionaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad (ARLA), attracting the majority 
of Kel Adagh fighters. The MPA now represented a minority movement of 
‘moderate’ Ifoghas and became subsequently seen as ‘the Ifoghas movement’, 
whereas the ARLA stood for the other Kel Adagh. The creation of the ARLA 
was mostly justified through their proclaimed vision on the need for change 
within Tamasheq society. The largest number of ARLA members came from 
the ranks of the imghad or tilaqqiwin tribes who had stood under Ifoghas domi-
nation in colonial times. The Keita Regime had promoted their status in the 
Adagh by declaring them to be the ‘oppressed masses’ and this discourse must 
have struck a chord. It was especially the évolués of tilaqqiwin origin who had 
stressed the ideals of social equality within the Teshumara movement, while 
many conservative Ifoghas attempted to maintain the idea of tribal hierarchy 
and status quo. Many ishumar felt a need to reform Tamasheq society through 
the abolition of caste, tribe and tribal chiefs. Ideas on equality and democracy 
were strongest among the intellectual elite of the ishumar, and these were gene-
rally also of imghad origins, as they had put up less resistance against education 
and had been favoured by the Keita Regime. Paradoxically, the ARLA was 
initially joined by a majority of Idnan fighters. These joined not so much out of 
agreement with the need to abolish the tribal structure of society, but largely 
because of the existing competition between tribes over political power within 
the tribal structure. As noted previously, the Idnan had been in competition with 
the Ifoghas over primacy in the Adagh since early colonial times. This 
competition had led to the Tamanrasset war between the two tribes and their 
                                                 
29  The creation of the eighth Région Kidal was confirmed in an article on the Taman-
rasset agreement in an article by Kaboré, G., ‘La paix fragile de Tamanrasset’, Jeune 
Afrique, 16-22/01/1991. 
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allies only a short decade earlier. In fact, the ARLA-MPA rivalry can be partly 
seen as a continuation of that conflict which was played out in violent ways 
directly after the creation of the ARLA. Having the majority of Kel Adagh 
fighters in their camp, the ARLA ousted the MPA/Ifoghas from the rebel base 
in Mount Tigharghar, forcing them to leave most of their material behind.  
The conscious efforts within the Tanekra to overcome internal social differ-
ences paradoxically led to the creation of new concepts that furthered social 
differences. From the start of the 1990s, clan and caste based ideologies gained 
the upper hand, slowly destroying the previous ideals of equality the Teshumara 
had stood for. The first such ideology was timgheda: the behaviour of an 
imghad, a free but not noble Tamasheq. Timgheda found its origins within 
Teshumara culture and the resistance organisation of the 1980s, when a number 
of the movement’s members with an imghad background questioned the leader-
ship position of the Ifoghas tribe within the movement. The main characteristics 
of ‘imghadness’ were seen to be industriousness, as opposed to the perceived 
laziness of the nobles; the sense that all the Kel Tamasheq are equal; and that 
lineage or descent should be of no importance to one’s place in society. This 
last idea forms an explicit denial of social privilege based on birthright. The 
perceived industriousness of the imghad and the laziness of nobles echo the 
writings of Malian administrators during the Keita Regime. In the relative 
absence of former slaves in the Adagh, the Keita Administration came to see the 
imghad as the oppressed class of the ‘labouring masses’. The same idea had 
now taken hold among the imghad themselves. This conflicting view of imghad 
self and noble other had already played an important role in the Tamanrasset 
war in the mid 1980s, and it would play an important part in the conflicts to 
come within the movement, continuing throughout the rebellion. Like caste 
identity, tewsit identity has recently become the focus of essentialist conceptual-
isations bordering on ideology. This conceptualisation has large impacts on a 
local or regional scale. A powerful example is the conceptualisation of tefo-
ghessa or ‘ifoghasness’: the essence of ‘being of the Ifoghas clan’. Tefoghessa 
had largely been developed in reaction to timgheda and it was an extension of 
the idea of temushagha, nobility. Tefoghessa expressed the idea that the Ifoghas 
clan is one of noble, strong warriors and religious specialists. Their descent 
from the prophet Muhammad (the Ifoghas claim shorfa status); their pure 
adherence to Islam; and their historical role as the wise and just leaders of the 
Kel Adagh federation, would give them the undeniable right to political sup-
remacy in the Adagh and even beyond. The tefoghessa idea was developed by 
ishumar and intellectuals from the Ifoghas, including MPA leader, Iyad ag 
Ghali. The latter had come to believe (or perhaps had always believed) that the 
chiefs and other traditional authorities were indispensable to Tamasheq society. 
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The wise men that are seen by some as “outdated” remain the pillars of society until 
the contrary is proven. They remain as indispensable to the movements as they are 
to the administration. First of all, they were at the start the principal mediators 
between the rebel forces and the authorities. They also played a principal role in 
reducing the tensions between different communities. Personally, I believe their role 
to be fundamental in installing a definite peace and that is what we most need these 
days.30 
A more fundamental reinterpretation of the meetings between the chiefs who 
had been sent as envoys and the movements of October 1990 is hardly possible. 
From backward colonial and neo-colonial collaborators, the chiefs had now 
been reinstalled in the mind of Ifoghas ishumar as the true leaders of Tamasheq 
society. With the advent of tefoghessa in the late 1990s, the ideals of the Teshu-
mara were effectively abandoned. Ishumar slowly became a pejorative term in 
Tamasheq society itself. 
 
From the fall of Traoré to the National Pact 
The Tamanrasset Agreement brought temporary relief to the besieged Traoré 
Regime, but it came too late. In Bamako and other cities in Mali the democratic 
movement had only grown stronger. Starting from December 1990 CNID and 
ADEMA organised several marches in Bamako and other cities. On 18 January 
1991, the students and workers trade unions and the opposition movements 
joined forces to organise a demonstration ending in riots, the sacking of a 
number of party leaders’ villas and the death of several students. The next day, 
CNID and ADEMA organised a demonstration in Segu, while the national trade 
union UNTM proclaimed a general strike. As the demonstrations continued 
over the months and as the number of participants in the demonstrations grew, 
the regime reacted more violently. On 23 March 1991 a mass demonstration 
ended in severe riots that continued over the next days. The army was deployed 
against the demonstrators, leading to several hundred deaths. On 26 March 
Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, commander of the airborne divi-
sion stationed in Bamako, ended the spiral of violence by staging a coup d’état. 
Moussa Traoré and his wife Mariam were arrested. Thirty-one years of dicta-
torship and single-party rule came to an end.31 
The new ‘strong man’, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, did not 
act alone. He immediately formed a Conseil pour la Réconciliation Nationale 
(CRN), including representatives of all the democratic movements in Mali 
                                                 
30  ‘L’avenir du Nord. La société civile est incontournable affirme Iyad ag Ghali’, 
L’Essor, 06/10/1993. 
31  Traoré and his wife were tried for crimes against humanity and for economic crimes. 
They received the death penalty, which was transferred to a lifetime sentence. At the 
end of his second term in 2002, President Konaré pardoned and released the Traorés. 
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(which, at that point, still excluded the Tamasheq movements). Touré pro-
claimed he would lead the CRN through a transitional phase, during which a 
new constitution would be written; political parties could be founded; and 
democratic elections for parliament and presidency would be organised. He 
himself would not propose his candidacy as president. After the presidential 
elections, he would step down and rejoin his post in the Army. All this, so he 
promised, would be done within nine months. In order to build democracy in 
Mali, and especially to discuss on which grounds it should be based, Touré 
organised a National Conference in July 1991. These National Conferences 
were much in vogue in the early 1990s all over francophone West Africa. 
Democracy took sail under the wind of the Franco-African summit at La Baule. 
The Malian National Conference gathered representatives of all the new poli-
tical parties and civil movements in the country, including the Tanekra, which 
was represented by Iyad ag Ghali. On the one hand, the main outcome of the 
National Conference with regards to the North was a certain amount of recog-
nition for the role the rebellion had played in bringing about the fall of Traoré. 
Yet, on the other hand, the Conference rejected the Tamanrasset Agreement, on 
the grounds that it had been anti-constitutional and too lenient towards the 
rebellion. Iyad ag Ghali, representative of the rebellion at the National Confer-
ence, pleaded for federalism as the new form of state rule, or at least economic 
and political autonomy through the creation of regional assemblies which had 
already been proposed in the Tamanrasset Agreement. The conference could not 
agree to these proposals and would not go further than to propose a decen-
tralised form of state administration. However, the National Conference agreed 
on the need to solve the rebellion and a majority of delegates agreed this should 
be done peacefully. 
Thus, for Touré to organise his democratic tour de force, a lasting peace in 
the North was necessary. In order to appease the Tanekra, Touré offered seats 
to two representatives of the Tamasheq movement in his interim government, 
and he assured that the Tamanrasset Agreement would be respected.32 However, 
the Tamanrasset Agreement was ‘only’ a cease-fire, which had been violated by 
both sides before the ink had dried. New negotiations were needed. These 
ultimately led to the signing of the Pacte National, the National Pact. Nego-
tiations leading to the National Pact started in December 1991 in the Algerian 
                                                 
32  The first two representatives of the movements were Cheick ag Baye and Hamed 
Sidi Ahmed. They were replaced by Acherif ag Mohamed and Malainine ould Badi. 
When Touré formed a government (prior to the election of Konaré in 1992), Mo-
hamed ag Erlaf, an Idnan from the Adagh with relatives in the movement, became 
Minister. He remained in the various governments under Konaré on various minis-
terial posts as a sign of inclusion of the Tamasheq movements and society in the 
Malian state. Poulton, R. & I. ag Youssouf 1998: 61. 
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town of El Golea under the auspices of the Algerian Government. They were 
pursued that same month in the Malian town of Mopti. The main issue during 
these two initial rounds was with whom the Malian Government should 
negotiate. By December 1991 the once united Tanekra had become divided into 
four movements: MPA; FIAA; FPLA; and ARLA. Under pressure from the 
Algerian mediators, the four movements tried to overcome their differences by 
creating an umbrella organisation that would conduct negotiations on behalf of 
all movements. This organisation was called the Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés 
de l’Azawad (MFUA). The MFUA united intellectuals and military leaders of 
all fronts, and even from outside the fronts, with the sole purpose of negotiating 
with the Malian state. As such, it became a sort of semi-autonomous diplomatic 
corps, only partly controlled by the movements, but acting on their behalf. A 
series of meetings took place between the MFUA and the Malian Government 
in Algiers between January and March 1992. The Algerian Government pro-
vided mediation, together with two independent mediators: the Frenchman Ed-
gar Pisani, director of the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris (and a personal 
counsellor to French President Mitterand); and Ahmed Baba Miské, a dissident 
Mauritanian politician based in Paris. Their attempt at mediation was however 
unsuccessfully aborted. Their intervention would be the last French attempt at 
mediation in the conflict. The first round of meetings under single Algerian 
mediation took place between 22 and 24 January; the second between 12 and 15 
February; and the last between 15 and 25 March 1992. These led to the final  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 6.1 
Negotiations for the National Pact, January 1992. Edgar Pisani (right, white shirt)  
in conversation with Adberrahmane ag Galla (left, suit).  
In the back-ground (turban, sunglasses), Iyad ag Ghali. 
[Courtesy of Mohamed Lamine ag Mohamed Fall] 
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signing of the National Pact on 11 April 1992. Far more elaborate than the Ta-
manrasset Agreement, the National Pact consisted of six main clauses, various 
sub-clauses and a total of 86 paragraphs. I will here briefly describe the six 
main clauses, their implications and, especially, the lack of their application.33 
 
I: Special social economic and administrative status for the North 
The idea reflects the intent of the MFUA to gain a form of autonomy for the Kel 
Tamasheq within the framework of the Malian state, a weakening of the 
Tamasheq position in comparison to the ideals of the Tanekra. The Malian 
Government and general public however, were extremely hostile to any idea 
even hinting at the dissolution of national unity. One of the clauses in the 
National Pact was explicitly called ‘On the consecration of solidarity and 
national unity in Northern Mali’. The idea of autonomy for the North was 
tacitly reshaped into the administrative decentralisation of the state. Not only in 
the North but in all of Mali. Ironically, the decentralisation process started first 
in the Southern Régions in 1996 before being implemented in the North in 
1999. 
 
II: Tax exemptions for the inhabitants of the North for the duration of ten years  
The demand had been made by the MFUA to alleviate the economic need of the 
inhabitants of the North, struck by four decades of rebellion and drought. The 
tax exemption had been granted, but was never implemented and was more or 
less informally dropped as a demand by the MFUA with new rounds of 
negotiations. However, as in the previous decades, tax collection in the North 
remained a futile effort. The tax exemption was made after new negotiations in 
2007. 
 
III: The creation of two special funds to reconstruct the North 
The Development and Reintegration Fund was meant to support former rebels 
financially in their efforts to reintegrate civilian life once the conflict would be 
settled. The Fund for the Assistance and Indemnification of Conflict Victims 
was analogous to the fund created to alleviate the needs of the victims of the 
demonstrations that brought the fall of Moussa Traoré in March 1991. Both 
funds for the North were formally created, but remained empty. The Malian 
Government claimed it did not have the money to fill the funds and looked for 
donor aid to provide funding. Donor countries were reluctant to provide the 
necessary means. Only in 1995 did money become available for the reinte-
                                                 
33  The integral text of the National Pact can be downloaded at:  
http://www.kidal.info/docs/pacte_national.pdf. Last visited 21/07/2009. 
 REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 273 
gration in civil society of former rebels. The fund to alleviate the victims’ needs 
remained a dead letter. 
 
IV: Decreasing deployment and withdrawal to a limited number of northern 
towns by the Malian Armed Forces 
After the signing of the National Pact, the Malian Armed Forces did indeed 
withdraw from a number of towns and barracks in the North, concentrating on 
Gao, Ménaka, Kidal, Tessalit, Ansongo, Bourem and Timbuktu, which meant 
that the Adagh, Azawad and Niger Bend were left to the control of the rebel 
forces. Security would be provided by so-called mixed patrols of integrated 
rebels and army soldiers (infra). To be sure, army patrols still ventured out of 
their barracks and retaliation on civilians after rebel attacks or ‘acts of banditry’ 
did not end. Although they were stationed in a smaller number of barracks, 
troop strength in the North only increased. 
 
V: The creation of structures to secure the gradual return of refugees after the 
end of the conflict 
In response to the National Pact clause on refugee repatriation, the UNHCR 
released a budget of 3,500,000 US dollars. The various NGOs concerned with 
aid to the refugees set up a programme to facilitate repatriation. A series of 
granaries intended to feed the returnees was set up in the North. Eventually the 
grain was used to feed internally displaced Malians as the refugees refused to 
return. Despite the signing of the National Pact, the fighting and executions had 
not ended as the hardliner movement FPLA did not respect the National Pact, 
and neither did the Army.34 
 
VI: Integration of former rebels in the Malian Armed Forces and 
administration 
In the years following the signing of the National Pact until the final peace in 
1996, the integration of former rebels in the Malian state was the main issue and 
the main bone of contention for all parties involved. Originally, the MFUA 
demanded that all former rebels be integrated within the Malian Armed Forces 
and administration. The demand of the MFUA to integrate 3,600 men outraged 
the Malian public and Government. The various movements also strongly 
disagreed on how many rebels should be integrated from which movement, 
which even contributed to the creation of new movements, such as the FULA 
and FNLA. On 11 February 1993, the Malian Armed Forces finally integrated a 
total of 640 rebels, who were deployed together with regular army soldiers in 
three so-called ‘mixed patrols’ under the command of Algerian officers. Res-
                                                 
34  Poulton, R. & I. ag Youssouf 1998: 65. 
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ponsibility for the mixed patrols was formally in the hands of the Commission 
Monitoring the Cease Fire (CCF), also provided for in the National Pact, and 
manned by MFUA members. In practice, control over the mixed patrols was 
totally unclear and so was their deployment. In fact, the mixed patrols formed 
an extra army that could be played out by all players in the field. The creation 
of the mixed patrols and the CCF were long the only measures of the National 
Pact to be applied, to the dissatisfaction of all: the rebels, who wanted more; the 
Army who wanted less integration of, and more combat against the rebels; the 
Malian general public who thought this was giving state means to the rebels; 
and the Tamasheq population, who did not see much improvement in security. 
Nevertheless, as ag Youssouf and Poulton conclude, the mixed patrols and the 
CCF “managed to buy a year of (relative) peace for Mali”.35 Despite the Army’s 
resistance and the general disapproval of the Malian public, the MFUA kept 
insisting on rebel integration. In May 1994, the MFUA and the Malian Govern-
ment renegotiated the implementation of the National Pact. The discussions 
focused entirely on rebel integration as the MFUA demanded integration of 
3,000 men into the Army, and development projects leading to the reinsertion in 
civil society for another 4,000, which outraged the Malian negotiators.36 The 
insistence on the integration of rebels in the Malian Armed Forces from the side 
of the MFUA was probably their worst public relations campaign in the whole 
conflict. It gave many Malians the impression the rebels were nothing but a 
bunch of unemployed mercenaries from Qadhafi (which they had been said to 
be from the start) demanding employment from the Malian state. 
 
The National Pact has never been fully implemented. The significance of the 
National Pact lies in the road leading to it; and in the consequences of its 
structural non-application on the internal development of the rebel movement, 
Tamasheq society in general and their relations with the Malian state. It led first 
to two years of structural negotiation by a group of men, the MFUA, who had 
less and less contact with the communities or state bodies they formally re-
presented, and could therefore hardly be considered as representative in real 
terms. Its non-application finally led to the outburst of severe interracial, inter-
ethnic, and intertribal violence in early 1994. The creation of the MFUA and its 
role in conducting negotiations meant a shift in importance within the move-
ments from the ishumar towards the évolués. The MFUA’s first secretary 
general and spokesman was Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed, the newly elected 
political leader of the FIAA. Before Zahaby joined the FIAA, he had been a 
development consultant to the AEN, the Norwegian Church development 
                                                 
35  Ibid. 
36  Poulton, R. & I. ag Youssouf 1998: 70. 
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organisation, which ran large projects in the Niger Bend. Zahaby was a typical 
évolué. Perhaps the clearest example of the ishumar retreat and the rise of the 
intellectuals is the signing of the National Pact by the hardliner movement 
FPLA. At first, the FPLA’s military and political leader Rhissa ag Sidi Mo-
hamed had refused to sign the National Pact, condemning it as yet another 
attempt to sell Tamasheq independence in exchange for some small privileges. 
In the end, the FPLA did sign the National Pact, under the signature of Zeidane 
ag Sidi Alamine, also a former employee of the Norwegian AEN, a relative to 
FPLA leader Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed and representing the FPLA within the 
MFUA. 
Zeidane explains that he and Rhissa disagreed over the 1992 National Pact. Zeidane 
travelled to Bamako and signed it on behalf of the FPLA. Rhissa only came round to 
supporting the Pact in 1994, but “since 1992 I have consistently worked for the 
application of the Pact, which provides a good framework for integration”, says 
Zeidane.37 
From the perspective of the FPLA, notably from Rhissa himself, Zeidane’s 
action could only be seen as a coup against Rhissa, a Lebanon veteran and 
ashamor of the first hour. The FPLA therefore continued its attacks against the 
Malian Armed Forces. The non-implementation of the National Pact and the 
constant renewal of negotiations between the MFUA intellectuals and move-
ment leaders created substantial friction between, on the one hand, the MFUA 
members and the movements’ leaders, and their fighters on the other. As many 
military leaders left the bases in the Adagh and Azawad for longer periods of 
time in Bamako, Algiers or Tamanrasset, discipline within the bases dropped. 
The MFUA intellectuals and high ranking officers were housed in luxurious 
villas and hotels in Bamako, while the fighters were still living on a military 
diet and sleeping on the rocks in their mountain bases. No results were forth-
coming from the long protracted negotiations. The Malian Government was 
reluctant to meet new demands and promises already made were never fulfilled, 
which led the fighters to look upon negotiators with mounting suspicion and to 
accuse them of selling out the Tamasheq cause for their own interests. The 
waning discipline and morale in the rebel bases resulted in the temporary de-
sertion of many fighters who, on their own account, started to attack merchant 
convoys, tourists and villages. Both the Malian Government and the MFUA 
negotiators were quick to denounce these attacks as ‘acts of banditry’. Both the 
MFUA and the Malian Government had every interest in making these declara-
tions as the Malian opposition parties were eager to attack the Government over 
the way it dealt with the rebellion, and as the MFUA members did not want to 
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lose what they thought they had won in negotiations. However, many fighters in 
the bases saw these ‘acts of banditry’ as a mere continuation of the fight. In the 
end, the difference between ‘regular’ rebel attacks on military goals as a sign of 
discontent with the peace process, and ‘banditry’ by rebel deserters became 
totally blurred. The musicians of the Teshumara had found a new theme for 
their songs: the divisions, discord and treason within the movement. 
I live in hard times 
In which kinship is untwined 
In which my maternal kin hates me 
When you have nothing left, they sell you 
With the heavy burden you carry you support no one 
Nothing is done together 
The world cries like young animals that leave the tent to drink38 
 
Insecurity, refugees and the exclusion of civil society 
The outbreak of the Tamasheq rebellion immediately provoked strong reactions 
from the Malian population towards the Tamasheq community, both in the 
North itself and elsewhere. As early as August 1990 the houses of the small 
Tamasheq community in Bamako were pillaged and their inhabitants attacked.39 
Hostility towards the Kel Tamasheq in the capital died down at the beginning of 
1991, after the signing of the Tamanrasset Agreement and the start of the 
demonstrations leading to the fall of Moussa Traoré in March that year. But in 
the North, especially in cities like Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao, hostility towards 
the Tamasheq and Bidân populations would only grow over the years. Waves of 
refugees coincided with various phases in the conflict. The first wave consisted 
of Kel Adagh who fled to Algeria during the second half of 1990. They mainly 
settled in the border towns of Bordj Mokhtar, Ti-n-Zaouatene and Timiaouene 
from where it was easy to move back into Mali if conditions were favourable. 
The Tamanrasset Agreement meant a temporary end to fighting in the Adagh. 
When the FPLA too agreed to adhere to the National Pact in 1993, the Algerian 
and Malian authorities judged it safe for the refugees to return. Algeria was 
eager to see its ‘guests’ leave as their presence was seen to be the cause of 
rising insecurity in Southern Algeria itself.40 A project was set up to repatriate 
12,000 refugees from Algeria between July and December 1993. In May 1993, 
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a pilot project repatriated 468 refugees. Upon arrival in Mali, these almost 
immediately returned to Algeria. In August a second group of about 1,000 was 
sent home, and these too had returned to Algeria by November as the sites of 
resettlement in Mali had been destroyed.41 The project was aborted and no new 
attempts to return the refugees were seriously undertaken until the effective 
ending of the conflict in 1995. By the end of 1992, the main theatres of conflict 
were located in the Tamesna, the Azawad and the Niger Bend, provoking a 
second, larger wave of refugees, this time mainly towards Mauritania, and to a 
lesser extent to Burkina Faso. These countries were closer to the concerned 
areas. In Mauritania, three refugee camps were created at Bassikounou, Aghor 
and Fassala-Niéré. In June 1991, the number of refugees reached about 5,000.42 
By October, this number had increased by a factor of six.43 In Burkina Faso, 
most refugees ended up in the neighbourhood of Gorom-Gorom and Saan 
Yogo. Between August 1991 and the end of 1994, their numbers rose from 
about 10,000 to 30,000. The conflict reached its high point in mid 1994 with the 
advent of the sedentary Ganda Koy movement (infra). By the end of 1994 the 
number of refugees in Mauritania reached an estimated 70,000, with 2,000 new 
arrivals a week in August 1994.44 By then, fighting had flared up again in the 
Adagh as well, provoking a new wave of Kel Adagh refugees to Algeria. Some 
estimates of the total number of refugees by the end of 1994 reach 160,000.45 
 The refugees were not granted official refugee status by international organi-
sations such as the UNHCR and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent. 
They were labelled ‘displaced persons’, which had consequences on the amount 
of help they received. Material assistance in the camps was often inadequate. 
The Algerian Red Crescent, for example, could only muster a 100 tons of se-
molina; 7,500 kilos of sugar; and 115 boxes of corned beef to feed a population 
of 5,700 souls at the refugee camp at I-n-Guezzam for the whole of 1992, 
without any further assistance.46 In 1992, the UNHCR had released a budget of 
4,000,000 US dollars to support the refugees in Mauritania. Unfortunately, a 
quarter of this budget had to be spent on transport from Nouakchott to the 
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camps at the Mali-Mauritanian border.47 Without wanting to trivialise or dimi-
nish the refugee problem, being a nomad refugee had some advantages. As the 
conflict dragged on, many fled in a pre-emptive attempt to save their lives and 
possessions. They brought part of their herds, their tents and goods with them. 
Although the living conditions in the camps were harsh, they were not much 
different from those the refugees were used to. The refugees were often without 
medical assistance and diseases such as cholera, smallpox and tuberculosis took 
their toll, but many had been without medical assistance in Mali during 
peacetime as well. Food remained a problem. Just as during the droughts, relief 
rations were primarily based on the surplus production of other countries and 
were often inappropriate to Tamasheq dietary habits. The UNHCR even ship-
ped canned herrings to the camps, which for many was their first ever encounter 
with fish. As the conflict continued, the camps started more and more to look 
like Tamasheq and Bidân villages, waiting for better days. The end of the con-
flict and a series of particularly good rainy seasons in the North led most refu-
gees to return of their own accord, without much assistance. 
Attacks from the rebel forces at the villages on the banks of the Niger, such 
as Djebock, Bamba and others, understandably created resentment, panic and 
grief over the victims, and hatred towards the Kel Tamasheq. The resulting 
pogroms against Tamasheq civilians led to avenging counter strikes by the rebel 
movements, which often took the form of attacks against commercial and 
private traffic on the road between Gao and Hombori. Gao in particular suffered 
under the rebellion. The rebellion effectively blocked the international trade 
over the main roads. At the village of Hombori, in the Niger Bend, transporters 
had to halt at night as use of the road was only allowed by daytime. From 
Hombori to Gao, cars drove in convoys under obligatory army escort, which 
had nevertheless to be paid for. Transport from Algeria to Gao had come to a 
halt in 1990, and gradually picked up again in 1992. With the conflict between 
ARLA and MPA in 1994, traffic between Algeria and Gao was again largely 
disrupted as the main road to Algeria goes through the Adagh. As the Bidân 
merchants in Gao and Timbuktu had better connections with the rebel 
movements, they were capable of partly attracting the remaining trade from 
their Songhay competitors. The main backers and funders of the Mouvement 
Patriotique Ganda Koy that would come as a reaction to the rebellion could 
therefore be found among the wealthier Songhay merchants of Gao. One of the 
co-founders and main advocates of the Ganda Koy was Ali Bady Maïga, owner 
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of a large transport company, two petrol stations in Gao, and head of the local 
transport union. 
The rebels had cut off transport. To survive, we had to start eating our investment 
capital. They explained to us they wanted the region to develop, but all they did was 
attack the sedentary population. The army did nothing. They [the Kel Tamasheq] 
never thought the blacks would take up arms to fight in the bush. But without a 
fight, they would never have returned to dialogue.48 
Apart from the lack of trading goods and provisions, Gao also suffered under 
the state of emergency that had been declared in the North in July 1990. It is no 
wonder that the sedentary population was not sympathetic to the rebellion. The 
ishumar had never included them in their movement, they had only scarcely 
included their own people, but they pretended to fight in the interest of the 
North. Particularly after the signing of the Tamanrasset Agreement the general 
discourse of the Tanekra had changed from a fight for independence to a fight 
in the interest of all of Northern Mali, which had been neglected by the Malian 
state. However true this neglect may have been for the Adagh and Azawad 
regions, it had never been the case for Gao or the villages along the Niger 
River. The Songhay population had never felt excluded from Mali. Particularly 
after the droughts, development projects had flourished in the Niger Bend. The 
projects of the Norwegian NGO AEN in the Gossi area, the projected building 
of a dam near Tossaye, the activities of World Vision, Accord, Oxfam and other 
NGOs had brought hope for prosperity after the drought. Now these organi-
sations had to retreat from the area under the threat of violence from both the 
rebel forces and the Army. In revenge, pogroms were directed against Tama-
sheq and Arab NGO employees. In May 1992, a crowd at Gossi, headed by an 
army unit, killed twelve Tamasheq employees of the Norwegian AEN, includ-
ing its vice-director and the assistant to the director. Negotiations between the 
rebel movements and the state in December 1990 leading to the Tamanrasset 
Agreement, and again in November 1991 leading to the National Pact, only in-
cluded representatives of the rebel movements. Other groups within Tamasheq 
society were excluded, not to mention delegates from other communities in the 
North. In April 1993, during a congress organised in Gossi, the MPA leader 
Iyad ag Ghali pleaded for the inclusion in negotiations of members of civil 
society, the ‘wise men and traditional leaders’. Fearing a growing influence of 
the chiefs to their own detriment, the MFUA intellectuals rejected this idea, 
stating that for the moment only the MFUA and rebel movements were valid 
interlocutors of Tamasheq interests.49 
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Masters of the Land: February to October 1994 
In Algeria and Libya, the exiled Kel Tamasheq in the Tanekra had discovered a 
relative freedom in the reshaping of tewsit hierarchy, which had led to com-
petition over leadership within the Tanekra and the ‘Tamanrasset War’ of the 
mid 1980s. Complementary to this process was the reshaping of the ideas on 
Tamasheq warrior status. In previous times, the warrior status of an individual 
had been linked to his tewsit affiliation. Now, warrior status became determined 
by individual participation in the Libyan campaigns in Lebanon and Chad, and 
participation in the rebellion itself. Contrary to the civilian population, and 
despite the retaliation on civilians by the Army, these new warriors discovered 
they could use violence as a means to reshape tewsit hierarchy under circum-
stances that had been missing for more than a century: State absence. After the 
first six months of rebellion, the state was absent in Northern Mali. Admini-
strators had been killed or had abandoned their posts, except in the major cities 
such as Kidal, Ménaka and Gao. After the Tamanrasset Agreement in 1991, the 
Army withdrew to a small number of posts, also largely situated in the main 
cities and villages. The number of posts would only decrease after the signing 
of the National Pact in 1992. Indeed, the Army occasionally left its barracks to 
fight rebel units and more often to terrorise and kill the nomadic population. But 
crudely put, that was ‘all’ it did. With this last remark I do not intend to tri-
vialise their actions. It is to say that, on one hand, the Army largely influenced 
peoples’ behaviour through the exercise of violence but, on the other hand, it 
had no means to directly control or influence developments within Tamasheq 
society, as it had had in previous decades. This situation of ‘independence’, or 
the absence of the state, combined with heavy military repression despite this 
absence, had a large influence on the reorganisation of the rebel movement 
along tewsit lines. The atrocities the Army committed against the civil popu-
lation forced the population and the rebels to organise their defence. The con-
cepts of illellan – the strong members of society – and tilaqqiwin – the weak 
members of society needing protection – needed to be reformulated to deal with 
the developments Tamasheq society underwent. In previous periods, notably in 
pre-colonial times, strong tewsiten had protected weak tewsiten. In practice, the 
clans and tribes of illellan status had monopolised violence to the detriment of 
the tilaqqiwin. During the colonial period, but particularly during the Keita 
Regime and the years of exile, the imghad had become aware of the possibility 
of a political existence independent from the noble clans. As a large number of 
rebel fighters were of imghad origins, they felt they did not need fighters of 
ellellu origins to protect them and their tewsit from the Army. However, this 
reformulation of strong and weak in society on the basis of personal combat 
skill instead of tewsit affiliation meant a fragmentation of protection. Where one 
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tewsit had formerly protected others, this shifted to some extent to groups of 
individuals protecting others within the same tewsit.  
These conflicts between former illellan and tilaqqiwin, between formerly 
dominated and former dominators, came especially to the fore in what became 
known as the ‘fratricidal war’ between the ‘modernist’ ARLA and the ‘tradi-
tionalist’ MPA in 1994. In February 1994, members of the ARLA ambushed 
and killed MPA’s second man Bilal Saloum. Bilal was a Kel Adagh of bellah 
origins and a close friend to Iyad ag Ghali with whom he had fought in 
Lebanon. Bilal had been a Colonel in the Libyan army, a rank he kept in the 
MPA. As a bellah, Bilal was the exception proving the rule of bellah absence 
within the movements. His high-ranking position within the MPA despite his 
bellah origins was often presented by the MPA as denial of its traditionalist 
outlook. As a high-ranking MPA officer, Bilal had integrated the mixed patrols 
created in 1993. In his function of officer and mixed patrol leader, he toured the 
Azawad region in search of ‘bandits’ or renegade rebels. On one of these patrols 
ARLA members ambushed and killed him.50 The ARLA attackers took Bilal’s 
weapons, car and body with them. The MPA demanded the ARLA to return 
Bilal’s arms, car, and body. Failure to fulfil this demand would be taken as a 
declaration of war. The ARLA sent a mission to fulfil the MPA demand, but 
this mission was in turn ambushed by the MPA, who disarmed the ARLA 
fighters and injured their commander. In reaction to the MPA counter-attack 
ARLA troops invaded Kidal on 6 March 1994 and kidnapped Intalla ag Attaher, 
the symbol of Ifoghas dominancy in the Adagh. The Ifoghas and their move-
ment, the MPA, considered the kidnapping of their supreme leader an outrage. 
The next day an MPA unit attacked the ARLA forces, killing three ARLA 
fighters and capturing a number of their men, among whom their leader 
Abderrahmane ag Galla.51 An exchange of hostages was arranged and in April 
1994 a treaty was signed to close the ranks of the movements in view of an 
upcoming meeting between the MFUA and the Government in Tamanrasset. 
This did not end the conflict. In July 1994 ARLA fighters belonging to the 
tewsit Idnan conducted a new attack against the MPA near Ti-n-Essako. Finally, 
in August 1994, the MPA and Intalla ag Attaher’s private militia managed to 
oust the ARLA from its base at Tigharghar, with the logistical assistance of the 
Malian Armed Forces. By accident, Intalla had managed to obtain a number of 
weapons from the Malian Armed Forces, destined to defend himself and his 
entourage against attacks by the rebels.52 In 1994, his militia, in alliance with 
the Ifoghas movement MPA, would start a campaign to re-establish Ifoghas and 
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chief dominancy within the Tamasheq political landscape of movements, civil-
ians and tribal leaders. The ARLA fighters were totally evicted from the centre 
of the Adagh. The ARLA fighters and their civilian protégés of imghad tribes 
sought refuge in the Tamesna plain at the FPLA base at I-n-Taykaren and the 
nearby base of Halboubouti. The Idnan members of the ARLA retreated to 
those areas of the Adagh generally considered to be their territory, notably the 
Timetrine valley, where they created their own movement: The Base Autonome 
du Timetrine (BAUA). In December 1994, these Idnan fighters were forcibly 
integrated in the MPA. Other former ARLA fighters followed after the signing 
of a final peace agreement between MPA and ARLA that same month.53 The 
effective destruction of the ARLA forces meant a final victory for the Ifoghas in 
the Adagh, and thus a victory for the conservative elements within the move-
ment. Hierarchy within the Kel Adagh federation was again established with the 
Ifoghas at the top. 
The Kel Adagh were not the only ones to experience factionalism along 
tewsit lines. The FPLA, which had started as a movement of hardliners, suffered 
under the same problem. In January 1993 two new movements came into 
existence: the Front Unifié de Libération de l’Azawad (FULA); and the Front 
National de Libération de l’Azawad (FNLA). The FULA consisted largely of 
Kel Intessar inhabiting the western part of the Niger Bend around Goundam. 
The FPLA headquarters were established at I-n-Taykaren at the extreme eastern 
part of the Niger Bend, under the control of the tewsit Chemennamas. I-n-
Taykaren is far removed from the Goundam area. Distance between operational 
bases and leadership questions led the Kel Intessar to opt out of the FPLA. The 
Ishidenharen, Dabakar and Daoussahak tewsiten, inhabiting roughly the same 
area as the Chemennamas, also withdrew from the FPLA, leaving the Chemen-
namas on their own. The Ishidenharen and part of the Dabakar created the 
FNLA, setting up its base at Mount Halboubouti in the vicinity of I-n-Taykaren. 
The Daoussahak, never having been much involved in the movement anyway, 
left altogether to form an independent defence militia. The splits along tewsit 
lines within the FPLA cannot be explained along the same ideological lines as 
the split between MPA and ARLA. The Daoussahak are both inside and outside 
the Tamasheq world. They speak their own language and are, strictly speaking, 
not Kel Tamasheq. However, they were incorporated within the Tamasheq 
political world as part of the pre-colonial Ouillimiden federation, with a status 
similar to imghad. The Chemennamas, Ishidenharen and Dabakar are tewsiten 
with more or less equal status within the tewsit hierarchy. In pre-colonial times, 
the tewsiten within the FPLA were under the protection of the Ouillimiden Kel 
Ataram imushagh (or ‘true’or ‘highest’ nobles), as were almost all other tew-
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siten in Northern Mali at the advent of French conquest. The Chemennamas are 
a tribe consisting of a number of fractions, created by the colonial authorities in 
the 1910s, but also under the sway of the Ouillimiden.54 Their status is com-
parable to that of imghad, which they most likely are. The Dabakar are con-
sidered to be on one hand noble or ellellu, but on the other hand to be tilaqqiwin 
under the protection of the Ouillimiden. In the 1960s, Nicolaissen positioned 
the Ishidenharen as somewhere between ineslemen (religious specialists) and 
imghad.55 The Ishidenharen would fiercely deny this position, arguing that they 
are nobles almost on a par with the Ouillimiden imushagh. It was exactly this 
contest over ascribed status that caused the break-up of the FPLA, a contest that 
was exacerbated by the fact that the status of most groups was rather unclear to 
begin with. Most are neither ‘true’ imghad nor ‘true’ nobles, but all had 
formerly been tilaqqiwin. The Ouillimiden, after their heavily defeated revolt of 
1916, had never joined a rebellious movement afterwards, but had instead 
closely cooperated with the various regimes. Their former tilaqqiwin, however, 
had joined the Tanekra and were active within the rebellion. Therefore, these 
groups could now effectively claim status as illellan or protectors. As army 
repression on civilians went on during the second rebellion, the question of 
protection became more urgent. Being warriors in the present, defending their 
kin, their status as tilaqqiwin could no longer be accepted. The enormous 
historical prestige of the Ouillimiden imushagh did not permit other tewsiten to 
claim absolute predominance altogether. But the relative hierarchy among them 
could be argued about. As the Chemennamas claimed leadership position within 
the FPLA, the other groups opted out as they contested Chemennamas domi-
nancy.  
Just to complete the account of internecine strife, a few ‘minor fights’ should 
be mentioned. The Bidân movement FIAA also underwent a process of internal 
division. Exactly when is not clear, but the movement ended up in at least two 
different units. In early February 1993, a small war broke out between FIAA 
and FPLA when FPLA fighters murdered a FIAA supporter outside Gao. The 
fight between both movements threatened to become ‘international’ when 
Arabs from the Touaji and Almouchakarai tribes living in Niger came to the aid 
of the FIAA in attacking the FPLA forces and the Kel Tamasheq inhabiting the 
Tamesna plain, and stealing numerous cattle. The Touaji were also suspected of 
delivering arms to the FIAA. In April 1993, the conflict between FPLA and 
FIAA ended with a treaty between both movements after FIAA leader Zahaby 
ould Sidi Mohamed threatened to leave the MFUA. In March 1994, the FNLA 
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was ousted from its base Halboubouti by the MPA, after which a number of 
their fighters forcibly joined this movement. As for the FULA, it seems the 
movement was dissolved, after which part of its fighters rejoined the FPLA, 
while others joined the FIAA. 
The movement had begun as a united force, but by mid 1994 all unity was 
lost, contributing to the general feeling of insecurity among all the inhabitants 
of the North, including the Kel Tamasheq. In the end, tewsit and temet – who 
you are and who your family is – remained more important than the ideal of 
temust, the Kel Tamasheq nation. 
 
Ganda Koy 
Negotiations with the Malian state seemed to only involve the Kel Tamasheq 
and Arab communities, leaving other communities in the North with a general 
feeling of exclusion. The creation of the Région of Kidal after the Tamanrasset 
Agreement was generally seen as a privilege granted to the Kel Adagh. The tax 
exemptions and special economic status for the North were generally inter-
preted as tax exemptions for the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân and as a special 
economic programme in their favour, while the rebellion had caused most eco-
nomic disruption in the Niger Bend. The strong stress on the integration of rebel 
forces in the Malian Armed Forces and civil service, regardless of qualifi-
cations, was seen as excluding other societies of the North and favouring men 
who had committed all sorts of crimes. Neither the Tamanrasset Agreement nor 
the National Pact, nor any other agreement between the MFUA and the 
Government afterwards, met with approval from the other communities in the 
North. The MFUA and government hardly made any efforts to explain the 
contents of the National Pact or any other agreement to the broader public 
either, and none of these had brought an end to fighting and banditry. On the 
contrary, it had brought banditry and rebels inside the cities. The Commission 
Monitoring the Cease Fire, the MFUA and the mixed patrols all had their seats 
in Gao. In the eyes of its inhabitants, the former rebels behaved as victors and 
occupying forces. On 13 May 1994, a group of armed Kel Tamasheq tried to 
steal a car parked outside the main mosque in Gao when Friday prayer came to 
an end. They killed the driver and a bystander who tried to prevent the theft. 
When the outraged congregation leaving the mosque tried to apprehend the 
assailants, they fled but two were captured. Subsequently the congregation 
brought the two victims of the theft in procession to Gao hospital, where they 
delivered the two bodies, and then started to lynch the two apprehended thieves. 
However, the returned comrades of the thieves to be lynched surprised the 
lynching party as they opened fire and entered the hospital. Firing from inside 
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on the crowd and in its halls on the hospitalised patients, the thieves killed 
eleven people.56 
The massacre in the Gao hospital was the event that led to the creation of the 
Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy. Ganda Koy had a clear solution to the 
problems of the North and a clear-cut goal: Protecting the sedentary populations 
from rebel attacks and banditry and chase the ‘white nomads’ from the land of 
the Songhay. According to its adherents, the Army did not or could not provide 
security in the North. Ganda Koy would do so in its place. Protection of the 
sedentary population would be delivered at all costs, and Ganda Koy did not 
make a secret about what the price was. 
Fellow citizens of the North, let us sweep away all nomads from our villages and 
cities, even from our barren land! Tomorrow the nomads will install themselves 
there as dominators. Black sedentary peoples, from Nioro to Ménaka, let us or-
ganise, let us take up arms for the great battle that waits. Let us send the nomads 
back to the sands of the Azawad. The existing social balance cannot be modified. 
The social economic problems of the North need to be solved for all citizens without 
discrimination. Why are there development projects for the nomads? Why are there 
army posts for the nomads? Why are there seats in parliament for armed rebel-
bandits? Because they took up arms and killed? That is inadmissible. The Ganda-
koye movement is born. Signed without us, the [National] Pact is against us. The 
realities in the North show this. We should create insecurity for the nomads as they 
have created it for the sedentary populations.57 
In this quote from the Ganda Koy pamphlet La Voix du Nord n° 00, 
announcing its foundation, we find almost all reasons for the creation of the 
movement, as well as its basic interpretation of the Tamasheq rebellion and 
society: Insecurity; exclusion; racism; nomadic versus sedentary existence; na-
tionalism; and the economy. 
Although some of the Ganda Koy’s founders were civilian inhabitants of 
Gao, its most prominent leaders were a number of army officers, members of 
the elite airborne division or ‘red berets’, the unit Amadou Toumani Touré had 
commanded until his coup d’état in 1991. The military commander of the 
Ganda Koy was Captain Abdoulaye Mahamahada Maïga, a red beret of Son-
ghay origins who deserted on 9 May 1994, together with Lieutenants Lamine 
Diallo, Abdoulaye ‘Blo’ Cissé and part of their company. These men would 
form the core of the Ganda Koy, leading most attacks against the Arab and 
Tamasheq populations in the months to come. They did so in uniform, and 
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perhaps with the help of comrades who had not deserted. Even the desertion of 
Captain Maïga and his men is questionable. They might well have been author-
ised to desert and create their movement by their superiors, and although any 
form of proof is lacking, the common opinion in Mali holds this to be the case. 
The army had for long been dissatisfied with the way the Government dealt 
with the rebellion and its leniency towards renegade rebels and the MFUA. 
Some officers still believed a military victory against the rebels was possible, 
despite their resounding defeats in 1990. Even if Maïga and his men had really 
deserted, no one made efforts to arrest them. The general public in Mali ap-
proved of Maïga’s actions. Support organisations were created in Bamako and 
elsewhere.58 Active financial support for the Ganda Koy even came from the 
vast Songhay commercial networks in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and 
from the indigenous Songhay community in Niger.59 Rumours had it the Ganda 
Koy fighters were provisioned in arms by the dissatisfied part of the Malian 
Armed Forces. 
The Ganda Koy followed strategies similar to the Tamasheq rebels. They 
made use of tecnicals for transport and attacks. In addition the Ganda Koy used 
boats to patrol and control the riverain villages. They made use of the 
environment the Songhay were used to and improved the fighting tactics the 
Songhay knew. In pre-colonial times, Songhay pirates and river borne raiding 
parties had been as much feared on the banks of the river Niger as Kel 
Tamasheq raiders had been in the desert.60 The Ganda Koy set up a base on an 
island in the Niger River near the village of Fafa. On 26 May the Ganda Koy 
struck its first blow at the village of Tacharane, killing nine Kel Tamasheq. 
Hearing about the attack at Tacharane, the Commission Monitoring the Cease 
Fire started an investigation headed by MFUA and FIAA leader Zahaby ould 
Sidi Mohamed. They quickly discovered that the attack had been launched by 
boat from the Ganda Koy riverain base at Fafa. Leading a mixed patrol, mostly 
made up of his own FIAA fighters, Zahaby went to Fafa and attacked the Ganda 
Koy base on 4 June. The Ganda Koy fighters fled, leaving most of their 
possessions behind. Among these were documents that proved the implication 
of Ganda Koy fighters in the massacre at Léré in 1991 that had cost the lives of 
fifty Bidân.61 In turn, Zahaby’s patrol was attacked on its way back from Fafa 
by an armoured car of the Malian Armed Forces. In the ensuing fight, the mixed 
patrol managed to put the armoured car out of action, but it cost the life of 
Boubacar ould Sadeck, FIAA’s military commander. The next day, in retali-
                                                 
58  ‘Les ressortissants d’Ansongo à Bamako réclament la suppression du Pacte Natio-
nal’, Le Républicain, 26/05/1994. 
59  ‘Nord: la vraie fausse paix’, Le Républicain, 18/05/1994. 
60  Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 1969. 
61  ‘Comment fut démantelée la base de Gandakoy à Fafa’, Union, 21/06/1994. 
 REBELLION: AL-JEBHA 287 
ation to Zahaby’s action, seven integrated rebels had their throats cut by mem-
bers of their unit at the army post of Gourma Rharous.62 The day after, inte-
grated rebels and FIAA fighters retorted by attacking the army post and prison 
at Niafunké, killing nine men and stealing two cars, while simultaneously 
attacking the village of Tonka.63 One day later, on 10 June 1994, most inte-
grated rebels had deserted their stations, with the exception of integrated MPA 
members. The leaders of the various movements, often staying in Gao or 
Bamako, returned to the rebel bases. Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed, until then a 
negotiating moderate, became one of the most intransigent military leaders, 
commanding the FIAA from its base at Almoustarat. His colleague Zeidane ag 
Sidi Alamine returned to the FPLA base at I-n-Taykaren. Negotiations and the 
semblance of peace provided by the National Pact mirage came to an end. What 
followed were the bloodiest months the North had witnessed.  
These first days of renewed violence and the nature of the Ganda Koy were 
decisive for what followed. As the first encounters had been between Ganda 
Koy, the Army and members of the FIAA, it was the latter movement, which 
had until then remained in the background, which took the lead in fighting the 
Ganda Koy. Proof that the deserted soldiers forming the Ganda Koy had been 
among the ‘butchers of Léré’ in 1991 resolved FIAA determination to avenge 
actions by the Ganda Koy against their kin. Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed, the 
main MFUA spokesman and one of the most outspoken intellectuals within the 
movement, became Mali’s ‘public enemy number one’. His ‘treason’ of the 
National Pact and the reopening of hostilities provoked army support for the 
Ganda Koy to a point where it became unclear if attacks were committed by 
Captain Maïga’s deserters or by regular troops. The Ganda Koy consisted 
mostly of soldiers and fighters of Songhay origins inhabiting the villages and 
cities at the banks of the Niger River. Therefore, most attacks made by the 
Ganda Koy were concentrated at the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân population living 
in the Niger Bend. Many Kel Tamasheq of the Niger Bend had settled after the 
droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, often creating villages of their own. These 
sedentarised Kel Tamasheq had not been part of the Teshumara as they had 
stayed in Mali and neither had they been part of the Tanekra. All of Northern 
Mali was engaged in the war, but most victims fell in the riverain villages and 
camps in a spiral of attacks and counter-attacks. After the first week of fighting 
between movements, the attacks changed in nature. Both sides in the conflict 
now concentrated their attacks on civilians. If the Ganda Koy and the Army 
attacked Tamasheq and Bidân camps and villages, the FIAA and FPLA would 
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respond in attacking Songhay villages. The number of victims on both sides 
grew larger with every attack as the conflict dragged on. On 12 June the Army 
killed between 26 and 60 Kel Tamasheq and Bidân in the vicinity of Anderam-
boukane. The next day, the Ganda Koy and regular army units attacked a no-
mad camp between Niafunké and Léré, killing an estimated 25 inhabitants. That 
same day and the day after, pogroms ended the lives of around 75 Kel Tama-
sheq and Bidân inhabitants of Timbuktu. Most of the victims belonged to the 
city elite of merchants and administrators. Simultaneously the Ganda Koy am-
bushed a caravan on its way back from the Taoudenit salt mines, killing 60 
caravaneers. On 19 June the Ganda Koy killed 160 inhabitants of a refugee 
camp near the village of Ber and in the village itself.64 In that month alone, an 
estimated 450 people died under Ganda Koy attacks. Those who managed to 
flee the killings wrote desperate reports to the outside world. 
About ethnic cleansing in Timbuktu city and vicinity 
Date, 15 June 94 
Crimes committed by the Malian Armed Forces and Ganda Koy movement and 
vigilante brigade – commanded by Lieutenant Abdoulaye Cissé called Blo and 
Sabre Kouyta and Chabone Barka and Casounké and Hamidou Mahamane Siréy – 
and commander of red berets sent to Timbuktu on 29 May. AEM 26 of the Malian 
Armed Forces has made an airlift 2 flights/day for 14 days and [on] each flight 55 
persons [from] the red berets and the paratroopers and their material [arrive]. On 
their arrival [they are] deployed in the northern neighbourhood – east and centre 
town. Instead of going to their barracks they are quartered in Arab and Tamasheq 
houses and their Headquarter is in the Badjindé neighbourhood [in centre of Tim-
buktu] so they do not have a mission order which [is signed by the] local com-
mander nor the governor of Timbuktu. (...) They have transformed the city of 
Timbuktu into their Head Quarter to massacre the Tamasheq and Bidân and the 
notable groups pay these soldiers. [for] Each Tamasheq or Arab, they get 200,000 
CFA. [for each] Individual killed. The house of each killed person is looted if he is 
sedentary and if he is a nomad his animals are confiscated. All valuable objects are 
seized. Bracelets, rings, shoes, boubous – etc – Their bodies are thrown to the vul-
tures or on the dunes for the wild animals (...).65  
These and other messages arrived at Amnesty International and other human 
rights organisations, but their reports on the situation in Northern Mali remained 
without much consequence. In other times they might have made headlines in 
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the Western press (‘Mysterious Timbuktu scene of ethnic violence’...) but ex-
cept for French international radio station RFI, the world was too absorbed by 
the Rwanda genocide to notice anything else going on in Africa. 
In reprisal for Ganda Koy attacks and pogroms, the FIAA and FPLA started 
a campaign of counter terror. On 1 July 1994 the FIAA attacked the villages of 
Bintangoungou, Biragoungou and Tenenkou, killing eight people. The village 
of Soumpi followed with twelve victims. On 17 July rebels attacked the road 
between Niono and Nampala. In return, the Army killed seventeen Kel Tama-
sheq in Nampala itself the same day. The severest FIAA attack came on 25 July 
at the village of Bamba. That day was market day in Bamba. The well-visited 
market is held at a crossroads. Camel mounted FIAA elements approached the 
market from all four roads and simply opened fire, leaving forty people dead.66 
In October 1994, the FIAA executed an elaborated series of attacks on the army 
base at Gao and the Ganda Koy leaders of the town. On 20 October 20 1994 
FIAA fighters attacked the army post at Ansongo, forty kilometres from Gao, 
with the purpose of drawing troops from the Gao garrison to Ansongo, which it 
did. On the evening of 22 October the FIAA attacked Gao itself. In an attempt 
to draw the soldiers out of their barracks, a number of fighters entered the city 
at night, shooting at random, setting fire to two petrol stations belonging to 
Ganda Koy founder Ali Bady Maïga, destroying a pharmacy and shooting at the 
barges on the Niger River. Another unit laid in ambush to intercept the Malian 
soldiers when they left the camp. However, the soldiers remained in their camp 
only to come outside when the FIAA fighters aborted their attack under the 
assault of an assembled Ganda Koy crowd. The next day, pogroms against the 
few remaining Bidân and Tamasheq in Gao followed. A crowd of Gaois and 
soldiers left for the nearby village of Inelfiss founded by the fraction Kel Essuq, 
Kel Takailalt. This village of ineslemen or religious specialists served as a 
zawiya, a religious centre of the Qâdiriyya Sufi brotherhood. The inhabitants 
were former nomads who had settled to promote religious learning and to 
practice agriculture. The village head, leader of the zawiya and tribal chief 
Mohamed Anara ag Hamadou was among the most respected Muslim scholars 
and civil community leaders of the region. Many inhabitants of Gao had sought 
his advice on religious matters. Nevertheless, on the accusation of having given 
hospitality to the FIAA unit the evening before their attack, the enraged crowd 
killed Mohamed Anara and fifty other villagers, while the Malian soldiers stood 
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by and watched.67 The FIAA attack and the revenge of the Gao population left 
thirty-eight ‘black’ Gaois and a hundred eighty ‘white’ Gaois dead.68 
 
Race and stereotypes resurface 
The coming of the Ganda Koy led to a renewed discourse on race, racism, and 
nationalism within Malian society on the whole and particularly in the North. 
This discourse was fed with arguments taken from the stereotyped images of 
Tamasheq society I have discussed in previous chapters. But contrary to the 
1950s and 1960s, the Kel Tamasheq community now had the means to defend 
itself against these stereotypes held in Mali. Tamasheq évolués not only con-
ducted negotiations with the Malian Government, some of them were also en-
gaged in returning the Ganda Koy polemics against the Kel Tamasheq com-
munity in the Malian press. The stereotyped image of the Tamasheq always 
served the same purpose, a purpose it serves all around the globe: Creating 
other and self, with strong emphasis on ‘other’. In all periods concerned in this 
book, the Kel Tamasheq served as an ‘uncivilised other’ in Mali, who had the 
indecency of viewing themselves as superior. With the start of the rebellion, 
these negative stereotypes resurfaced to be developed by the Ganda Koy from a 
discourse on the ‘uncivilised other’ into a discourse on the ‘life-threatening 
other’ who should be exterminated. Self and other are concepts limited by, and 
made operational by, shifting boundaries. The concept of ethnic or group 
boundaries is extremely well developed, but I’d like to add a few comments.69 
The general idea on ethnic or other boundaries between groups is that they are 
seen as in flux or permeable. Identity is created in dialogue, and is negotiable. 
True as this might be, the boundaries of identity, self and other, are created or 
negotiated in context, and these contexts can vary within a number of para-
meters. The first is the scale of the group to be identified. One can safely say 
that the larger the category to be ‘othered’, the more general and essential the 
stereotype applied to it. Nuance is lost as the group to identify becomes larger 
and stereotypes need to be all-inclusive. The second is the nature of relations 
between groups, in relation to the size of the groups involved. These can vary 
from friendly jokes swapped at the bar after a successfully concluded deal, to 
curses hurled together with hand grenades in wartime. I do not think I surprise 
anyone by saying that in a context of war, the boundaries of identity are no 
longer permeable. They are raised with barbed wire, with defence lines on both 
sides. It is also plainly obvious that the more hostile relations between groups 
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are, the more the image of the other becomes hostile and, especially, reduced. It 
is not only negative, it is almost void of substance as substance involves nu-
ance. This process of stronger essentialisation and the drawing of fixed boun-
daries of self and other, followed by a nuancing of images and the reopening of 
boundaries when the opposing parties felt the need for reconciliation, can be 
seen at work in the discourse accompanying the conflict between the Ganda 
Koy and the Kel Tamasheq. 
The Ganda Koy’s problem was on what stereotype and criteria the con-
struction of the Kel Tamasheq other should be focused. Tamasheq society is 
heterogeneous and so are the other societies of the North. Apart from the Kel 
Tamasheq, Bidân and Songhay, the North is inhabited by the Fulbe; Bambara; 
Dogon; and Bozo. Nevertheless, one thing was relatively clear: the rebellion, 
and thus the problems of the other inhabitants of the North, had been organised 
and started by the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân from the Northernmost part of 
Mali, the Adagh and Azawad. From these groups, only the upper strata of 
society had been involved. The rebels could thus easily be ‘othered’ on criteria 
applicable to these groups only. The first was their racial appearance, their 
‘whiteness’. Most Ganda Koy discourse focused on the Kel Tamasheq as ‘white 
people’. Historical discourse on the relations between the Songhay and the Kel 
Tamasheq played an important part as well. The Kel Tamasheq were not only 
portrayed as white, but especially as slavers who had enslaved the Songhay in 
pre-colonial times. Ideas about Tamasheq racism and practices of slavery 
resurfaced in Southern Mali with the rebellion. In May 1992, the Ivorian 
journalist Venance Konan tried to find the reasons for the rebellion while travel-
ling in Mali. Although he may not have found them, the quotes from his inter-
views give a rare insight into the thinking of the average Malian on Tamasheq 
society, and its divisions between blacks and whites, masters and slaves. His 
own words too might give an impression of what the average West African 
intellectual might have thought on the same issues. 
From Saint-Louis to Addis Ababa, there runs a line above which people are white 
and feel different and superior to blacks. How often has one not heard Moroccans, 
Tunisians and Algerians say “you Africans”. The peoples to the north of this line, 
one should not hide it, have always been and, in some cases, still are slavers. The 
Tuareg today still have black slaves. In Bamako, they have told me various stories 
about the relations between Tuareg and blacks and between Tuareg and their slaves. 
Masters who break the arms of disobedient slaves, bella slave students obliged to 
serve them. (...) Seydou Boiré, a geographer who lived for a long time in Tamasheq 
country gave me a rather instructive case: “One day, we drank tea with a Tamasheq 
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chief. And he said to us, as if it was the most normal thing in the world, that it was 
his dream to bridle a black man and to ride him as a horse”.70 
The Ganda Koy interpreted the Tamasheq rebellion as an attempt to regain 
control over the Niger Bend and its inhabitants on a basis of their racial superi-
ority. The author of Ganda Koy’s pamphlet ‘La Voix du Nord nº 00’ gave this 
explanation for the outbreak of revolt in clear terms. 
Not one armed rebel-bandit claims the Azawad, but he seeks recognition of the right 
to dominate black peoples. (...) The armed rebels-bandits are racists, slave-drivers; 
they consider all blacks as slaves, as inferior beings. Even their intellectuals hold 
these ideas. They refuse to live together with blacks. At best they tolerate blacks.71 
Ganda Koy spokesmen made statements of the same kind in the national 
newspapers. 
Again, it will never be said in the records of history that the Songhay people (they 
exist) have meekly accepted to being delivered, their hands and feet bound, to the 
slave-drivers of the desert, spurned straight from medieval obscurity; pro-slavers 
since they are only driven to this so called Tuareg rebellion by feudal, slave-driving, 
racist motives, and low mercantile considerations.72 
The second element of Ganda Koy othering discourse was Tamasheq and Bidân 
social organisation. The societies of the Adagh and Azawad, be they Bidân or 
Tamasheq, were hierarchical, hence feudal, and especially nomadic. The idea of 
the lazy, anarchist, unattached nomad who should be sedentarised and civilised 
was as alive in 1994 as it had been under Modibo Keita. Analysing the prob-
lems of the North, an anonymous administrator in Gao gave his view of Tama-
sheq society and its problems: 
We have already mentioned nomadic existence. It was long deformed by the West-
ern, particularly the French, press. One brings to mind the pride of the “blue men of 
the desert” in support of the Tuareg lobby. With regards to this subject, the picture 
presented by a European development worker who lived in Kidal for a year speaks 
volumes: “It is true that the Tuareg are proud, but proud of what? Everything but of 
work which they think is debasing. Rather, they are proud to beg, steal and kill”. 
There is evidence that gardening yields high profits in Kidal. The Tuareg are ac-
customed to gifts and it is rare to find Tuareg who think that, in lack of livestock, 
they could commit themselves to agriculture or other forms of production.73 
Set in a language of reason and analysis, we rediscover all stereotypes of nomad 
unproductiveness and the type of character nomadic existence produces: Lazi-
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ness; deceitfulness; and bloodthirstiness. Hence, in a desire to erase the other by 
making him akin to self, they should be converted into civilised sedentary 
citizens practising agriculture, just like the Songhay do. Apparently, the 
thoughts of administrators on Tamasheq society had not much changed since 
the days of Modibo Keita.  
Where the Kel Tamasheq had not been able to provide an answer to the 
essentialising stereotypes during the 1950s and 1960s, they now had the means 
to defend themselves in words. Freedom of the press in Mali ensured that not 
only the Ganda Koy or the Government could be heard. The Kel Tamasheq also 
had a sympathising press. The newspapers l’Union; Nouvel Horizon; and Ata-
ram, le vent du Nord ensured that those who were interested could read a dif-
ferent story. Particularly l’Union and its editor-in-chief Houdaye ag Mohamed 
ardently exposed the atrocities committed by the Ganda Koy and offered a plat-
form for Tamasheq intellectuals of the more radical movements to counter the 
accusations made. In an interview with Nouvel Horizon in September 1994, 
Zeidane ag Sidi Alamine aired his grievances about the image of the Kel 
Tamasheq in no uncertain terms. 
From Modibo Keita to Alpha Oumar Konaré, from Moussa Traoré to General Ama-
dou Toumani Touré, the Tuareg question has caused the flow of much blood, ink, 
sweat and tears, without ever being fully understood by the national opinion. Be-
cause the Tuareg have always been treated by certain compatriots as nationless. 
Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots as slavers. 
Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots as separa-
tists. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots as 
racists. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots as 
invaders. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots as 
strangers. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots 
as traitors. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatriots 
as dictators. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain compatri-
ots as outlaws. Because the Tuareg have always been considered by certain com-
patriots as a useless part of the nation. Because the Tuareg have always been con-
sidered by certain compatriots as fugitives. Because the Tuareg have always been 
considered by certain compatriots as mercenaries. Because the Tuareg have been 
constrained by certain compatriots to be eternally on the move. Because the Tuareg 
have always been considered by certain compatriots as “the darlings” of the Western 
and Arab countries.74 
Iyad ag Ghali, remaining outside the conflict in the Niger Bend, was often 
interviewed by the newspapers L’Essor and Les Echos, which tended to be 
more government-supporting, in which he could give his views on the reasons 
and origins of the conflict. From the fall of Moussa Traoré in March 1991, and 
the signing of the National Pact in April 1992, to the renewal of hostilities in 
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May 1994, the rebellion was not presented as a separatist movement in the 
Malian press. On the contrary, the Tanekra had been presented as concerned 
with the improvement of the living conditions in the neglected North on the 
whole, and bringing about the fall of Moussa Traoré’s dictatorial regime. Thus, 
instead of nationless traitors and dictators, the rebels had been worthy sons of 
the fatherland in helping to bring democracy about. Iyad ag Ghali was prone to 
underline this interpretation of ‘his’ rebellion in 1990. 
It is certain that the start of the movements’ fight has played an important role in 
bringing democracy by weakening the dictatorial regime. In its days, the MPA had 
formulated the problems of the North in terms of social, political, economic and 
cultural demands.75 
The reconciliatory stance made by the Malian press, confirmed by Iyad ag 
Ghali, backfired in 1994 when the promises of the National Pact were not 
delivered. Many Southern intellectuals and politicians blamed the movements 
for demanding a special political and economic status for the North. The 
MFUA’s unyielding stance towards the application of the National Pact, despite 
Southern resistance and the impossibility of meeting all demands, were seen as 
unpatriotic in comparison to their patriotic attitude in bringing about the fall of 
Traoré. The Kel Tamasheq had suffered under Traoré, but so had all Malians, 
and the honour of getting the credit of Traoré’s fall should suffice as extra 
compensation. The idea that the rebellion had been about separation after all 
resurfaced. Ethnic and racial motives regained ground, not only among the 
Ganda Koy but also among the Southern political elite. 
If we put aside the suspicion of “disqualifying” secessionist intentions of certain 
rebel movements, we should recognise the merit of the armed revolt of the Azawad 
in starting the struggle leading to the fall of the decadent regime in Bamako. (...) By 
giving themselves an essential and distinct ethnic appearance, while sharing practi-
cally the same living conditions with other Malians who have never been consulted, 
nor associated, nor incorporated, the suspicion of a difference in pigment as a ve-
hicle for secession re-emerges.76 
Othering and conflict emphasise not only the essential features of the enemy, 
but also of the originating group. The Ganda Koy could claim essential traits 
opposite to those of the Kel Tamasheq rebels. They were ‘black’ and sedentary, 
and they lived along the banks of the Niger River. The emblem of the Ganda 
Koy consisted of a canoe crossed with a hoe and a harpoon, representing the 
Niger River; sedentary life; and defence. The bellah community of the Niger 
Bend shared these traits. Despite being part of Tamasheq society and culture, 
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many bellah participated in the Ganda Koy, which is less surprising than it 
seems. Elsewhere, I have described the differences between the bellah and the 
free Kel Tamasheq in their experience of the period between the 1950s and 
1990s. The politics of the late colonial period and the Keita Regime brought 
them emancipation. Alfellaga did not concern them. The droughts brought them 
hunger and exile too, but to different places in Africa. Barely any bellah were 
part of the Teshumara or Tanekra and their community suffered just as hard 
under rebel attacks as the others. In June 1994, bellah intellectuals attempted to 
create a special bellah movement, the Mouvement pour l’éveil du Monde 
Bellah.77 This movement never came off the ground. Most bellah simply joined 
the Ganda Koy. But the attempt to create a movement, and the reasons invoked 
in the article announcing its birth, do give an insight in the reasons why bellah 
joined the Ganda Koy. 
Considering the reigning climate of distrust between white and black in the North, 
between integrated rebels and the FAS [Malian Armed Forces]; considering that the 
few erring bellah (there are less than 10) who found themselves in the rebellion have 
been killed, in a cowardly way, by the “red”, the assassination of Colonel Bilal 
Saloum by the “imghad” of the ARLA forms a notorious example; considering that 
the Songhay have created the Ganda Koy movement; considering that the Malian 
Government and people have been let down by the manipulators of the [National] 
Pact (Commissioner for the North and Malian rank of the MFUA); considering that 
thousands of bellah have been removed from their land by the rebels and armed 
bandits; considering the marginalisation of the bellah community (...) The Mouve-
ment pour l’éveil du Monde Bellah (...) Informs the national and international 
opinion that a bellah is different from a Tuareg and that a haratin is different from a 
Moor [Bidân]. The Mouvement pour l’éveil du Monde Bellah fights against the new 
“Western apartheid” which the MFUA and the Commissioner for the North want to 
put in place in Northern Mali: A white, armed minority, controlling power and 
economic means, to the detriment of the Malian state and people, and dominating a 
black majority.78 
Due to army repression and some results made by the movements in nego-
tiating with the state, the rebel movements attracted more recruits. Most of these 
new recruits either joined in search of protection, or because there was some-
thing to gain. With the rising animosity against ‘white’ Kel Tamasheq, many 
had no choice. Either they fled, or they joined, or they fell victim to pogroms. 
The bellah community suffered less under pogroms, but in their turn suffered 
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under rebel attacks.79 Many bellah had become internally displaced people 
within Mali as they had felt forced to leave their homesteads. Few had the 
chance to integrate into the movements. Their fate was cruder than that of the 
refugees outside Mali (as the latter at least had some support from international 
organisations), while simultaneously being excluded from the rebel forces. Pre-
existing animosity towards their former masters also made many bellah join in 
the repression of free Kel Tamasheq by the Army and the Ganda Koy. When 
the Army attacked the Kel Tamasheq and Arab community in Léré in 1991, 
many bellah joined in, guarding the survivors who were more or less interned 
outside the village for more than a year. 
The bellah took our possessions, engaged in trade in our place, set up shops almost 
everywhere in the South, killed our cattle. Others lived with our herds in the bush. 
They also killed people in the bush and looted their camps. During the last dry sea-
son, we had neither access to the wells, nor to the market because of the problems 
[between the Malian Armed Forces and the rebels]. The bellah were charged to 
survey us. Some we knew, others we didn’t. At night, military vehicles patrolled to 
prevent our escape. They threw stones at us when we tried to leave.80 
Like the Ganda Koy, the Mouvement pour l’éveil du Monde Bellah used 
racial motives as the Tanekra had largely excluded the bellah community from 
its actions. Finally, the bellah, like most other inhabitants of the North, rejected 
the National Pact. They felt excluded from its stipulations and saw it as nothing 
but a privilege for their former masters. Support for the Ganda Koy in the 
bellah community and the racial view of the problems of the North by the 
bellah themselves meant that, on the one hand, Ganda Koy discourse could not 
be simply anti-Kel Tamasheq. To this day, most bellah see themselves as part 
of the Kel Tamasheq community, but as second-rank citizens. On the other 
hand, opting for racial discourse had become less problematic and the only 
option left to other the Kel Tamasheq accused of supporting or joining the 
rebellion. Despite the failure of the Mouvement pour l’Eveil du Monde Bellah 
and the integration of bellah in the Ganda Koy, bellah political organisation did 
come off the ground with the founding of a regional political party in Ménaka: 
the Union Malienne pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UMADD). The 
Cercle of Ménaka has a large bellah population, next to a large ‘free’ Kel 
Tamasheq population. The UMADD was often seen as ‘the bellah party’, 
although many of its adherents came from the imghad population of the Cercle. 
Its two main leaders belong to the tewsit Ishidenharen, one of which is of bellah 
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Bamako, if it was known that they were Kel Tamasheq. 
80  Association des Refugiés et Victimes de la Répression de l’Azawad, Témoignage de 
Fati Wellet Hamomo, retenue en hotage à Léré de mai 1991 à mai 1992 (Bassikou-
nou, 26/05/1992). Personal archives. 
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origins. During the communal elections of 1999, the UMADD managed to gain 
10 of the 21 seats in the Ménaka council, thus forming a political force to be 
reckoned with. 
The rebellion had been instigated to achieve Tamasheq independence. This 
posed a threat to the existence of the Malian state. Therefore, nationalism 
became an important feature of the Ganda Koy. To justify its existence, it 
claimed that it defended the nation in ardent patriotism against people who, it 
was argued, did not want to be Malian and in fact were not Malian. It is sig-
nificant that the Songhay movement quickly changed its name from simply 
Ganda Koy to Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy. As most nationalist dis-
courses in wartime, that of the Ganda Koy was directed foremost against the 
enemy, instead of in praise of their own nation, which in this case meant that 
the negative stereotypes of the Kel Tamasheq and Arab communities formed 
the most important discourse in the movement. After being attacked by the 
FIAA in June 1994, the inhabitants of Niafunké wrote an open letter to the 
Malian press to complain about their fate and to strengthen their resolve to find 
a solution. 
Faced with this situation and total abandonment by the Government, we, the in-
habitants of Northern Mali, are faced with a choice between three solutions: A. To 
accept being the slaves of the Tuareg rebels. In fact, this is one of their principal 
aims. The Tuareg culture and mentality has always made them feel racially superior 
to others. Therefore, they have never taken up productive work and will never do so. 
They only put effort into bedding their big-breasted women and robbing decent 
people who gain their livelihood by the sweat of their backs. B. To abandon our land 
to the profit of the nomads. This hypothetical option would permit them to reach 
their goal: the creation of a Tuareg state, based on the use of ethnic blacks for chores 
and productive labour. Historically, the land in question has been owned and tended 
by the Bambara kingdom of Segu, the Peulh empire of Macina, the Mali Empire and 
the Songhay Empire (...) In our history, there has never existed a Tuareg empire or 
kingdom. C. To defend our fatherland by all means.81 
In nationalist war rhetoric, the other is not just the other. Rather, it is an 
invading other from outside. Most rebels had been involved in the Teshumara 
and Tanekra, which meant they had lived in exile outside Mali for a long 
period. This was put forward as a sign that the rebels were not Malians. After 
the FIAA attack on Gao, in October 1994, passports were found on the bodies 
of killed FIAA attackers. These Malian passports were issued in Tamanrasset 
and N’djamena, which led the pro-Ganda Koy press to conclude that Zahaby 
ould Sidi Mohamed’s FIAA had hired Algerian and Chadian mercenaries, des-
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pite evidence to the contrary; issued abroad, the passports were Malian.82 Rhe-
toric on ‘the other’ was balanced by a discourse extolling the virtue of the 
Malian nation. This nationalist discourse was built on the same elements as 
those put forward in the 1950s and 1960s to construct the Malian nation: 
History; fraternity; honour; dignity; and labour. The sole missing element was a 
bright future. Indeed, in wartime, the future hardly looks idyllic. In the quote 
above, we find all these elements together. The Ganda Koy strongly invoked the 
glorious Malian past. Unsurprisingly, most attention was paid to the medieval 
Songhay Empire and its leaders, the Askia dynasty. The emphasis on the history 
of the Songhay Empire as an example to the present-day Malian nation should 
also be seen as countering the emphasis placed on Mande history and historical 
importance in the official Malian historiography. The Ganda Koy stressed that it 
should not be forgotten by the Malian South, which remained indifferent 
towards the problems of the North; and that the Songhay were Malians and 
equally important to the creation of the Malian nation as the Mande. To a large 
extent, Ganda Koy nationalist discourse countered the ‘Mandefication’ of Mali. 
But other empires, kingdoms and heroes were invoked too, including Ghana, 
Mali, cheick Ahmad Lobbo, Elhajj Umar Tall and Samory Touré. Surprisingly, 
the Kel Tamasheq heroes Cheiboun, amenokal of the Tengueregif and victor 
over the French conqueror Bonnier; and Firhun ag Elinsar, amenokal of the 
Ouillimiden Kel Ataram, were included too. With regards to the latter, it was 
stressed by many bellah that, despite being amenokal, he was black and there-
fore must have been of slave origins. As I have discussed earlier, the colour 
differences made within Tamasheq society, which reserved sattefen or bluish 
black to the imushagh, had effectively been exchanged for a ‘colour scheme’ 
only including ‘white’ nobles and ‘black’ slaves. The sole picture taken of Fir-
hun shows him to be sattefen, hence ‘black’, hence of slave origins. However, 
in contrast to the importance of the Songhay Empire and other medieval 
empires in forming the Malian nation, the Ganda Koy stressed there had never 
been an ‘Empire of the Azawad’. The Kel Tamasheq had thus not contributed to 
the shaping of the Malian historical nation. Despite the virtues of Firhun and 
Cheiboun in resisting French conquest, the Kel Tamasheq remained outsiders. 
The return of peace: October 1994 to March 1996 
The attack at Gao and the massacre of the Kel Essuq Kel Takailelt zawiya, and 
of the ‘white’ population of Gao was the last of its kind. It more or less directly 
led the Songhay and Tamasheq civilian population to wonder what was happen-
ing to their communities. The goal of the FIAA attack on Gao had been to force 
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the Malian Government back into negotiations and acceptance of the National 
Pact, recently abandoned by the Government under popular pressure as unwork-
able since it did not account for the sedentary population. The FIAA wanted to 
show the Malian Government, the Army, and the Ganda Koy that even the 
larger cities of Mali were not safe from rebel attacks and that the military 
capacity of the movement had not withered away. In this respect the attack was 
partly successful. The inhabitants of Northern Mali, ‘black sedentary’ as well as 
‘white nomad’, realised that neither the Army, nor the rebel movements, nor the 
Ganda Koy could or would protect and defend them. On the contrary, only 
further spiralling violence could be expected. In realising this danger and the 
situation the population found itself in, the chiefs of the tewsiten and the village 
chiefs of the Cercle of Bourem, and representatives of the Ganda Koy signed a 
peace treaty of their own in November 1994, irrespective of the National Pact 
and other engagements between state and rebel movements. The local Bourem 
treaty arranged mutual protection; abstinence from violence; and especially land 
tenure and water rights.83 In the Niger Bend, pastoral and sedentary commu-
nities largely depended on each other in daily life. The nomad population de-
pended on the farmers’ agricultural production for supplies in grain. In return, 
the farmers depended on the nomads for manure and the sales and transport of 
their surplus products, and they often put their own livestock into the care of 
nomad families. These relations had been disrupted during the conflict. Rela-
tions between sedentary and pastoral communities were not the only ones 
damaged by the conflict. Due to the absence of the state and parallel to the 
conflicts between the movements, many Tamasheq and Bidân tribes and 
fractions had engaged in hostilities between themselves over pasture, wells, and 
internal hierarchy. By 1994, small arms abounded in Northern Mali. The 
Bourem Pact focused on daily relations between nomadic and sedentary in-
habitants of the Cercle, by formally regulating practices that had been normal 
prior to the conflict. The sedentary population and the Ganda Koy would give 
the nomads access to the village markets and the watering sites for the herds at 
the banks of the Niger River, which had been denied during the rebellion. New 
to the agreement was that, contrary to practices over the last years, the village 
heads and the Ganda Koy would offer protection to the nomads. In return, the 
nomads would abstain from stealing animals belonging to the village inhabit-
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ants; would not carry arms when entering the villages; and would warn the 
villagers of upcoming rebel attacks. The latter arrangement would effectively 
prevent attacks by rebels or renegades, as the fractions of the Cercle would 
certainly know of upcoming actions. With this agreement, the fractions of the 
Cercle of Bourem explicitly denied support to the rebel forces. The Bourem 
Pact also provided for the creation of a committee to oversee its implement-
ation, analogous to the committees created through the National Pact.84 This 
committee would play a key role in promoting similar local agreements 
between fractions and villages in the area throughout 1995, which were in-
cluded in the Bourem Pact, and the peace agreements between the movements. 
This local peace treaty on local initiative meant the beginning of the establish-
ment of a lasting peace. 
The initiative for peace came mainly from the civil population, but most 
rebels too had grown weary of conflict. After six years of fighting, all parties 
were simply exhausted. Those ishumar who had fought for an ideal in 1990, 
had seen nothing of it. Unity was far from being attained, the movements only 
fought among each other. Tamasheq independence had been ruled out by the 
more pragmatic leaders. 
You know, of all the fighters who had been trained in Libya, perhaps only twenty 
percent understood the goal. The others had understood nothing, they just went 
along. With the Kel Tamasheq, there is this thing we call teylelil: If there is one who 
has a goal, the rest will follow automatically. Without knowing what the goal is, 
without thinking. That is teylelil. But we are also jâhil [ignorant, anarchists]. Give a 
jâhil a gun and the gun controls the man, not the man the gun.85 
Fighters who had joined after the outbreak of revolt in fear of their lives and 
desiring to see their kin protected had come to realise that the protracted fight-
ing only brought further insecurity. As one former rebel formulated his experi-
ence of the rebellion in 1995: 
I was in Libya in 1990. One day, I killed a reptile. A Libyan officer approached me 
and asked me why I had killed it. Before he went away, he said to me: “the reptile 
you just killed is more Libyan than you are”. We started the rebellion. As time 
passed, the massacres between Malians began. There came a moment when we, the 
rebels, symbolised terror (...) Many Malians had enough of it, they wanted nothing 
to do with us. Then, I remembered the Libyan reptile and I started to fear that one 
day I would be considered less than a reptile in my own country.86 
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As his leaders had done before him, this former rebel saw himself explicitly 
as a Malian. The idea that the Kel Tamasheq could be something else than 
Malian had given way to more pragmatic aims, but pragmatic leaders and intel-
lectuals who had negotiated for as much autonomy and economic privilege as 
possible had been faced with a structural non-application of the National Pact 
and most other agreements made afterwards; outright hostility towards the Na-
tional Pact culminating in the actions of the Ganda Koy; the total break-up of 
the rebel movements; and their incapacity to control their men. A new frame-
work for resolving the conflict was needed. The initiative to end internal con-
flicts and to reunite the movements, by force if need be, came from the MPA 
and the FPLA. The movement representing the one tribe most involved in 
preparing the revolt – the Ifoghas – and the movement representing the most 
intransigent secessionists – the FPLA – took the initiative to end the fight and 
thus to give up the idea of akal n temust, Tamasheq independence. Throughout 
1994, the MPA, with the help of the Malian Armed Forces and the Ifoghas 
militia led by amenokal Intalla ag Attaher, had fought the ‘dissident move-
ments’. The conflict between MPA and ARLA had been militarily settled in 
favour of the MPA. After defeating the ARLA, the MPA successfully attacked 
the Idnan militia BAUA, and the FPLA dissidents of the FNLA. After force-
fully integrating BAUA and FNLA fighters in their ranks, or at least annihi-
lating their fighting power, the MPA directed itself against the FIAA, again 
with active support from the Malian Armed Forces. In November 1994, the 
Army and MPA forces successfully attacked the FIAA base at Assid El Biat. 
The attack and conquest of the base was filmed and broadcasted on Malian 
TV.87 However, despite military success, the ARLA and other movements re-
mained existent and could pose a new threat to the MPA. Therefore, a final 
peace agreement was signed between the MPA and ARLA through the medi-
ation of FPLA leader Zeidane ag Sidi Alamine on 15 December 1994.88 The 
agreement was also signed by the FPLA itself and was placed explicitly under 
the umbrella of the Bourem Pact, sidestepping the National Pact. By giving 
supervision over the agreement to civilian leaders of the Bourem community, 
the movements acknowledged that further initiatives for peace should come 
from civil society. The agreement between ARLA, MPA and FPLA implicitly 
stated that the three movements would together fight ‘renegade rebels’ and 
‘bandits’, in other words: the FIAA, which had taken the lead in fighting the 
Ganda Koy. In order to gain support, FIAA leader Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed 
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had toured the surrounding countries. In 1994, rumours circulated that Zahaby, 
who spent much time in Algiers, had sought and gained the support of the 
Algerian FIS. All this ensured that the FIAA was as much of a threat to the 
other movements as to the Ganda Koy. In the weeks prior to the formal treaty 
between the MPA, ARLA and FPLA, the MPA and FPLA had reached an in-
formal agreement with the Ganda Koy to fight the FIAA together.89 This in-
formal agreement was followed by a formal treaty between the FPLA and the 
Ganda Koy on 11 January 1995. Like the treaty between ARLA, MPA and 
FPLA, this treaty between Ganda Koy and FPLA was placed under the auspices 
of the Bourem Pact. Besides signing the treaty with its sister movements, FPLA 
leader Zeidane ag Sidi Alamine also came to terms with the Malian Armed 
Forces. On 11 December 1994, the Malian Army agreed to the reinsertion in its 
ranks of those FPLA fighters who had been integrated into the Army under the 
provision of the National Pact, but who had deserted after the outbreak of 
hostilities in May 1994.90 Finally, in June 1995, Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed 
stated that the FIAA would from now on adhere to the National Pact, which in 
diplomatic terms meant he gave up the fight against the Ganda Koy and the 
other movements. 
Peace between the movements led to a climate in which civilians could start 
to reconstruct relations among the various communities of the North. The re-
construction of relations of trust and cooperation between civil societies in Mali 
was just as necessary as those between movements. To reinstall trust, so called 
Rencontres Intercommunautaires, Inter Community Meetings, were organised 
by leaders of the communities involved. The first of these had resulted in the 
Bourem Pact. A second meeting was held at the end of March 1995 at Aglal, 
close to Timbuktu, to reconcile the communities in the Niger Bend. A third was 
held in September 1995 at M’bouna near lake Faguibine, to pacify the sur-
rounding area. By then, the NGO community inside Mali, notably the Nor-
wegian AEN, had become an active supporter of these meetings and helped in 
financing and organising these meetings. From October 1995 to March 1996, 
the AEN and other NGOs supported the organisation of 37 meetings.91 The 
Inter Community Meetings – called takoubilt in Tamasheq – would become a 
necessary and institutionalised part of Northern Malian regional politics after 
the official end of the conflict.92 Besides reconciliation, the meetings also 
served to re-establish power balances between those groups who participated 
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and organised the meetings. The meetings were organised on the initiative of 
local powerbrokers: Fraction chiefs; the heads of local NGOs; and powerful 
former rebels. The organisers sought the financial support of foreign NGOs who 
often provided means of transport and money to buy the necessary food for the 
participants: Rice; sheep and goats; tea and sugar. Invitations to all communities 
involved were then extended, as well as to the local administration (often also 
involved in the organisation), which often formally presided over the meeting. 
The meetings involved extensive discussion between representatives of all tew-
siten, often by mouth of the chiefs or religious leaders, on development; dis-
armament; banditry; and land and water tenure. Festivities, such as camel races, 
dance parties, and concerts by Tinariwen or other local bands, complemented 
discussions. The takoubilt meetings still form part of the political landscape in 
Northern Mali, although a number of them have become world music festivals 
and tourist attractions. 
History, a source for the justification of hate in the previous months, was 
now invoked to reconcile the warring parties. Whereas in early 1994 the Ganda 
Koy stressed the otherness of the Kel Tamasheq and the historical difference 
between Songhay and Kel Tamasheq, now the common history and origins of 
the two peoples were presented. 
Even legend has cursed war between Songhay and Tuareg. Everyone who travels the 
Niger River knows the two stones called the Targui and the Songhay. According to 
legend, they were two warriors of the same mother. The one had a Tuareg father, the 
other a Songhay father. During ethnic troubles each was ready to defend his father’s 
side. Despite their mother’s tears, they were ready to attack each other. God changed 
them into stones looking at each other without ever touching.93 
Another element used in normalising relationships was the concept of 
senankuya: Joking relationships between cousins or ethnic groups. Like in Ta-
masheq society, Mande social relationships are largely based on hierarchies and 
inequalities. These hierarchies and inequalities are mostly expressed through 
age or generation and kinship relations, finding expression and justification in 
the Sunjata epic or like epics in the Mande culture area. The social inequality 
between group members is the fundamental principle of day-to-day social 
interaction between individuals.94 However, they cannot form the basis of 
interaction between groups of strangers. The institution of the joking relation-
ship, or senankuya in Bamanakan, helps to overcome this handicap. Joking 
relationships allow the denial of hierarchy through the ritualised exchange of 
standardised jokes and insults. Non-hierarchical relations exist on the family 
level between cross cousins and between grandparents and grandchildren. They 
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can also exist between certain families, who are thus perceived as having a 
cousin relationship. This is then extended towards members of other social 
groups with the same family name or jamu, who are therefore seen as actual 
family. The equality created between social groups through these joking rela-
tions is seen as primarily preventing violence and bloodshed. Originally used 
within social groups and between adjacent ethnic groups on a small scale, 
senankuya was now taken up to form the basis of inter-ethnic relationships 
within the Malian nation-state at large. As a traditional denial of hierarchy and 
the expression of equality, senankuya relations were highly functional in stress-
ing the equality of the nation’s members and member-groups. The most often 
quoted example to prove the existence of senankuya relations between ethnic 
groups is that between the Bozo fishermen and the Dogon, whose elaborate 
senankuya excludes both bloodshed and intermarriage.95 All ethnic groups, it 
was postulated, stood in senankuya relations, putting them on equal footing 
within the nation. Thus, senankuya is said to exist between the Kel Tamasheq 
and the Dogon, between the Fulbe and craftsmen in general (as an extension 
between Fulbe and their own casted craftsmen), between the Bambara and the 
Somono (which are a kind of casted, but ethnified Bambara fishermen), et 
cetera. The equality between ethnic groups through senankuya relations, 
involving elaborate ritual insults and duties of mediation in dispute, was 
invoked to reconcile the disrupted nation which should include the Kel Tama-
sheq. On 30 May 1994, evaluating the progress in the implication of the 
National Pact after a fresh round of negotiations with the MFUA, and warning 
against ethnic war after the creation of the Ganda Koy, President Konaré ex-
plicitly brought senankuya relationships into play to stress national unity. 
If nothing else, we have to prove ourselves worthy of this rich and living history of 
the people who invented and instituted the “senankuya”, an alliance of totemic 
fraternity as sacred, if not more sacred, than consanguinity.96 
After the end of the conflict in 1996, senankuya would play an important 
role in both explaining the conflict and in reconciliation. In 1999 the Malian 
director Cheik Oumar Sissoko released the magnificent movie La Genèse. The 
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movie is inspired by the Book of Genesis – chapters 23 to 37 – on the brothers 
Jacob, the pastoralist, and Esau, the hunter, and Hamor, the farmer from whom 
Jacob bought a piece of land. The story focuses on the conflict between Hamor 
and Jacob over the raping and kidnapping of Jacob’s daughter Dinah by Ha-
mor’s son Sichem (Genesis 34: 1-31). The movie is explicitly set in a Malian 
context. It was shot on location in Hombori and Ansongo, two villages that had 
suffered under the conflict. Jacob and his family wear Tamasheq clothes 
(topped with Fulbe hats) and live in Tamasheq tents. Hamor and his family 
wear the traditional attire of Mande farmers. After the scene of revenge on 
Hamor’s village by Jacob’s sons for kidnapping their sister, a long scene of 
about twenty minutes follows. This scene depicts how both parties, presented in 
the film as cousins, are reconciled by concluding a senankuya pact to stabilise 
their peaceful relationship after war. Sissoko explained the subject of his film in 
an interview. 
I wrote the script of this film about fratricide five years ago [i.e. in 1995], and it 
shows what is happening in my country right now, in the southwest and in the 
northeast. Something like one hundred and fifty people died recently in a conflict 
between the Soninke and the Fulani. There are also conflicts between Arabs and 
Moors in the area around Gao. (...) In the film, you have peasants and farmers. They 
live together for centuries. They know each other very well, and they share many 
things. But because they know each other so well, they also have many reasons to 
hate each other. In the film, like right now in Mali and across Africa, they are 
choosing to focus on these. Why? They share customs, they marry together. But 
because of poverty, because of money, there is all this jealousy and envy and ulti-
mately fratricide.97 
Parallel tot the Inter Community Meetings the UN organisations UNIDIR 
and UNDP actively supported the disarmament of the rebel movements, in-
cluding the Ganda Koy, and their integration in the Malian Army or in civil 
society. Most important in the reconciliation between the Ganda Koy and the 
MFUA movements was that the latter agreed to integrate the Ganda Koy in the 
National Pact. More prosaically put, Ganda Koy fighters could integrate into the 
Malian Armed Forces under the provision of the National Pact. This meant the 
Ganda Koy gave up its resistance against the Pact. It was now no longer seen as 
privileging the nomads and therefore ‘directed against the sedentary population 
of the North’. The integration of former rebels into the Malian Armed Forces 
and into civil society was organised along the lines of a proposal made by 
UNIDIR consultant Lieutenant-General Henny van der Graaf. On the initiative 
of President Konaré, and as part of a more general study on this topic in West 
Africa, van der Graaf and his team had studied ways to halt the spread of small 
                                                 
97  Interview with Cheik Oumar Sissoko by Ray Privett, 03/01/2000.  
http://www.britannica.com/magazine/article?content_id=252652&pager.offset=30 
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arms in Northern Mali and the disarmament of the movements in 1994. They 
concluded that no action could be undertaken until a larger degree of security 
had been established.98 These circumstances had come in July 1995, when van 
der Graaf undertook a second mission, parallel to the Round Table Conference 
of Timbuktu, held between 15 and 18 July 1995, uniting the Malian Gov-
ernment, the MFUA and Ganda Koy, and the international donor community.99 
The aim of the conference was to allocate money to the reconstruction of 
Northern Mali and the ending of the conflict. During the five years the conflict 
had lasted, donor countries and NGOs had made various promises to contribute 
financially to peace. In addition, money had accumulated that had been reserved 
for ongoing projects in Northern Mali that had been postponed in wait of better 
days. In all, during the Timbuktu Round Table, an estimated 150,000,000 US 
dollars were promised as contribution to the reconstruction of the North when 
lasting peace would be established. This large boon greatly helped to appease 
the warring factions. A last, but certainly the most important measure, was the 
creation of the FAR-Nord; a fund to finance peace in the North or, better put, to 
finance the disarmament and integration of the former fighters according to van 
der Graaf’s plan for disarmament. This plan essentially consisted of the creation 
of special sites in the North where fighters who wished to integrate into the 
Malian Armed Forces or civil society could present themselves and hand over 
their weapons. In return for their arms, the fighters would be registered in the 
integration projects, with the assurance that they would either integrate into the 
Army, or would be financially assisted in setting up a civilian life. In the 
meantime, they would stay in the camps, where free food, clothes and basic 
army training were provided, as well as an entry bonus of 20,000 CFA and 600 
CFA per day salary.100 In other words, their arms, hearts and minds were 
bought. Bluntly put, peace was bought for a relatively small sum of money in 
comparison with amounts spent on other peace operations organised by the 
same or similar international organisations. That this could be done is due to the 
extreme state of impoverishment Northern Mali found itself in after four 
decades of war and drought. Even during the major part of my fieldwork in 
Northern Mali in the late 1990s, three years after the end of the war and the start 
of economic reconstruction, it was not uncommon to meet people who owned 
nothing but the clothes on their body, a few rags to construct a tent, and a pot to 
                                                 
98  Graaf, H. van der, Sahara-Sahel advisory mission report (unpublished document, 
n.p., n.d.), courtesy of Lt.-Gen. (Ret.) van der Graaf, who kindly gave me this docu-
ment from his personal archives. 
99  Unless indicated, based on: Republique du Mali, Rencontre Gouvernement-Parte-
naires sur le Nord-Mali. Version provisoire 7 Juin 1995 (unpublished document, 
n.p., n.d.), courtesy of Lt.-Gen. (Ret.) van der Graaf. 
100  ‘Léré: La paix est cantonnée’, Les Echos, 03/02/1996. 
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cook in. In the 1950s, one was not considered rich in the Adagh unless one 
owned a herd of 500 head of cattle, in the 1990s one was considered extremely 
lucky if one owned a herd of 50 camels. Four of these cantonment camps arose 
at Bourem, Léré, Kidal and Ménaka. The camps were under the command of 
regular army officers and financed by the Malian state as a sign of its com-
mitment to establishing peace. In return, the FAR-Nord programme would 
finance the more expensive bonuses for the handing over of arms in the camp; 
the financing of training of integrated fighters; and the financing of projects to 
reinsert the remaining fighters into civilian life.101 The cantonment started in 
November 1995 and lasted until February 1996. In all 2,902 fighters entered the 
cantonment camps.102 However, most of the cantoned men had not been core 
members of the movements and most of the arms they presented were outdated 
models. The best fighters and arms never reached the camps. A number of these 
fighters would later form well-equipped tribal militias, their weapons in hiding, 
which ensured ‘real’ peace among the various communities of the North and, 
occasionally, serve to engage violently in political affairs. 
The absence of skilled fighters and the newest weapons could not temper 
spirits. On 26 March 1996, a highly symbolic date as on that day in 1991 
dictatorship came to an end, the conflict was ceremoniously ended in burning 
the weapons presented by the cantoned fighters at Timbuktu’s main market. The 
ceremony was attended by the most important Malian Politicians, the MFUA 
and delegates of the international NGOs. Piled up with fire wood and poured 
over with petrol, the weapons burst into fire for the last time. While the arms 
burned, FPLA leader Zeidane ag Sidi Alamine proclaimed the movements 
united in the MFUA: MPA, ARLA, FIAA, FPLA and Ganda Koy, dissolved. 
The rebellion was over. 
 
 
                                                 
101  Poulton, R. & I. ag Youssouf 1998: 115. The costs of these bonuses amounted to 
$3,000,000, provided by Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and the US. 
102  The distribution of these fighters over the different movements showed which move-
ments had won and which had lost in the internal struggle for power. Most fighters, 
1,092 or 37%, came from the MPA. The Ganda Koy followed close with 811 men or 
28%. The FPLA could integrate, 453 of its men or 16% of the total number of 
integrés. ARLA and FIAA were the losers with 260 and 288 men respectively, or 
9% and 10% each. Other movements were not even considered for reintegration. 
 7 
Conclusion 
I began the introduction saying that this book attempts to answer a few simple 
questions that could be summarised as ‘why have there been violent conflicts 
between the Malian state and its Tamasheq and Bidân inhabitants since the 
1960s’? Perhaps I was too enthusiastic in asking such a broad question which 
brings about its own complexities. Of course the conflict had many reasons and 
various causes, but one encompassing answer can be given. Throughout this 
book I have argued that the conflict found its origins in a Tamasheq desire to 
regain the political independence they held in the 19th century and which they 
had lost after French colonial conquest. They expressed this desire in a gra-
dually developing Tamasheq nationalism culminating in violent upsurge. This 
desire was countered by successive Malian Governments who wished to keep 
the Northern part of the country within the Malian borders because it was be-
lieved to contain mineral riches and, in a way, also because the Malian nation 
had imagined the Kel Tamasheq to be ‘an other within’ that was needed to give 
further body to the imagined Malian nation. This is an obvious answer, valid for 
many similar conflicts, and there have been many, but human history is not as 
difficult as it is sometimes made out to be. Nevertheless, this simple answer 
disguises complexities about the variegated, inchoate, and sometimes incohe-
rent process of decolonisation; about the nature of the state and who holds 
power in it; about racial prejudice and stereotyped images of self and other; 
about various forms of competing nationalisms; and about political and social 
developments within Tamasheq society. 
Decolonisation, the state and nationalism 
After the Second World War, colonial politics were restructured worldwide. In 
French West Africa and the Maghreb this restructuring led to the establishment 
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of a new political elite, political parties and a gradual transfer of power in AOF 
and Morocco from the French colonial administration to this new elite. At the 
same time, as mineral wealth was discovered in the hitherto worthless Sahara, 
various conflicts broke out over attempts to redraw the Saharan borders, which 
culminated in the French creation of the OCRS in 1957, while in 1956 already 
the Moroccan Liberation Army invaded the Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. 
These were driven back by French and Spanish forces in 1958, while, further to 
the northwest, a ferocious colonial war of independence raged in Algeria. In this 
geo-political configuration, the Bidân and the Kel Tamasheq were at centre-
stage as the inhabitants of the Sahara. 
However, in Soudan Français the new political elite created in the decoloni-
sation process consisted mainly of French educated colonial servants and army 
officers recruited from among the colonial elite of traditional chiefs. Most 
members of this new political elite came from the heartland of Soudan Français: 
the Mande and Bambara inhabited regions. The inhabitants of the North, espe-
cially the Bidân and the Kel Tamasheq, were less well represented but not 
absent. It is often argued by scholars and some Kel Tamasheq alike that the 
Bidân and the Kel Tamasheq had no interest in or understanding of the new 
political game. I hope to have shown that this was not the case. The Kel Ta-
masheq political elite did play an important part in the new politics, but they 
placed their bets on the wrong horses. 
The inchoate and politically charged decolonisation of the Sahara led to 
competition over power between old and new political elites in the region, and 
finally to the creation of competing expressions of nationalism. The nascent 
nationalisms included those of Mauritania, where the political elite was divided 
over alliance with Morocco or France; and the West Sahara, where local Bidân 
tribes supported both the Moroccan invasion and the subsequent Spanish and 
French military Operation ‘Écouvillon’. This led to the birth of a national 
feeling among West Saharans that would ultimately lead tot the creation of 
POLISARIO. A Malian nationalism was already in the making, but it was 
certainly strengthened by the necessary political struggle to keep its territorial 
integrity intact even before independence was reached. In the attempt the US-
RDA regime made after independence to modernise society, politics and state 
control dominated over economic development, while patriotism and Malian 
nationalism were preeminent in politics. The nation was imagined as Malian, 
but this imagining was specifically based on Mali as a Mande nation, an image 
that proved incompatible with the images of potential members of that nation: 
the Kel Tamasheq. Hence, the same adverse national ideal was constructed on 
both sides. The Malian political elite imagined the Kel Tamasheq as inherently 
not Malian and the Kel Tamasheq political elite fully agreed. 
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The last competitor was a Kel Tamasheq nationalism that originally was 
simply against something: Kel Tamasheq and Bidân incorporation in Mali. The 
OCRS sought to keep the Sahara under French tutelage. The Nahda al-Wat-
taniyya al-Mauritaniyya sought to incorporate the Bidân and (partly) Tamasheq 
inhabited parts of Mali in either Mauritania or Morocco. Even those Saharan 
leaders who participated in party politics and elections in Soudan Français did 
so in an attempt to curb the political power of the Southern political elite. 
Although the demands of the ifulagen, the fighters of Alfellaga in 1963, were 
only partly clear, it was clear what they did not want: to be part of a state ruled 
by ‘black Africans’. Tamasheq nationalism only reached maturity in the 1970s 
and 1980s when it was developed by the members of the nationalist movement, 
the Tanekra, who made clear what they wanted: an independent Tamasheq 
state. Their demand found its full expression in the rebellion of the 1990s. A 
few things stand out when looking at the Tamasheq national idea as it was 
imagined in the 1970s and 1980s by the ishumar. The first seeming anomaly is 
that a people who organised society and politics on the basis of fictive kinship 
ties based its nationalist ideal on territorial notions and, more surprising still, 
that these territorial notions were based on the pre-existing states they sought to 
secede from: Mali and Niger. The Kel Tamasheq indigenous to Algeria, Burki-
na Faso and Libya never joined the liberation movement. Already during the 
1980s the Kel Tamasheq from Mali and Niger, once united under the name Kel 
Nimagiler, had broken up along the lines of exactly these states. That they 
garbled the names of Mali and Niger to form their own name as a political 
entity shows how strongly the political geography of the existing states was 
already grafted on their political imagination. Their competing idea of a 
Tamasheq nation had already lost out, as it had to be imagined within existing 
territorial structures. There were nevertheless very specific reasons why ‘soil’ 
was taken as the binding national factor, instead of ‘blood’. The Tamasheq 
nationalists perceived the already existent use of kinship ideology in Tamasheq 
social political organisation as a major obstacle to successful political unifi-
cation of the Tamasheq nation. Indeed, the social-political structure of the Kel 
Tamasheq in tewsiten – clans – kept hindering the nationalist movement 
throughout its existence as various clan-based factions fought for political 
dominance within the movement. These fights started in the mid-eighties, 
continued during the rebellion, and even after the rebellion violence between 
clans continued to haunt Tamasheq internal politics. 
Another development is that the Tanekra nationalist movement incorporated 
certain ideas on the nature of Tamasheq society and the need to reshape it, 
which its predecessors – the political leaders of the 1950s and the fighters of 
Alfellaga – had actively resisted. The US-RDA had sought to curb the power of 
the tribal chiefs, a power created or strengthened during the colonial period, and 
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to promote the interests of the lower strata of society: the bellah and imghad. 
These policies had not been successful at the time. They had formed a major 
cause for the discontent and subsequent violent rebellion of the Kel Adagh in 
1963. But only a decade later, with the Keita Regime gone, the new Tamasheq 
revolutionaries not only sought to liberate their country from ‘foreign occupa-
tion’, they also sought to liberate it from tribal structures and ‘feudal’ leadership 
and social relations. The prejudices once held against them were now part of a 
Tamasheq image of self. In the end, the attempt to rid society of its ‘feudal 
chiefs and social relations’ failed as much as the attempt to liberate the country 
from Malian rule. After the ‘fratricidal war’ between the competing rebel move-
ments MPA and ARLA in 1994, and especially after the initiative for a lasting 
peace in Northern Mali in October 1994 initiated by the tribal chiefs of the 
Bourem Cercle, the power of the tribal leaders was even strengthened at the 
expense of the Tanekra revolutionaries. The failure of the movement to in-
corporate the bellah as a social group would eventually lead many of them to 
join the Ganda Koy, a vigilante movement that sought to end the Tamasheq 
rebellion in violence and ethnic cleansing. 
Stereotypes, nation and race 
The discursive shape the conflict between the Malian state and nation and the 
Kel Tamasheq and Bidân took, forms part of a problem that haunts all of the 
Sahel, a problem often seen as one of ethnicity, but locally phrased in terms of 
race. 
Soudan Français consisted of a number of different cultural and political 
spheres. One can safely say that the further apart geographically, the less 
contact these spheres had. Besides, in particular respects, these spheres were 
governed differently. Northern Mali remained under military administration un-
til 1947 and particular social and cultural relations, especially regarding slavery, 
forced labour, and military recruiting, were judged differently on the basis of a 
racial perception of nomad society. When true interaction is lacking, ideas and 
attitudes towards each other are mostly informed by stereotyped images that 
were partly based on a perception of the colonial racial differentiation in ad-
ministration, and partly on much older pre-existing stereotypes. The image the 
US-RDA leaders had of the Kel Tamasheq and Bidân was that they were 
‘white’, feudal, slavers and ‘colonial darlings’. The image the Kel Tamasheq 
and Bidân had of the Southern US-RDA elite was that they were ‘black’ 
usurpers of a power they had no right to have and which would upset social 
structure and power balances within society. The ‘bellah question’ of the 1940s; 
the Tamasheq involvement in the slave trade to Saudi Arabia in the 1950s; and 
collaboration in attempts to incorporate Northern Soudan Français in other 
312 CHAPTER 7 
political entities confirmed their image as ‘white slavers’ and ‘vassals of French 
neo-imperialism’. Of course, this stereotype did not apply to the former slaves, 
the demographic majority of the Kel Tamasheq in Soudan Français. The US-
RDA’s stress on the ‘bellah question’ during their election campaigns and their 
attempts to curb the power of the chiefs confirmed the stereotyped image of 
‘black usurpers of power’ and ‘destroyers of Tamasheq society’. Again, the 
slaves did not hold this image, but to the political elite and the common Kel 
Tamasheq of free descent, these events were threatening and the stereotype was 
a valid one. 
During Alfellaga, racial discourse was again present on both sides, although 
the more solid historical evidence I have on this point comes from the side of 
the Malian regime for both their own point of view as well as that of the 
ifulagen. It was expressed by Captain Diby Sillas Diarra in an interview he gave 
to the Malian press, and his opinion as he stated it there was either based on his 
interrogations of ifulagen, or he had written his preconceived ideas on the 
ifulagen in his interrogation reports. In either case, it is at least clear that the 
Malian regime had a racial interpretation of the conflict, and it is most likely 
that the ifulagen were fed by racial ideas they had expressed earlier in writing. 
During the rebellion of the 1990s, discourse on inclusion and exclusion in 
the Malian nation and the image of the Kel Tamasheq as Malian or foreign was 
fully developed by the Ganda Koy, which can be seen as the Malian vox populi 
about the rebellion. Ganda Koy’s exclusion of the Kel Tamasheq from the 
Malian nation and depiction of the Kel Tamasheq as foreign was largely based 
on the same discourse on race that played a role in the period of decolonisation, 
as if decolonisation had indeed more or less taken off again with the start of the 
rebellion. By accusing the Kel Tamasheq of being ‘white slavers’ and ‘Qad-
hafi’s Arab mercenaries’ they were depicted as foreign elements seeking to 
dominate the indigenous Malian population. By stressing the rebels’ ‘white-
ness’, the Ganda Koy managed to develop an othering discourse excluding 
those elements of Tamasheq society that were not ‘white’: the bellah or former 
slaves who could join the Ganda Koy ranks. 
Perhaps the most interesting side to the racial aspect of the conflict between 
the Malian state and the Kel Tamasheq is that both sides were equally obsessed 
with race and that both used racial discourses. One could safely say that 
Alfellaga was the result of relations between two different political elites based 
on mutual distrust and negative preconceived stereotyped images. While the 
Keita Regime perceived the Kel Tamasheq as white, anarchist, feudal, lazy, 
slave driving nomads who needed to be civilised, the Kel Tamasheq elite saw 
the Malian politicians as black, incompetent, untrustworthy slaves in disguise 
who came to usurp power. These ideas resurfaced with the outbreak of the 
second rebellion in 1990 and were openly expressed in a mutually hostile dis-
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course on ‘the other’ at the height of the conflict in the summer of 1994, when 
the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy set out to defend the ‘sedentary black’ 
population against the ‘white nomad’ threat against national unity. 
On a theoretical level one could argue about whether racialism is or is not a 
subcategory of ethnicity. The answer is: it depends on what one means with 
both terms and from which side one looks at the problem. Indeed, until the 
1970s the term ‘race’ remained a significant concept of analysis, used in ways 
akin to the present-day use of the term ‘ethnicity’. As Ashcroft et al. remark, 
In practice, “race” may be a major constitutive factor in determining ethnic cate-
gories, but to revive the idea that it is somehow “objective” and less socially con-
structed than ethnicities founded on religious, linguistic or other more obviously 
culturally determined factors is to fail to recognize that race is a cultural rather than 
a biological phenomenon, the product of historical processes not of genetically 
determined physical differences.1 
Throughout this book, I have indicated a congruence between the social 
categories ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’: a social political group of a size that 
does not allow all members to know each other, which means it is partly an 
imaginary community the members of which recognise each other’s member-
ship on the basis of certain shared traits. The distinction often made between 
‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’ is a political choice stemming from the idea that 
‘nation’ is inherent to ‘nationalism’, which in turn is linked to ‘state’, as be-
comes clear from the standardised usage of the term ‘nation-state’. I have also 
indicated that I see ethnicity as the ideology that forms the imaginary frame-
work of an ethnic group or nation, whereas nationalism, and here I take Gell-
ner’s definition, is ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent’.2 In these definitions, race is not a 
subcategory of ethnicity. One can perceive members of the same nation to have 
various racial backgrounds and this is indeed the case in Tamasheq society. The 
Kel Tamasheq see themselves as phenotypically divided and so do the Malian 
Government and, in fact, most of the world. The Kel Tamasheq themselves 
make a distinction between: koual, black; shaggaran, red; and sattefen, bluish 
black. Each ‘race’ roughly corresponds with a certain social group within so-
ciety, but none of these groups is seen as not being part of the Kel Tamasheq. 
The colonial administration, the Malian administration of the 1960s, as well as 
the Ganda Koy movement of the 1990s only saw two phenotypes in Kel Tama-
sheq society: ‘white’ and ‘black’. But regardless of whether one distinguishes 
between two or three, one constructs racial differences within one and the same 
                                                 
1  Ashcroft, B., G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin 2000: 204-205. 
2  Gellner, E. 1983: 1. 
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society. Whether the ‘white’ and ‘black’ (or ‘red’ or ‘green’) racial types can be 
seen as ethnic subgroups is arguable.  
There seems to be a tendency among the former Tamasheq slaves to see 
themselves as a distinctive group within Tamasheq society. In Mali, this found a 
first expression in the creation of the Mouvement pour l’Eveil du Monde Bellah 
in 1994. The organisation remained dormant for a long time, but in August 
2006, former initiators of the movement founded the Association Temedt, an 
NGO which has as its main stated goal the promotion of human rights, but 
which is mainly directed at defending the rights of former slaves.3 Temedt is 
partly inspired by a similar organisation in Niger: Timidria.4 The distinctions 
these organisations of former slaves made have some racial overtones next to 
the main social reasons for their existence: a feeling of being discriminated 
against as former slaves. However, it seems this process of ethnic differenti-
ation is hardly on its way, but it cannot be excluded that, say, ten years from 
now, one speaks of the bellah as a different ethnic group or nation.  
A last question 
Throughout this book I have stressed the importance of a particular Tamasheq 
concept in explaining the outbreak of rebellion: Egha, a mixture of hate; 
powerlessness; and longing for revenge; or a contracted honour debt. Egha as 
revenge and the paying of one’s honour debt formed the start of Alfellaga. Egha 
was the one feeling that bound all ishumar of every political persuasion in the 
Tanekra movement. Egha is created when one is powerless in the face of an 
attack on one’s honour, and on one’s existence. Egha created the link between 
the first and the second rebellion. Given the fact that the atrocities committed 
during the first rebellion were repeated in the second rebellion, given that yet 
another generation of young Kel Tamasheq was confronted with war and 
misery, it is pertinent to ask whether egha links these two rebellions with the 
most recent upsurge of the ADC in Kidal. The answer is negative on the whole 
but not entirely. The main leaders of the ADC were the same men who had led 
the rebellion of the 1990s, the generation of the ‘orphans of the Adagh’, who 
had taken egha during Alfellaga, but who had repaid their honour debt at the 
battle of Toximine. As far as egha did play a part in the past few years, it was 
                                                 
3  Statuts du LPDH TEMEDT, drafted and signed 02/09/2006. Personal archive. The 
association was created after the Essakane Conference, held in August 2006 in 
Essakane by a number of community leaders of iklan origins. The sole reference to 
slavery in the statutes of the Association Temedt is written in its Preamble: “consta-
tant la persistance des pratiques humiliantes et esclavagistes dans certaines zones 
du Mali”. 
4  Lecocq, B. 2005. 
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the egha of the imghad and Idnan towards the Ifoghas, an honour debt con-
tracted in the 1990s in the ‘fratricidal war’ between the clans. In fact, the events 
around the ADC form more a continuity with the rebellion of the 1990s than a 
new episode. 
But will egha then not link the previous rebellions to a new one in the 
future? Of course, it is impossible to answer this question. But I have asked it 
myself and so have others. I can only provide the answer others have given me. 
Whether or not the current generation of young Kel Tamasheq has taken up 
egha will be clear when they grow to adulthood. Their future actions are then 
dependent on the social political circumstances. Although the ideals of the 
Tamasheq nation have been lost for the moment, one could say that the Kel 
Tamasheq have won, or at least that they haven’t lost the fight they started in 
1990. They have reached a certain level of political autonomy and heightened 
participation in Malian politics. Their integration in the Malian nation is slowly 
but certainly on its way. Through democratisation and decentralisation the Kel 
Tamasheq community itself holds responsibilities for its future. They have been 
empowered and feelings of empowerment and egha are mutually exclusive.  
 
 
 Epilogue 
The rebellion ended but despite the Flamme de la Paix ceremony, violence 
remained an integral part of politics and everyday life in Northern Mali. The 
Malian state made half-hearted attempts to reassume its powers in the North, 
while remaining faithful to its tradition to delegate state powers to local in-
formal rulers. This delegation now included informal military power in the 
hands of local political elites, while at the same time efforts were made to 
disarm the local civilian population. Just how ephemeral these efforts in dis-
armament were became clear in a number of violent confrontations between 
local communities, despite the local peace treaties signed under the aegis of the 
Bourem Pact. At the same time, the administrative decentralisation and imple-
mentation of local democracy meant that, after a short century of political de-
pendence and overlordship, the Kel Tamasheq could arrange their political life 
more freely. But here too, violence remained an integral part of the political 
process. Finally, in May 2006, almost exactly ten years after the Flamme de la 
Paix ceremony, a number of former rebels took up arms again in what seemed 
to be a renewed rebellion. 
What had changed by that time however, was the global position of the 
region. Over the past decade, Kidal grew from one of the most isolated spots on 
the planet to being a small global hub. After the rapid modernisation of the Kel 
Tamasheq world from the 1970s onwards, there followed a rapid globalisation 
of that world (again, I use both terms offhandedly in their popular sense). From 
the 1950s onwards, more and more Kel Tamasheq left their homeland in search 
for work, new ways of life, and political and military experiences to further 
their cause of a Tamasheq homeland. Now that the rebellion was over, the 
world came to that homeland. African migrants en route for Europe or Libya 
turned Kidal from a backwater into a small cosmopolitan city, while internati-
onal traffic and commerce, ranging between the customary Algerian foodstuffs 
to Colombian coke, provided income and provisions to the community, and 
turned it into a hub of renewed trans-Saharan trade. The takoubilt festivals, 
originally intended to further peace, attracted Western tourists, while Arabs 
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from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia came back for one of their favourite hobbies: 
hunting with heavy arms and vehicles in the Saharan desert. More recently still, 
Northern Mali is at stake in the new scramble for Africa between various petrol 
companies in search of hydrocarbons. Since 2005 the Australian-Malian joint 
venture Mali-Petroleum SA is exploring the Taoudennit Basin for reserves in 
hydrocarbons, while the Canadian Centric Energy Company is doing the same 
in the Graben field north of Gao.1 At the turn of the Christian millennium, the 
South-Asian Muslim grassroots organisation Tablighi Jamaat reached Northern 
Mali, taking the region into a global network of religious movements. However, 
the peaceful South-Asian Tablighis were followed by the militant Algerian 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Their activities in the Sa-
hara, in turn, led to US military presence and intervention. The post-rebellion 
period coincided almost neatly with the post-9/11 world of ‘War on Terror’, 
leading to a continuation of military violence in the Sahara, although this time 
the local civilians were not targeted by either side. From the 1950s onwards the 
Malian Far North and its inhabitants had gained a sinister reputation as lazy 
anarchist nomads, racist slavers, and dangerous rebels. In the new century, in 
the international setting of ‘War on Terror’, the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ and the 
‘Global Village’, they were framed in yet another stereotype: the potential 
‘Muslim fundamentalist terrorist’. 
It is not my intention here to deal extensively with all these topics. For the 
most part I have done so already elsewhere.2 I will here give a short pre-
sentation fitting these events, as far as possible, in preceding histories and 
social-political structures. 
In the late 1990s, peace and prosperity reigned to some degree in Northern 
Mali, but it remained a heavily armed peace.3 Despite general global warming, 
the Saharan climate turned milder in the last years of the 20th century, with 
abundant and well-spread rains in 1997 and 1998. Although 1999 was less 
affluent, the rains remained good until the middle of the first decade of the 21st 
century, when hunger and famine reemerged, albeit on a far smaller scale than 
in the 1970s and 1980s.4 Those Kel Tamasheq who were still living as nomads 
rediscovered that life could be good, and thanked God’s blessing and mercy. In 
1999, two small local factories were opened in Kidal to produce pasteurised 
milk and yoghurt (natural, vanilla and banana flavours) from locally produced 
milk. Telecommunications networks and public radio stations were rapidly 
spreading, connecting the Malian Sahara to the wider world. In June 1999 Kidal 
                                                 
1  Lecocq, B. & P. Schrijver 2007. And http://centricenergy.com/ 
2  Lecocq, B. 2003; Lecocq, B. & P. Schrijver 2006, 2007. 
3  The following is based on Vallet, M., “Chronique de la vie au Sahara”. Le Saharien 
148 (1st semester 1999) – 155 (4th semester 2000). 
4  Jezequel, J-H. & X. Crombe 2005. 
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received electricity. Abundance seemed to return and so did the refugees from 
the conflict. By the end of 1998, about 130,000 of the total estimated 160,000 
international Kel Tamasheq refugees had returned. Even the Kel Essuq Kel 
Takailelt, who had fled to Niger after the massacre of their tribe and zawiya 
near Gao in October 1994, did return. In June 1999, the UNHCR closed its 
mission in Northern Mali. Those Kel Tamasheq who had not remained nomadic 
could find means of existence in other ways. After the rebellion was over, the 
trans-Saharan traffic in consumer goods, set up in the 1970s, grew in impor-
tance. Apart from the basic consumer goods smuggled from Algeria (oil, sugar, 
flour, pasta, dates, essence), smuggler trade evolved in electronics, cars, arms, 
cigarettes, and, more recently, drugs. The most lucrative of these forms of trade 
is the transport of cigarettes along the ‘Marlboro Road’ that stretches from 
Mauritania, via Mali and Niger to Algeria and Libya and, finally, to Europe. 
This trade in consumer goods was doubled by a lively traffic in prospective 
African migrants to the Maghreb and Europe. The tightening of security 
measures against illegal immigrants in ‘Fortress Europe’, together with the 
growing marginality of young men on the continent, led to a growing trans-
Saharan traffic from West to North Africa, in which Kidal grew to become a 
transport hub for young Africans en route for the Mediterranean coast. Another 
important source of income came from international donor-money for the 
reconstrucion of Northern Mali. The Timbuktu roundtable in 1995 had provided 
vast amounts of money for the peace process. Part of this money was spent on a 
building-boom in the North. The administrative decentralisation discussed 
below brought about the necessity to build a vast amount of new government 
buildings, as well as new schools, health care centres and other facilities. Some 
long awaited and very necessary infrastructure was finally put in place. On 22 
September 2006, on the celebration of Malian independence, the Wabaria 
Bridge connecting Gao to the right bank of the Niger was inaugurated. It has 
decisively contributed to the economic connection of the North to the rest of 
Mali. Telephone, both landlines and mobile phones, as well as internet were 
introduced between 1996 and 2002, connecting Northern Mali to the global-
isation hype spanning the world. Kidal now has its own website: Kidal.info. 
With more or less success, depending on their work experiences as ishumar, 
many former rebels started construction companies, winning a good deal of the 
building contracts written out under the development programmes. After the 
Flamme de la Paix ceremony, a large-scale Disarm Demobilise and Reintegrate 
(DDR) programme started with the integration of former fighters in civil life.5 
                                                 
5  From 1996 till December 1999 this programme was known under the name Pro-
gramme d’Appui à la Réinsertion des ex-Combattants au Mali, PAREM. From 2000 
onwards it was known as Consolidation des Acquis de la Réinsertion au Nord, 
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The programme first took shape in the form of a cash-for-weapons initiative, in 
which each fighter who handed in his weapon would receive a demobilisation 
fee of 500 US dollars. This money was destined to finance investments for his 
future livelihood, but most fighters used it to pay a dowry and marry.6 After 
1999, the financial handouts stopped and were replaced by microcredits to set 
up small businesses. In all, some 9,500 former fighters were reintegrated 
through these programmes for a total cost of around 9,000,000 US dollars. A 
small sum to pay for peace, when one compares it with other DDR programmes 
in West Africa.7 In the early 1910s the French had introduced firearms to 
exacerbate local conflicts, after which they reaped benefits in the form of me-
diation and, ultimately, colonisation. After that, the colonial administration tried 
to curb arms possession without much success.8 But never had the amount of 
arms and their use been so widespread in the Tamasheq world as after the 1996 
rebellion. By 2002, the DDR programmes had managed to collect about 35,000 
small arms, but this was estimated to represent about one tenth of the amount of 
weapons then circulating in Northern Mali.9 The possession of firearms had 
slowly become an integral part of daily life among the Kel Tamasheq. 
Old and new local conflicts were played out in a new game of decentralised 
administration, democracy and violence. One of the main demands of the rebel 
movements in the later stages of the rebellion had been for more autonomy. 
This had been granted in a double shape: the decentralisation and democratisa-
tion of the Malian administration on a local level. Although these measures 
were ‘sold’ to the rebel movements as meeting their demands, the pressure in 
the early 1990s of donor countries and institutions to implement ‘good govern-
ance’ had weighed more heavily on the decision to implement decentralised 
democracy. Kidal had the honour of being the first place in Mali to be de-
centralised by being formally upscaled from Cercle to Région in August 1991, 
but the effective administrative installation of that Région came only in 1996 
when Eghless ag Foni, a Kel Adagh himself, finally took his seat in the new 
Governors office. He was the first Kel Adagh ever to be appointed to high 
                                                 
CAR/Nord. Both programmes fell under the direction of the Commissariat au Nord. 
It is unclear when exactly this programme ended but in 2002 it was slowly inte-
grated into a West African region wide DDR programme set up by ECOWAS: Pro-
gramme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in Africa, 
PCASED. 
6  Interview with PAREM responsible Gao. Gao, 10 December 1996. 
7  OCDE, Regional Working Group on DDR Programmes and Post-conflict Manage-
ment in West Africa. Vol. 2 Working Documents. Paris, December 2006. http:// 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/18/38520347.pdf 
8  Lecocq, B. 2003; Lecocq, B. & P. Schrijver 2006, 2007. 
9  USAID office of Conflict and Mitigation, USAID/DCHA/CMM Assessment: North-
ern Mali. 17/06/2004. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADC966.pdf 
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administrative office in Kidal since the colonial conquest. In general, the num-
ber of Kel Tamasheq participating in high administration and in national poli-
tics rose spectacularly. As the representatives (Députés) to the National Assem-
bly are elected by Cercle, with each Cercle sending one representative, the 
promotion of Kidal to Région meant that the Adagh could now send four 
instead of one representative. A number of Kel Tamasheq men and women rose 
to the ranks of ministers in various governments, such as Mohamed ag Eghlaf 
and Zakiatou wellet Haltanine. The rise in participation culminated in the 
appointment of Mohamed Ahmed ag Hamani, a Kel Intessar pupil of the 
Goundam école nomade, as Prime Minister in 2002. The essence of the Malian 
decentralisation rested in the creation of a parallel structure of Communes 
within and next to the administrative structure of the Cercles. While the 
Commandant de Cercle remained an appointed administrator, he now lost part 
of his powers to the democratically elected counsellors of the Commune, who 
elect a Mayor from their midst. However, in most of the Far North in Mali, the 
power of the Commandant had been mitigated for a long time and remained so 
after the administrative reforms. Kidal had been without a Commandant de 
Cercle since 1992, and formally remained without one until 1999, the admini-
strative and political functions being performed by the Adjoint de Commandant 
in the intermediate period. The upscaling of the Cercle of Kidal to a Région, 
meant that its Arrondissements were promoted to the ranks of Cercles, with the 
Central Arrondissement of Kidal now becoming a Cercle too. Each new Cercle 
was now endowed with its proper Commandant. These new Commandants had 
no administrative means at their disposal to start with, and for the most time 
resided in Kidal City, or further down South. In practice, administration came 
more firmly in the hands of the tribal chiefs than ever before. They were now 
informally responsible even for civil peace and policing, which they did manu 
military in alliance with the former rebel officers, but of course within the 
parameters of local politics. However, they did have to answer to Bamako to a 
certain degree. When local disputes became too violent, it rested with Intalla ag 
Attaher, together with the other tribal chiefs, and Iyad ag Ghali, together with 
his trusted men, to ‘mediate’ and restore some form of order. Georg Klute has 
labelled this arrangement ‘parasovereignity’, by which he means the replace-
ment of the formal state by traditional political institutions and modern NGOs, 
which perform the state functions of delivering safety and social services res-
pectively. The appropriateness of the term ‘sovereignty’ is questionable (given 
the classical definition of sovereignty) but the description is of course accu-
rate.10 
                                                 
10  Klute, G. 1999; Klute, G. & T. von Trotha 2000. 
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In most of Mali the new democratic Communes were put in place in 1996. 
However, the Région of Gao had to wait until 1998 and Kidal even until June 
1999 before elections took place. Most of the new Communes were created 
along the lines of the old Arrondissements within the Cercles, but in many 
places the new administrative structure reopened old land tenure conflicts 
between communities. This was the case in the North as much as in the South. 
They were, however, played out less openly, since the rebellion could no longer 
be taken as a pretext for open violence. Nevertheless, the revolt had shown that 
the Government could not prevent men from carrying arms and using them. 
Those fractions with more combat experience, courageous men and better 
armament saw themselves as fit to protect their vested interests in certain areas, 
and felt they had a certain right to do so. One such a conflict was the fight over 
the wells of Tedjerert, a small hamlet on the border between Kidal and Ménaka, 
which was disputed by three main fractions in the area: the Iforgoumoussen; the 
Chemennamas; and the Ishidenharen. Drawn in 1948, the border between these 
antagonistic parties goes from well to well, without any specifications about the 
rights to use these wells themselves. Violent conflicts over the wells at Tedje-
rert occurred in 1948 and 1974, during the drought, but the worst came in Sep-
tember 1997, when a fight between Iforgoumoussen and Chemennamas left 
several people dead around the wells, whereupon both parties took to their 
vehicles and drove into the Tamesna plain to pursue their fight. The area 
between the wells of Tedjerert (and other wells, like Ibalaghan and Sahin) and 
the Tamesna plain north of it were an administrative imbroglio. After the 
rebellion local politicians from all sides and sorts – traditional chiefs, newly 
elected communal counselors and mayors, former rebels – tried to get the 
boundaries changed in their favour. Formally, Tedjerert belongs to the Ménaka 
Cercle and, after the decentralisation, to the Commune of Tidarmène. In 1999, 
during the communal elections, a number of former rebel fighters from the 
Kidal area led by Ibrahim Bahanga, a fighter from the Iforgoumoussen tribe, 
kidnapped the election committee at Tidarmène to emphasise the claim that 
Tedjerert should be relocated to the Région of Kidal, within the ‘Commune-to-
be-created’ of In Tedjedit. Bahanga did not act alone. He had at least the tacit 
support of a number of traditional leaders in Kidal. His demands were not ac-
cepted in Bamako and thus the conflict continued. In December 2000, Ibrahim 
Bahanga attacked an army patrol, killed its leading officer and took four men 
hostage, a tactics he would repeatedly use in the coming years. After tumultu-
ous negotiations led by his former commanding officer Iyad ag Ghali, Bahanga 
released his hostages in February 2001, in exchange for the creation of the In 
Tedjedit Commune of which he himself became the Mayor. Tedjerert however, 
remained within the Ménaka borders. On the day of the Tidarmène kidnapping, 
I witnessed the events at the house of a local politician, where most of the tribal 
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political elite had assembled to follow the events over the radio, since Bahanga 
and his men communicated over the RAC. At the end of the day one of them 
told me: ‘sometimes we do certain things to show that, despite democracy, there 
is always the possibility of “demokalashi” in Kidal’. The ironic mixture of 
democracy and Kalashnikovs remains a reality in Northern Mali and clearly 
underlined the readiness to use violence to solve local political problems by 
turning them into national ones.11 
Land-tenure questions were not the only ones that festered in the new 
decentralised democratic politics. Religion came into it too. Since the end of the 
rebellion, Northern Mali has been open to different global Islamic movements, 
starting with the arrival of the Tablighi Jamaat. During Ramadan 1419, Decem-
ber 1998, four South Asian Tablighis arrived in Kidal on a da’wa mission.12 By 
May 1999, the Ifoghas had wholeheartedly embraced the Tablighi teachings. 
Two of amenokal Intalla ag Attaher’s sons had completed a ten-day course in 
Bamako after which they became active at the mission in Kidal. One of these 
sons would later travel to a Tablighi Jamaat centre in Raiwind, Pakistan. Iyad 
ag Ghali had also taken the Tablighi Jamaat courses. The arrival of the Tablighi 
Jamaat coincided with the preliminaries to the first Communal elections in June 
that year. In Kidal city, the Communal elections had become the new battlefield 
for the old rivalry between the Ifoghas, determined to keep the power they had 
almost lost and won back with so much difficulty during the rebellion, and the 
Idnan and their found-again imghad allies, who were gradually allowed back in 
the city, from which they had been chased in 1994. The Ifoghas based the 
legitimacy of their power largely on religious grounds. They claim shorfa status 
(the status of descendants of the prophet Muhammad), and in his late days in 
power Intalla ag Attaher presented himself emphatically as ‘amir al-mu’minin: 
the commander of the believers. But, in the Communal elections, the Idnan had 
the most popular candidate for the position of mayor, a woman, affectionally 
called ‘Tenhert’, ‘Doe’, during the elections, as she is a member of the Idnan 
clan Inheren, ‘The Does’. As I described in Chapter 5, Tamasheq women enjoy 
a great measure of freedom to involve themselves in public life and politics. A 
freedom that is often viewed as exceptional in the Muslim world, an exception 
of which Kel Tamasheq women, having lived in the Arab world as migrants, are 
very aware. They became even more aware of this with the coming of the 
Tablighi Jamaat, a movement which preaches strongly antifeminist concepts, 
                                                 
11  Similar conflicts like this one, for example between the Kounta federation and the 
Almouchakarai Arabs of the Gao Région over pastures and political power in the 
Tilemsi plain, or that between the Daoussahak and Foroforo Fulani over pastures in 
the border area between Niger and Mali, remain rampant until present, with similar 
scenarios of entwined power relations being in play. 
12  Lecocq, B. & P. Schrijver 2007.  
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based in traditional South Asian Muslim society. Intalla ag Attaher initially 
acted favourably to the female candidate, in spite of her clan origin. She was the 
appointed candidate for ADEMA, the party in power in Mali, and Intalla had 
made it his policy throughout his long career to side with the political party in 
power. He changed his position around May 1999. Under the influence of the 
Tablighi doctrine, the local ‘ulama decreed that it was impossible according to 
Muslim law to have a female mayor. Should Intalla fail to revoke his support 
for ‘Doe’, they would no longer acknowledge him as ‘amir al-mu’minin. Intalla 
thereupon suggested one of his sons to run as an alternative candidate to ‘Doe’ 
within the ADEMA party, while another son decided to run for an opposition 
party so as to hinder any eventual coalition talks after the elections. It is easy to 
guess that henceforth the sharpest opposition to the Tablighi Jamaat in Kidal 
came from women, particularly women from ‘Doe’s’ immediate family. Not 
only did the Tablighi Jamaat create difficulties to her run for mayor, but many 
women also feared what they called ‘Algerian situations’: a forced retreat from 
public and political life under the impact of conservative Islamic teachings. In 
an open letter to the traditional rulers and notables of the city, a group of 
influential women from Kidal asked where precisely Islam bars women from 
becoming elected and since when the spiritual leaders of the region needed 
advice from strangers. They stated that women had always enjoyed the right to 
participate in social debates and that Kel Tamasheq traditions were preferable to 
those of strangers.13 To avoid the political competition with the Ifoghas, ‘Doe’ 
then withdrew as ADEMA candidate to set up her own electoral list, called 
‘Tenhert’, and continued to campaign with the continuous presence of a body-
guard, as someone had tried to assassinate her in the meantime. She gained a 
percentual majority in the Communal Council, but the new ADEMA candidate 
came in second, blocking her direct election as Mayor of Kidal. Long-drawn 
negotiations followed under very tense conditions. The fear of internecine 
violence grew so strong that a state of emergency was declared locally, and a 
night curfew was set at eight in the evening with tanks patrolling the streets of 
Kidal. Finally an agreement was reached through the mediation of the party 
leadership in Bamako. In the end ‘Doe’ accepted defeat in exchange for a more 
or less assured position on the electoral lists of the newly created Haut Conseil 
des Collectivités, an elected advisory organ meant to represent the new Com-
munes at the central-government level. She did so partly because of the un-
relenting opposition of the ‘ulama and Intalla, but partly also because of the 
untimely death of Attaher ag Bissaada, the amenokal of the Idnan. The dispute 
over his succession also considerably weakened the Idnan power position in the 
establishment of the new democratic Commune council.  
                                                 
13  Ibid. 
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Contrary to what more suspicious minds would have anticipated, the Tabli-
ghi Jamaat quickly lost popularity in Kidal and in Mali in general after the 
events of September 2001. The inhabitants of the Sahel quickly realized what 
the adoption of global Salafi Islam might lead to. Many realized the link 
between radical Islam at home and the terrorist attacks abroad and feared 
possible retaliation. But religious questions nevertheless retained local promi-
nence after 9/11.14 From that moment on, the Pentagon and US intelligence 
turned a higher degree of attention to the outer reaches of the Muslim world: 
areas that bore some form of resemblance to Afghanistan within the inter-
pretation of the US military and foreign affairs experts; areas with a favourable 
terrain for guerrilla warfare; with little or no state presence; and with increased 
activity of militant Muslims. They shared this focus of attention with their 
adversaries, the propagators of worldwide jihad. In April 2006, for example, a 
certain Abu Azzam al-Ansari wrote the article ‘Al-Qaeda is moving to Africa’ 
in the electronic online jihadi magazine The Echo of Jihad.15 Al-Ansari listed 
the many possibilities he saw the continent could offer to the worldwide jihad: 
African Governments are weak, divided, and corrupt. They lack, moreover, a 
strong army and effective security and intelligence services so that the muja-
hedeen can easily organize themselves and move without being discovered. The 
borders are poorly guarded, and weapons are available cheaply and in vast 
quantities. According to Al-Ansari, the notion of jihad is widespread on the 
continent, while, still according to him, the numerous ethnic conflicts and civil 
wars have fostered in Africans a certain readiness to die a heroic death in battle. 
This readiness would increase the potential to wage a successful jihad. It is 
remarkable how, in his analysis of the potentials of the African continent, al-
Ansari thought in stereotypes similar to those of his adversaries in the US. His 
analysis of the jihadi potential of the African continent was sketched, as it were, 
in imperialistic geostrategic platitudes. According to Oliver Roy this is no 
coincidence as both sides in the War on Terror share the notion that the ‘Clash 
of Civilisations’ sketched by Samuel Huntington is the reality in which their 
battle is set. Islamists in fact frame the world in modes and discourses very 
similar to that of Washington-based think tanks.16 Northern Mali almost per-
fectly fitted the picture drawn by both, especially after the Algerian Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) established itself in the area. 
                                                 
14  Shortly after 9/11, the Malian government proceeded to extradite 25 Pakistani mem-
bers of the Tablighi Jamaat. The movement is now leading a dwindling existence in 
Northern Mali. 
15  Abu Azzam al-Ansari, ‘Al-Qa’ida (...) tattajih nahwa Ifriqiyya’. In Sada al-Jihad 7 
(Jumada al-Ula 1427), pp. 18-20. A translation and analysis of the article are 
available on www.sofir.org/sarchives/005627.php. Last checked 13/07/09. 
16  Roy, O. 2004: 77-78. 
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The GSPC is an offshoot of the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), and 
was founded in September 1998 by former GIA Commander Hassan Hattab. In 
2003 there appeared a regional split in the leadership of the GSPC and a split in 
the organisation, with one branch operating in Northern Algeria, and a second 
branch in Southern Algeria and in the bordering Sahel states, directed by two 
new emirs: Amari Saïfi and Mukhtar Bilmukhtar. Amari Saïfi, a former Alge-
rian Army paratrooper (hence his nickname ‘Al Para’), was responsible for the 
spectacular abduction of 31 European tourists in the Algerian Sahara in March 
2003.17 After the Algerian army managed to free a first group of seventeen 
hostages in Southern Algeria in June, the GSPC retreated into Mali with the 
remaining 14 hostages. The general if diminishing sympathy towards Muslim 
radicalism in the region, and the business connections between Tamasheq and 
other smugglers in the Sahara, made Northern Mali a necessary and excellent 
hiding place for the GSPC, and its inhabitants excellent mediators to solve the 
hostage crisis. The crisis was solved through the mediation of the Malian 
Government (the Malian Prime Minister at that time was the Tamasheq Mo-
hamed Ahmed ag Hamani), but especially through the intervention of Kidal’s 
political elite. The main mediators were former rebel leaders, traditional chiefs 
and local ‘ulama from Kidal. The abduction ended in October 2003, when the 
German Government paid 5,000,000 euros in ransom for the 13 remaining 
hostages (one German woman had died of sunstroke, the remaining hostages 
were 12 Germans and a Dutchman). The Malian Government tolerated the 
continuing presence of the GSPC on its territory, as long as it kept quiet and did 
not attack anyone. The Kel Tamasheq intermediaries also made it quite clear 
that, if the GSPC would stir up trouble, it would be dealt with on their own 
terms. It is surprising that few of the reports written on the abduction case 
mention the fact that the GSPC hostage crisis was actually resolved through the 
mediation of ‘the savage and violent rebel’ Tamasheq from Kidal. Instead, 
some journalists even mistook the abductors for local Kel Tamasheq from 
Mali.18 Thus, the good guys quickly turned again into bad guys in the per-
ception of the public, simply because they had been the bad guys for more than 
a century. A year later, in 2004, Al Para’s group was hunted down by the US 
Special Forces, but he was eventually captured in March 2004 in the north-
western part of Chad by a small, local rebel group, the Mouvement pour la 
Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT). After chaotic negotiations in 
                                                 
17  The tourists were travelling in small separate groups or as individuals. In all 15 
German, 10 Austrian, 4 Swiss, 1 Dutch and 1 Swedish tourist were kidnapped 
during March and early April 2003. 
18  In a pre-interview by Dutch TV news NOS Journaal at the occasion of the liberation 
of the remaining hostages in October 2003, I was asked what was wrong with the 
Malian Tuareg that they had abducted the tourists. 
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October 2004, El Para was handed over to Algeria were he was given a life 
sentence. By that time, the US Army had installed itself in the central Sahara, 
especially in Northern Mali, aiming at the eradication of all possible forms of 
Muslim terrorism. 
US counterterrorism specialists deemed Northern Mali to be a potentially 
explosive area. The region is poor, smuggling is the greatest pillar of the local 
economy, and firearms abound. The bad reputation of the Kel Tamasheq is not 
limited to Mali. Their image as freedom-loving nomads, yet anarchist rebels, 
has spread to the US as well. Another point of American concern was the sup-
posed lack of state presence and anarchy reigning in the Sahara. The lack of 
strong state institutions, or their inefficiency, was seen as a lack of government 
in the region. However, as I have tried to show throughout this book and in the 
pages immediately above, this is far more complex than it seemed to the US 
government. Then there was of course the increase of Islamic activism in the 
region. The American military initiatives in Sahel were initially established not 
so much in response to an actual threat, but according to the idea that it was 
imperative to prevent the region from becoming a breeding ground for Muslim 
terrorism. While not being the only triggering factor, the abduction of tourists 
by the GSPC was, to the Americans, proof that real danger did hide in the 
Sahara and that therefore their military presence was indispensable. The US 
Armed Forces initiatives in the Sahel started in 2002 under the name Pan-Sahel 
Initiative (PSI), encompassing Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad.19 With a li-
mited budget of 6,000,000 dollars, the American Army trained and outfitted 
rapid-reaction units in each of these four countries, which had as their duty to 
better guard the porous state borders in an attempt to stem the flow of illegal 
persons, goods and weapons in the region. It was also their duty to prevent the 
Sahel from becoming a retreat for terrorists. American concern was especially 
focused on the developments in Northern Mali. More than half of the PSI 
budget was meant for this region. In 2005 the PSI was continued in the Trans-
Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which has a wider range than its 
predecessor.20 It has a planned time-frame of five years and a budget of half a 
billion dollars. In addition to the countries previously involved, Algeria, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria also joined the TSCTI, and so will Libya 
possibly. The aim is to set up antiterrorism units in each of these countries, as 
well as semi-permanent bases of operations for American troops. According to 
local witnesses and GSPC websites, such bases have been set up in Northern 
Mali, where the old French Air-force base at Tessalit has been readied for use, 
at Nema (in Mauritania), at Tamanrasset (Algeria), and at Agadez in Niger. In 
                                                 
19  www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm 
20  www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm. 
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addition, American troops were stationed in Gao and Timbuktu, making regular 
patrols towards Kidal. 
Meanwhile, internal politics in Kidal reached the boiling point. Local poli-
tical powers and the new powers of the state became more and more enmeshed, 
while at the same time these two different political structures had to face 
intertwined crises. In the late 1990s an old generation of tribal leaders passed 
away, creating a power vacuum in the chieftaincy dimension. While indulging 
in some cases in internal struggles over tribal power, the chiefly lineages and 
their clans at the same time tried to grab the new decentralised democracy. In 
turn, the members of the new political elites – former rebel leaders, ishumar and 
evolués – tried to strengthen their influence in local politics by either (again) 
disputing the legitimacy of chiefly power, or by even trying to become tribal 
chiefs themselves. In January 1999 Inguida ag Hibba, amenokal of the Taghat 
Mellet died. His replacement went smoothly within the tribe, although it is 
noteworthy that, for a short time, his function was taken over by Intalla ag 
Attaher until the Taghat Mellet had found their new leader. This is significant as 
a demonstration of the power the Ifoghas could exercise over some of the other 
tribes in the Adagh. But this was not at all the case when Attaher ag Bissaada, 
the amenokal of the Idnan, died that same month. His death left the Idnan 
bitterly divided over his succession, which was violently disputed by the 
Talkast and Taitoq clans.21 This dispute severely hampered ‘Doe’, a member of 
another Idnan clan, the Inheren, in her struggle to become Mayor of Kidal and 
gave new chances to the Kel Effele, the clan of the amenokal of the Ifoghas, to 
strengthen their grip on the new democracy. By the new millennium, Intalla ag 
Attaher, amenokal of the Adagh, had aged considerably. In June 2005 he had a 
car accident, which left him paralysed, but he did not die, leaving him 
nominally in power though effectively powerless.22 Thus, other contestants to 
the title of amenokal could come to the fore. Within the Ifoghas, the position of 
leading clan had long been contested between the ruling Kel Effele and the 
Irayakan clans. This competition had last been in the open in the 1940s and 
1950s, when Alla ag Albachir, an Irayakan, defied the French authorities as 
much as he defied the authority of amenokal Attaher ag Illi. Now the Irayakan 
again had a powerful contestant to Kel Effele supremacy: Iyad ag Ghali, former 
rebel leader and leader of the Irayakan clan. Despite his extremely powerful 
position based on his prestige as rebel commander, leader of the MPA, and 
Colonel in the Malian Army, Iyad held no formal power position within either 
                                                 
21  Moussa ag Intazoume. “Quelle sécurité pour le Nord? Cas spécifique de Kidal étude 
prospective des conflits dans la Région de Kidal”. (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2005). 
http//library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mali/03534.pdf 
22  Kidal info. Forum in Tamasheq Subject: Attayoub Author: Taywan Date 24/06/2005 
13H02. http://www.kidal.info/Forum/TQ/lire.php?msg=78 
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the tribal structure or the new democratic institutions. Iyad never publicly 
expressed his claim to Irayakan leadership within the Ifoghas and hence to the 
title of amenokal, nevertheless the claim was clearly perceived. This forced the 
Kel Effele, especially the sons of Intalla ag Attaher, to bid for power within all 
possible structures in order to strengthen their hand in the struggle over the 
position of amenokal, which they knew was coming up. The 1999 Communal 
elections had finally brought Alghabbas ag Intalla to power as the new Mayor 
of Kidal city. Alghabbas was also generally seen by the Kel Effele as the most 
likely candidate to replace his father as amenokal. In 2002 he was elected 
Kidal’s representative in the National Assembly. He was replaced as mayor by 
Bayene ag Ahawali. Somewhere during those years, Alghabbas’ older brother 
Attayoub ag Intalla travelled to Pakistan to study Islam under the guidance of 
the Tablighi Jamaat.23 The importance of this journey in political terms cannot 
be overestimated and reflects the further intertwining of traditional and national 
politics. The Kel Effele base the legitimacy of their power in their religious 
status as shorfa (descendants of the prophet Muhammad) and in their religious 
knowledge. The claims of Intalla ag Attaher to the position of amir al-mu'minin, 
ruler of the believers, should be seen in this light. Through his piety and reli-
gious learning, Attayoub ag Intalla represents the spiritual dimension of the Kel 
Effele powerbase. He was back from Pakistan well before the 2004 communal 
elections, which brought him to the position of Mayor, a position he kept until 
the 2009 elections, when he was replaced by Arbakane ag Abzayak. Their 
oldest brother, Mohammed ag Intalla, had been the representative for the Cercle 
of Kidal in the National Assembly since the 1990s and was now the repre-
sentative for the Cercle of Ti-n-Essako. Thus, the Kel Effele covered their poli-
tical power bases in the religious and democratic political domains to protect 
their position against the possible threats to their tribal power from the side of 
the Irayakan, a power they see as the most important in a variegated political 
field. Of course, the possible threats to their power came not only from within 
the Ifoghas, but also from outside. In 2002 Alghabbas ag Intalla had Zeid ag 
Hamzata as his rival in the elections for the National Assembly, and Zeid ag 
Hamzata also announced his candidacy for the post of Mayor of Kidal in 2004, 
challenging Attayoub ag Intalla (among other candidates, they were not the only 
ones). In 2007, Zeid again competed with Alghabbas for the election of the 
National Assembly representative, and accused Alghabbas of large-scale electo-
ral fraud.24 
                                                 
23  The exact dates and duration of his travels are not known to me. 
24  Arrêt n°07-179/cc–el du 10 août 2007 portant proclamation des résultats définitifs 
du deuxième tour de l’élection des députés a l’assemblée nationale (scrutin du 22 
juillet 2007). http://www.matcl.gov.ml/img/pdf/resultats2etourlegislives.pdf 
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A further problem in both tribal and communal politics was the growing 
independence of the Iforgoumoussen. Originally a clan within the Ifoghas, they 
had moved towards a status closer to that of an independent tribe during the 
colonial period. The creation of the I-n-Tedjedit Commune sketched above 
temporarily resolved long-standing conflicts over pastoral rights, but this solu-
tion generated even more independence for the Iforgoumoussen, who now had 
‘their’ Commune, led by their strong man: Ibrahim Bahanga. A common soldier 
in the rebellion, Ibrahim Bahanga was now famous for his bravery, driving and 
fighting skills, which gained him the honorary nickname ‘Lion of the Tamesna’. 
After the rebellion, he was integrated in the ranks of the Malian Army as a 
Corporal, which was a bitter demotion to him as he had held the rank of 
Sergeant Major in the MPA. But he was not successful in securing a higher rank 
because he lacked strategic and political insights. His independence from the 
political elite in Kidal as Mayor of I-n-Tedjedit would prove a political liability. 
Although he was now formally incorporated in the legal power structures of the 
state, his political behaviour was closer to that of Alla ag Albachir in the 1940s 
and 1950s: militarily defying the authorities with ever growing demands. After 
all, he had won his position in politics with the abduction of the electoral 
committee in Tidarmène and the attacks on all and sundry in late 2000 to obtain 
‘his’ Commune. After the GSPC hostage crisis, he allegedly showed the GSPC 
drivers a number of secret roads in Northern Mali, only known to the most 
skilled ishumar drivers, in return for a large sum of money, which gave him 
more leeway in his enterprises. 
Then there was the unresolved and very bitter fight between the Ifoghas and 
imghad dating from the mid-1990s when ARLA and MPA had fought each 
other. After the MPA had ousted the ARLA from their bases in the Adagh with 
the help of the Malian Army, the imghad had been driven out of Kidal and away 
from their pastures in the Adagh. Although they were gradually ‘allowed’ back 
in the city, their position remained precarious and the Ifoghas kept demanding a 
subservient attitude, under the ideology of tefoghessa, which became harder and 
harder to retain, leading to a hardening of the idea of timgheda. In the middle 
years of the last decade, a small group of integrated officers of imghad origins 
rose to prominence in the Malian Army. Most prominent is Elhajj Gamou, an 
imghad born around 1964 in Tidarmène, a village in the Cercle of Ménaka that 
is part of the disputed zone around Tedjerert. During the rebellion he was an 
officer within the ARLA.25 He integrated in the Malian Army in 1996, and 
followed an intensive officer training at the Military Academy. In 2001 he was 
promoted Lieutenant Colonel and stationed in Gao as regimental commander. 
                                                 
25  Dao, B., ‘Insécurité au Nord: l’Etat entretient le conflit ethnique’, Le Républicain, 
16/01/2009. http://www.maliweb.net/category.php?NID=39658 
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He quickly became the commander ad interim of the 1st military region (Gao), 
to occupy that post formally in 2005.26 While Elhajj Gamou and a small number 
of Kel Tamasheq from outside the Ifoghas tribe made good career progress, the 
career of the main Ifoghas (Iforgoumoussen) officer in active service, Hassan ag 
Fagaga, stagnated. This added to the Ifoghas perception that they were loosing 
their power. An imghad officer and former ARLA fighter commanded the mili-
tary in the North and could thus put pressure behind the reintegration of the 
imghad within the Adagh. Probably in disgruntlement with being passed over 
and being overtaken in rank, and in fear of the shifting power balance, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga deserted his post shortly after Elhajj Gamou’s 
promotion.27 After negotiations, he agreed to return to a new post in Timbuktu, 
but he did not present himself at the barracks. Instead he defected for good in 
March 2006, taking a small number of Tamasheq soldiers from the Adagh with 
him into Mount Tigharghar. President Amadou Toumani Touré then sent Iyad 
ag Ghali to mediate, but to no avail. Under unclear circumstances Iyad even 
ended up joining the deserted soldiers, perhaps in a bid to keep his own power 
base as leader of the former rebels intact, perhaps even to put more pressure on 
the Kel Effele in the undeclared struggle over the chieftaincy of the Ifoghas. 
They were soon joined by Ibrahim Bahanga, a clansman to Hassan ag Fagaga, 
and a group of his followers, among whom his half brother Moussa Bâ, an 
officer at the army base in Ménaka. On 22 May  2006 this group of prominent 
former rebels of Ifoghas origins seized a large amount of weapons and material 
from the army bases in Kidal and Ménaka and occupied Kidal city. Contrary to 
the situation in 1992, the material was not taken over violently as it was handed 
over by integrated Kel Tamasheq officers within both bases who joined the 
group around Iyad, Ibrahim, and Hassan. On 23 May 2006 the group announced 
its formal existence as the Alliance Démocratique du 23 Mai pour le Change-
ment (ADC). They posted their main demands in June on their own website: 
Azawad-union.blogspot.com. The demands remained rather vague, evoking an 
unequal development between Northern Mali and ‘useful Mali’ and the lack of 
implementation of the National Pact of 1992. 
The greater North, a desert deserted by the central authorities in Bamako, cannot 
even pretend to any form of stability in face of a developmental crevice literally 
dividing the country in two: The useful Mali [le Mali utile] and the rest (…). 
In its days, the National Pact had raised hopes, unfortunately snuffed out since 
then. The revenues of the country and the scarce development aid are unidirecti-
                                                 
26  Sylla, C. ‘Elhajj Gamou, patriote dans l’ âme’, Le Républicain, 08/02/2006. http:// 
www.malikounda.com/nouvelle_voir.php?idNouvelle=8336. 
27  Unless indicated otherwise, the following narrative elements on the events since 
May 2006 are based on Vallet, M., “Chronique de la vie au Sahara”. Le Saharien 
177 (2nd semester 2006) – 187 (4th semester 2008); and on Saint-Girons, A. 2008.  
 EPILOGUE 331 
onally sent to the so-called useful part of the country. The lack of infrastructure in 
the North is not coincidental but the result of studied and planned political direct-
ives.28 
A certain amount of support for the new mutinous upsurge (I feel great 
reluctance to call these events a third rebellion) was expressed on the Internet. 
A certain Ayor 54, for example, created a series of logos and posters celebrating 
the new movement, which he posted on his website.29 However, the new vio-
lence did not meet general approval, not even in Kidal itself, let alone outside 
the Adagh. On the Kidal website Kidal.info, former rebel leader Zeidane ag Sidi 
Alamine posted a concise analysis of the reasons for this new upsurge. 
The situation is first of all a concentrate of social problems in the Adrar, notably:  
1. the problem of a ‘post-Intalla’ period and the survival of the tribal rule of the 
Ifoghas sapped by internal struggles; 
2. the role and place of the former political and military leaders of the former MPA 
in the partition and democratic exercise of political power in the Adrar;  
3. the aftermath of the ARLA-MPA conflict of 1994 reinvigorating the fear of 
vengeance by the ARLA on the MPA through the present military command in 
Gao (held by an Imrad from Ménaka and of the ARLA ) and that in Ménaka 
(held by an Ifoghas from Kidal and the MPA);  
4. a wish for autonomy from the side of the Iforgoumoussen in Ti-n-Essako from 
the authoritarian power exercised by ADEMA-PASJ representative Mohamed 
Ag Intalla. Note that both Ibrahim Bahanga and Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Fa-
gaga are from the Ti-n-Essako fraction;  
5. the real or perceived sentiment within the Ifoghas tribe to no longer be at the 
centre of decisions in the Région of Kidal in the face of emerging democratic and 
civic powers and countering powers;  
6. the birth of certain autonomous political forces (women, Imrads and Iklans) 
escaping the local traditional Ifoghas order;  
7. the poverty and economic vulnerability of the Région of Kidal;  
8. the controversial choices of the Malian state in the management and admini-
stration of the Région of Kidal create and feed a syndrome of structural in-
stability;  
9. the rivalling identities of Ifoghas – Imrads between the political parties in Mali 
and their members, especially in 1994, when the State supported the MPA 
against the ARLA.  
                                                 
28  http://azawad-union.blogspot.com/2006/06/les-raisons-dune-rvolte.html 
29  http://members.lycos.co.uk/ayor54/tallywen.htm. This webiste in Arabic by an ano-
nymous Tamasheq webartist is among the most fascinating websites created by Kel 
Tamasheq. The artist in question has designed posters, postcards and stamps for an 
independent Azawad Republic and other sharply political art.  
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10. the democratic deficit and the absence of social justice within parts of the Tuareg 
Community in the Adrar encourages omerta, violence and permanent small scale 
rebellions [révoltes de poche].30 
If one compares Zeidane’s analysis and the narrative above following similar 
lines to that of the previous rebellions sketched in this book, it becomes clear 
that the situation in 2006 resembles more closely that of 1963 than that of 1990. 
Local and national politics become enmeshed to form the ingredients of a 
violent dispute in an attempt to regain independence and a preceived lost 
political power. A major difference with the rebellion of the 1990s was the 
position and armament of the insurgents. While, at the moment of their attack in 
June 1990, the movement no longer possessed any means of warfare, the ADC 
possessed a large amount of heavy arms taken from the army bases they 
previously occupied as officers and soldiers themselves.31 Thus, from the start, 
the ADC was just as well equipped as the Malian Army, from whence it more 
or less sprang. A second difference is in tactics and strategy. The ADC officers 
and men took with them a number of non-Tamasheq soldiers as prisoners of 
war when taking the material from the bases. If no other demand was met, they 
could at least discuss the situation of these POWs. The taking and keeping of 
POWs became an integral part of this conflict, with the ADC and its later 
offshoot ATNMC taking Malian soldiers prisoner on a large scale (at one point 
the ATNMC held over 70 soldiers and officers as prisoners) as means of 
pressure. In the later phases of the conflict, especially in 2007, the ADC and 
ATNMC were accused, rightly or not, of using landmines as part of a strategy 
of besieging army bases, notably the army base at Ti-n-Zaouatene. With the 
new heavy equipment, new tactics became available other than the hyper-
mobile guerrilla warfare of the 1990s. A further difference with the previous 
rebellions was the international situation in which the events played out. Al-
fellaga was set in a context of international ignorance and indifference to the 
plight of the Kel Tamasheq. Al-Jebha played in an international context where 
the great powers still did not care, but also one in which international media 
                                                 
30  http://www.kidal.info/Forum/FRv1/lire.php?msg=5581. Zeidane lists a further 4 
points that are more observations on the present situation than causes for the con-
flict. From the above narrative it is clear that I largely share his vision and analysis, 
and that mine is partly based on his, although in large parts I reached my con-
clusions independenly from Zeidane by following the news. This particular analysis 
is shared by other outside observers, such as Pierre Boilley, who expressed similar 
views during the round table “Les rébellions au nord Niger et au nord Mali. 1990-
2008” organised at the CEMAF in Paris 18/04/2008. 
31  A news item filmed by Al-Jazeera showed heavy anti-aircraft guns in possession of 
the deserters. Al-Jazeera Arabic. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbdTbaL9o_Q. 
Added to YouTube 29/02/2008. 
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attention could put pressure on the international community. But although there 
was international media attention, this was thwarted by news of the Rwandan 
genocide in a media landscape where the importance of African news was ever 
more decided by the number of victims. Of course, there was an international 
dimension to the conflict in so far as neighbouring countries mediated or ac-
cepted to host refugees from the conflict, but there was no further intervention 
from their side. Hoever, since 2001, the international setting was one in which 
the remotest areas of the Muslim world were under the attention of the only 
remaining superpower and in which a number of international mining com-
panies were looking for new oilfields in a market of ever-staggering demands 
and prices. Next to the US, the Algerian Government was also very interested in 
the situation in Northern Mali as the area served as a rear base to the GSPC. 
Then, on a far smaller scale, the European Union and the United Nations were 
interested since they saw the region as a hub in the international traffic in drugs, 
arms and prospective migrants to Europe. On 25 May 2006, the Malian Army 
retook the city of Kidal with the help of US soldiers stationed semi-permanently 
in Gao as part of the Pan Sahel Initiative. The US Air Force provided further 
assistance in flying material for the Malian Army to the North, to which the 
ADC reacted by firing at these planes with the seized anti-aircraft guns. The US 
Army formally confirmed both the assistance to the Malian Army and the ADC 
assault on a USAF C-130 transport.32 Never before had foreign troops been 
officially engaged in Northern Mali in the context of a Tamasheq rebellion. The 
US assistance had obvious reasons. While the Malian Government had now 
fully learned to differentiate between Kel Tamasheq identities, which in practice 
meant that this differentiation was actually lived up to by those groups, the US 
Government still had to learn who was who in the Sahara. The ADC therefore 
found it necessary to add a communiqué to its website which indicated that their 
struggle had nothing to do whatsoever with Islamic militancy and terrorism. On 
9 June 2006 one could read on Azawad-union.blogspot.com: 
Denial of any connection between our movement and the GSPC. We could fight for 
Islam, but we fight first for our living conditions.33 
Indeed, on 26 September 2006 the ADC attacked a group of GSPC fighters 
still present in Northern Mali and using it as a base for activities in the Sahel, 
                                                 
32  Soares, C. ‘Tuareg rebels attack US plane as insurgency in Mali intensifies’, The 
Independent, 14/09/2007. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/tuareg-
rebels-attack-us-plane-as-insurgency-in-mali-intensifies-402323.html 
33  http://azawad-union.blogspot.com/2006/06/dementi-pour-toute-connexion-de-
notre.html 
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killing one of the GSPC emirs.34 The message had a double edge that the ADC 
tried to play out in the new international settings. Any connection to Muslim 
militancy was denied, but the ADC tried to communicate two different potential 
scenarios to the US and to the Algerian Government. Te first was that they were 
the force par excellence to fight Muslim militants in the Sahara and they could 
do so if the US would stop its alliance with the Government in Bamako against 
the Kel Tamasheq, and if Algiers was willing to keep playing its role as 
mediator.35 But if this situation did not produce itself, and if the US forces 
would keep actively supporting the Malian Armed Forces, there was of course 
always the second scenario in which the Kel Tamasheq would indeed turn to 
Muslim militancy, thereby creating exactly the situation the US tried to avoid 
with its military presence. Clearly, the former rebels had learned more about 
international policy than their predecessors knew in the days of Alfellaga. By 
far the most important difference between the previous rebellions and this new 
crisis was the reaction of the Malian Government. President Amadou Toumani 
Touré reacted very prudently to the new rebellion. Contrary to his predecessors 
he had personal experience as a leading officer in the Army in fighting the 
rebellion in the 1990s, and it seemed that he had drawn important lessons from 
previous mistakes. The most important mistake ATT avoided was to think in 
stereotypes and to put all Kel Tamasheq away as a possible threat to national 
unity. Thus, loyal administrators and military commanders were not relieved 
from their posts to be replaced by men from the South, as had been done during 
Alfellaga. The Governor of the Région of Kidal, Al Amadou ag Iyan, was kept 
in place, while command over military operations rested with Elhajj Gamou. 
Repression against civilian Kel Tamasheq was avoided as much as possible. 
ATT appointed his secretary of state Modibo Sidibe at the head of a crisis 
centre which had as one of its primary tasks to make it clear to the Malian 
Armed Forces and to the population at large that not all Kel Tamasheq were 
rebels, and to do everything to avoid army repression and pogroms of the kind 
seen in the 1990s. The number of summary executions and retaliations against 
the civilian population was indeed kept very low.  
In June, the ADC proposed negotiations through the intermediary of Algeria, 
to which the Malian Government agreed. The negotiations took place in Algiers 
between 30 June and 4 July, leading to the signing of the Algiers Agreement. 
                                                 
34  http://www.kidal.info/infos/news/infos.php. Accrochages mortels entre le GSPC et 
l’alliance democratique du 23 mai pour le changement. 
35  Some observers at Kidal.info saw this attack on the GSPC as ‘tit for tat’ to the 
Algerian government, in reimbursement for their mediation with Bamako. On Oc-
tober 6th, 2006 the GSPC retaliated with a counterstrike on an ADC patrol at Taou-
dennit, the GSPC’s main base, leaving 9 ADC fighters dead and taking two prison-
ers.  
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Whereas the National Pact in 1992 stipulated problems and solutions intended 
for the whole of Northern Mali, the Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal Régions, the 
Algiers Agreement concentrated entirely on the Région of Kidal.36 This was 
more or less logical. Just like Alfellaga, but unlike Al-Jebha, the ADC was 
entirely based on the Kel Adagh, addressing and expressing issues internal to 
the Kel Adagh. But unlike Alfellaga, the ADC had virtually no support from 
outside the Adagh. While opposition to the National Pact from outside the 
North had always been strong, the Algiers Agreement received opposition from 
both Southerners and Northerners claiming that the President had bowed to the 
demands of ‘the Kidal rogues’. However, if it was indeed President Touré’s 
intention to stop the conflict as soon as possible and without high costs in 
human lives and material, and if one takes into account that given the military 
equipment, training and combat experience of the Kel Adagh mutineers the 
costs might indeed have run high, the price paid in the Algiers Agreement was 
very low. It must be said to his credit, however partial this might sound, that 
President Amadou Toumani Touré handled the new crisis with great resolve, 
determined not to let violence spiral out of control, despite the public attacks 
made on his honour for not choosing the military option against the insurgents. 
After initial political resistance in the National Assembly, it became possible to 
put the Algerian Agreement into effect by early 2007. Throughout February and 
March 2007, ADC fighters descended from the bases in Mount Tigharghar to 
newly installed cantonment camps. On 12 March a large number of the seized 
arms were ceremoniously handed over to the Malian Armed Forces, and 
between 22 and 24 March an international forum on development took place in 
Kidal, as had been stipulated in the Algiers Agreement. 
But the new conflict was not over. As during Al-Jebha, refractory parties, 
disagreeing with the Algiers Agreement, split off to continue the fight. Contrary 
to Iyad ag Ghali and Hassan ag Fagaga and their men, Ibrahim Bahanga and a 
                                                 
36  The integral text of the Algiers Agreement can be downloaded at http://www.kidal. 
info/docs/Accord-Alger040706.pdf. The agreement stipulates hardly any measures 
on development that were not already been taken in by the National Pact and, in 
fact, parts of which were in progress at the start of the mutiny. As in the National 
Pact, the most elaborate clauses were on the integration in the Malian Armed Forces 
of former ADC fighters. One new demand was one hour of broadcasting time for 
regional matters on national television (of which all Malian Régions would benefit) 
and one very old point was finally won: academic degrees in Arabic were to be 
recognised as valid for administrative applications, a final victory for the long-
sought integration of Arabic in the educational curriculum. One very important 
measure from the National Pact that had not been put into effect was now finally 
agreed upon: a ten-year tax exemption for the Kidal Région to catch up with its 
economic underdevelopment. This measure had created outrage in Mali at the time, 
and again met with heavy resistance when included in the Algiers Agreement. 
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number of warriors, including a large group of Idnan fighters beside Bahanga’s 
Iforgoumoussen continued the fighting.37 They found new allies in the Mouve-
ment des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ).38 As in Mali, new fighting had 
broken out in Northern Niger in February 2007. Here a number of key issues 
led to renewed violence. The first was the lack of application of the various 
peace agreements of the late 1990s, together with political tensions around 
former rebel leader (and then minister in various governments) Ghissa ag 
Boula, and general dissatisfaction with the Government of President Mamadou 
Tandja. But more important were tensions over the possible discovery of new 
mineral riches. With oil prices staggering to unprecedented heights and the 
search for other energy sources becoming more urgent, uranium prices also rose 
and so did international interest in Niger’s uranium and petrol potentials. The 
carving-up of the entire northern part of the country into prospection and 
exploitation blocks for crude oil and yellow cake led to intense concerns among 
the Kel Tamasheq about environmental issues (of which they had plenty ex-
perience through the open-air uranium mines at Arlit), the possible loss of 
access to pastures and, not least, the distribution of the revenues of these new 
riches. Contrary to the Kel Tamasheq of the ADC, the MNJ made no public 
claims to more autonomy, let alone independence. They claimed to defend the 
rights of all inhabitants of Northern Niger, regardless of ethnical background, 
and the presence among their ranks of a few Fulani, Arabs and, especially, a 
group of regular army officers, gave these claims some credibility.39 In July 
2007 Ibrahim Bahanga formed a formal alliance with the MNJ called the 
Alliance Touarègue Niger-Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC).40 Bahanga and 
his men joined in a number of attacks in Niger but the alliance was short-lived. 
The ATNMC was quickly rebaptised Alliance Touarègue Nord-Mali pour le 
Changement, allowing it to keep its previous acronym, and concentrated on 
                                                 
37  The motivations for the Idnan to join Bahanga in his continued struggle can only be 
guessed at. It might well be that this was a temporary alliance of two groups – 
Iforgoumoussen and Idnan – because both sought more independence for them-
selves and hence less power for the Ifoghas, this despite the fact that the Iforgou-
moussen officially still formed part of the Ifoghas tewsit. 
38  Deycard, F. 2007. I am less familiar with the internal political constellations of the 
Kel Tamasheq in Niger, but undoubtedly a number of internal political issues played 
an important role in the new conflict as well. I have not yet come across a sound 
analysis of these internal issues. 
39  The presence of Nigerien Army Officers among the MNJ was due to internal con-
flicts within the Nigerien Armed Forces dating back to the time of the coup d’état by 
Colonel Ibrahim Mainassare Baré in January 1996, assassinated in a counter coup in 
April 1999 by Major Daouda Malam Wanké, leading to mutinies by troops loyal to 
Baré. 
40  http://atnmc.blogspot.com/ 
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besieging the Malian Armed Forces in Northern Mali in their army bases in Ti-
n-Zaouatene, making use of landmines, which lost him the last bit of support 
from outside the limited circles of insurgents.41 His tactical strongpoint however 
remained his ability to take relatively large numbers of military hostages, which 
gave him a position of relative safety and negotiation. Looking for outside 
support to quell the continued upsurge, President Touré managed successfully 
to depict Bahanga and his men as ordinary drug traffickers and possible al-
Qaeda affiliates, which led to continued US and French military assistance. Yet, 
Touré seemed to have remained determined to solve the insurgency with as few 
casualties as possible. In December 2007 negotiations under Algerian mediation 
led Bahanga to release 10 of the 36 soldiers he had taken captive in the previous 
months. However, during April and May 2008, Bahanga launched a massive 
offensive against the Malian Armed Forces, leaving 63 Malian soldiers dead, 67 
wounded, 33 newly captured (bringing the total number of hostages to 59), and 
12 cars, 4 BRDM armour carriers and a helicopter destroyed, with another 5 
cars taken. On 6 May 2008 Bahanga’s men ventured far south to attack the 
army base at Diabaly in the Région of Segu, about 500 km from Bamako, 
proving that the hyper-mobile warfare tactics of the 1990s had not been for-
gotten.42 This attack caused outrage among the Malian public, but President 
Touré’s decision not to perform punitive counter attacks in the North provoked 
even greater outcry, and insults were levelled at him.43 After Bahanga’s offen-
sive, Mu’ammar Qadhafi offered his mediation, which was accepted by both 
sides. From then on, Tripoli would become the main mediator in a conflict that 
was more and more seen as one between a group of armed bandits and the 
Government. Given the lack of coherent political demands from his side, 
Bahanga’s position indeed came closer and closer to that of Alla ag Albachir, 
who defied authorities for the sake of defiance itself. The difference between 
both men seems to be that Alla is a very popular historical memory among all 
Kel Adagh and beyond, while Ibrahim Bahanga is widely unpopular among 
many Kel Adagh and certainly beyond the Adagh, where constant fear of re-
taliation on all Kel Tamasheq for Bahanga’s deeds is not unfounded. This was 
not without reason. In September 2008, Ganda Koy was revived under the name 
Ganda Djio: the Son of the Land. Its first act was to kill four Kel Tamasheq 
herdsmen. Still, President Amadou Toumani Touré remained determined to 
                                                 
41  IRIN-WA, “Mali: Indignation dominates reaction as attacks in north escalate”. 
31/08/2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74058  
42  http://atnmc.blogspot.com/ 
43  During a call radio programme discussing Bahanga’s attack, one caller simply res-
ponded with the outcry ‘ATT is his father’s genitals’, a major insult in Bamanakan 
that quickly became Bamako’s most popular ringtone. Personal communication 
Greg Mann. 
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keep the peace as much as possible. In all 22 arrests were made to bring the 
murders to justice and to quell Ganda Djio before the spiral of ethnic killings 
would start. This did not mean, however, that Touré did not respond militarily 
to Bahanga’s offensive. In June, Algeria and Mali agreed to organise communal 
border patrols to intercept both the fighters of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Lands of 
the West (the former Algerian GSPC which had formally joined al-Qaeda in 
2007) and Ibrahim Bahanga.44 That same month, Touré ordered large-scale 
operations to intercept Bahanga and his men and to chase them out of their 
bases in Mount Tigharghar. Colonel Elhajj Gamou led these operations. His 
troops did not only include regular soldiers of the Malian Armed Forces. 
Gamou had formed a militia of former ARLA fighters of imghad origins – 
ironically called ‘Delta Force’ after the US Special Forces – that was equipped 
with tecnical vehicles carrying heavy arms.45 The motifs behind the formation 
of this imghad militia and its success in fighting Bahanga’s ATNMC are easy to 
explain at the very end of this epilogue at the very end of this book: egha over 
their loss in 1994 and the subsequent humiliation and degradation the Ifoghas 
forced them into. Gamou’s forces managed to drive Bahanga from his bases, 
leaving 20 of his fighters dead, but although the operations dealt a heavy blow 
to the ATNMC, the fight would take another half year. New negotiations in 
September 2008 led to the release of 44 military hostages and a short period of 
calm, but in December 2008 Bahanga attacked the army base at Nampala. In 
retaliation, Gamou’s troops of Malian Armed Forces, largely consisting of Kel 
Tamasheq soldiers from outside the Adagh and solely led by Kel Tamasheq and 
Bidân officers; and completed by Gamou’s ‘Delta Force’, decisively ousted 
Bahanga’s ATNMC from their bases in Mount Tigharghar on 21 January 
2009.46 As an irony of history, Bahanga’s last fight, which he decisively lost, 
took place at Toximine, the place where he had battled the Malian Army and 
won in 1990. It is less ironic that his defeat was brought about by his former 
comrades in arms who had given up the idea of resistance to the Malian state in 
                                                 
44  Berschinski, R. 2007. 
45  Kone, Ousmane. ‘Accrochage à la base de Tin-Assalek: Le colonel Gamou a maté 
hier Bahanga et ses troupes’, Malijet, 05/06/2008. 
http://www.malijet.com/rebellion_au_nord_du_mali/accrochage_a_la_base_de_tin_
assalek_le_colonel_gamou_a_mate_hier.html. 
46  ‘L’armée annonce avoir pris “toutes les bases” du groupe d’Ag Bahanga’, Jeune 
Afrique, 12/02/2009.  
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP20090211T172332Z/-defense-armee-
touareg-Ibrahim-Ag-Bahanga-L-armee-annonce-avoir-pris--toutes-les-bases--du-
groupe-d-Ag-Bahanga--.html The main commanders of the Malian Armed Forces in 
the North apart from Colonel Elhajj Gamou were Colonel Sidi Ahmed Kounta, a 
Kounta as his name indicates; Commander Barek of unknown origins; and Colonel 
Takni of Kel Adagh origins. 
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return for personal career perspectives and a modest development of their 
Sahara. Kel Tamasheq politics seem to have entered a phase of real politik. 
After his defeat, Bahanga managed to escape to Libya where he reportedly still 
resides in Tripoli.47 On 23 January the remaining Idnan warriors within the 
ATNMC gave up the fight through mediation of Idnan politicians.48 By then 
Hassan ag Fagaga’s remaining men within the ATNMC had already left.49 At 
the time of writing, Northern Mali is quiet, but it remains clear that violence 
might remain an integral part of Kel Tamasheq politics for the coming times.  
 
 
                                                 
47  ‘Ibrahim Ag Bahanga se retire en Libye’, RFI, 24/02/2009.  
http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/110/article_78672.asp?keepThis=true&TB_iframe=t
rue&height=350&width=450 
48  Takia, Ch., ‘A l’initiative de Ag Erlaf et de Ag Bouya : 120 jeunes Idnanes se 
retirent de la bande à Bahanga et brûlent leurs armes’, L’Indépendant, 23/01/09.  
http://www.maliweb.net/category.php?NID=39889&intr= 
49  AFP. ‘Des centaines de rebelles touareg déposent les armes’, Jeune Afrique, 18/02/ 
2009.  
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP20090217T125512Z/-paix-armee-
touareg-Ibrahim-Ag-Bahanga-Des-centaines-de-rebelles-touareg-deposent-les-
armes.html 
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Interviews 
Over the years I have had numerous talks, discussions, and interviews in vari-
ous forms with many Kel Tamasheq and other Malians and Nigeriens. All have 
contributed to my understanding of Tamasheq society and the problems des-
cribed in this book. I will here only list those interviewees I have cited. 
 
AMEGHA AG SHERIF, one of the leaders of Alfellaga, one of the principal organisers of 
the Tanekra movement in Algeria and mediator during the second rebellion. 
Amegha is one of the main informants of this work. I have had numerous informal 
talks with him and conducted a series of interviews, which led to two sessions on 
tape. Brussels, October 1994 (recorded). Bamako, 08/02/1998, and Bamako 
10/02/1998 (recorded). 
ALBACHIR, a civil servant of Daoussahak origins. Bamako, 24/01/1998. 
ALMOUSTAPHA MAÏGA, Songhay, temporary researcher (ecologist) for SNV project 
Minika. Menaka, 24/03/1999.  
BAY AG ALHASSAN, one of the veterans of the Tamasheq involvement in Lebanon and 
officer in the second rebellion in which he partook from day one. I have conducted a 
series of interviews with Bay, culminating in one recorded session. Bamako, 13/11/ 
1998, Menaka, 01/04/1999, and Menaka, 11/04/1999 (recorded).  
BIBI AG GHASSI, one of the military leaders of Alfellaga. Interviewed by Sidi Mohamed 
ag Zimrou, no date or place known. Georg Klute kindly provided me the transcript 
of this interview. 
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CHEIK OUMAR SISSOKO, cineast and later Malian Minister of Culture, interviewed by 
Ray Privett, 03/01/2000.  
http://www.britannica.com/magazine/article?content_id=252652&pager.offset=30 
‘COLONEL’ TAGHLIFT, one of the veterans of the Tamasheq involvement in the Libyan 
campaigns in Chad and officer during the second rebellion in which he partook from 
day one. I have conducted a series of talks and interviews with Taghlift, culminating 
in one recorded session. In-Taykaren, 03/04/1999, and Menaka, 19/04/1999 
(recorded). 
FITUK, one of the participants in the premature attack made by the Tanekra on Fanfi in 
1982. Menaka, 30/03/1999 (recorded). 
KEYNI AG SHERIF, brother to Amegha ag Sherif. Keyni joined his brother in exile in 
Algeria after Alfellaga. He was involved in the organisation of the Tanekra 
movement from its first moments. Kidal, 25/05/1999. 
LAMINE AG BILAL, participant in the second rebellion, amateur historian and Sergeant in 
the Malian armed forces and my research assistant in Gao. I have conducted a series 
of talks with Lamine, none of them recorded. Gao, 20/06/1999. 
MAKHAMAD WAN DAGHADA, one of the fighters of Alfellaga. Interviewed by Ibrahim 
ag Litny on demand of Georg Klute. Kidal, August 1994. Georg Klute kindly 
provided me the transcript of this interview. 
MALIK AG SALLAH, one of the first men from outside the Adagh to join the Tanekra 
movement. Menaka, 28/04/1999. 
MAMADOU GOLOGO, former Minister of Information, under Modibo Keita and present-
day leader of the revived USRDA. Bamako, 18/01/1998. 
MAZA’, one of the veterans of the of Tamasheq involvement in Lebanon. Maza’ was 
part of the group of fighters who demanded to be returned to Algeria upon arrival in 
Syria. Lyon, March 1994. 
MOHAMED AG INTALLA, Député in the Assemblée National for Tin Essako and oldest 
son of Intalla ag Attaher, amenokal of the Adagh. Kidal, 23/05/1999. 
MOHAMED LAMINE AG MOHAMED FALL, one of the first men to join the Tanekra 
movement and long time its main organiser in Libya. At present amateur historian 
and one of the members of the (informal) Ifoghas council, nicknamed ‘Ifoghas 
minister of information’. One of my main informants and research assistant in Kidal. 
I have conducted a series of interviews with Mohamed Lamine, most of which 
resulted in notes, and one in a formal taped interview. Kidal, 27/12/1998 (recorded), 
23/05/1999, May (unknow date) 1999, and 08/06/1999 (recorded). 
MOHAMED SALLAH AG MOHAMED, DAOUSSAHAK, cousin to Younes and Ilyas ag 
Ayyouba, two of the leaders of Alfellaga and organisers of the Tanekra movement. 
Mohamed Sallah joined the Tanekra in Libya, but left the movement out of 
discontent with its political direction and the exclusion of non-Tamasheq from the 
movement. Bamako, 18/01/1998. 
MOUSSA BASWISH, a former member of the Tanekra and a local historian in Kidal. 
Kidal, 06/01/1999. 
MOUSSA AG KEYNA, al-guitara singer-songwriter, took part in the Tamasheq rebellion 
in Niger. Leiden, 04/10/01. 
MOUSSA KEITA, former Minister of Youth and Sports under Modibo Keita and the 
latter’s younger brother. Bamako, 10/01/1998. 
FORMER LIEUTENANT SAMAKÉ, serving in the Adagh during Alfellaga and Secretary of 
the Malian Association of Army Veterans. Bamako, 03/11/1998. 
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S. TAMASHEQ, woman who wished to remain anonymous. Paris 09/01/1996. 
TAKHNOUNA, a Tamasheq woman living in Bamako. Takhnouna took care of Alfellaga 
leaders Zeyd ag Attaher and Elledi ag Alla during their imprisonment in Bamako. 
Bamako, 08/02/1998. 
 
 
Newspaper articles  
A l’initiative de Ag Erlaf et de Ag Bouya: 120 jeunes Idnanes se retirent de la bande à 
Bahanga et brûlent leurs armes. In L’Indépendant. 2009/23/01. 
Accrochage à la base de Tin-Assalek: Le colonel Gamou a maté hier Bahanga et ses 
troupes. In Malijet. 04/06/2008. 
ARLA – MPA: Signature d’un accord de paix. In Amawal. 27/12/1994. 
Bilan de l’attaque de Gao. In Ataram. 01/11/1994. 
Camps des refugies, l’entassement. In Algerie actualité. 21/10/1992. 
Chasse au Touaregs au nord du Mali. In Libération. 28/08/1994. 
Comment fut demantelée la base de Gandakoy à Fafa. In Union. 21/06/1994. 
Conference des chefs de circonscriptions d’élevage du Mali. In l’Essor. 12/02/1962. 
Démantèlement de la base rebelle de Assid El Biat. In Le Malien. 28/11/1994. 
Des centaines de rebelles touareg déposent les armes. In Jeune Afrique. 18/02/2009. 
Des nouvelles atrocités auraient été commises contre les civils touaregs. In Le Monde. 
05/09/1990. 
Des affrontements meurtriers auraient opposé l’armée aux Touaregs. In Le Monde.  
15-08-1990. 
Droit de réponse à M. Houday ag Mohamed. In Union.13/09/1994. 
Elhajj Gamou, patriote dans l’âme. In Le Républicain. 08/02/2006. 
Extrait d’un article de Mohamed Hasanayn Heikal, conseiller du Président Nasser et 
rédacteur en chef d’Al-Ahram, quotidien du Caire, 27 janvier 1961. In Notes sur 
l’actualité politique no 48: Documents sur l’esclavage en Arabie Seoudite et dans 
d’autres pays Arabes. Edited by the Israeli Ministry of foreign affairs, division of 
information. Jerusalem. 01/06/1961. 
Face aux forces sociales réunis samedi à Koulouba, Alpha rassure sans convaincre.  
In Le Républicain. 01/06/1994. 
Ganda Koy l’oeil du Caën de la IIIième République. In Le Tambour. 27/09/1994. 
Ganda Koy, ou la revanche des paysans. In Le Monde. 31/01/1996. 
Gao et les échecs. In Le Démocrate. 22/11/1994. 
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga se retire en Libye. RFI. 24/02/2009. 
Insécurité au Nord: l’Etat entretient le conflit ethnique. In Le Républicain. 16/01/2009. 
Interview accordée à la revue “Le Mali” par le Commandant Diby Silas, Commandant 
de Cercle de Kidal. In Le Mali. 02/02/1966. 
Journal officiel de la République du Mali, spécial 3. Bamako. 26/11/1996. 
Kidal a célébré la fête nationale avec un éclat particulier. In L’Essor Hebdomadaire. 
28/09/1964. 
L’Afrique subira les effets d’une sécheresse plus dramatique. In Le Monde. 06/02/1974. 
L’armée annonce avoir pris “toutes les bases” du groupe d’Ag Bahanga. In Jeune 
Afrique. 12/02/2009. 
L’avenir du Nord. La société civile est incontournable affirme Iyad ag Ghali. In l’Essor. 
06/10/1993. 
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La route des esclaves noirs commence à Villa Cisneros et aboutit à la Mecque.  
In Afrique Nouvelle, 04/09/1954. 
Le chemin de retour et de l’espoir est ouvert pour nos réfugiés. In l’Essor. 08/04/1992. 
Le lieutenant Abdoulaye Cissé dit Blo: Le tueur de Ber demasqué. In Union. 
19/07/1994. 
Le nord à la lisière de la guerre civile. Nous refusons le diktat touareg.  
In Le Républicain. 22/06/1994. 
Le nord renaît! In Le Démocrate. 06/12/1994. 
Le pacte national deux ans après. In Le Républicain. 26/01/1994. 
Le Président réaffirme la gestion nationale et équitable du pacte. In L’Essor. 
30/05/1994. 
Léré: La paix est cantonnée. In Les Echos. 03/02/1996. 
Les attaques des hommes de Zahaby. In L’Observateur. 03/10/1994. 
Les Belahs réclament une gestion partagée du Pacte National. In Le Républicain. 
01/06/1994. 
Les réfugiés touaregs au Burkina’. In Liberté. ??/??/1992. 
Les ressortissants d’Ansongo à Bamako réclament la suppression du Pacte National.  
In Le Républicain. 26/05/1994. 
La Rebellion au Mali: Qualités et Vices. In Cauris. ??/??/1993. 
M. Attaher Maiga, minstre des finances expose les grandes lignes du budget national. 
In: l’Essor. 20/02/1962. 
Mali: Indignation dominates reaction as attacks in north escalate. IRIN-WA.  
31/08/2007. 
Nord: La montée des périls. In: Union. 21/06/1994. 
Nord: la vraie fausse paix. In: Le Républicain. 18/05/1994. 
Nord: l’équipe sanglante de Zahabi. In: Le Républicain. 26/10/1994. 
Problème du Nord: Comment anéantir Zahabi? In: Le Malien. 07/11/1994. 
Pourquoi une rébellion touarègue au Mali? In: Le Républicain. 14/12/1994. 
Razzias et représailles dans le Nord Malien. In: Libération. 26/07/1991. 
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